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Fractured Identity:
The Genesis of the American Evangelical Movement during the Cold
War, 1945-1981

Tesis Doctoral

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Introducción

Las creencias religiosas en Estados Unidos, desde los orígenes de la nación, han sido variadas. Tras la llegada de los primeros europeos a las costas de América del Norte, las sectas y las denominaciones protestantes se han multiplicado con una asombradora rapidez. “...En ningún otro lado el cristianismo parece tan diverso o variopinto como en América,” dijo Richard Niebuhr, uno de los grandes teólogos protestante estadounidenses.¹ En el siglo XX, el movimiento religioso conocido como el evangelismo emergió de esta comunidad con una rotunda y difusa influencia. Esta tesis doctoral de Historia Contemporánea quiere investigar los orígenes históricos de la expansión del evangelismo en Estados Unidos entre el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la inauguración presidencial de Ronald Reagan, es decir, entre 1945 y 1981. Muchos autores han intentado resolver esta cuestión y los académicos han propuesto varias teorías acerca de los posibles orígenes de este movimiento religioso, el ímpetu exacto que ha permitido que el cristianismo evangélico haya florecido después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Entre las numerosas hipótesis que iremos desgranando en esta tesis doctoral al afrontar el estado de la cuestión hay una que es capaz de explicar el movimiento evangélico en toda su complejidad, con todos sus matices. Zygmunt Bauman, el sociólogo polaco, en su obra *La posmodernidad y sus descontentos*, publicada en 1997, ofreció una teoría respecto al fundamentalismo religioso que está relacionada con la cuestión de la identidad.² Bauman identificó la posmodernidad como un periodo caracterizado por una fuerte y repetida crisis de identidad, un momento histórico en el que las condiciones no favorecen el desarrollo de una identidad personal. Al entender de Bauman, la respuesta más ubicua a esta crisis de identidad del mundo posmoderno ha sido crear, en vez de un identidad, una serie de pseudo identidades, un desfile de experiencias intercambiables.³ Y para el autor, todavía de mayor poder y eficacia a la hora de combatir este problema de identidad y su “nunca completa construcción”⁴ ha sido la elaboración de sistemas religiosos fundamentalistas. Lejos de simplemente ofrecer al adepto la llave a la salvación eterna, los movimientos

¹ Richard H Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1956), 2 [mi traducción]. Véase también Randall Balmer, *Blessed Assurance: A History of Evangelicalism in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), 14, 16-18, 31-43.

² Zygmunt Bauman, *La posmodernidad y sus descontentos*, trans. Marta Mal de Molina Bodeblón y Cristina Piña Aldao (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2001).

³ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 220.

fundamentalistas, postula Bauman, buscan hacer desaparecer el obstáculo de la crisis identitaria y del problema de la formación de la identidad; los fundamentalismos, prosigue Bauman, intentan proveer al adepto una explicación de la vida universalmente aplicable, un mapa completo con el que se puede navegar por un mundo hostil, terminan pues con ese horror al vacío identitario de las sociedades actuales.⁵

Y es siguiendo esta teoría de Bauman, que examinaremos con más detalle más adelante, enriquecida con las aportaciones sobre el concepto de identidad que los historiadores han realizado, con la que queremos afrontar el estudio del evangelismo estadounidense e intentaremos vislumbrar el origen de la historia de como emergió en Estados Unidos. Bauman, en *Posmodernidad y sus descontentos*, planteó su hipótesis pero no siguió el hilo de la misma. En realidad en su trabajo solo dedicó cinco páginas al fundamentalismo religioso.⁶ Además tampoco aplicó su teoría específicamente al evangelismo estadounidense y a su contexto histórico.⁷ La emergencia y la fortaleza del movimiento evangélico en Estados Unidos no han sido tampoco seguido ni resuelto en sus otros estudios académicos.⁸ El objetivo principal de esta tesis es pues el de explorar históricamente las afirmaciones de Bauman y ver si se pueden aplicar al contexto de la sorprendente emergencia y fortalecimiento del cristianismo evangélico en Estados Unidos durante la Guerra Fría. La exploración histórica de la tesis de Bauman se llevará a cabo utilizando dos repertorios de fuentes válidas para la investigación histórica que han sido dos elementos básicos de la expansión del movimiento evangélico: la revista religiosa *Christianity Today* y los sermones y discursos radiofónicos del pastor evangélico Billy Graham. Explicaremos la importancia y la descripción minuciosa de estas fuentes primarias al final de la introducción.

Como se ha señalado, hemos elegido como periodo de estudio el que va desde 1945 hasta 1981. Es decir el periodo que se inicia con el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y termina con las elecciones presidenciales de 1980 que llevaron a Ronald Reagan a la presidencia. Consideramos que el periodo que abarca desde el final de la Segunda Guerra

⁵ *Ibid.*, 228.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 224-228.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, *Comunidad: En busca de seguridad en un mundo hostil*, trans. Jesús Alborés (Madrid: Siglo, 2009); Bauman, *Liquid Love* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2003); Bauman, *Modernidad líquida*, trans. Mirta Rosenberg (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012); Bauman, *Society Under Siege* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002).

Mundial y la llegada de Reagan al poder fue importante para la emergencia y fuerza del cristianismo evangélico por cuatro razones principales.

La primera es que es el periodo en dónde se polemizan y se redefinen los términos que sustentan al evangelismo. Entre ellos mismos, entre los evangélicos, se debatió los términos “evangélico” y “evangelism,” qué significado tenían, y quién, en suma, era el evangélico. En este momento histórico, “evangélico” era un concepto criticado, es decir, existía un desacuerdo tangible respecto a su significado y un claro intento de definirlo.⁹ “¿Quiénes son los evangélicos?” se preguntaba un editorial en *Christianity Today* en 1967, poniendo en evidencia que aún, décadas después de que comenzara con fuerza este nuevo movimiento, las fronteras no estaban claramente delineadas.¹⁰ En 1960, otro artículo en la misma revista propuso la misma erotema: “¿Qué es un evangélico?”¹¹ Lo que siguió fue una larga y clara definición.

Una segunda razón para centrarnos en este periodo es que durante esos años los evangélicos establecieron diferentes e importantes organizaciones religiosas que apoyarían al movimiento en el transcurso del tiempo.¹² Estas entidades abarcaron supraorganizaciones o grupos gubernamentales eclesiásticos, redes de medios de comunicación, una plétora de instituciones educativas y numerosas e influyentes publicaciones. Desde 1945 y hasta 1981 fue un periodo de creación de una red espesa de empresas educativas y de publicaciones que impulsaron su fuerza. En 1941 Carl McIntire, un predicador fundamentalista presbiteriano, famoso por sus diatribas anticomunistas, fundó el American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC).¹³ Un año más tarde en 1942, los evangélicos establecieron una de las organizaciones evangélicas más importantes: la National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). La NAE creció rápidamente en los años cuarenta del siglo XX y llegó, en pocos años, a incluir 22 denominaciones, cientos de iglesias independientes y contó con más de un millón de los fieles evangélicos en Estados Unidos.¹⁴ Conscientes del poder y el efecto de la radio como medio de comunicación, la NAE estableció el órgano National Religious Broadcasters

⁹ Melvin Richter explora la noción de un concepto contestado en “The Concept of Despotism and L’abus des mots,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 3, no. 1 (2007): 8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23730864>.

¹⁰ “Who are the Evangelicals?” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, June 23, 1967, 22 [957]. La misma pregunta se ve en el siguiente artículo: Harold Lindsell, “Who Are the Evangelicals?” *Christianity Today*, June 18, 1965, 3 [967].

¹¹ Harold John Ockenga, “Resurgent Evangelical Leadership,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 11-14.

¹² Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 95.

¹³ *Ibid.*; George M. Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism* (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1991), 106.

¹⁴ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 95-96; Frances FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), 5-6.

(NRB) en 1944. Durante la década de los cuarenta, fue el gobierno federal de Estados Unidos, a través de la Federal Communications Commission (FCC), que otorgó espacio para programas en la radio del país. La asociación evangélica NRB, después de su fundación, intentó presionar la FCC y eventualmente logró estar presente en la radio de Estados Unidos.¹⁵ La victoria de esta organización en ciernes de obtener espacio para programas religiosos en la radio nacional y su trabajo durante las siguientes décadas¹⁶ no fueron acontecimientos insignificantes. El trabajo persistente de la NRB cementó la presencia evangélica en la composición radiofónica estadounidense y fue el fundamento de la eventual e inmensa red de medios de comunicación afines y subvencionados por ellos que hoy en día caracteriza el movimiento evangélico en Estados Unidos. El desarrollo a lo largo de décadas de medios de comunicación evangélicos fue, según Sara Diamond, a quien veremos más adelante, el recurso principal en la “movilización” de la derecha cristiana en este país.¹⁷

También en este periodo, nacieron otros grupos próximos a las instituciones evangélicas (en inglés *parachurch organizations*). Uno de los más exitosos fue Campus Crusade for Christ (1951).¹⁸ Otras organizaciones evangélicas prominentes fueron la Christian Freedom Foundation (1965),¹⁹ la Chalcedon Foundation (1956) y el Institute for Christian Economics (1973).²⁰

Un tercer aspecto que nos invita a elegir este periodo para nuestro estudio es que en este momento de auge de la Guerra Fría las publicaciones evangélicas florecieron. Numerosas revistas religiosas surgieron que articulaban el mensaje evangélico, guiaban el movimiento y creaban un foro de pensamiento evangélico. Algunas de las más significativas del momento fueron *Christianity Today* (1956); *Christian Economics* (1950), que estaba asociada con la Christian Freedom Foundation; y la ala publicitaria del NAE *United Evangelical Action* (1942).²¹ En 1961, la revista *Decisión* de Billy Graham, establecida en los años cincuenta, superó más de un millón de personas en números de circulación.²²

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 98. Para una lista más amplia de organizaciones vinculadas con el movimiento evangélico y con la Nueva Derecha en Estados Unidos véase Juan Maldonado Gago, “Política y religión en la derecha cristiana de los Estados Unidos de América,” *La balsa de piedra* 3, (April 2013), 18.

¹⁸ John G. Turner, “Selling Jesus to Modern America: Campus Crusade for Christ, Evangelical Culture, and Conservative Politics” (doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2005), 16.

¹⁹ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 247.

²⁰ Frederick Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility: The Struggle Between Theocracy and Democracy* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press: 1997), 80.

²¹ Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 96-98.

²² Protestant Panorama, *Christianity Today*, November 24, 1961, 34.

El periodo entre 1945 y 1981 es clave también, en la historia del evangelismo contemporáneo, porque es el momento en el que los evangélicos vigorosamente adoptaron los medios modernos de evangelización que ya son tan representativos del movimiento. La radio, la televisión y eventualmente el internet llegarían a dominar este movimiento religioso.

Por último, la decisión de centrarnos sobre todo en la época de la Guerra Fría como momento de la emergencia y fortalecimiento del cristianismo evangélico se debe a que los historiadores y politólogos estadounidenses señalan varios sucesos en este periodo, especialmente en los años sesenta, como las causas de la fuerza de este cristianismo evangélico, una cuestión que veremos más adelante.

El movimiento evangélico estadounidense durante la Guerra Fría ha tenido un papel duradero e intenso en la vida política de Estados Unidos. No es solo una cuestión de política, este movimiento religioso contemporáneo ha influido en diferentes aspectos de la sociedad estadounidense durante más de medio siglo.

La alianza sistemática que tuvo el evangelismo con la política conservadora de Estados Unidos nos sorprende más debido al rechazo verbal de penetrar en la política que los líderes y fieles evangélicos habían establecido. Como veremos más adelante, el movimiento evangélico durante la Guerra Fría promulgaba la separación del mundo depravado. Esta separación, al menos en teoría, se extendió también a la esfera de la política. “Estamos *en* el mundo pero no somos *parte de* este mundo,” anuncia el lema bien conocido del cristianismo evangélico. En esta línea, el pastor Billy Graham, a quién dedicaremos unas páginas en esta tesis, dijo con toda sinceridad, “Soy completamente neutral en el asunto de la política.”²³ A pesar de las protestas de mucho creyentes de rechazar la política de Estados Unidos, los evangélicos habían entrado en el espacio político.

Aunque muchos autores insistían en el apoliticismo²⁴ de esta comunidad religiosa, como veremos, hay dos notables excepciones. Uno es el estudio del historiador Matthew Avery Sutton de 2012, titulado “Was FDR the Antichrist? The Birth of Fundamentalist Antiliberalism in a Global Age?”²⁵ Sutton muestra las posturas y actividades políticas de los cristianos fundamentalistas en los años treinta, concretamente en relación con el *New Deal*. El otro ejemplo es el trabajo de la historiadora y profesora Carolyn Renée Dupont *Mississippi*

²³ Billy Graham citado en William G. McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1960), 94 [mi traducción].

²⁴ Véase por ejemplo FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 1.

²⁵ Matthew Avery Sutton, “Was FDR the Antichrist? The Birth of Fundamentalist Antiliberalism in a Global Age?” *Journal of American History* 98, no. 4 (March 2012): 1052–74, consultado el 15 de abril de 2016.

Praying: Southern White Evangelicals and the Civil Rights Movement. En su estudio del evangelismo durante el Movimiento por los Derechos Civiles, Dupont ofrece evidencia abundante de que los evangélicos, ya entre 1945 y 1970, estaban políticamente activos. La iglesia evangélica, según la autora, fue instrumental en el intento de preservar el sistema de segregación y dominio racial de los blancos.²⁶

El evangelismo cristiano en Estados Unidos, a lo largo de la Guerra Fría, ha crecido con una sorprendente rapidez. El poder de expandirse, de multiplicarse, ha sido siempre el don divino del evangélico.²⁷ El evangelismo en este periodo no solo crecía en términos de adeptos sino también en formas religiosas, modos de organización, técnicas y medios de expansión. Como es sabido, la radio, la televisión y ahora el internet se han convertido en los principales canales de transmisión religiosa. De esta expansión prodigiosa nace una pregunta: ¿Por qué el evangelismo disfrutó y disfruta, durante un tiempo tan largo, de tanto éxito?

Acertar con números exactos es una hazaña complicada. Los números varían según la fuente consultada. La socióloga estadounidense Sara Diamond, autora de varias obras sobre esta comunidad religiosa, estimó que en 1976 50 millones de adultos se consideraban cristianos renacidos de una población de 218 millones de personas.²⁸ En 2006, un autor puso la cifra total de evangélicos alrededor de 70 millones de adherentes o un 25 por ciento de la población de Estados Unidos.²⁹ Lo más importante es que la comunidad evangélica representó y sigue representando una parte notable de la población estadounidense.

La importancia de esta rama del cristianismo en la historia de Estados Unidos del siglo XX se debe también a que, aunque se estableció en Estados Unidos, se ha expandido por el mundo entero. Ya es, sin duda, un fenómeno universal. Después de décadas de misiones extranjeras, millones de dólares, un sinnúmero de vidas orientadas a la divulgación del Evangelio, ya casi no queda ni país ni pueblo aislados de su mensaje, de su visión, del poder transformador de su celo.

La génesis y el fortalecimiento de este movimiento religioso durante la Guerra Fría han ocasionado un conflicto y rotundo rechazo alrededor de y hacia estos grupos religiosos en Estados Unidos. Es un conflicto y rechazo que no se registra con otros grupos religiosos

²⁶ Carolyn Renée Dupont, *Mississippi Praying: Southern White Evangelicals and the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1975* (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 8, see also 9-11.

²⁷ Véase William G. McLoughlin, "Is There a Third Force in Christendom?" *Daedalus* 96, no. 1 (1957): 43, consultado el 22 de noviembre de 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027024>; Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, and Susan D Rose, *Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 258; FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 261.

²⁸ Sara Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 55.

²⁹ Chris Hedges, *American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 18.

igualmente conservadores. Con los amish o los judíos ortodoxos en Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, no se ha producido una abundante literatura académica hablando del peligro que estos grupos igualmente conservadores y religiosos pueden generar para el sistema democrático; no existe un enfoque público tan duro. Sin embargo, con el evangelismo cristiano, sí ha habido tal miedo, tal preocupación.

Deberíamos considerar brevemente el contexto histórico, el momento del que nace este movimiento. El evangelismo de Estados Unidos no fue, como muchos creen, un fenómeno geográficamente aislado. Y, desde luego, no estuvo limitado al Sur estadounidense. Las megaiglesias, por ejemplo, son partes integrales de los centros urbanos. Las instituciones educativas de los evangélicos están distribuidas por todo el país. La Jesus People, miembros de la contracultura de los sesenta y setenta que se convirtieron al evangelismo, fue un sector del evangelismo emergente concentrado en California.³⁰ Y los escritores de *Christianity Today* provenían de todos los rincones de la República.

Dicho esto, ahora nos ocupamos del mundo fuera de los muros de la iglesia evangélica. El amanecer de nuestro periodo histórico empieza alrededor del final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Fue un evento que ocupó la atención del mundo. Pero lo que salió de las cenizas de la guerra y de la desolación fue algo inquietante: un cierto saber de que los seres humanos eran capaces de practicar una cruel destrucción calculada, sistemática. El abismo que es a veces el propio ser humano se puso definitivamente en evidencia.³¹ La Segunda Guerra Mundial es, como todos sabemos, una de las grandes quiebras de la modernidad.

La guerra terminó en el Pacífico tras el acontecimiento que lanzaría una nube oscura sobre todo lo que ha ocurrido después. Los bombardeos atómicos sobre Hiroshima y Nagasaki todavía revelaron más sobre la capacidad destructora del ser humano, sobre lo que estamos dispuestos a hacer, a desencadenar.³² Sin duda, el poder total y destructivo de la bomba atómica horrorizó al mundo. Lo que quizá fuera más preocupante que la explosión en sí fue la proliferación de estas herramientas de destrucción, esa voluntad macabra con la que las naciones corrían a la destrucción completa del mundo y de la vida.³³ Bajo las

³⁰ Ronald M. Enroth, Edward E. Ericson Jr., and C. Breckenridge Peters, *The Jesus People: Old-Time Religion in the Age of Aquarius* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972).

³¹ John M. Murrin, et al., *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, vol. 2 (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2012), 881, 890. John Mack Faragher et al., *Out of Many: A History of the American People*, vol. 2 (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2012), 745, 748.

³² Véase Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of the: Philosophical Fragments Enlightenment*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr and trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

³³ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 892.

justificaciones narcotizantes de la seguridad, la necesidad de usar y fabricar armas nucleares, flotaba el fatalismo aceptado de la destrucción.

Entre las nuevas posibilidades aniquiladoras del momento, la sociedad estadounidense creó y tuvo que enfrentarse a nuevos oponentes ideológicos en el extranjero, sobre todo tras la ruptura con su aliada y ahora enemiga: la comunista Unión Soviética (URSS). Después de la conferencia de Potsdam en 1945, las relaciones entre la URSS y Estados Unidos llegaron, como sabemos, a un estado de extrema tensión.³⁴ El fracaso del Plan Baruch, que buscaba frenar la proliferación nuclear entre Estados Unidos y la URSS, solo empeoró la situación geopolítica.³⁵ Al llegar 1947, los estadounidenses, teóricamente armados con la Doctrina Truman, intentaban impedir la expansión militar, estratégica e ideológica de la Unión Soviética.³⁶

El conflicto creciente entre los dos poderes y el incremento de la propaganda y de la cultura de la Guerra Fría en las dos naciones generaron un miedo enorme dentro de Estados Unidos que culminó, como se sabe, en las campañas anticomunistas del senador republicano Joseph McCarthy.³⁷ Los miembros del movimiento evangélico en ciernes no vivían aislados de las actividades anticomunistas del senador de Wisconsin. Los protestantes conservadores estadounidenses respaldaron, como señala el historiador Robert P. Ericksen, a McCarthy durante su breve pero intensa campaña de purificación ideológica.³⁸ El sentimiento anticomunista en Estados Unidos tocó todas las esferas de la vida de Estados Unidos y llegó, como veremos, a ser una parte fundamental del movimiento evangélico.

En medio de la emergencia de este enemigo mortal, del comunismo, se levantaban nuevas voces de protesta y de condena en Estados Unidos. Si la década de los cincuenta fue la década de construcción ideológica de los anticomunismos estadounidenses, la de los sesenta fue diferente. El movimiento por los derechos civiles enraizado también tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial floreció en los sesenta.³⁹

Pero para muchos historiadores la base de la comprensión del movimiento está además relacionado con el cambio económico acelerado. Desde los años cincuenta hasta los años setenta, el país disfrutó de un crecimiento económico sin paralelo.⁴⁰ La base de esta

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 908.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 909.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 909-910.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 923-924.

³⁸ Robert P. Ericksen, "The Role of American Churches in the McCarthy Era," *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 3, no. 1 (May 1990): 46-48, accessed March 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43750635>.

³⁹ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 968-977.

⁴⁰ Sobre el florecimiento de la sociedad afluyente véase *Ibid.*, 947-948.

economía fue una expansión del mercado de consumo. Entonces, debemos constatar que el movimiento evangélico no salió de una situación de estrés económico sino de abundancia general y de prosperidad. Las transformaciones económicas que Estados Unidos estaba experimentando también efectuaron una gran reorientación espacial de la sociedad estadounidense. Tras el éxito del primer Levittown en Long Island (Nueva York), el nuevo modelo de comunidades suburbanas se difundieron por todo Estados Unidos, alterando, quizá para siempre, la tela geográfica, la organización social y la manera de vivir de los norteamericanos.⁴¹ El anclaje de la nueva sociedad implicaba una transformación económica. Había que ser propietario de una casa y el gobierno fomentó este sueño y ofreció, a través de varias políticas, asistencia financiera.⁴² Al principio de los cincuenta había 53,8 millones de norteamericanos viviendo en suburbios; a llegar a las setenta, la cifra había crecido a 75,5 millones de personas.⁴³

Con la difusión de la propiedad de viviendas, algo que impulsó y obligó la compra del coche, el así llamado sueño americano se transformó ahora en algo relacionado con la propiedad y el consumo. Pero incluso aquí, en el ámbito del sueño y de la fantasía, se multiplicaron las divisiones. Fueron los blancos de la clase media los que realizaron la marcha hacia los suburbios y las instituciones financieras reforzaron esta tendencia al dar casi exclusivamente préstamos a varones blancos.⁴⁴ Se creó, en semejante situación, una división económica entre blancos y otros grupos étnicos y también permitió el desarrollo de un espacio de separación mental y físico.⁴⁵ En el medio de estos cambios, en reacción o en oposición a ellos, nació el movimiento evangélico del siglo XX.

Debemos primero definir que queremos decir exactamente en esta tesis con los términos “evangélico” y “evangelismo.” ¿Quiénes eran estos hombres y mujeres que se unieron al movimiento evangélico? ¿Es el término “fundamentalista” el equivalente de “evangélico?”

Ya en el siglo XIX, la designación “evangélico” fue utilizada en Estados Unidos para describir a esos cristianos que hacían hincapié en la actividad de extender la palabra de Dios, de evangelizar sobre todo en la expansión hacia el Oeste y en los movimientos de reforma del Noroeste de Estados Unidos. El término estuvo relacionado con la palabra evangelista, griega

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 933-934.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ John Mack Faragher *et al.*, *Out of Many: A History of the American People*, vol. 2 (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2012), 798.

⁴⁴ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 934-935.

en origen. *Euangelistes* quiere decir, “el que predica el Evangelio,” el que comparte el mensaje de la salvación de Cristo.⁴⁶ El proselitismo, como ocurrió en el siglo XIX, también se entiende como una parte integral del evangelismo del siglo XX. El sacerdote episcopaliano e historiador estadounidense Randall Balmer escribió sobre estos predecesores del siglo XIX, “Especialmente en el norte, los evangélicos buscaban reformar la sociedad según los parámetros de la piedad. Se organizaron para abolir la esclavitud, combatir el azote del abuso de alcohol, reformar el sistema penitenciario, educar a las mujeres, crear escuelas públicas y generalmente mejorar el mundo.”⁴⁷ En el siglo XIX, el impulso de la reforma que caracterizó el evangelismo en ese momento, el deseo de mejorar a la sociedad norteamericana y de liberar a los “olvidados de la historia,” coincidió con el espíritu de romanticismo que nació en Estados Unidos y en Europa durante ese siglo.⁴⁸

Dado que esta comunidad religiosa nació de las diferentes iglesias cristianas, los evangélicos, los historiadores y otros académicos, para intentar definir al movimiento se han refugiado principalmente en categorías teológicas. En la búsqueda por definir a este grupo tan importante en la Historia de Estados Unidos, encontramos las cinco características principales. George M. Marsden, un historiador de la religión en Estados Unidos, en *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, de 1991, formuló el marco teológico del evangelismo de la siguiente manera:

Las creencias esenciales incluyen (1) la doctrina reformista de la autoridad final de la Biblia, (2) el carácter real e histórico de la obra redentora de Dios comunicada en las Escrituras, (3) la salvación y la vida eterna a través de la vida de Cristo, (4) la importancia del proselitismo y de las misiones y (5) la importancia de una vida transformada espiritualmente.⁴⁹

Esta cuarta creencia—el proselitismo—revela la dirección futura de este movimiento cristiano en Estados Unidos. No fue un movimiento hacia dentro sino un movimiento hacia fuera, un movimiento expansivo no solo por Estados Unidos sino por todo el mundo. Lentamente, conforme nos alejamos del final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, una nueva creencia empezó a insinuarse entre los evangélicos y logró una influencia considerable en

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 933.

⁴⁶ “Evangelist,” Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=evangelist&allowed_in_frame=0 [mi traducción].

⁴⁷ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, xiv-xv.

⁴⁸ Carmen de la Guardia, “El Gran Despertar. Románticas y reformistas en Estados Unidos y España,” *Historia Social* 31 (1998): 11-13, 15-19, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40340673>.

los corazones y en las mentes de los seguidores evangélicos: la doctrina que todas las esferas de la vida deberían pasar por debajo del dominio [en inglés, *Lordship*] de Cristo.⁵⁰ Los preceptos, la infalibilidad y la autoridad de la Biblia, las enseñanzas del Salvador, creyeron los evangélicos, deberían formar la superestructura de todas las cosas, influir en todas las instituciones, tocar a todos los seres, con un espíritu nuevo. En la cosmovisión evangélica, el dominio ubicuo de Cristo no fue solo deseable sino también factible. Encontraremos, a lo largo de esta tesis, centrada en el movimiento evangélico durante la Guerra Fría, como fueron atravesados por la esperanza milenaria que aboga por el dominio de Cristo en todas las facetas de la existencia humana.

En el evangelismo estadounidense del siglo XX, la doctrina del renacer espiritual fue y sigue siendo un modo esencial de entender la religión y la relación espiritual del adherente con Dios. El historiador Fritz Stern, nacido en Alemania pero que trabajó como profesor de historia en Columbia University, describió esta doctrina cristiana de la siguiente manera: “El renacimiento espiritual representó el don de una nueva vida espiritual a través de Jesús, la transformación de un hombre pecaminoso a una criatura de gracia.”⁵¹

Otra consideración importante en la discusión de la definición del término evangélico es la prevalencia en gran parte del protestantismo estadounidense de dos creencias milenarias, cuyos marcos conceptuales proveen al creyente de una cosmovisión para interpretar los textos sagrados, entender el mundo y predecir que será del futuro. Estas visiones escatológicas, en el sentido de ser creencias referentes al fin de los tiempos, contienen dos componentes fundamentales. El primero es que las visiones escatológicas están relacionadas con el momento futuro de la Parusía, es decir de la segunda venida de Cristo. Segundo, entrelazada con la vuelta gloriosa del Salvador cristiano, es la existencia del reino terrenal, el reino milenario de Cristo. En el evangelismo la creencia predominante es el premileniarismo.⁵² Esta teología apocalíptica se centra en la creencia del estado deplorable del mundo y resalta la total decadencia de la vida humana. Tan corrupto y vil es el hombre que, aboga el premileniarismo, es en vano toda esperanza de redención. A causa de esta perdición inevitable, los premileniaristas mantienen que el reino de Cristo se

⁴⁹ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 4-5 [mi traducción]; FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 2-3.

⁵⁰ Véase Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 79; Richard John Neuhaus, “Why Wait for the Kingdom? The Theonomist Temptation,” *First Things*, May 1990, <http://www.firstthings.com/article/1990/05/002-why-wait-for-the-kingdom-the-theonomist-temptation>.

⁵¹ Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), 49 [mi traducción].

⁵² Según Balmer: “El Según Balmer: “El premileniarismo y las profecías apocalíptica siguen informando las perspectivas evangélicas del mundo,” *Blessed Assurance*, 52 [mi traducción].

establecerá después de la venida de Jesús en el momento de Apocalipsis.⁵³ Los historiadores del movimiento evangélico señalan el premilenialismo y el rechazo del mundo que fomenta esta visión teológica como la fuente y causa de la separación del fundamentalismo cristiano y el evangelismo de la sociedad estadounidense a partir de los cuarenta. Armados con la escatología premilenialista, los evangélicos aparentemente rechazaron la sociedad corrupta y la política ineffectual de Estados Unidos durante la Guerra Fría como fenómenos del mundo degenerado.

El sistema teológico paralelo al premilenarianismo es el posmilenarianismo. El premilenarianismo estipula que la segunda venida de Cristo precederá la fundación del reino celestial. Al contrario, el posmilenarianismo concibe la creación del reino milenario de Jesús como una hazaña realizable dentro de la historia humana y como precursor a la Parusía.⁵⁴ Por lo tanto, el posmilenarianismo inspira la creencia evangélica en que se puede mejorar el mundo, que el cambio es posible, que un santo reino cristiano se puede fundar. El posmilenarianismo, la esperanza que la vuelta de Jesús vendrá después del reino milenario, predominaba en los movimientos de reforma cristianos durante gran parte del siglo XIX en Estados Unidos.⁵⁵

El premilenarianismo y su fe irrompible en la total corrupción del hombre y del mundo ha fomentado otro principio teológico significativo, uno que tiene consecuencias sociales rotundas. El sistema teológico premilenarista ha creado una práctica de separación entre los fieles evangélicos y la cultura degenerada de su alrededor, entre la nación elegida y los condenados. Tanto los evangélicos como los fundamentalistas, durante el siglo XX, han predicado la separación de ellos con el mundo impío.⁵⁶ Pero hasta que punto realmente predominaba el premilenarianismo en las iglesias evangélicas en Estados Unidos es un hecho difícil de averiguar. El caso es que vemos claramente y en muchas ocasiones evangélicos y fundamentalistas en Estados Unidos que, lejos de abandonar el mundo, se entregaron plenamente a la política y a la lucha por conquistar el poder. Un ejemplo por excelencia encontramos con el archifundamentalista Jerry Falwell, el predicador que fundó Moral Majority en 1979. La Moral Majority junto con su programa de televisión *Old Time Gospel Hour* representan una clara involucración con el mundo. El proyecto abiertamente

⁵³ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 100.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Steven R. Pointer, "American Postmillennialism: Seeing the Glory," *Christian History, Christianity Today*, 1999, <http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-61/american-postmillennialism-seeing-glory.html>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

político de la Moral Majority contradijo cualquier credo de separación del mundo caído que imponía teóricamente la fe fundamentalista.⁵⁷

De igual importancia en el marco teológico del movimiento evangélico contemporáneo son las tendencias históricas, los debates y las divisiones teológicas y los antagonismos feroces dentro del protestantismo estadounidense que emergieron en los siglos XIX y XX.

La alta crítica alemana, que emergió primero en Alemania a finales del siglo XVIII, tuvo un gran impacto en los debates teológicos en Estados Unidos durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.⁵⁸ Los proponentes de esta forma de hermenéutica bíblica desarrollaron nuevas metodologías para interpretar, entender y usar la Biblia. La alta crítica toma como punto de partida los contextos sociales, culturales y políticos en los que nace un texto sagrado específico. Este tipo de exégesis creó un espacio para nuevas interpretaciones teológicas y cuestionó la autoridad de doctrinas bíblicas.⁵⁹ Los protestantes estadounidenses tradicionales que opusieron a la alta crítica alemana vieron en este sistema la posibilidad de desmitologizar la narrativa bíblica y desarraigar el dogma cristiano.

Las incursiones de la alta crítica alemana, junto con los avances y descubrimientos de la ciencia, especialmente la interpretación que muchos científicos sociales decimonónicos dieron al darwinismo, abrieron una brecha entre los cristianos liberales y los conservadores en Estados Unidos del siglo XIX.⁶⁰ Durante las siguientes décadas, estas divisiones iban intensificándose, eventualmente generando el nacimiento del fundamentalismo Cristiano. Entre los años 1910 y 1915, los conservadores protestantes publicaron *The Fundamentals* un código que recogía sus creencias y su oposición a lo que consideraron diferentes corrientes erróneas dentro de la iglesia cristiana estadounidense.⁶¹ De esta atmósfera de controversia y conflicto, nació el fundamentalismo cristiano como segmento específico dentro del protestantismo estadounidense. A menudo se ve este fundamentalismo religioso como un rechazo a un proceso de secularización fuera de la iglesia.⁶² Pero con el fundamentalismo cristiano que estaba emergiendo en las primeras décadas del siglo XX vemos que se movilizó, al menos al principio, en oposición a una percibida herejía dentro de los muros de la iglesia cristiana. El cisma entre los cristianos liberales y los cristianos conservadores también ha sido un aspecto prominente del movimiento evangélico estadounidense durante

⁵⁷ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*. p. 112.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁵⁹ Maldonado Gago, "Política y religión en la derecha cristiana de los Estados Unidos de América," 14.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

la Guerra Fría. Como veremos en esta tesis, los evangélicos estaban bien atentos a las actividades, a las interpretaciones teológicas y a las afiliaciones políticas de sus correligionarios más liberales.⁶³

La distancia mental y conceptual entre los cristianos que seguían atados y los aspectos fundamentales de la fe, por un lado, y los cristianos liberales, por otro, ocasionó un nuevo impulso de unidad en el cristianismo protestante estadounidense; también abrió una brecha nueva y dolorosa de división. Las pequeñas divisiones, las infinitas rivalidades de las distintas denominaciones protestantes, que esta forma de organización eclesiástica ha generado, empezaron a desaparecer. En el lugar de la rivalidad entre las denominaciones, surgió una nueva solidaridad, un nuevo ecumenismo de unión y oposición. Ahora todos los conservadores se unieron en contra de lo que entendieron como formas apóstatas de la fe cristiana. Las líneas de separación ya tuvieron menos que ver con las denominaciones protestantes y, en cambio, dividió los cristianos en dos campos: los conservadores y los llamados liberales. Estos temas emergentes de unión y división perdurarían en el cristianismo estadounidense el resto del siglo XX.

El movimiento evangélico contemporáneo en Estados Unidos, que empezó a crecer con una formidable rapidez después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, fue y es un movimiento extremadamente diverso dentro del cristianismo protestante. Fue una amalgama de organizaciones diferentes, iglesias independientes, un mosaico de denominaciones, de canales religiosos de televisión y de figuras y líderes religiosos de varios rangos de celebridad. Balmer evocó esta variedad religiosa en su libro *Thy Kingdom Come*: “Hasta hoy en día el evangelismo en Estados Unidos tiene los rasgos de estas influencias iniciales—la introspección obsesiva de los puritanos, el precisionismo doctrinal de los presbiterianos y el énfasis en una espiritualidad afectiva y cariñosa del pietismo.”⁶⁴

Pero tuvo también otras influencias. El pentecostalismo ha tenido una fuerte influencia en el desarrollo del movimiento evangélico, tanto en términos de doctrina como en estilos de práctica religiosa.⁶⁵ El pentecostalismo surgió en Estados Unidos al principio del siglo XX, principalmente entre grupos económica y socialmente marginados. De ahí se ha expandido con una implacable rapidez por el mundo. El movimiento pentecostal toma su nombre de la fiesta cristiana de Pentecostés cuando el Espíritu Santo, según narra la Biblia,

⁶² Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God* (New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group, 2000), xii.

⁶³ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 29-30, 101-102.

⁶⁴ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, xiv [mi traducción].

⁶⁵ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 42-44; George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism in American Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 236.

descendió y llenó a los apóstoles otorgándoles dones espirituales. Los fundadores del movimiento se apoderaron del versículo del Nuevo Testamento (Hechos de los Apóstoles 2: 1-31) y lo interpretaron no como un hecho del pasado sino como un patrón reproducible. El creyente, promete el pentecostalismo, puede recibir la protección del Espíritu Santo, puede recibir los dones espirituales e incluso puede recibir el don de la glosolalia, el don de las lenguas.⁶⁶ El crecimiento dinámico del pentecostalismo, el énfasis llamativo en el poder del Espíritu Santo, la creencia en la curación a través de la fe y las ceremonias religiosas vivas y exuberantes han dejado su rastro en el movimiento evangélico de la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Hoy en día, el pentecostalismo es uno de los movimientos que crece más rápidamente en el mundo, con una presencia notable en Latinoamérica.⁶⁷

En cuanto al movimiento evangélico, el concepto del “fundamentalismo” es uno de suma importancia. Este concepto tiene dos significados correspondientes. Por un lado, en el uso popular del concepto, encontramos la noción de un rasgo que puede aparecer en cualquier tradición religiosa. Aquí figura como el equivalente al “extremismo” o al “integrista”⁶⁸ en una comunidad religiosa. Como tal se puede hablar del fundamentalismo cristiano o, por ejemplo, del fundamentalismo islámico.

El concepto de “fundamentalismo” y la connotación de intransigencia doctrinal que conlleva nació, como hemos visto, de una tradición cristiana en Estados Unidos que empezó a brotar a principios del siglo XX, concretamente después de la Primera Guerra Mundial.⁶⁹ El movimiento evangélico es, para ser bien preciso, un movimiento que surge de esta comunidad cristiana fundamentalista. En cuanto a teología, los dos grupos cristianos—los llamados fundamentalistas y los evangélicos—son idénticos. Las dos doctrinas teológicas centrales, de que deriva gran parte de la cosmovisión evangélica—la inspiración divina de la Biblia y la interpretación literal de los textos sagrado—aparecen tanto en las iglesias fundamentalistas como en las evangélicas. El evangélico famoso Harold John Ockenga (1905-1985), por ejemplo, lo confirmó en 1960; él dijo, “La teología evangélica es un sinónimo del fundamentalismo o de la ortodoxia. En cuanto a la doctrina los evangélicos y los fundamentalistas son uno. Es un error que el evangélico se divorcie del fundamentalismo histórico como algunos han intentado hacer.”⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 112-14.

⁶⁷ Ed Stetzer, “Why Do These Pentecostals Keep Growing?” *Christianity Today*, November 11, 2014. <http://www.christianitytoday.com/edstetzer/2014/november/why-are-pentecostals-growing.html>.

⁶⁸ Bauman, *La posmodernidad y sus descontentos*, 224-225.

⁶⁹ FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 5.

⁷⁰ Harold John Ockenga, “Resurgent Evangelical Leadership,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 13 [mi traducción].

La división entre el fundamentalismo cristiano y el evangelismo es un tema de constante debate. Kristen Dombek, en su tesis doctoral de 2005, titulada “Shopping for the End of the World: *Left Behind*, Evangelical Culture, and Apocalyptic Consumerism,” menciona la dificultad de definir claramente los términos relevantes: “‘Fundamentalista,’ ‘evangélico,’ y ‘cristiano conservador’ han sido empleados de manera intercambiable en la prensa y en los comentarios académicos...pero tienen, de hecho, significados distintos para los adeptos y para los historiadores de la religión.”⁷¹ Pero estas fronteras bien marcadas, que señala Dombek, no siempre son tan claras. No existe una línea que los separe de forma nítida. Por lo tanto, podemos entender el movimiento evangélico como uno fundamentalista, empleando los dos significados del concepto. Es decir, por un lado, el movimiento exhibía a lo largo de la Guerra Fría los característicos de una religión fundamentalista. También, por otro lado, el evangelismo del siglo XX estaba estrechamente relacionado con el fundamentalismo cristiano que emergió como una rama independiente del cristianismo estadounidense. Con las diferencias menores que haya las dos comunidades, no estamos excesivamente preocupados.⁷²

Pero además de la reflexión sobre si el movimiento evangélico es fundamentalista o no en la historiografía estadounidense han surgido otros calificativos para el movimiento que debemos aclarar. Han entrado otros términos en el discurso académico. Términos como la derecha cristiana, la derecha religiosa, la derecha teocrática o incluso la derecha radical han llegado a ser casi sinónimos del evangelismo cristiano en Estados Unidos. Son designaciones políticas y lo que evocan es sobre todo el conservadurismo del movimiento evangélico. Durante la guerra Fría, la mayoría de los evangélicos eran política y socialmente conservadores pero eso es solo *un* aspecto de ser evangélico. Sabemos que existieron grupos supuestamente liberales, como los Sojourners que emergieron en los setenta.⁷³ El impacto de este grupo al margen del evangelismo en Estados Unidos es insignificante. Respecto a los diferentes términos que se han hecho populares en los últimos cincuenta años, en esta tesis evitaremos esta terminología.

⁷¹ Kristen Dombek, “Shopping for the End of the World: *Left Behind*, Evangelical Culture, and Apocalyptic Consumerism” (doctoral dissertation, New York University, 2005), 4 [mi traducción].

⁷² El historiador eminente George M. Marsden intentó, en *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 1, establecer definitivamente una diferencia entre el fundamentalismo y el evangelismo. Para él, es una división social, de comportamiento; también es una división poco convincente. Marsden mantuvo, “Un fundamentalista cristiano es un evangélico que está enfadado...Los fundamentalistas no solo son religiosos conservadores sino también están dispuestos a tomar una postura y luchar [mi traducción].” Aquí Marsden sugiere una tangible ausencia de militancia en el evangelismo, una falta de enfado, un intento de evitar conflicto con la sociedad. Como veremos la evidencia desmienta tal aseveración.

⁷³ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 74-75.

Estado de la cuestión

Una vez revisado el momento histórico del renacer del evangelismo y explicado lo que entendemos por el movimiento evangélico podemos ya centrarnos en un análisis de los trabajos existentes sobre el movimiento evangélico y de las conclusiones a las que estos han llegado.

Comenzaremos por las obras clásicas y generales centradas en el movimiento para después pasar a analizar las diferentes líneas de interpretación y los debates abiertos y de alguna manera explicaremos las razones para considerar la obra de Bauman como sustento de este trabajo. Además en una segunda parte del estado de la cuestión también introduciremos los debates existentes sobre uno de los conceptos básicos para esta tesis como es el de identidad.

De los muchos autores y la plétora de estudios hay algunos que son fundamentales en la historiografía del evangelismo. Por ejemplo, la socióloga Sara Diamond ha dedicado gran parte de su carrera profesional al estudio de este movimiento religioso en Estados Unidos. En *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States*, escrito en 1995, Diamond observó que el evangelismo del siglo XX, en Estados Unidos, emergió en paralelo a un movimiento político y social de derechas mucho más grande.⁷⁴ Para Diamond grupos anticomunistas, otros como el John Birch Society y el White Citizens' Council y, por supuesto, el movimiento neoconservador fueron facetas de este impulso derechista que ocupaba lugar en la vida política del país.⁷⁵ En esta obra, Diamond señaló los eventos de los setenta como las causas del origen del movimiento. Los cambios registrados en esta década, según la autora, representaron una clara amenaza a los valores del evangelismo conservador.

Es verdad que en 1976, los evangélicos se movilizaron a favor del candidato demócrata Jimmy Carter. Estos cristianos esperaban que Carter, un bautista renacido del sur, como presidente instalaría un programa político conservador y anticomunista y intentaría oponer la legalización del aborto que, unos años antes, se legalizó con el caso *Roe v. Wade*.⁷⁶ Carter, desde la perspectiva evangélica, no solo decepcionó a la mayoría de los evangélicos por su programa social sino también en términos de las relaciones internacionales. Un punto

⁷⁴ Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995).

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 52; Maldonado Gago, "Política y religión en la derecha cristiana de los Estados Unidos de América," 7-8.

⁷⁶ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 176.

de decepción para los evangélicos salió del acuerdo SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] entre Estados Unidos y la URSS. Cualquier compromiso con los comunistas, cualquier reducción en el poder de la patria, provocó la ira de los elementos más fervientemente anticomunistas del movimiento evangélico.⁷⁷

En otro libro importante, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right*, escrito en 1989, Diamond exploró el fenómeno evangélico enfocándose más en las actividades políticas de estas iglesias cristianas en Estados Unidos y las consecuencias de ellas.⁷⁸ Aquí Diamond examina el papel duradero que ha tenido el tele-evangelismo. A lo largo del estudio, Diamond plasma la naturaleza multifacética de esta comunidad religiosa.⁷⁹

En esta obra Diamond dedica espacio a aspectos y a grupos del evangelismo mucho menos conocidos. Un ejemplo es el movimiento conocido en inglés como “shepherding” que, al inicio de los setenta, llegó a ser una parte importante de la iglesia evangélica estadounidense. Diamond sostiene:

Por todo Estados Unidos un sinnúmero de iglesias ‘carismáticas’ y ‘fundamentalistas’ (con una cantidad de miembros estimada en los cientos de miles o incluso un par de millones de fieles) están rígidamente divididas en ‘células’ autoritarias que requieren que los adeptos ‘se rindan’ a los ‘pastores’ encima de ellos en la jerarquía. Los incidentes continuos y frecuentes de abuso psicológico son parte de la historia secreta de la derecha cristiana.⁸⁰

Otro elemento al margen del movimiento evangélico es el Identity Christianity. Este segmento particular, cuenta Diamond, afirma que Dios, en algún momento dado, estableció una alianza sagrada con los anglosajones. Las personas que se encuentran fuera de este grupo anglosajón son, al entender de estas iglesias, inferiores.⁸¹ Este ramo del cristianismo extremista y racista reserva un cultivado desdén para los judíos.⁸² Diamond, al escribir el libro, estimó que había unos diez mil de estos cristianos en Estados Unidos. Aunque Identity Christianity no tiene gran papel dentro del movimiento evangélico, sí, afirma Diamond, hubo momentos de influencia mutua.⁸³

Otro escritor que ha contribuido mucho al estudio de la religión y en particular a la historia del evangelismo estadounidense es Randall Balmer, a quien hemos mencionado

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 137-138. Marsden remarked, in *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 63.

⁷⁸ Sara Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* (London: Pluto Press, 1989).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, vii [mi traducción].

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 27, 139-141.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 139-140, 239.

antes. En *Thy Kingdom Come*, un estudio del evangelismo contemporáneo desde su emergencia hasta finales del siglo XX, Balmer reconoce en este movimiento un desvío y abandono radical del evangelismo del siglo XIX.⁸⁴ El evangelismo del siglo XIX, por ejemplo, buscaba liberar al esclavo. El movimiento evangélico de la Guerra Fría intenta en cada instante mantener y perpetuar el sistema de segregación y racismo en Estados Unidos. Los evangélicos en el siglo XIX querían educar a las mujeres. El movimiento evangélico contemporáneo busca confinar a la mujer a su reino doméstico. Y, a lo largo de esta tesis, demostraremos otras diferencias sociales, políticas y teológicas importantes entre estos dos grupos religiosos.

Una gran parte de este estudio está dedicada al peligro que el evangelismo representa para la democracia de Estados Unidos.⁸⁵ Balmer trata la intervención de los evangélicos en la educación pública sobre todo en los intentos de implementar el estudio de la historia bíblica de la creación o el ‘diseño inteligente’ en vez de la teoría de la evolución. Balmer examinó también un aspecto menos conocido del evangelismo, su postura antiecológica.⁸⁶

Quizás sea Balmer el historiador que más ha indagado sobre las razones de los orígenes y gran desarrollo del evangelismo en Estados Unidos después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y ha ofrecido su propia teoría acerca de la génesis de esta comunidad cristiana en Estados Unidos.

El tema del evangelismo, de manera general, no ha sido estudiado solo por los historiadores, también se ha transformado en un punto importante de investigación en el campo de la sociología. Una representante importante de la sociología en la literatura sobre el evangelismo es Nancy Ammerman, ahora profesora en la Universidad de Boston. En *Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World*, de 1987, Ammerman se centra en el año que pasó con una iglesia fundamentalista en el norte de Estados Unidos. Estas obras generales suelen ofrecer al lector un vislumbre íntimo de como funcionan estas iglesias, como son las relaciones humanas y cual es la composición económica y social de la congregación.⁸⁷

Otra figura de la historiografía que deberíamos mencionar es la escritora británica Karen Armstrong, experta en las religiones. Armstrong, anteriormente una monja católica,

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁸⁴ Randall Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens America, an Evangelical's Lament* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 177.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 71-108.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁸⁷ Nancy Tatom Ammerman, *Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

ha dedicado mucho tiempo al estudio de la religión y la religión comparativa. Una de sus obras principales es *The Battle for God*, de 2000, que analiza con detalle el nacimiento casi simultáneo de fundamentalismo en el islam, el judaísmo y el cristianismo. *The Battle for God* es la historia de como el fundamentalismo religioso llega a ser una parte importante e ignorable de la vida moderna.⁸⁸

Las obras generales son las que proceden del mundo de la información y del periodismo. Debido a la expansión enorme de esta comunidad, su papel creciente en la vida social y política de Estados Unidos y su influencia en otros países, el evangelismo ha ganado mucha atención, incluso fuera del ámbito académico. Y de alguna manera estos trabajos hay que conocerlos y mencionarlos. Muchos de estos estudios ofrecen al lector una investigación detallada y nuevas perspectivas en el análisis del evangelismo. Un ejemplo es *American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America* de Chris Hedges, escrito en 2007.⁸⁹ Hedges, un periodista de guerra, es autor de varios libros enfocados en la cultura estadounidense.⁹⁰ Una aportación importante del libro de Hedges es la atención que él presta al llamado “culto de la masculinidad,” un aspecto desde luego importante del movimiento evangélico. Porque es cierto que el discurso evangélico está atravesado por los valores de lo masculino y de lo femenino que ellos representan de forma muy tradicional. Otro libro que se puede considerar es *Eternal Hostility: The Struggle Between Theocracy and Democracy*, escrito por Frederick Clarkson en 1997.⁹¹ El libro enfatiza la génesis del evangelismo como fenómeno político y, especialmente, las actividades, a veces violentas, en contra del aborto de varios grupos evangélicos en Estados Unidos. Como los títulos de estos libros sugieren, podemos catalogar los estudios dentro de una cierta categoría, una que hemos indicado antes: la dicotomía extrema entre la sociedad estadounidense y el evangelismo ajeno, la democracia y la teocracia, una nación de paz y bondad y la guerra. Clarkson, perpetuando este marco conceptual, termina su libro con el capítulo “Defending Democracy.”

Podemos terminar el estado de la cuestión con un segmento de la historiografía que se enfoca principalmente en el evangelismo a través de los medios de comunicación, especialmente la televisión y los programas religiosos. Como el “televangelismo” se ha hecho una parte tan integral en este movimiento religioso, los historiadores, sociólogos y

⁸⁸ Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God* (New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group, 2000).

⁸⁹ Hedges, *American Fascists*.

⁹⁰ Otras obras de Hedges incluyen: Chris Hedges, *War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); *Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spectacle* (New York: Nation Books, 2009).

⁹¹ Frederick Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility: The Struggle Between Theocracy and Democracy* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press: 1997).

otros académicos han prestado mucha atención a este asunto, algo que trataremos en el capítulo IV.⁹²

Una vez presentadas la procedencia y el contenido de las obras generales sobre el movimiento evangélico podemos reflexionar sobre las diferentes líneas interpretativas y sobre los debates que historiadores, politólogos y otros científicos sociales tienen abiertos. Nos interesa además dialogar con ellas para que se pueda entender nuestro deseo de cotejar la línea que consideramos más acertada y que hemos elegido como sustento de nuestro trabajo de investigación, la de Bauman. A pesar de la literatura amplia sobre el evangelismo, continúa existiendo un debate sumergido acerca del origen del movimiento. La mayoría de las teorías se centran en la década de los setenta como el momento de galvanización política, como el nacer del evangelismo contemporáneo en Estados Unidos. Estas hipótesis se sostienen en una división que creemos errónea: la idea que el evangelismo estadounidense fue, entre 1945 y 1976, despolitizado o apolítico y que, de repente y *ex nihilo*, entró en la política. Tal aseveración, una vez consultada nuestras fuentes, es difícil de mantener.

Antes de presentar con detenimiento la teoría de Bauman, que exploraremos en esta tesis, deberíamos familiarizarnos con las diferentes teorías existentes. El historiador estadounidense William McLoughlin, observando el impacto del evangelismo en la sociedad estadounidense durante los sesenta y los setenta, fue uno de los primeros en plantear una posible explicación histórica. McLoughlin, como historiador de la religión en Estados Unidos, sabía mucho de los grandes despertares y renacimientos religiosos del país.⁹³ McLoughlin vio en el evangelismo del siglo XX, en sus mensajes y su celo, en sus cruzadas [crusades] religiosas y su estilo, algo del sentimiento religioso que ha caracterizado Estados Unidos durante tantas generaciones.⁹⁴ Para McLoughlin, el evangelismo contemporáneo de la posguerra no fue otra cosa que una continuación histórica de tendencias religiosas ya potentes; fue básicamente el cuarto gran despertar. “Los despertares religiosos,” escribió el

⁹² Véase Quentin J. Schultze, *Televangelism and American Culture: The Business of Popular Religion* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991); Steve Bruce, *Pray TV: Televangelism in America* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Bobby C. Alexander, *Televangelism Reconsidered: Ritual in the Search for Human Community* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994); Jeffrey K. Hadden, and Anson Shupe, *Televangelism: Power and Politics on God's Frontier* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1988); Razelle Frankl, *Televangelism: The Marketing of Popular Religion* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987).

⁹³ Véase William G. McLoughlin, *Modern Revivalism: Charles Grandison Finney to Billy Graham* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1959); *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion and Social Change in America, 1607-1977* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

⁹⁴ McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” 47. See also William G. McLoughlin, *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform*, 193; William G. McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1960), 23.

historiador en *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform* de 1978, “han sido un poder determinante en la cultura estadounidense desde su inicio.”⁹⁵ McLoughlin continuó:

Los despertares...son el resultado no de depresiones, guerras o epidemias sino de disyunciones críticas en la auto-conceptualización [de un país]...Restauran el brío cultural y la autoestima, ayudando mantener la fe en nosotros mismos, nuestros ideales, y nuestra “alianza con Dios”...A través de los despertares una nación crece en términos de sabiduría, respeto, y relaciones armoniosas con otros pueblos y el universo físico.⁹⁶

Como otros autores, McLoughlin percibe una división abriéndose en la sociedad estadounidense durante la Guerra Fría. Al entender de McLoughlin, el evangelismo, como el cuarto despertar religioso, emerge como respuesta heroica al declive nacional y como elemento necesario en la progresión cultural de la nación. En el esquema de McLoughlin, la estimación sumamente positiva del evangelismo va más allá: el movimiento religioso, el nuevo despertar, logra un rol salvífico. Por lo tanto, como no buscamos atribuir tales características al evangelismo, rechazamos rotundamente la teoría.

Otros académicos siguen el camino y la línea de pensamiento de McLoughlin. Por ejemplo, Karen McCarthy Brown, una antropóloga de la religión de Estados Unidos, nos guía hacia la disyunción social como el momento de génesis del fundamentalismo cristiano. ““El fundamentalismo,”” cuenta Brown, ““es un producto de estrés social extremo.””⁹⁷ Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, and Susan D. Rose, los autores de *Exporting the American Gospel* de 1996, un estudio de la expansión del evangelismo estadounidense por el resto del mundo, están de acuerdo con la teoría de la antropóloga. Ven el evangelismo y también su versión global como un intento de llenar un espacio vacío en la sociedad moderna.⁹⁸ El problema es que el conflicto social o el estrés cultural no son aspectos sin precedente en la historia. Son más bien aspectos perennes de la historia humana. Y la calificación de extremo es extremadamente difícil de clarificar. Desde varios puntos de vista, especialmente respecto a la economía de Estados Unidos, el evangelismo nace durante momentos de prosperidad.

Otras teorías propuestas hablan también de cambio social pero enfocan en un evento específico. Diamond, en *Roads to Dominion*, es una exponente de esta teoría. “El despertar

⁹⁵ McLoughlin, *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform*, 1 [mi traducción].

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2 [mi traducción]. FitzGerald, en su estudio sobre el evangelismo estadounidense de 2017, está de acuerdo con la aseveración de McLoughlin respecto al supuesto poder revitalizador de los despertares religiosos en la sociedad de Estados Unidos, FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 14.

⁹⁷ Karen McCarthy Brown citada en Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, and Susan D. Rose, *Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 6 [mi traducción].

político de los evangélicos,” teorizó Diamond, “ocurrió como respuesta a cambios sociales profundos, especialmente los que tiene que ver con la igualdad de la mujer, la libertad reproductiva y derechos civiles para los homosexuales.”⁹⁹ Como se ve, Diamond ve el despertar político como una respuesta repentina a cambios sociales, sobre todo con la legalización del aborto.¹⁰⁰

Balmer ve la cuestión de la legalización del aborto como la teoría más aceptada del origen del evangelismo de Estados Unidos. Tan extendida es esta idea que la llama el “mito del aborto.” En un artículo escrito en 2014 Balmer dijo, “Uno de los mitos más durables de la historia contemporánea es que la derecha cristiana, la coalición de evangélicos y fundamentalistas conservadores, emergió como una respuesta política al caso de la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos de 1973 que legalizó el aborto.”¹⁰¹ En *Thy Kingdom Come*, Balmer explica que, respecto a la legalización del aborto en los años setenta, “...la inmensa mayoría de los líderes evangélicos no comentaron nada al respecto; los que intervinieron en realidad aplaudieron la decisión [de legalizar el aborto].”¹⁰² Según Balmer, fue solo más tarde, al darse cuenta del poder galvanizante del asunto político del aborto y la legalización de ello, cuando los evangélicos adoptaron esta cuestión como tema central del proyecto, como técnica política.¹⁰³ Al rechazar la legalización del aborto como momento del despertar del evangelismo, Balmer entró con su propia teoría. Esta teoría también tiene que ver con la década de los setenta.

Después del caso de 1972 *Green v. Connally*, que tuvo como consecuencia la supresión de la exención de impuestos a las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro que practicasen la discriminación, Bob Jones University fue el centro de una controversia.¹⁰⁴ En aquel momento, cuenta Balmer, el centro educativo cristiano tenía normas discriminatorias lo cual provocó la supresión de la exención.¹⁰⁵ Al entender de Balmer, a los ojos de los evangélicos, fue una intervención grosera por parte del gobierno federal. Al entremeterse, el gobierno no solo les privó a varios grupos evangélicos de un privilegio fiscal sino también intervino en un ámbito que los evangélicos entendieron como separado, como el dominio

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁹⁹ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 161. Véase también FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 1, 8.

¹⁰⁰ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 55-58, 84, 90-100.

¹⁰¹ Randall Balmer, “The Real Origins of the Religious Right,” *Politico Magazine*, May 27, 2014, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/religious-right-real-origins-107133.html#.VLFy86mRnww>.

¹⁰² Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 12.

¹⁰³ Randall Balmer, *True Origins of the Christian Right*, Emory University, May 11, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Gf4jN1xoSo.

¹⁰⁴ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 14.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

exclusivo de la iglesia. Para Balmer, la controversia de la Universidad de Bob Jones fue el momento culminante, el origen del movimiento evangélico politizado en Estados Unidos.

Con la teoría de la legalización del aborto y la de Bob Jones hay varios y problemas persistentes. Primero, estas teorías dan a un evento singular demasiado poder de creación. El caso es que no podemos atribuir ni la politización del movimiento ni la expansión evangélica a estos dos eventos históricos. Segundo, tales teorías ignoran, incluso suprimen, una larga historia de más de treinta años de actividad, de pensamiento y comentario políticos por parte de los cristianos renacidos en Estados Unidos después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tercero, no se puede separar el aspecto político del evangelismo, no es un elemento aislado que no tiene relación con las otras facetas del movimiento. Si observamos el evangelismo cristiano desde una perspectiva global, vemos claramente que el caso de Bob Jones y la legalización del aborto tienen poco que ver con el movimiento tomado en conjunto. ¿Qué, por ejemplo, relevancia tiene la legalización del aborto con la oposición evangélica al Movimiento por los Derechos Civiles de los años cincuenta y setenta?

Volviendo otra vez a Armstrong, ella sitúa la emergencia del fundamentalismo cristiano en la segunda parte del siglo XX. Fue, en su opinión, un rechazo fuerte a la expansión de una sociedad secular. “Pero en los setenta,” ella escribió en *The Battle for God*, “los fundamentalistas empezaron a rebelar en contra de la hegemonía secular y empezaron a sacar la religión de su posición marginal y darla un papel protagónico.”¹⁰⁶

La teoría de origen que Armstrong ofrece depende de una cierta conceptualización del rol y del propósito de la religión. En el pasado, afirma Armstrong, existían dos maneras de concebir y manipular el mundo y el conocimiento: *mythos* y *logos*. *Mythos*, para Armstrong, está relacionado con lo eterno y lo constante de la vida; está vinculado sobre todo con el significado.¹⁰⁷ Al contrario, *logos* “fue el pensamiento racional, pragmático y científico que prepara a los hombres y a las mujeres funcionar bien en el mundo.”¹⁰⁸ Según Armstrong, la emergencia y el florecimiento del fundamentalismo religioso en el mundo moderno fueron el resultado de una situación en la que el *logos* suplanta *mythos*. Armstrong ve una transformación de la fe religiosa a *logos*.¹⁰⁹ La esencia de su teoría es que el poder de la fe, en el mundo moderno, ya no domina.

Mientras Armstrong deja de ver la religión, en la forma fundamentalista, como un mecanismo de la búsqueda y la creación de significado, hay otros en cambio que ven el

¹⁰⁶ Armstrong, *The Battle for God*, xii.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, xv.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, xvi.

fundamentalismo cristiano desde otra perspectiva. Ralph W. Hood, Jr., Peter C. Hill, and W. Paul Williamson, los autores del libro *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* de 2005, en yuxtaposición irreconocible con la teoría de Armstrong, ven el fundamentalismo cristiano en Estados Unidos como un modo de crear y compartir el significado. Los autores dicen, “operamos desde la perspectiva que la religión provee la estructura de un sistema implícito de creencia que crea significado y a través de este sistema se puede experimentar el propósito [de la vida].”¹¹⁰ La religión, aseguran los autores, es un “esquema central,” que ayuda al adepto a comprender y enfrentar los problemas existenciales de la vida.¹¹¹ El núcleo de este sistema es el rol, la interpretación y la implementación de los textos sagrados.¹¹² Con Armstrong, por un lado, y los autores de *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*, por otro, vemos el gran espectro del pensamiento acerca del origen y la esencia de sistemas religiosos fundamentalistas.

Bauman nos presenta otra teoría acerca del origen del fundamentalismo religioso y es la que exploraremos en esta tesis. Esta teoría existe al margen de la historiografía sobre el evangelismo y no forma parte del discurso general. Como hemos indicado brevemente al principio de esta introducción, Bauman desarrolla su hipótesis sobre el fundamentalismo religioso en general, y no específicamente con el evangelismo estadounidense. Solo se puede entender la teoría si tomamos en cuenta lo que Bauman dice respecto a la identidad en *La posmodernidad y sus descontentos*.¹¹³ El mundo posmoderno, el mundo fragmentado y desasosegado contemporáneo, a los ojos de Bauman, es cada vez más oscuro, caracterizado por su impermanencia, su aspecto transitorio. La transitoriedad del mundo contemporáneo Bauman describe de la siguiente manera:

En efecto, el mensaje que actualmente transmiten con gran poder de persuasión los medios de comunicación culturales más ubicuamente eficaces...es un mensaje sobre la indeterminación y ductilidad esenciales del mundo: en este mundo, todo puede pasar y todo se puede hacer, pero no se puede hacer nada de manera definitiva, y todo lo que pasa llega de improviso y desaparece sin previo aviso. En este mundo, los lazos toman la apariencia de encuentros consecutivos; las identidades, de máscaras que se van usando sucesivamente; la biografía, de

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, xviii.

¹¹⁰ Ralph W. Hood Jr., Peter C. Hill, and Paul W. Williamson, *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*, (New York: The Guilford Press, 2005), 13.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 3, 5.

¹¹³ Zygmunt Bauman, *La posmodernidad y sus descontentos*, trans. Marta Mal de Molina Bodeblón y Cristina Piña Aldao (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2001).

una serie de episodios cuya única importante perdurable reside en su recuerdo igualmente efímero.¹¹⁴

En fin, según Bauman, el mundo actual se reconoce sobre todo por su incertidumbre perpetua.

En tal situación, en una sociedad tan desequilibrada, al entender de Bauman, el problema principal es la creación de una identidad (personal). “En lugar de construir la propia identidad gradual y pacientemente, tal y como se construye una casa—a través de la lenta suma de techos, suelos, habitaciones y pasillos comunicantes—, tenemos una serie de ‘nuevos comienzos,’ una experimentación con formas ensambladas instantáneamente, pero también,” Bauman continúa, “fácilmente desmanteladas, pintadas unas sobre otras; tenemos una *identidad-palimpsesto*.”¹¹⁵

La teoría propuesta por Bauman representa una inversión del pensamiento académico convencional. Mientras las otras teorías presentan el movimiento evangélico como una respuesta a un evento singular, como mera reacción, Bauman ve el fundamentalismo religioso como una solución dinámica al problema creciente de crear una identidad. Las incertidumbres del momento crecen y provocan una “inseguridad existencial” y hacen la elaboración de una “identidad individual” cada vez más difícil.¹¹⁶ El fundamentalismo nace como un proyecto, como una respuesta a semejante situación, como solución prefabricada a la incertidumbre y sirve como sustitución a la labor ontológicamente inevitable de crear una identidad. Para Bauman, la situación actual es la siguiente:

La amarga experiencia en cuestión es la experiencia de la *libertad*: de la desgracia de una vida compuesta de elecciones arriesgadas, lo que siempre significa aceptar algunas posibilidades y rechazar otras, o la incurable incertidumbre introducida en cada una de las decisiones, de la responsabilidad insoportable, porque no es compartida, antes las experiencias desconocidas de cada elección, del constante temor a hipotecar el futuro y posibilidades todavía no previstas, del temor a la ineptitud personal, de experimentar tal vez menos y con menos intensidad que los demás, de la pesadilla de no estar a la altura de las nuevas y mejoradas fórmulas de vida que el futuro notoriamente caprichoso puede proporcionar. Y el mensaje que deriva de dicha experiencia es: no, el *individuo* humano no es autosuficiente y no puede ser independiente.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Bauman, *La posmodernidad y sus descontentos*, 35.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 226.

En suma, la religión fundamentalista libra al adherente de la carga de, “de la agonía” de, *decidir*.¹¹⁸ El fundamentalismo, en la hazaña de eliminar la decisión, quitar la obligación de crear una identidad, crea lo que Bauman llama un “*completeat mappa vitae*.”¹¹⁹ Este mapa de la vida sirve para responder a cualquier pregunta, resolver cualquier duda.

Para resumir, según Bauman, el fundamentalismo religioso emerge como alternativa al largo y duro proyecto de crear una identidad. Lejos de estar relacionado con las preguntas transcendentales de la vida, con el significado, como suponía otras teorías, el fundamentalismo desarrolla un programa detallado de respuestas fáciles para problemas mundanos. Con este programa, con las infinitas soluciones que provee el sistema religioso fundamentalista, uno busca evitar el peso asfixiante de decidir, la obligación de cuestionar, la necesidad de elaborar una identidad.

La cuestión de identidad

El componente esencial de la teoría de Bauman es, como ya se sabe, el problema de la identidad; naturalmente, tenemos que clarificar este concepto. Bauman ofrece un uso y significado particular del concepto. Como hemos visto, él entiende la identidad como un proyecto, como algo construido a largo plazo. Al contrario de una máscara, Bauman nos habla de un edificio, de algo duradero, de estructura, de permanencia. También da a entender como la identidad y su formación, en el contexto contemporáneo, son cada vez más aspectos problemáticos de la vida. El historiador estadounidense Craig Calhoun, en su ensayo de 1994 sobre la identidad, hace eco del concepto de identidad de Bauman en el que la identidad se concibe como un proyecto de la vida, como algo que se forma.¹²⁰ También Calhoun ve la modernidad como el momento en el que a cada instante se frustra más la formación de la identidad.¹²¹ Al entender de Calhoun, la modernidad es el momento histórico en el cual podemos empezar a ver el deshielo traumático de “esquemas identitarios universales,” que llevaban siglos congelados.¹²²

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 227.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 228.

¹²⁰ Craig Calhoun, “Social Theory and the Politics of Identity,” in *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), 13, 23.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 11.

Pero la identidad por lo general es un término extremadamente difícil de definir.¹²³ Utilizamos el concepto muchas veces, en el día a día, sin saber exactamente a qué nos referimos, sin saber precisamente qué conlleva el enigma de identidad. Deberíamos, antes de continuar, definir que queremos decir con el concepto y como se usa este concepto en la historia.

“Identidad” empezó a ser utilizado en el lenguaje académico en Estados Unidos después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El proponente principal del concepto fue Erik Erikson, un judío alemán que logró huir del Tercer Reich. Sobre el terrible fondo de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Erikson elaboró su conceptualización de identidad.¹²⁴ Después de que Erikson lo empleara, muchos académicos empezaron a utilizar el término.

Desde el principio, la identidad, para Erikson, estaba conectada a la cuestión de “quién” es una persona. Para Erikson, el concepto va más allá que una mera respuesta superficial a la pregunta “¿Quién soy?” Al entender de Erikson, el concepto indica un proceso profundo de “desarrollo interior,” un movimiento continuo de crecimiento interior.¹²⁵ Otros académicos en las décadas de los sesenta y los setenta, en cambio, utilizaron el concepto para señalar algo “poco profundo, exterior, evanescente,” en resumen, una máscara.¹²⁶

En la historia académica, el uso sigue la tendencia de hablar más de *identidades*. Los historiadores suelen dividir el concepto entre la identidad colectiva y la identidad personal.¹²⁷ Los académicos utilizan la identidad colectiva para describir la participación de alguien en un grupo—sea una nación, una religión, una clase social, un grupo étnico—y la relación de ese grupo, de ese colectivo, con los demás.¹²⁸ La identidad colectiva, concebida por los historiadores, se construye y se forma de manera negativa, en oposición al otro.¹²⁹ Durante toda la historia, los seres humanos han cultivado y empleado varios pares conceptuales para diferenciar, categorizar, observar, controlar: el griego y el bárbaro; el Cristiano y el pagano. El centro de la identidad colectiva es, por lo tanto, la diferencia.¹³⁰

¹²³ Véase Philip Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 4 (1983): 920, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1901196>.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 914.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 914, 918. Véase también Erik Erikson, “Psychosocial Identity,” *A Way of Looking at Things*, ed. Stephen Schlein (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 675.

¹²⁶ Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” 920.

¹²⁷ Chris Lorenz, “Representations of Identity: Ethnicity, Race, Class, Gender and Religion. An Introduction to Conceptual History,” in *The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Religion, Class and Gender in National Histories*, ed. Stefan Berger (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 25-28.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 25-28.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

La identidad personal, a diferencia de la identidad colectiva, pertenece al individuo.¹³¹ Para el historiador Chris Lorenz, en un ensayo de 2008 en el que explora el tema de identidad, la identidad personal es un sinónimo de personalidad o carácter.¹³²

Aquí, desde luego, no hemos resuelto de una vez la cuestión de identidad. Esta cuestión será, sin embargo, una preocupación recurrente de esta tesis. Guiados por las observaciones de Bauman, entendemos la construcción identitaria como un proyecto a largo plazo.¹³³ Para llevar a cabo la exploración de Bauman, podemos profundizar esta definición diciendo que la identidad se crea a través del lenguaje;¹³⁴ que la identidad busca y necesita un marco intelectual de transmisión y orientación;¹³⁵ que se revela a través de la acción humana;¹³⁶ se expresa con ciertas formas, patrones de organización y núcleos de enfoque;¹³⁷ y, por último, se elabora en las redes fluctuantes de relaciones humanas, es decir, que emerge cara a cara con la inevitable e innegable pluralidad del mundo.¹³⁸ Y son esos aspectos identitarios los que de alguna manera nos han llevado a una organización de la tesis de forma temática y no cronológica. Queremos así explorar hasta que punto el movimiento evangélico incide en ofertar esos aspectos que construyen, según los expertos, la identidad.

Metodología y fuentes primarias

Para la elaboración de esta tesis además de la revisión de la bibliografía existente sobre la Historia de Estados Unidos en la Guerra Fría, el renacer del movimiento evangélico, y los problemas identitarios del sujeto moderno hemos utilizado fuentes primarias que consideramos relevantes para la elaboración de la tesis. Así, como ya hemos señalado, hemos revisado la publicación evangélica *Christianity Today* y también los sermones del pastor evangélico Billy Graham. De las miles de fuentes primarias de los evangélicos cristianos en Estados Unidos, desde revistas y sermones hasta libros y programas de televisión, estas fuentes representan fielmente, de alguna manera encarnan, el cristianismo evangélico en Estados Unidos durante el periodo de cristalización entre 1945 y 1981.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 27.

¹³³ Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Politics of Identity," 12, 23.

¹³⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 179. Véase Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," 1063.

¹³⁵ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: A Harvest Book - Harcourt Inc., 1968), 458.

¹³⁶ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 179.

¹³⁷ Cruz, 1997

La primera fuente, la revista evangélica *Christianity Today*, es una publicación bimensual. Fue fundada por Billy Graham junto con su suegro L. Nelson Bell y el teólogo evangélico y autor Carl F. H. Henry en 1956. Actualmente existe una versión impresa y una digital.¹³⁹ Aunque Graham ayudó en la fundación de la revista, y aunque la publicación estaba vinculada con la persona de Graham, fue una entidad independiente y la influencia principal procedía de otras figuras evangélicas.

Un editorial en la primera edición de 1956 nos provee la razón detrás de la fundación evangélica y el marco en el que la revista operaba. Según el editorial, la misión de la revista fue llevar el “cristianismo histórico” a una generación, que supuestamente, “no conocía las verdades básicas de la fe cristiana.”¹⁴⁰ Francamente, y completamente conforme con el trayecto futuro del evangelismo, *Christianity Today* proclamó que la palabra de Dios fue una fuente de autoridad y de *poder*.¹⁴¹ Cuál fue este poder, quién lo iba a ejercer, para qué el evangélico buscaba el poder fueron preguntas ignoradas. La estabilidad y la supervivencia de Estados Unidos, como nación, advirtió la revista, estaban relacionadas con su vida espiritual, es decir, el triunfo de la Cruz.¹⁴² Junto a esto, el editorial informó que, hasta 1956, había sido un fracaso agudo en cuanto a difundir el “mensaje total del evangelio” e imponer ese mensaje en “cada ámbito de la vida.”¹⁴³

Para la comunidad evangélica en Estados Unidos, *Christianity Today* ha sido la voz guiadora y un punto de referencia. Respecto a esto, hay un sólido consenso.¹⁴⁴

A finales de los setenta, tenía más de 200.000 suscripciones, se estima que la cantidad de lectores fue aún más grande.¹⁴⁵ Inicialmente, la audiencia fue principalmente el clero evangélico; después, el liderazgo de la revista reorientó la publicación hacia un público más general.¹⁴⁶ El valor de la revista como fuente primaria para la elaboración de esta tesis viene de su inmensa variedad. La revista es una amalgama de pensamiento evangélico sobre

¹³⁸ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 183-184; James Baldwin, “The Devil Finds Work,” in *James Baldwin: Collected Essays*, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: Library of America; distributed the U.S. by Penguin Putnam, 1998), 537; Calhoun, “Social Theory and the Politics of Identity,” 9.

¹³⁹ “Our History,” *Christianity Today*, accessed November 15, 2015, <http://www.christianitytoday.org/ministry/history/>. Véase también Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 100.

¹⁴⁰ “Why Christianity Today,” [Editorial] in *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (New York: Meredith Press, 1966), 1 [mi traducción].

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, [mi traducción].

¹⁴⁴ Phyllis Elaine Alsdurf, “*Christianity Today* Magazine and Late Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism,” (doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2004), 1; McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” 60; Randall Balmer, *Encyclopedia of Evangelicalism: Revised and Expanded Edition* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2004), 138; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 98.

¹⁴⁵ Elaine, “*Christianity Today* Magazine and Late Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism,” 274.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 276.

una gran variedad de asuntos que aquí nos preocupan: la teología, la interpretación bíblica, la política, las noticias, el cristianismo histórico y la actualidad. Esta variedad se extendió también a los que utilizaban la revista como vehículo de sus pensamientos, esperanzas y miedos. Los clérigos, los escritores, los profesores, los legos y los teólogos contribuyeron a la publicación. Aparte de estos grupos, *Christianity Today* publicaba frecuentemente, entre 1956 y 1981, artículos de militares, políticos y burócratas estadounidenses. Los artículos de J. Edgar Hoover, el director del Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), por ejemplo, a menudo llegaron a las páginas de la revista. Las cartas, los artículos, los poemas llegaban desde todos los rincones de Estados Unidos y, también, desde el extranjero representando una gran variedad geográfica.

Las ediciones más antiguas, de 1956 a los años setenta, forman parte de la colección de microfilm de la University of Texas en Austin (en aquel entonces en la biblioteca Perry Castañeda). Los primeros volúmenes—de 1956 a 1957—no son parte de la colección. También faltan los volúmenes VII y VIII (parte del año 1962 hasta parte del año 1964) y los volúmenes XV y XVI (de 1970 a 1972). Existe también una colección impresa que incluye artículos de *Christianity Today* de los volúmenes de 1956 hasta 1966.¹⁴⁷

La segunda fuente primaria que nos ha servido para la elaboración de esta tesis es la obra y la palabra de Billy Graham. Nacido en 1918 en Carolina del Norte, el evangelista estadounidense llegaría tener un impacto profundo y permanente en el curso de la religión de Estados Unidos.¹⁴⁸ Graham empezó su carrera evangélica con el movimiento Youth for Christ en los cuarenta, una organización que llegó a tener un gran éxito en el proyecto de evangelización.¹⁴⁹ Graham, empujado por el éxito en Youth for Christ, empezó sus famosas cruzadas religiosas, desplazándose por todo Estados Unidos y por todo el mundo. Aparte de este foro evangélico, Graham intentó, con el celo característico de un evangélico, esparcir el Evangelio a través de todos los medios posibles: las películas, los libros, la radio, los artículos y los sermones. Cada vez más famoso, Graham fue el pastor preferido de los famosos estadounidenses, los políticos más devotos y los presidentes de la República. Tan popular, tan cautivador, fue su mensaje que ya en 1961, según *Christianity Today*, Graham

¹⁴⁷ *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank G. Gaebelin (New York: Meredith Press, 1966).

¹⁴⁸ Para una historia más detallada de la carrera evangélica y del impacto de Graham en el evangelismo de Estados Unidos véase FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 169-207.

¹⁴⁹ McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” 67. Véase también John G. Turner, “Selling Jesus to Modern America: Campus Crusade for Christ, Evangelical Culture, and Conservative Politics” (doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2005), 48-49; FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 173.

había predicado delante de más de treinta millones de personas en el mundo y, con el suave abrazo de su voz, había convertido más de 900.000 personas.¹⁵⁰

A veces había una interrelación entre Graham y *Christianity Today*. Esta interrelación aparece sobre todo en la forma de artículos escritos por Graham, reproducciones ocasionales en *Christianity Today* de sus sermones, comentarios entusiastas sobre sus cruzadas religiosas y entrevistas con el evangélico que era cada vez más famoso. Nuestro contacto con el evangélico Billy Graham no viene principalmente de la revista *Christianity Today*. Sino que, respecto a Graham, hemos prestado atención casi exclusivamente a sus sermones, los de las cruzadas religiosas y los pronunciados por la radio, de los años cuarenta hasta finales de los setenta. La gran mayoría de estos discursos religiosos son fuentes audiovisuales. Hay tres vías principales de acceso. Se puede acceder algunos sermones en libros impresos, por ejemplo, algunos de los primeros sermones—específicamente tres antes de los años cincuenta—están recopilados en la colección *The Early Billy Graham*, publicada en 1988.¹⁵¹ Otro manera de acceder las fuentes es en línea. Por ejemplo se puede encontrar muchos sermones en Youtube. Sin duda, el mayor repositorio de los sermones y discursos radiofónicos de Graham están en la colección digital de la Billy Graham Evangelistic Association.¹⁵² Todos los archivos, los documentos y las fuentes audiovisuales son de libre acceso. La colección digital se divide en las fuentes de televisión,¹⁵³ la radio y World Wide Pictures, el ala de la producción de películas de la organización evangélica de Graham. Para esta tesis solo se ha utilizado los primeros dos grupos, es decir, los sermones audiovisuales. El archivo de sermones y discursos radiofónicos contiene más de 1.600 fuentes de un periodo de tiempo de más de sesenta años.¹⁵⁴

Teniendo en cuenta los objetivos de la tesis: explorar históricamente las premisas de Bauman sobre la relación entre el crecimiento del fundamentalismo, en nuestro caso del movimiento evangélico entre 1945 y 1981 en Estados Unidos, y la crisis identitaria de la modernidad; y las fuentes localizadas para su realización es lógico que nos aproximemos metodológicamente a corrientes historiográficas muy relacionadas. Por un lado nos interesa

¹⁵⁰ Smith, Ralston C. "Billy Graham's Evangelistic Thrust: The Crusaders and Changing Times," *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1961, 4.

¹⁵¹ Billy Graham, *The Early Billy Graham: Sermons and Revival Accounts*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland Pub., 1988).

¹⁵² *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, accessed June 6, 2016, <https://billygraham.org/>.

¹⁵³ "Video Categories, Classics," *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, accessed June 6, 2016, <https://billygraham.org/tv-and-radio/television/classics/>.

¹⁵⁴ "Audio Archives," *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, accessed June 6, 2016, <https://billygraham.org/tv-and-radio/radio/audio-archives/>.

la Historia cultural de la política, también la historia de los conceptos y además de alguna manera tomaremos aproximaciones de especialistas en los discursos de género que son sobre todo reflexiones sobre las relaciones de poder. Recordemos que nos vamos a fijar para organizar la tesis en los principios, en los conceptos que sustentan los discursos identitarios. Y estos discursos están fuertemente armados como discursos reunificados, como discursos de restauración de un orden perdido, como discursos de poder.

Por ello el enfoque que le queremos dar a este trabajo está muy vinculado a la nueva historia cultural de la política en dónde las fuentes que se trabajan no son fuentes emanadas del poder institucional sino que más bien son expresiones de la cultura generada por distintos grupos sociales. Desde los trabajos en Estados Unidos del historiador Bernard Bailyn en los años sesenta y setenta del siglo XX, las expresiones y las manifestaciones culturales populares han servido para estudiar las culturas políticas estadounidenses.¹⁵⁵ Primero fueron los panfletos y la prensa del periodo revolucionario, después viñetas políticas, mítines y discursos políticos. Y desde la incorporación de los medios audiovisuales y de todas las herramientas de la cultura popular a la expresión política, los programas televisivos, la publicidad, películas y series, discursos, han sido fuentes de atención de los historiadores. Bailyn en su obra famosa *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* de 1967 intentó capturar “las suposiciones, las creencias y las ideas—la cosmovisión articulada” del periodo revolucionario.¹⁵⁶

Bailyn así mostró un camino para los historiadores interesados en otros momentos históricos. Vislumbrar el componente cultural, los valores, las ideas en donde emergen y polemizan los discursos culturales, sociales y políticos, de los periodos históricos que queremos afrontar implica entre otras muchas cosas relacionar el contexto con una comprensión de la realidad determinada. Los discursos del movimiento evangélico y sus herramientas de difusión son exitosas porque calan en los ciudadanos americanos del momento. Porque son comprensibles por ellos, porque tratan de problemas que les preocupan y de manera incuestionable aciertan con los canales de difusión. Estudiar estos aspectos múltiples y en conflicto como señalaba Bailyn nos acerca a la comprensión de la diversidad y la polémica de los diferentes discursos que habitan el marco político, social y cultural del periodo en este caso de la Guerra Fría.

¹⁵⁵ Véase Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1967), v-xii, 2-21.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, vi [mi traducción]. Véase también Bernard Bailyn, *On the Teaching and Writing of History*, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (Hanover, NH: Montgomery Endowment, Dartmouth College: Distributed by University Press of New England, 1994), 54.

Y muy vinculados al giro cultural y en algunos casos al giro lingüístico surgió una reflexión sobre el lenguaje vinculado al devenir histórico que conocemos como historia de los conceptos. La historia de los conceptos en esta tesis, sobre todo en el primer capítulo con el análisis del léxico evangélico durante la Guerra Fría, será otro marco teórico. Aunque esta tesis no sea un aplicación dogmática de la metodología de la historia conceptual, este campo de la historia sí sirve como punto de partida. La historia de los conceptos, tratada con más detalle en el siguiente capítulo, emergió en Alemania al terminar la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Desde entonces, los historiadores conceptuales afirman que el lenguaje, específicamente los conceptos, representa el fundamento y el motor de la transformación histórica. Es a través de los conceptos que las fronteras de la metamorfosis social y política se establecen. Es a través del estudio de los conceptos que se puede hallar el cambio histórico.¹⁵⁷

Y también desde los estudios de género que se producen en Estados Unidos dentro del ámbito académico estadounidense, muy comprometido entonces con la militancia política, hemos reflexionado siguiendo a Joan Wallace Scott sobre los discursos del poder y su reivindicación de lo representado como masculinos en su concepción de lo deseable.¹⁵⁸ Para Scott el género no solo es uno de los elementos constitutivos de las relaciones sociales sino que también es un elemento determinante en las relaciones de poder. Como tal el análisis trasciende la historiografía relacionada con las relaciones de género y permite trasladarlo a cualquier estudio que reflexione sobre el poder. La masculinización, según la construcción social dominante, de los discursos hegemónicos será también revisado cuando estudiamos el discurso del evangelismo estadounidense durante la Guerra Fría.

En esta tesis del campo histórico, investigaremos la cuestión del origen del evangelismo como problema de identidad—dicho de otro modo, exploraremos la teoría de Bauman—de manera temática y desde una perspectiva histórica. Buscando encontrar algunos de los rasgos que constituyen la identidad evangélica estadounidense, según nuestra definición de identidad, el primero y el más llamativo es a su vez el más básico y será el de analizar el lenguaje utilizado, el discurso, los conceptos que predominaron en el evangelismo de la Guerra Fría. Haremos hincapié en tendencias claras en el léxico evangélico: el uso del cliché en los discursos políticos, sociales y religiosos; los conceptos de destrucción y militarismo que dominan la era; los conceptos económicos, es decir, la

¹⁵⁷ Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

terminología relacionado con el mercado libre, el mundo de los negocios y el capitalismo que efectivamente invadió la retórica evangélica; y, por último, el desarrollo evidente, en el evangelismo de la posguerra, de una teología de biologismo, el uso de conceptos y metáforas orgánicas. Una investigación parecida no existe en la historiografía sobre el evangelismo en Estados Unidos.

Tras la exploración de este aspecto sumamente importante del evangelismo, entre 1945 y 1981, examinaremos el movimiento y su contenido ideológico, es decir, la transformación de un sistema de fe a un sistema ideológico que penetra en todos los aspectos de la vida social estadounidense. Pero trataremos esta metamorfosis no como una mera respuesta a un mundo secularizado, como lo ve Armstrong, sino, más bien, como un intento de resolver y eliminar los problemas, en aumento, de la crisis y recreación de una identidad personal. En el tercer capítulo vemos la cuestión de acción como un punto en el que la identidad se manifiesta y veremos como la facultad humana de actuar llegó a tener un papel importante en el desarrollo, en la génesis, del evangelismo contemporáneo. Aquí exploraremos también el mapa completo de la vida, mencionado por Bauman. El siguiente capítulo trata del florecimiento de formas nuevas de evangelizar, de promulgar la palabra de Dios, de expresión religiosa. Pero a su vez es un fenómeno de recreación, de fortalecimiento de la identidad creada. Estas formas son maneras y *técnicas* de organizar, estructurar y expresar el sentimiento religioso. En este capítulo consideraremos la expansión *qua* forma religiosa; la mercantilización de la religión; la unión entre la religión y la tecnología, el mundo técnico; y, por último, “la idolatría del poder:” la celebración y la búsqueda de poder, el deseo de adquirir el poderío.

La identidad, como veremos, no es un fenómeno que nace *in vacuo*. Al contrario, nace *en* el mundo, un mundo lleno de hombres y mujeres, lleno de vida. Y si en algo están de acuerdo los historiadores es en que las identidades se construyen frente al otro. Desde esta perspectiva, en el último capítulo, exploraremos las relaciones de los evangélicos con los demás, con tres grupos fuera de la nación electa. Primero, estudiaremos la relaciones evangélicas con los afroamericanos en Estados Unidos, especialmente en el contexto del Movimiento por Derechos Civiles en los años cincuenta y los sesenta. Veremos también la relación del evangelismo y la comunidad, cada vez más pública en la posguerra, homosexual. Y, finalmente, la relación entre evangélicos y mujeres, un grupo de la población que, en ese momento, buscaba también adquirir derechos civiles, cambiar su papel

¹⁵⁸ Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *The American Historical Review* 91, no.

en la sociedad y participar en la vida económica del país. La emergencia y las exigencias políticas y sociales de estos grupos socavaban una tras otra vez las nociones queridas y tradicionales que los evangélicos tenían sobre Estados Unidos y la religión cristiana. La aparición de estos grupos en el escenario estadounidense no solo representó un desafío a un mundo congelado, sino también obligó a los evangélicos a cuestionar, buscar respuestas y soluciones. En esta búsqueda frenética, el evangelismo se aleja de un sistema religioso y se acerca a un sistema que intenta controlar, explicar, regular cada detalle de la vida, cada relación humana, cada suspiro del otro y cada manera de entender y conceptualizar a ese otro.

Introduction

From the beginning, religion in the United States has taken a peculiar form: sects and denominations, within the Christian Church, have multiplied and divided with astonishing rapidity, giving birth to a complex body of religious belief and practice—“...nowhere does it [Christianity] seem more diverse and multifarious than in America,” Richard Niebuhr, one of the most important Protestant theologians in the United States, once wrote.¹ To emerge from this community, in the twentieth century, with an unavoidable presence, a profound and widespread influence, was the movement known as evangelicalism. This dissertation is an inquiry into the historical origins of evangelical Christianity in the United States in the period between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, that is, between 1945 and 1981. Many have attempted to scale this summit, offering numerous and diverse theories regarding the possible origins of the twentieth-century evangelical movement, the exact impetus, which made evangelicalism what it was and granted it its flourishing power.

Among these theories, there is one, which seems to have the capability of explaining evangelicalism in all of its complexity, all of its nuances, and brings, into our field of vision, evangelicalism in its fullness. The Polish-born sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, in *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, published in 1997, set down a theory concerning religious fundamentalism, which hinges on the question of identity. Bauman identifies postmodernity as a period marked by a general crisis in identity, an age in which the conditions of the world neither foster nor create space for the elaboration of a personal identity. Instead, what has emerged as a remedy in this period of crisis has been, according to Bauman, to create, in lieu of identity, a series of false starts, a species of pseudo identity.² Of greater power and efficacy in combatting the problem of identity and its “never complete construction” in this period has been the elaboration of fundamentalist religious systems.³ Far from merely providing the believer with the key to eternal salvation, fundamentalist movements, postulated Bauman, seek to remove the hurdle of identity formation altogether; they seek to provide the adherent with a total explanation of life, a complete map in one’s

¹ Richard H Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1956), 2. For more on the diversity of the American religious landscape, see Randall Balmer, *Blessed Assurance: A History of Evangelicalism in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), 14, 16-18, 31-43.

² Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 24.

³ *Ibid.*, 178.

navigation of the world.⁴ We will examine Bauman's theory in greater detail elsewhere in this introduction.

It is through this theory, enriched by the contributions that historians have carried out concerning this concept, that we will question evangelicalism, and attempt to uncover its origin, the history of its emergence in the United States during the Cold War. Bauman, in the aforementioned work, did not fully flesh out his theory.⁵ Nor did Bauman apply his theory specifically to American evangelicalism and its historical context.⁶ Nor has the subject been pursued or resolved in many of Bauman's other scholarly works.⁷ Bauman's understanding of religious fundamentalism as a postmodern religious form rooted in problems and questions of identity does not inform the wider discussions or historiography, which deals with American evangelicalism. Instead, as we shall see, historians, sociologists, and other scholars have pointed to other theories as explanations of evangelicalism's genesis, its politicization during the Cold War, and the boundaries by which this collective identity, in the United States, has formed. As such, this dissertation stands as an exploration and application of Bauman's theory in the context of American evangelicalism. We will explore this theory primarily through two primary sources: the magazine *Christianity Today* and the sermons and radio addresses of Billy Graham, which we will explore in detail at the end of this introduction.

We have chosen to explore Bauman's theory of the origin of religious fundamentalism in the period between 1945 and 1981. The period is bookended by two major historical events: the end of World War II and the election of Ronald Reagan. With the end of the war, the evangelical community that emerged out of Christian fundamentalism began to coalesce and spread, becoming a distinct and visible movement and an abiding aspect of American religious and cultural life. With Reagan's election to the presidency, American evangelicalism of the twentieth century was very much in place, its theological doctrines clear, its political positions and ambitions identifiable, its forms and institutions in an advanced state of development. We consider the period spanning from the

⁴ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁵ Bauman's specific examination of religious fundamentalism in this work spans only four pages, see Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, 182–185.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, *Comunidad: En busca de seguridad en un mundo hostil*, trans. Jesús Alborés (Madrid: Siglo, 2009); Bauman, *Liquid Love* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2003); Bauman, *Modernidad líquida*, trans. Mirta Rosenberg (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012); Bauman, *Society Under Siege* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002).

end of the Second World War to Reagan's rise to power as important for the emergence of the evangelical movement in the United States for four principal reasons.

The first is that this was the period in which the terms surrounding evangelicalism were defined. One finds in this period, amongst evangelicals, a reconceptualization of and debate surrounding the words "evangelical" and "evangelicalism," what it meant, and who evangelicals were. In short, in this historical moment, evangelical was a contested concept, that is, there was explicit disagreement with regards to the meaning and application of this term as well as an overt attempt to define it.⁸ "Who are the Evangelicals?" asked an editorial in *Christianity Today* as late as 1967, revealing that still, decades after the movement had begun, the boundaries were as of yet unclear.⁹ In 1960, another article asked the same rhetorical question: "What is an evangelical?" following it with a lengthy definition.¹⁰

Alongside the attempts to codify the meaning and the direction of the evangelical movement, another justification for our election of the period between 1945 and 1981, roughly speaking, as the moment of evangelicalism's concrete emergence stems from the fact that throughout this span of time evangelicals established a variety of institutional entities that would facilitate the movement in the coming years.¹¹ These varied entities ranged from supra-organizations or governing bodies, communications alliances, an array of educational institutions, and numerous and influential publications. A few years prior to the close of the Second World War, in 1941, Carl McIntire, a fundamentalist radio Presbyterian preacher, famous for his anticommunist diatribes, founded the American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC).¹² A year later in 1942, evangelicals founded what would become one of the most influential of the various evangelical organizational entities, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), which grew rapidly in the 1940s, representing, in that decade, twenty-two denominations, hundreds of individual churches, and over one million of the evangelical faithful in the United States.¹³ Understanding the power and effect

⁸ The notion of a contested concept is taken from conceptual history. See Melvin Richter, "The Concept of Despotism and L'abus des mots," *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 3, no. 1 (2007): 8, accessed June 12, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23730864>.

⁹ "Who are the Evangelicals?" [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, June 23, 1967, 22 [957]. The question was also posed in another article from 1965; see: Harold Lindsell, "Who Are the Evangelicals?" *Christianity Today*, June 18, 1965, 3 [967].

¹⁰ Harold John Ockenga, "Resurgent Evangelical Leadership," *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 11-14.

¹¹ Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 95.

¹² *Ibid.*; George M. Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism* (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1991), 106.

¹³ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 95-96; Frances FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), 5-6.

of radio as a means to expand the evangelical message, the NAE quickly established the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB), in 1944. During the 1940s, it was the federal government, through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), that allotted space for radio programs. The evangelical association NRB, after its foundation, lobbied the FCC and was eventually successful in gaining an evangelical presence in the radio airwaves of the country.¹⁴ This fledgling organization's victory in carving out airtime for religious programs and its work over the following decades¹⁵ were not insignificant events. The dogged labor of the NRB cemented the evangelical presence in the composition of American radio and provided foundation for the development of the eventual and vast communications network, which nowadays characterizes the American evangelical movement. The decades-long development of the evangelical communications network was, according to Diamond, whom we shall visit presently, the principal resource in the "mobilization" of the Christian Right in the United States.¹⁶

In tandem with these institutions, there were parachurch organizations. One of the most successful was Campus Crusade for Christ (1951).¹⁷ Other prominent evangelical organizations of the period include the Christian Freedom Foundation (1965),¹⁸ the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade (CACC, 1953),¹⁹ the Chalcedon Foundation (1956), and the Institute for Christian Economics (1973).²⁰

Together with all this prolific activity, the Cold War was a burgeoning period for evangelical publications. Numerous magazines emerged that articulated the evangelical message, guided the movement, and provided a forum of evangelical thought and support. Some of the most important publications to surface during this period were *Christianity Today* (1956); *Christian Economics* (1950), which was associated with the Christian Freedom Foundation; and the publication arm of the NAE *United Evangelical Action*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁷ John G. Turner, "Selling Jesus to Modern America: Campus Crusade for Christ, Evangelical Culture, and Conservative Politics" (doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2005), 16.

¹⁸ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 247.

¹⁹ Kevin M. Kruse, *One Nation Under God: How Corporate American Invented Christian America* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 148-151.

²⁰ Frederick Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility: The Struggle Between Theocracy and Democracy* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press: 1997), 80. For a more complete list of organizations linked to evangelicalism and the New Right in the United States, which cropped up in this period, as well as later, see Juan Maldonado Gago, "Política y religión en la derecha cristiana de los Estados Unidos de América," *La balsa de piedra* 3, (April 2013), 18.

(1942).²¹ By 1961, the American evangelist Billy Graham's magazine *Decision*, founded in the 1950s, had surpassed the one million mark in circulation.²²

Another reason that makes the years between 1945 and 1981 significant, and very much in line with the organizational development of American evangelicalism, was that this was the period in which evangelicalism would vigorously adopt those modern modes of evangelization, which have become undeniably representative of the movement. We have already made brief mention of the growing importance of radio; alongside this we must place the increasingly significant role of televangelism.²³

A final reason for the decision to focus on the majority of the Cold War era as the moment of evangelicalism's emergence is that scholars of American evangelicalism have pointed to events in this period, especially in the 1970s, as causes of evangelical Christianity, an issue we will come to shortly.

American evangelicalism was itself an integral part of sweeping transformations taking place in American society after the Second World War. In the Cold War period, evangelicalism established an intimate and ongoing involvement in American politics. What came to the fore after the Second World War was the evangelical movement's political and social conservatism. This was and is perhaps the most visible aspect of evangelicalism in the United States.

Evangelicalism's eventual embroilment in American politics was one of the most perplexing occurrences if for no other reason than the fact that these Christians pledged, with endless repetition, their apoliticism, and their distance from all things political. The evangelical's utterances, following the Second World War, sounded as if they were an echo of Tertullian, *pater ecclesiae*, who in the context of Rome, pronounced of the Christians "no matter is more alien to us than what matters publicly."²⁴ Tertullian's rejection of the political affairs of humankind, the unifying cultural and sociopolitical activity of Rome, was translated into evangelical parlance. "We are *in* the world, but not *of* the world," evangelicals said endlessly. In this vein, Billy Graham, with whom we will deal further on, in all seriousness and in complete sincerity, proclaimed, "I am completely neutral in

²¹ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 96-98.

²² Protestant Panorama, *Christianity Today*, November 24, 1961, 34.

²³ Sara Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 1-44.

²⁴ Tertullian quoted in Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1998), 74.

politics.”²⁵ This convenient and disarming assertion, which will be touched upon and unraveled throughout this work, serves to mask the reality of evangelicalism in the United States, its situation, its role, and its ongoing political activities. Evangelicals, in the period with which we are concerned, had entered the political realm and at the same protested that, from the political space, they were absent.

Not only has this idea been promoted by evangelicals, the evangelical’s alleged apoliticism up until 1976 is this the general consensus among scholars, as we will come to see.²⁶ There are two notable and extremely important exceptions. One is the historian Matthew Avery Sutton’s 2012 study of Christian fundamentalism during the 1930s and its relation to the New Deal in which he demonstrates the very clear political activity of this religious group.²⁷ The other is the historian Carolyn Renée Dupont’s study of evangelicalism and the Civil Rights Movement in Mississippi. In this work, the question of political activity is linked specifically to the question of race and the Civil Rights Movement. Dupont provides the reader with ample evidence that already in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s Southern evangelicals were working to uphold segregation and a system of what the author calls “white supremacy.”²⁸

This religious movement has, from the beginning, grown at an astonishing pace. Evangelicals seem to be endowed, either at creation or conversion, with preternatural powers of persuasion, attraction, ingathering. Scholars have made note of this characteristic since evangelicalism’s earliest days. One such observer of this new religious community and its powers of expansion was the American historian, who devoted a great part of his work to the subject of religion in the United States, William G. McLoughlin. In his 1967 essay regarding evangelicalism in the United States, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” he said, “The most significant aspect of these groups is that they have increased their membership by 500 to 700 per cent over the past twenty years...”²⁹ In contrast, traditional Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church only enjoyed a 75 to 90 percent

²⁵ Billy Graham quoted in William G. McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1960), 94.

²⁶ See for example, FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 1.

²⁷ Matthew Avery Sutton, “Was FDR the Antichrist? The Birth of Fundamentalist Antiliberalism in a Global Age?” *Journal of American History* 98, no. 4 (March 2012): 1052–74, accessed April 15, 2016.

²⁸ Dupont writes, “In spite of this confessed avoidance of politics, a specific political orientation lay embedded in evangelical doctrine,” Carolyn Renée Dupont, *Mississippi Praying: Southern White Evangelicals and the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1975* (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 8, see also 9-11.

²⁹ William G. McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” *Daedalus* 96, no. 1 (1957): 43, accessed November 22, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027024>.

increase.³⁰ Evangelicalism's implacable expanse, during the second half of the twentieth century, led Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, and Susan Rose, the authors of the 1996 *Exporting the American Gospel*, a study of American evangelicalism's global reach, to proclaim, "Perhaps there are now no limits to the expansion of the Calvinist 'elect.'"³¹ Not only did evangelicalism grow, in terms of people, but in forms, ways in which this religious thought and sentiment were transmitted. With vigor, evangelicals adopted new ways of being, modern modes of existence; the most visible of these were radio, television, film, and later the Internet. The prodigious expansion of evangelicalism means that it was a Christian sect characterized by conversion. Converts came from other Christian traditions, from men and women who could be described as only nominally religious, as well as from outside religion altogether. What was drawing them in? Was it merely the promise of eternal life or was there something more at work?

This phenomenal increase, this almost unbridled growth, swiftly translated into a situation in which vast segments of the American population were suddenly adherents to this religious movement, transformed, totally, by its message. Exact numbers are difficult to ascertain and differ from source to source. One approximate estimate is offered by the sociologist Sara Diamond, who has authored several important works on Christian fundamentalism and its place in right-wing movements in the United States. Diamond affirms that in 1976, 50 million adult Americans considered themselves to be born-again Christians out of a population of some 218 million people.³² More recent statistics, from 2006, place the total of evangelicals in the United States at around 70 million or 25 percent of the population.³³ But it is not the numbers themselves that call to us, that arrest our attention. Ultimately, we are not concerned with exact numbers, such a task is fruitless as it is impossible. And it is not evangelicalism's largeness as such that, for us, holds interest. Instead, it is *why* evangelicalism was so appealing. What has led millions to enter into the evangelical fold? What secret attraction did and does this religion hold over the minds of so many men and women?

The phenomenal increase in numbers that the evangelical movement experienced during the Cold War, these throngs of souls converted, constituted a new and more cohesive source of power, a new force, in the American Republic, which would increasingly throw

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, and Susan D Rose, *Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 258.

³² Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 55.

around the weight of its influence and, when the hour arrived, the evangelical movement would activate this massive base to carry out their political and social objectives.

The religious movement that was forged in the United States, the religious spirit that took root in American soil, has extended, in one form or another, across the globe. It is now a universal phenomenon. In the postwar United States, as evangelicalism began to assert itself, evangelical missionaries were sent far and wide, scouring the globe for new converts, and, just as it had occurred in the United States, millions heeded the call. We may say with assurance that every community finds itself in the presence of evangelicalism, if not physically in the form of a church, then through radio, television or the Internet. The same magnetism that many Americans found and continue to encounter in this message is an experience of people the world over.

While the mystery of evangelicalism has enchanted many, it has provoked equally powerful reactions in many men and women who are not sheep in the evangelical flock; they are reactions of fear and, at times, of loathing, almost always of alarm. It was a fear and anxiety that is, generally speaking, not extended to other religious communities, even communities that exhibit equally fundamentalist tendencies. There are, in our modern world, numerous examples of being religious, of having faith, which do not elicit the slightest elements of fear, a single drop of dread. Do we, for example, fear the monk in his mountain monastery, his entire life ordered to glorify God? At the mention of the Amish, with their *Ordnung*, their strict, fundamentalist religious code, do we cower in horror? These are instances of profound religious faith, yet we do not fear them. No one writes of Amish hordes, for instance, bursting forth from their farms, poised to conquer the United States. The absence of animosity and opposition was not the case with American evangelicalism nor has this animosity and opposition subsided. As an example of the fear that comes to the surface in contemplation of evangelicalism, we may cite Balmer. In his 2006 book *Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens America, an Evangelical's Lament*, he writes, as the title of his book suggests, of the threat that evangelicalism poses to the United States and to its democracy. In Balmer's mind, evangelicalism, in its contemporary form, is equivalent to a "right-wing takeover," which has resulted in "a poisoning of public discourse and a distortion of the [Christian] faith."³⁴ Balmer is not alone in his animus towards the Christian Right, a whole host of other authors

³³ Chris Hedges, *American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 18.

³⁴ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, ix.

and scholars have voiced this same belief: that there is something dangerous, undemocratic and unspeakably other in the evangelical movement.³⁵

Balmer's words, which are representative of the opinions of many outside evangelicalism, are important in that they draw a compelling and seductive distinction. There is often, by scholars and journalists, an attempt to contrast evangelicals with the rest of society. On the one hand, we are confronted with a sometimes subtle and sometimes explicit assertion that evangelicalism is different, undemocratic, an anomaly, an anachronism, out of place, or even a form of proto-fascism. On the other hand, the society out of which evangelicalism emerged is depicted in a wholly benevolent light, as democratic, as just, as righteous. We are often led to see the evangelical on far off plains, as one sees a mustering army, waiting to storm the gates of our citadel of justice, peace, and harmony. The question of the beclouding distinction between evangelicalism and the rest of society, between an antiquated religious movement and modernity will become, as we continue, a fundamental one to keep in mind.³⁶ But, for the moment, we will make the claim—one that runs counter to the prevailing understanding of this form of religiosity—that evangelicalism was begotten, not made—*génitum, non factum*—and it was of the same substance as the society from which it was forged.

It is naggingly curious that such a divisional schema has been erected at all and to what end. When leaned into, does it hold up? When called upon, can answers be given? Or, upon close examination, does the antipodal setting up of an “anti-modern” evangelicalism over against the glorious triumphs of modernity seek to edify something? Is it nothing more than a normative performance? On the one hand, it might serve to cast the evangelical out, to mold him in the fires of alterity, and have him stand opposite us as a statuesque object, a reminder of our boundless goodwill and decency. Or perhaps, on the other hand, this schema that has been permitted to abide in silence and has been elevated to the pursuits and ambitions of the nation, tools in conformity with and in service of its ideals.

This movement flourished in a specific place and in a particular time. Though evangelicalism very quickly spilled over the borders of the United States, sweeping across the world, we are concerned with the emergence of this movement solely in the American Republic. The evangelical movement was in no way a geographically isolated phenomenon,

³⁵ Hedges, *American Fascists*, 18; Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*; Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*.

a remote occurrence. It was not limited to the American South or rural backwoods. Megachurches, for example, are architectural motifs of major urban centers. Evangelical educational institutions were scattered throughout the United States and new ones were founded with each passing year. The Jesus People, children of the counterculture who, in the 1960s and 1970s, converted to evangelicalism, were a phenomenon concentrated in California, an area not known for its staunch conservatism.³⁷ Southern California specifically was an oasis for evangelical churches, sub-movements within evangelicalism, and evangelical organizations.³⁸ And contributors to *Christianity Today* hailed from all corners of the Republic.

The dawn of our period of consideration began with the end of the Second World War, which, from its outbreak until 1945, had occupied the American mind. What arose from the ashes of war and carnage was something disconcerting, something unnerving and terrifyingly unsettling: a certain knowledge that human beings were capable of calculated, methodical, and routine destruction, bloodshed, and annihilation on a previously unimaginable scale. To the eyes of the world, the depths to which human beings could sink were laid once and for all bare and naked.³⁹

The ending of World War II, in the Pacific, took place on the heels of an event that would cast a dark cloud over all future occurrences. The period that followed the war would forever lurk in its shadow. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki also, in their way, revealed the things of which men and women were capable.⁴⁰ While the splitting of the atom was no doubt momentous and terrifying for those who learned of it, there seems to be another aspect of this monumental occurrence that was altogether more alarming. Beneath the umbra of atomic power, what might be said to be all the more confounding was the abandon with which nations would enter into the manufacture and proliferation of these weapons, the macabre willingness with which states would court and entertain the possible

³⁶ Marsden furthers the notion of an insoluble dichotomy between Christian fundamentalism in the United States and modernity or modernism, see George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4, 119, 221.

³⁷ Ronald M. Enroth, Edward E. Ericson Jr., and C. Breckenridge Peters, *The Jesus People: Old-Time Religion in the Age of Aquarius* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972).

³⁸ Gerardo Marti, *Hollywood Faith: Holiness, Prosperity, and Ambition in a Los Angeles Church* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 40-42.

³⁹ John M. Murrin, et al., *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, vol. 2 (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2012), 881, 890. John Mack Faragher et al., *Out of Many: A History of the American People*, vol. 2 (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2012), 745, 748.

⁴⁰ See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of the: Philosophical Fragments Enlightenment*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr and trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

and complete destruction of the world and of life.⁴¹ Beneath the bromide of security, of necessity, floated the accepted fatalism of destruction. Against this situation, the individual seemed powerless to move, seemed awash in the loss of agency.

Reeling from the stark possibilities, which human beings were capable of unleashing, American society created and was forced to confront new foes abroad, most significantly with the Soviet Union. After the Second World War and the Potsdam Conference of 1945, relations between the Soviets and the Americans became increasingly tenser.⁴² The failure of the Baruch Plan in 1946, a proposal which sought to end nuclear proliferation between the United States and the USSR, and the subsequent Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, added further strain to a relationship that was already crumbling.⁴³ By 1947, the Truman Doctrine was already attempting to thwart Soviet expansion in Greece and Turkey and, beneath the moniker of containment, the United States implemented a national security policy of global opposition to communism.⁴⁴

The struggle playing itself out abroad had far-reaching domestic consequences in the United States. A fear crept into the porous regions of the American mind and its fires were devotedly stoked, which is to say that the sentiment was both a genuine apprehension in the face of Soviet expansion and nuclear capabilities as well as manufactured, fomented.⁴⁵ This fear engendered a zealous anticommunism in almost all sectors of American society and reached its zenith, as is well known, with the Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy's campaign against communism.⁴⁶ The members of the flourishing evangelical movement did not live isolated from the anticommunist activities of the senator from Wisconsin. Conservative Protestants in the United States wholeheartedly supported McCarthy, as the historian Robert P. Ericksen shows, during his brief yet intense campaign of ideological purification.⁴⁷ American evangelicalism of the post-World War II era was not outside the reach of anticommunism's unforgiving grip, this new political technique; instead, fear and animosity towards communism moved beyond McCarthy becoming, during the Cold War, one of the abiding preoccupations of the evangelical mind. American evangelicalism, its

⁴¹ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power.*, 892.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 908.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 909.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 909-910.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 923-924.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 925-926.

⁴⁷ Robert P. Ericksen, "The Role of American Churches in the McCarthy Era," *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 3, no. 1 (May 1990): 46-48, accessed March 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43750635>.

faithful, its institutions, its organs of dissemination, quickly grew to be a bastion of anticommunist sentiment.

While the United States had fingered its mortal enemy, the specter of communism, with evangelicals participating fully in this national ritual of condemnation, new voices were rising in protest, in dissent, and in rebellion. We might recall a myriad of changes that were occurring, from the 1950s onward, but the most notable of these acts of decision was, without doubt, the Civil Rights Movement.⁴⁸

As a final note, the backdrop of evangelicalism's emergence was one of quickening and kaleidoscopic economic change. From the early 1950s to the beginnings of the 1970s, the United States enjoyed stable economic growth, spurred on by the expansion of consumption.⁴⁹ It is therefore the case, generally speaking, that evangelicalism developed, expanded and flourished not in the midst of economic woe or acute poverty but in the pleasures and delights of unprecedented economic prosperity. The economic transformations, which the United States was undergoing in this period, also brought about a momentous reconfiguration of spatial organization and of society. Following the 1947 success of Levittown, the housing development in New York, suburbia soon spread across the United States, altering, perhaps permanently, the geographic make-up, social organization, and mode of living of Americans.⁵⁰ The federal government through policies that provided financial assistance and incentives for purchasing a home directly promoted housing ownership.⁵¹ By the 1950s, 53.8 million Americans were living in the suburbs; by the 1970s, the number had grown to 75.5 million.⁵²

Through the spread of suburban home ownership, which, in turn, fostered the economic necessity of automobiles, as well as new consumer goods, the so-called American Dream was increasingly linked to material consumption. But even here, in the realm of dream and fantasy, divisions abounded. The march to the suburbs was one that was largely undertaken by middle-class whites and financial institutions reinforced this trend by awarding the majority of loans needed to purchase a home to white males.⁵³ This not only created an economic rift between whites and minorities but fostered a physical and mental place of separation in which whites were shielded from multi-ethnic neighborhoods.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power.*, 968-977.

⁴⁹ On the flourishing of the "affluent society" see *Ibid.*, 947-948.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 933-934.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Faragher, *Out of Many*, 798.

⁵³ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 934-935.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 933.

This brief overview, which is meant to help us situate the times in which evangelicals were living, is by no means comprehensive. But it is in the midst of these external events that evangelicalism was born and it is the genesis of this movement, the question of origin, with which this dissertation is ultimately concerned.

“Evangelical” is an umbrella term for a community of Christians, which implies specific theological propositions, historical trends and antagonisms within American Christianity, and an admixture of different forms of Protestantism many of which appeared in the United States in the twentieth century.

Who were those men and women who bound themselves to the evangelical movement? Is “evangelical” equivalent with the term “fundamentalist?” In the naming of this particular Christian tradition, which only sheds minimal light on its meaning, evangelicals looked back to the American past in hopes of finding the word which might best gather in and transmit their sentiments and aims. Already in the nineteenth century, evangelical was used to characterize those Christians who, with a clear focus on social reform, were working to spread the Word of God.⁵⁵ Then, in the nineteenth century, social reform centered on, among other things, the abolition of slavery, ending the surge of alcoholism, and the education of women.⁵⁶ In the nineteenth century, the impetus of reform, which characterized American evangelicalism in that period, the desire to better American society and free history’s forgotten ones, coincided with the spirit of romanticism that emerged in the United States and Europe during that century.⁵⁷

The term “evangelical” was ultimately connected to evangelist, which is Greek in origin. *Euangelistes* meant, evangelist, that is, “one who brings the Good News,” the one who bears the Gospel of Christ’s salvation.⁵⁸ Indeed, the spreading of the message of God, the Christian plan of salvation as evangelicals sometimes called it, was an integral part of the twentieth-century evangelicalism, is the subject of this dissertation.

Being that twentieth-century evangelicalism issued from the womb of the Christian Church, evangelicals themselves along with historians, sociologists, scholars, and other observers have, when the question of definition has arisen, turned back to religious and

⁵⁵ Randall Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens America, an Evangelical's Lament* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), xiv-xv.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Carmen de la Guardia, “El Gran Despertar. Románticas y reformistas en Estados Unidos y España,” *Historia Social* 31 (1998): 11-13, 15-19, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40340673>.

⁵⁸ “Evangelist,” *Online Etymology Dictionary*, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=evangelist&allowed_in_frame=0

theological categories to delineate that which was and is evangelicalism. In this search to define the movement, what comes together are the five cardinal tenets of evangelical Christianity. George M. Marsden, a scholar of religion in the United States, in *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, a collection of essays published in 1991, formally expounded upon the guiding theological aspects of evangelical religion:

The essential evangelical beliefs include (1) the Reformation doctrine of the final authority of the Bible, (2) the real historical character of God's saving work recorded in Scripture, (3) salvation to eternal life based on the redemptive work of Christ, (4) the importance of evangelism and missions, and (5) the importance of a spiritually transformed life.⁵⁹

The fourth elemental belief of evangelicalism already reveals the direction of the evangelical movement. It was a movement outward, into the space we call world.

Slowly, as the distance from the Second World War grew in time, a new belief began, here and there, to make itself known, and it was one that we add to Marsden's five defining characteristics. This belief was to have a considerable influence on the hearts and minds of the evangelical faithful: the doctrine that all realms of life should be brought under what evangelicals commonly call the "Lordship of Christ."⁶⁰ The precepts, infallibility, and authority of the Bible, the teachings of the Savior, were intended, thought evangelicals, to form the superstructure of all things, to infuse all institutions, all beings, with a new spirit. Not only was Christ's ubiquitous lordship believed to be desirable, but also feasible, a feat that could and would be accomplished. The idea that Christ should dominate all realms of human existence is one that we will encounter time and again in this dissertation.

In twentieth-century American evangelicalism, the doctrine of rebirth was a crucial way of understanding religion and one's relationship towards God. The German-born historian Fritz Stern said of this Christian doctrine, "Rebirth signified the gift of a new spiritual life through Jesus, the transformation of a sinful man into a creature of grace."⁶¹

⁵⁹ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 4-5. For more on the authority of the Bible in evangelicalism see Billy Graham, "Biblical Authority in Evangelism," in *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank G. Gaebelin (New York: Meredith Press, 1966), 18-24. On the inerrancy of Scripture in evangelicalism, see in Everett F. Harrison, "Criteria of Biblical Inerrancy," in *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank G. Gaebelin (New York: Meredith Press, 1966), 62-67; FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 2-3.

⁶⁰ See Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 79; Richard John Neuhaus, "Why Wait for the Kingdom? The Theonomist Temptation," *First Things*, May 1990, <http://www.firstthings.com/article/1990/05/002-why-wait-for-the-kingdom-the-theonomist-temptation>.

⁶¹ Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), 49.

Another important consideration in the discussion of evangelicalism is the prevalence, in American Protestantism, of two millennial beliefs, which provide believers with a framework with which to interpret scripture, understand the world, and make predictions concerning the future. These eschatological theologies contain two fundamental components. First, the focal point around which these beliefs circulate is the future moment of the Parousia or Christ's second coming. The second pertains to the establishment of the earthly rule, a millennial kingdom. In evangelicalism, the predominant millennial belief is premillennialism.⁶² This eschatological vision centers on a certain conceptualization of the state of the world and places an overwhelming importance on the alleged and ultimate degeneracy of life. So corrupt and vile were the world and humans, urges premillennialism, that hopes of redemption, attempts to reform or ameliorate the conditions of the world, were efforts in vain. Because of this ultimate degeneracy, premillennialists maintain that the kingdom of Christ, with its specific temporal mandate of one thousand years, will be established only after the Savior had returned to Jerusalem clothed in celestial triumph.⁶³ It is widely accepted amongst scholars that premillennialism and its ideas about the forlornness of the world led fundamentalists and evangelicals, from the 1940s onward, to strict separation, both from ecclesiastic heresy in the church, as well as from the corruption and folly of humankind. Armed with premillennialism, many evangelicals abstained from or at least pretended to shun politics as a phenomenon of the unregenerate world.

The counterpart of this eschatology is postmillennialism. Premillennialism claims that Christ's return will precede the establishment of the heavenly kingdom. Postmillennialism, on the contrary, sees the creation of the thousand-year reign as an achievable earthly possibility. After the establishment of this kingdom, this holy reign, Christ will return.⁶⁴ Postmillennialism inspires its adherents with the belief that the world can be bettered, that change can be created, that a Christlike reign can be established. In the United States during the nineteenth century, postmillennialism, contrary to the Cold War evangelical movement, was the predominant eschatological theology.⁶⁵

⁶² According to Balmer: "Premillennial sentiments and apocalyptic prophecies continue to inform evangelical views of the world," *Blessed Assurance*, 52.

⁶³ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 100.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Steven R. Pointer, "American Postmillennialism: Seeing the Glory," *Christian History, Christianity Today*, 1999, <http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-61/american-postmillennialism-seeing-glory.html>. see also FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 5.

Premillennialism and its unerring faith in the ultimate corruption of man and world has lead to another important theological principal, one that has far reaching social consequences. Premillennialism has created an ecclesiastical practice instating varying degrees of separation between the faithful and the den of corruption found in the surrounding culture. Both fundamentalists and evangelicals, during the twentieth century, have preached removal from all that was ungodly. The doctrine of separatism is more pronounced in fundamentalism, while evangelicalism has exhibited a more conciliatory approach to society, politics, and the rest of the world.⁶⁶ But just to what extent the fundamentalist, in contradistinction to the evangelical, was separate is, to put it plainly, entirely suspect. The arch-fundamentalist Jerry Falwell, for example, was the mastermind behind the infamous political coalition the Moral Majority, which was founded in 1979. Falwell and other fundamentalists were intimately involved in religious television programs. And amongst strict fundamentalists, the discussion of politics and society were never far away. In the United States, during the period with which we are concerned, there can be no doubt that the notion of fundamentalist separation enjoyed the most convenient fluidity.⁶⁷

Equally important to the theological propositions, which govern the twentieth-century evangelical movement, are the historical trends, theological debates and divisions, and fierce antagonisms within American Protestantism that emerged in the second part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.

Higher biblical criticism appeared first in Germany and quickly spread to the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century.⁶⁸ The theological exponents of these new forms of Biblical hermeneutics developed new methodologies for interpreting and understanding the Bible. Higher biblical criticism takes into consideration the social, cultural, and political context in which a specific text emerged. This type of biblical exegesis created room for new theological interpretations, offering a challenge to long accepted biblical truths, and questioned the authority of biblical texts.⁶⁹ Higher criticism's opponents claimed, in effect, that, by pointing to the original meaning or intent of a passage of Scripture and not to the accepted interpretation, these new trends demythologized the Biblical narrative and unmoored Christian dogmas.

⁶⁶ Marsden, in *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 6

⁶⁷ Marsden, in *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 112, attempts to explain away this contradiction, wherein the fundamentalist avowing strict separation, becomes hopelessly intertwined in modern technologies, American politics, and the happenings of society by saying that this is the residual effect of the postmillennial tradition in the United States.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁶⁹ Maldonado Gago, "Política y religión en la derecha cristiana de los Estados Unidos de América," 14.

The inroads made by higher criticism, as well as the discoveries and advance of science, especially Darwinism and the theory of evolution, opened up a gulf between liberal Christians and conservatives in the nineteenth century.⁷⁰ The divisions would intensify in the ensuing decades eventually spawning the birth of Christian fundamentalism. Between 1910 and 1915, conservative Protestants published *The Fundamentals* a textual codification of both their beliefs and their opposition to errant currents within the American Church.⁷¹ From the atmosphere of these controversies, Christian fundamentalism took its first breaths. This form of religious fundamentalism is often seen as a reactionary movement towards a growing process of secularization.⁷² Yet with Christian fundamentalism as it emerged during the first decades of the twentieth century, we see that it was not coalescing in opposition to forces of secularization outside the walls of the Church; instead, it was a response to a perceived heresy within the Christian community itself. At least initially, the reason for the fundamentalist emergence was theological. The schism and fierce antagonism between the liberal and conservative groupings of Christianity remained a prominent aspect of evangelicalism during the Cold War. As we shall see, evangelicals were highly attuned to the activities, theological interpretations, and political affiliations of their more liberal co-religionists. The Social Gospel, the Death of God School, and Situational Ethics, for example, were all twentieth-century liberal Protestant theological schools that never ceased to conjure up the evangelical's ire.⁷³ Thus, the shape contemporary evangelicalism took was very much derived from the direction of liberal Christianity. Evangelicalism was, in numerous ways, the antithesis of liberal Christian belief and practice.

From the second part of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, the gulf between those who accepted biblical truths and the believers who began to question certain aspects of Christian tradition occasioned a new source of unity in American Christendom; so, too, did it make way for fresh wounds of division. While the Protestant institution of the denomination remained an important vehicle in American religion, the small divisions, the infinite denominational schisms, which had for so long characterized religion in the United States, all began, as the twentieth century progressed, to fade away. What took their place was a new unity, a new solidarity, an ecumenism of unified and holy opposition. Now many disparate groups were united chiefly in their opposition to what they believed were apostate forms of Christianity. The lines of separation were no longer drawn

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God* (New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group, 2000), xii.

around competing Protestant denominations but instead between two camps: the conservative Christians who believed in all points of Christian dogma, on the one hand, and liberal Christians, on the other.

These newly forged motifs of unity and division would persist in American Christianity through the remainder of the twentieth century. The contemporary evangelical Church, the great champion of orthodoxy, which was growing rapidly after the Second World War, was and is a highly varied movement within the branch of Protestant Christianity. It was and continues to be a shifting amalgam of different organizations, independent churches, a mosaic of denominations, television ministries, and religious leaders and figures with diverse degrees of celebrity. The twentieth-century evangelical movement draws from some of the oldest of American religious traditions. Randall Balmer, an Episcopalian priest, respected scholar of American religion, and an individual who has written extensively on the evangelical movement remarked, “To this day, evangelicalism in America bears the marks of those initial influences—the obsessive introspection of the Puritans, the doctrinal precisionism of the Presbyterians, and the emphasis on a warm-hearted, affective spirituality from Pietism.”⁷⁴

Pentecostalism has also been an exceedingly influential Christian sect in contemporary evangelicalism, both in terms of belief and in terms of evangelicalism’s style of worship.⁷⁵ First emerging among socially and economically marginalized groups at the start of the twentieth century, the message and appeal of this form of worship soon spread. The movement derives its name from the Christian feast of Pentecost, when the Holy Spirit was said to have filled Christ’s apostles and provide them with spiritual gifts, most memorable was the gift of glossolalia, the ability to speak in tongues. The early founders of Pentecostalism seized upon the New Testament passage (Acts of the Apostles 2: 1-31) and interpreted it as a repeatable pattern. For Pentecostals, who are literal interpreters of the Bible, the story in Acts was not a profound and unique occasion in the first moments of Christianity so much as it was a system of worship that could be reproduced. A believer, Pentecostalism promises, can also be filled with the Holy Spirit; receive healing, protection, and other gifts through this benediction, as well as speak in tongues.⁷⁶ Pentecostalism’s vibrant growth, their emphasis on the power of the Holy Spirit, their belief in divine healing,

⁷³ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 29-30, 101-102.

⁷⁴ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, xiv.

⁷⁵ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 42-44; Marsden, *Fundamentalism in American Culture*, 236.

⁷⁶ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 112-14.

and their exuberant and emotional religious services have all left their mark on the evangelical movement. Pentecostalism is now one of the fastest growing Christian movements in the world, with a sizable presence in Latin America.⁷⁷

With regard to the evangelical movement, the concept of “fundamentalism” is one of supreme importance. This concept has two predominant meanings. On the one hand, in the popular use of the concept, we encounter the notion of a quality, a characteristic, which can appear in any religious tradition. Here, the concept figures as an equivalent of religious “extremism” or “*intégrisme*.”⁷⁸ As such, one can speak of Christian fundamentalism or, for example, Islamic fundamentalism.

The concept of “fundamentalism” and the connotation of doctrinal intransigence that it imparts were born out of a particular Christian tradition in the United States that, as we have indicated, began to flourish at the beginning of the twentieth century, specifically after the First World War.⁷⁹ The evangelical movement, to be precise, sprang up from the Christian fundamentalist community. In points of theology, the two are absolutely identical. The key driving theological positions: the divine inspiration of the Bible and the literal interpretation of Scripture, are shared by both evangelicals and Christian fundamentalists. The famous evangelical Harold John Ockenga (1905-1985) attested to this binding unity in 1960. “Evangelical theology,” he clarified without equivocation, “is synonymous with fundamentalism or orthodoxy. In doctrine the evangelical and the fundamentalist are one. It is a mistake for an evangelical to divorce himself from historic fundamentalism as some have sought to do.”⁸⁰

Despite the theological affinities between Christian fundamentalism and evangelicalism, as well as their united opposition to liberal Christianity, scholars have insisted that the two are essentially different groups. In 2005, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Kristen Dombek entitled “Shopping for the End of the World: *Left Behind*, Evangelical Culture, and Apocalyptic Consumerism,” the author wrote of the complexity of definition and differentiation: “‘Fundamentalist,’ ‘evangelical,’ and ‘conservative Christian’ have been used somewhat interchangeably in journalistic and academic commentaries...but

⁷⁷ Ed Stetzer, “Why Do These Pentecostals Keep Growing?” *Christianity Today*, November 11, 2014. <http://www.christianitytoday.com/edstetzer/2014/november/why-are-pentecostals-growing.html>.

⁷⁸ Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, 182.

⁷⁹ FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 5.

⁸⁰ Harold John Ockenga, “Resurgent Evangelical Leadership,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 13. In 1956, another conservative Christian publication, *Christian Life*, also argued that Christian fundamentalism and evangelicalism were essentially equivalent; see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 191-192.

in fact have quite distinct meanings to insiders and to church historians.”⁸¹ She did not go on to point out these essential differences. Another attempt to draw a distinction between the two branches comes from the eminent American historian George M. Marsden; his distinction appears to be one of style. “A fundamentalist,” said Marsden, “is an evangelical who is angry about something...Fundamentalists are not just religious conservatives, they are conservatives who are willing to take a stand and to fight.”⁸² The distinction is unconvincing, for, as we shall see, the “militancy” Marsden observes in fundamentalism was equally identifiable in their evangelical counterpart during the Cold War. For this dissertation, these minor differences are not overly important and we will primarily use the term “evangelical.” But, that said, we can understand evangelicalism as a fundamentalist movement in both meanings of the concept. On the one hand, evangelicalism has exhibited quite clearly during the Cold War the credal “*intégrisme*” of a fundamentalist religion and the desire to impose a creed over other areas of life. On the other, evangelicalism emerged from and has been closely related to fundamentalism, the independent branch of Christianity that cropped up in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Other designations have entered popular and academic parlance. Such labels as the Christian Right, the Religious Right, the theocratic right, or even the radical right have become for the most part synonymous and interchangeable with evangelical Christianity in the United States. These various names are political conceptualizations and what they evoke is, above all, the conservative politics of evangelical Christianity. There is no doubt that the majority of evangelicals were conservative politically and socially speaking, but this is only one manifestation of being evangelical, only a single aspect of what was coming together beneath the umbrella of evangelicalism. Fringe elements within evangelicalism, purporting to be politically progressive or liberal, do exist. Once such group, the Sojourners, coalesced around the publication of the same name in the 1970s.⁸³ Academics enjoy dragging out and putting this particular community on display as an incontrovertible example of the abounding diversity of the evangelical movement. The impact of this group on evangelicalism in the United States was and is negligible. Moreover, beyond politics, to what extent Sojourners represent an essential contrast to the larger evangelical community remains an important question. With respect to the various labels that have cropped up, we will, in this dissertation, eschew such terminology.

⁸¹ Kristen Dombek, “Shopping for the End of the World: Left Behind, Evangelical Culture, and Apocalyptic Consumerism” (doctoral dissertation, New York University, 2005), 4.

⁸² Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 1.

Theories of Origin

The secondary literature on American evangelical Christianity is vast, fruitful, and, as a whole, comprehensive. The actors are known. Their lines have been heard and accounted for. Their motives have been recorded. The fears, hopes, beliefs, and desires of evangelicals have been cataloged. When one begins to comb through the secondary literature devoted to the study of evangelicalism it becomes clear that, for some, there was an understanding that evangelicalism represented something altogether unprecedented and unforeseen in the history of religion. McLoughlin, in the essay cited earlier, proclaimed that evangelicalism in the United States constituted a new and third force in Christendom, which was vying for the world's attention over against Roman Catholicism and traditional Protestant denominations.⁸⁴ In *Exporting the American Gospel*, the authors said of the rise of this global movement, "We are clearly in a new age of religion."⁸⁵

We would do well to consider, before moving on to the various theories that have been offered up to satisfy our curiosity concerning evangelicalism's origins, important studies on this religious community. We will also examine the reasons why Bauman's understanding of religious fundamentalism forms a central part of this work in history. We will also consider the debates surrounding the central concept of this dissertation: identity.

We may begin our brief analysis of the secondary literature with the American sociologist Sara Diamond, for she has written extensively on the subject and her contribution to the study of evangelicalism is tremendous. One of the most important observations made by Diamond, as she recounts in the meticulously researched *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States*, written in 1995, was that evangelicalism was one of the largest subsets within a wider right-wing political and social movement, which would work its way into the fabric of the United States after the Second World War.⁸⁶ To emerge alongside evangelicalism and in harmonious tandem with it, was the anti-communist movement, fomented by many American corporations and groups such as the John Birch Society.⁸⁷ The neoconservative movement, in the United States, also arose in parallel fashion to evangelical Christianity.⁸⁸ In this work,

⁸³ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 74-75.

⁸⁴ McLoughlin, "Is There a Third Force in Christendom?" 43.

⁸⁵ Brouwer, *Exporting the American Gospel*, 2.

⁸⁶ Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁸⁸ Maldonado Gago, "Política y religión en la derecha cristiana de los Estados Unidos de América," 7-8.

Diamond pays close attention to the social events of the 1970s, events she sees as threatening to evangelical values, to their sense of family, and their overall conceptualization of the world. In Diamond's history, the figure of Jimmy Carter also played a pivotal role, who, being himself a born-again Christian, for a passing moment, was the embodiment of evangelical political hopes. The evangelical support and anticipation that was generated around his presidential campaign would swiftly dissipate once evangelicals found that President Carter was unwilling to implement a conservative political agenda such as opposing the legalization of abortion.⁸⁹ The Carter administration's relation towards communism, informs Diamond, was equally disappointing to evangelicals. The second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), which Carter worked to establish with the U.S.S.R., gave anticommunist elements in the United States and within the evangelical community an opportunity to oppose the born-again President. A campaign was launched to block the ratification of the agreement, which also featured a film that reached a wide audience, *The SALT Syndrome*. Opposition to the nuclear weapons agreement stemmed from the assertion that ran counter to a deep-seated and long cultivated anticommunist sentiment in the American, evangelical Church, which viewed any compromise with communist potentates as a fundamental and outright betrayal.⁹⁰

In *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right*, written in 1989 and another important work in the literature on evangelicalism, Diamond explores this religiopolitical movement as an isolated phenomenon. In this study, certain aspects of evangelicalism, most notably televangelism, come to the fore as essential in understanding the movement. Through Diamond's book, it becomes clear that evangelicalism is a multi-layered interaction of groups working in tandem and separately towards a common goal. Diamond writes:

The Christian Right is a complex coalition of media ministries, political lobbies and missionary groups active in foreign affairs. Because of the overlapping nature of all of its elements, and because the Christian Right is a movement in constant flux, it is difficult to describe the activities of any one group or individual without simultaneously talking about half a dozen other entities and a whole series of public policy issues.⁹¹

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 137-138. Marsden remarked, in *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 63, that evangelicals came to the realization that "Having a Southern Baptist and a Democrat [Carter] elected to the White House did not advance their party's cause."

⁹¹ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 45.

Diamond also gives space to lesser-known yet equally important aspects of this growing religious community. One example was the shepherding movement, which, by the 1970s, had become an integral part of the expanding evangelical Church:

Across the United States countless ‘charismatic’ and ‘fundamentalist’ churches (with estimated memberships totaling in the hundreds of thousands if not a few million) are broken into rigidly authoritarian ‘cell groups’ which require believers to ‘submit’ to ‘shepherds’ hierarchically above them. The frequent and ongoing incidence of psychological abuse in these churches is part of the untold story of the Christian Right.⁹²

In *Spiritual Warfare*, Diamond sheds light on another important aspect, which lurks at the fringes of evangelicalism: Identity Christianity. This segment of the Christian Church, according to Diamond, affirms that God had established a covenant with white Anglo-Saxons. Those who, by some mistake of nature, were not born into this holy covenant are referred to by Identity Christians as “mud people.”⁹³ For this extreme and racist element of American evangelicalism, Jews are thought to be the offspring of Satan.⁹⁴ Identity Christianity’s figuration of the Jew as something unholy stems from this group’s assertion that the Jews had, in the remote past, usurped the identity of God’s chosen people, thereby disenfranchising whites and depriving them of their true place of splendor and preeminence.⁹⁵ The number of Identity Christians in the United States was estimated, at the time of Diamond’s book, to run into the tens of thousands, and while Diamond assures us that many of their ideas do not resonate with evangelicalism as a whole, there are instances of what Diamond describes as “crossover.”⁹⁶

One of the most important insights that Diamond’s scholarship can provide us is the sweeping variety that characterized evangelical Christianity in the United States. Thus, when we describe evangelicalism as a movement, we would do well to keep in mind the understanding that it was one that was not governed centrally and uniformly. Instead, different groups, denominations, associations, media conglomerates, and theological concerns would play out independently. Despite this apparent diversity, we will find in

⁹² *Ibid.*, vii.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 27, 139-141.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 139-140.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 140.

evangelicalism common and unifying ways of being, understanding, as well as shared social and political aims.⁹⁷

Another significant contribution to the study of evangelicalism comes from Randall Balmer, whom we have already mentioned. In *Thy Kingdom Come*, a 2006 study of evangelicalism from its emergence up until the first decade of the twenty-first century, Balmer, himself a Christian, sees in the Christian Right, a radical departure from the historical evangelicalism of the nineteenth-century.⁹⁸ In this, Balmer is of course correct. There are numerous and important differences between the nineteenth century evangelical and the contemporary evangelical movement, which was forged and hardened in the Cold War. The evangelical of the nineteenth century, for example, looked to free the slave; the evangelical of the twentieth century preached and toiled to maintain a system of terror and racial segregation. Evangelicals in the nineteenth century worked to educate women; the Cold War evangelical endeavored to keep American women confined to their kingdom of domesticity. Other differences between these two groups will become, as we shall demonstrate in this dissertation, apparent. We have already seen how, for Balmer, evangelicalism of the twentieth-century emerged as a threat to American democracy. To this, too, we have made allusion and the dichotomy of a democratic society, on the one hand, plagued and besieged by the undemocratic Christian Right, on the other, is a predominant feature of the historical and sociological literature on American evangelicalism. Much of Balmer's study is devoted to examining how evangelicals sought to intervene and even undermine democratic processes. One poignant example of this occurs, to Balmer's mind, with American public education. The chapter entitled "Deconstructing Democracy," deals with the "war on public education" that Balmer envisions evangelicals to be waging.⁹⁹ Closely connected to the question of public education in the United States is the debate surrounding the science curriculum of public schools and the efforts on the part of evangelicals to promote and institute creationism and intelligent design, as opposed to the theory of evolution, which Balmer explores in the following chapter. One of the most interesting aspects of Balmer's work is the final chapter, which deals with the "anti-environmentalism of the Religious Right," an evangelical stone that, for the most part, has

⁹⁷ Some of Diamond's other works on evangelicalism include: *Facing the Wrath: Confronting the Right in Dangerous Times* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1996); *Not by Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right* (New York: Guilford Press, 1998).

⁹⁸ Randall Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens America, an Evangelical's Lament* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 177.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 71-108.

been left unturned.¹⁰⁰ While evangelicalism's relation to nature is too complex to be examined here, the relation was governed, at least on the level of appearance, by a unique and suspiciously convenient interpretation of Scripture. The question of man's dominion over the earth has long been a component of Christianity. Amongst evangelicals in the 1970s and 1980s, notions of care and stewardship were jettisoned for ideas that fit in with the current economic climate—exploitation. There was floating around evangelical circles, Balmer shares, the idea that “God had placed all of nature at the disposal of humanity.”¹⁰¹ God, evangelicals preached, had given man “dominion” over the earth and its creatures. Thus, perhaps quite effectively for their antiecological crusade, evangelicals rummaged through their holy texts in search of divine dispensation for the actions of men and women in the twentieth century. Evangelicals met the growing environmental movement, which meant to protect and preserve the natural world, with increasing opposition, asserting that God had given humans free reign over nature; it could therefore be destroyed as humans saw fit. Incredulity towards the prospect that nature should be safeguarded and visceral disagreement with the notion that man had a hand in climate change had been added unto being evangelical.¹⁰²

Despite the fact that Balmer is a respected historian of American religion and that his research has afforded those who look closely at evangelicalism with new insights, our interest with Balmer stems from another source. Balmer, perhaps more than any other historian, has been preoccupied with the question of evangelicalism's origin, and provides his own theory as to the genesis of this movement in the United States. For this reason, Balmer will accompany us throughout this dissertation.

Another fruitful way in which this particular branch of Christianity has been studied is through direct contact with various communities that fall under the umbrella of evangelicalism. An example of one scholar who has taken this sociological approach is Nancy Ammerman, an American sociologist and currently a professor at Boston University. In *Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World*, from 1987, Ammerman tells of the year spent with a fundamentalist church in the northern part of the United States in the hopes of gleaning a better understanding of how fundamentalists communities function, what relationships are forged, what challenges these communities face. In Ammerman's

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 144.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 143-165.

work, attention is paid to the composition of the church congregation itself.¹⁰³ The age, former religious affiliations of the congregants, and income are all aspects that are brought under consideration. These types of studies afford a glimpse into the complexity of religious life: the expectations, demands, and the hopes that characterize a religious community.

The British scholar Karen Armstrong is another academic who has made fascinating contributions to the study of religion, particularly religious fundamentalism. Armstrong, once a Catholic nun, left the religious life to pursue, amongst other things, the study of religion. Armstrong's avenue of approach to religion is one of comparison. Many of her works deal with religious belief and practice in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. *The Battle for God*, written in 2000, details the almost simultaneous emergence of religious fundamentalism in all three of these monotheistic religions, though Armstrong painstakingly notes the different contexts and unique circumstances out of which fundamentalism, in these three religious traditions, came to be an inextricable part of modern life. Armstrong, in *The Battle for God*, also posits her own theory as to the genesis of religious fundamentalism, which we will explore as we move forward.¹⁰⁴

Another area of the secondary literature we may consider is what we might call the journalistic subgenre. With respect to evangelicalism, as its influence spread, as it increasingly became an undeniable element of American politics, and as conflicts between evangelicals and the outside world, here and there, began to arise, it is unsurprising that journalists would also take note of the new occurrences taking place in American religion. These journalistic works are copious in number and many of them are well researched, offering unique insights into this American phenomenon. These works deserved to be studied and included in our discussion. One such example is *American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America*, written in 2007 by Chris Hedges an American war correspondent and author of numerous books, mostly dealing with American culture.¹⁰⁵ Hedges' book, one to which we will make reference throughout this dissertation, is important to us for two primary reasons: his enthralling treatment of what he calls "the cult of masculinity" and the culture of despair out of which American evangelicalism emerged in the twentieth century. For, evangelicalism has certainly developed a discourse cut through by traditional understandings of masculine and feminine. Another book, which we might

¹⁰³ Nancy Tatom Ammerman, *Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

¹⁰⁴ Armstrong, *The Battle for God*.

place into this genre, is *Eternal Hostility: The Struggle Between Theocracy and Democracy* by Frederick Clarkson.¹⁰⁶ Clarkson, in his 1997 work, focused on the emergence of evangelicalism as a political phenomenon, lending special attention to the activities, sometimes violent, of anti-abortion groups. Clarkson also examined, at considerable length, various theological aspects of evangelicalism, some of which we will encounter in other parts of this dissertation. There is a considerable problem with many of these works, a problem to which we have already made allusion. Many of the journalistic as well as academic studies on American evangelicalism, as the titles of these two books suggest, create a strict division between the United States' democratic society and the flourishing evangelicalism, which lay in wait to besiege it. The extreme dichotomy of war and democracy, theocracy and freedom, are some of the ideas that are used to create a framework in which evangelicalism is supposedly to be understood. Clarkson's final chapter, "Defending Democracy," which reads as a guide for the coming apocalypse, only serves to reinforce evangelicalism's allegedly increasing distance from modern American society.

With a brief survey of the secondary literature on evangelicalism, one will undoubtedly come to the realization that when, evangelicalism is under discussion, the presence of televangelism is never distant. Televangelism is both a subject of study and a primary source, a way in which to approach this religious movement. We will touch upon some of the scholarship that is concerned with televangelism in the section on the evangelical and technique (in Chapter IV).¹⁰⁷

We can now reflect on the different lines of interpretation and debates regarding the origins of this movement that historians, political theorists, and other social scientists have opened up. Despite the fact that the literature on American evangelicalism is extensive there is an unspoken debate raging about the origins of the movement itself. Though much has been said, the question of evangelicalism's genesis remains a *lacuna*. When the secondary

¹⁰⁵ See, among many other writings, Chris Hedges, *War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); *Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spectacle* (New York: Nation Books, 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*.

¹⁰⁷ Quentin J. Schultze, *Televangelism and American Culture: The Business of Popular Religion* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991); Steve Bruce, *Pray TV: Televangelism in America* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Bobby C. Alexander, *Televangelism Reconsidered: Ritual in the Search for Human Community* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994); Jeffrey K. Hadden, and Anson Shupe, *Televangelism: Power and Politics on God's Frontier* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1988); Razelle Frankl, *Televangelism: The Marketing of Popular Religion* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987).

literature is taken as a whole, this *lacuna*, in the distance, appears as a confusion: numerous theories have been promoted, which, very often, contradict one another and offer radically different ideas of *why* evangelicalism, as a distinct phenomenon of the Cold War, come into being. Various scholars have come to the fore with their theories, and we accept these theories in that they signify for us something of great import, namely, that evangelicalism was not simply a reassertion of historical Christianity, it was not merely a continuation of already existing religious trends, one could not point only to the past in hopes of unearthing expedient answers and solutions to the perplexing question of this movement's promulgation. Instead, there seems to be an understanding amongst scholars that, in the midst of evangelicalism, one was encountering something unique, even inexplicable, and whose origins needed to be prodded and explored. Why evangelicalism surfaced as it did and has continued to enjoy, throughout the world, such agitated support remains as much a mystery as a lingering question.

Almost all of these different theories as to the decisive moment, which allowed for evangelicalism's birth, have one thing in common: they center on events in the period in which we are examining, indicating a tacit agreement that this historical period was decisive for evangelical Christianity in the United States, as we have said before. Thus, we reiterate: the period between 1945 and 1981, were the years of solidification, the decades in which countless millions worked, alone and in tandem, through prayer and conversion, through television and song, a new spirit into the world. And these efforts would extend the evangelical's voice into the farthest reaches of the globe, making it impossible to simply ignore their call, to shun their presence.

The question of origins, the quest to pick out one single event in history from which all other events and occurrences flow has overshadowed the entire discussion of this religious and political phenomenon.¹⁰⁸ This dispute does not always make itself known explicitly; very often it lurks in the shadows, hanging over what is said about evangelicalism like a dark cloud, a question that has not been asked. We must, before working our way to Bauman, and in order to move more freely in the debate surrounding evangelicalism's origins, familiarize ourselves with some of the various ideas that have been set down. McLoughlin, amidst the very seas of change as evangelicalism began to impact the world, did not shy away from providing us with one of the first theories of contemporary

¹⁰⁸ The American historian Joan W. Scott writes of historical change, "Instead of a search for single origins, we have to conceive of processes so interconnected that they cannot be disentangled," Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 1067.

evangelicalism's creation. In McLoughlin's aforementioned essay, wherein he worked to establish evangelicalism as a third force—something altogether new—it is important to note that he was doing so in a pre-established framework. McLoughlin espied in twentieth-century evangelicalism vestiges of specifically American forms of religiosity. To his mind, the crusades and revivals, the zeal and the message, which were a vital part of the evangelical movement of the twentieth century, were nothing more than a resurgence of those awakenings that, in the past, had been a vital and visible aspect of American life. McLoughlin was well acquainted with revivals in the United States, for he authored two detailed histories on the subject.¹⁰⁹ McLoughlin's investigations into the workings of American religion, led him to assert that contemporary, twentieth-century evangelicalism was the Fourth Great Awakening, comparable in essence, meaning, and intention to those religious revivals that had taken hold of the United States in the past.¹¹⁰ "Awakenings," said McLoughlin in *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform*, written in 1978, "have been the shaping power of American culture from its inception."¹¹¹ McLoughlin continued:

Great Awakenings (and the revivals that are apart of them) are the results, not of depressions, wars, or epidemics, but of critical disjunctions in our self-understanding... They restore our cultural verve and our self-confidence, helping us to maintain faith in ourselves, our ideals, and our 'covenant with God'... Through awakenings a nation grows in wisdom, in respect for itself, and into more harmonious relations with other people and the physical universe.¹¹²

McLoughlin, in contradistinction to other scholars, does not seek a single event as the origin of this third force in the Christian West. Instead, he spoke of a general cleavage emerging in American society, which precipitated the flourishing of evangelical Christianity. Evangelicalism was, in this scholar's estimation, a heroic response. But McLoughlin, as theories of origin go, stands alone for one particular reason, namely, he

¹⁰⁹ See Willaim G. McLoughlin, *Modern Revivalism: Charles Grandison Finney to Billy Graham* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1959); *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion and Social Change in America, 1607-1977* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Another proponent of the theory of the genesis of contemporary evangelicalism as a revival can be found in Erling Jorstad, *Evangelicals in the White House: The Cultural Maturation of Born Again Christianity 1960-1981*, (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1981), 4-7.

¹¹⁰ McLoughlin, "Is There a Third Force in Christendom?" 47. See also William G. McLoughlin, *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform*, 193; William G. McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1960), 23.

¹¹¹ William G. McLoughlin, *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform*, 1. FitzGerald, in her 2017 study on American evangelicalism, is in full agreement with McLoughlin's estimation of revivals and their supposedly revitalizing role in American life, FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 14.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 2.

imputes into the movement the power of salvation. For this historian of religion, evangelicalism, insofar as it was this Fourth, and perhaps long-awaited, Great Awakening, emerged as a necessary element in the cultural progress of the United States; it had the power to confront the loss of vitality, waning national confidence, and, like healing waters, restore the ideals of the nation. Through McLoughlin's thinking, evangelicalism, and the awakening it brings, becomes the *sine qua non* of the Republic's survival. A few paragraphs later, McLoughlin reinforces the idea that evangelical awakenings are the forces that save the nation. In addition, he appears to accept the role of the United States as savior of the world, saying, "To understand the functions of American revivalism and revitalization is to understand the power and meaning of America as a civilization." He follows this by making note of the United States' "efforts to redeem the world."¹¹³ We do not mean to exclude the influence of previous awakenings, which, in times past, have emerged with a captivating presence in the United States. Even so, such a theory: lumping evangelicalism into the category of the revival of old, though perhaps quaint and reassuring, in that evangelicalism is linked with something exceedingly positive and desirable, can be dismissed without ceremony. We have no intention of attributing or accepting any salvational role, born out of the fires of necessity, to American evangelicalism. Nor are we seduced by notions of America *qua* redeemer. Such formulations we leave to the propagandist. Moreover, with respect to the assertion that this twentieth-century revival has restored life to the languishing national soul, apart from the unverifiability of such a claim, many would argue the contrary.¹¹⁴

The same social cleavage or disjunction that McLoughlin pointed to as the ground from which evangelicalism sprang is called forth and presented by other scholars as the primary cause of evangelicalism. Karen McCarthy Brown, for example, an American scholar whose career was centered around the anthropology of religion, stated, "Fundamentalism is a product of extreme social stress."¹¹⁵ The authors of the previously mentioned *Exporting the American Gospel*, seem to have been convinced of Brown's position and hint that evangelicalism emerged to fill a void at the center of society: "The existence of thousands of denominations and independent churches may seem chaotic, but they have little time for serious doctrinal dispute as they compete to fill the vacuum created

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹¹⁴ This has already been hinted at with Balmer, Diamond, and Hedges, among others.

¹¹⁵ Karen McCarthy Brown quoted in Brouwer, *Exporting the American Gospel*, 6.

by massive social dislocation and economic transformation.”¹¹⁶ We may derive from this position two important ideas. The first was that the resultant situation of the postwar United States was a vacuum, a void, an absence ready to be filled. While social dislocation and economic transformation are no doubt real occurrences of modern life, it is not clear if there was a void as such or how such economic and social dislocation translates directly into evangelicalism. Is it a simple question of cause and effect? Was evangelicalism on the outside of such occurrences or were evangelicals, along with others, at the center of such dislocation and economic transformation, and, therefore, not simply victims of a chaotic situation but also perpetrators of the system from which such dislocation was given space to develop? Put differently, and perhaps more fundamentally, is social dislocation a situation of befalling or of creation? Such questions have not been resolved. While these happenings may confront certain groups as external forces, it is quite possible that many of those who were experiencing such social incohesion also had a hand in bringing this state of affairs about. The second point to be taken from this idea, though it was not explicitly presented as a theory of origin, was that it seeks to explain the global phenomenon of Christian fundamentalism or evangelicalism. The competitive intention of evangelicalism was its ability to fill a void, to move into emptiness and occupy a space. We might say, that for these authors, it is in such movement that the movement can be explained. Put differently, with such a theory, the meaning and purpose of evangelicalism is packaged into the easily assimilable idea that this religious movement was used to fill a void. This is similar to McLoughlin’s theory, though purged of eschatological fantasies (to be fair, *Exporting the American Gospel* is a work whose purpose was to explore a religious system that was created in the United States and eventually made its way around the world, and was not overtly concerned with the origin of evangelicalism itself).

Other theories have emerged, which follow the same understanding of evangelicalism as appearing in a void, as filling a space; yet they differ in that they attempt to bring this idea into focus in the smelting heat of specific events, which took place in the period with which we are concerned. Diamond, in *Roads to Dominion*, is one such exponent of this theory. “The political awakening of evangelicals,” Diamond theorized, “came about in response to profound social changes, especially around issues of women’s equality, reproductive choice, and homosexual civil rights.”¹¹⁷ What is most significant about

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹¹⁷ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 161. See also Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 242; FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 1, 8. Elsewhere in her study, FitzGerald theorizes the “politicization” of

Diamond's theory is the primacy of politics. For her, we might venture to assume, what is most worthy of attention concerning evangelicalism was this movement's entry into political space. She does, elsewhere, devote attention to other aspects of evangelicalism. But, for Diamond, it is the crossing of the threshold into American politics that transforms evangelicalism into something noteworthy. Some scholars and journalists pay such devoted attention to the conservative politics of evangelicals that at times it appears as if outside of the political realm there was, pertaining to evangelicalism, nothing of significance. But the theory of sudden politicization as a response to pivotal social issues, is also important in that it asserts one of the unspoken assumptions about evangelicalism: that, prior to these events, evangelicalism was withdrawn, apolitical, separate, and that suddenly and in reaction evangelicalism was *perforce* moved to awakening, to politicization. The issue of evangelicalism's supposed apoliticism is one that we will confront in time.

Out of all these salient social issues that were careening against evangelicalism, there is one that enjoys, in the eyes of many scholars, and in the eyes of the public in general, a particular favor. The legalization of abortion in the United States in 1973, in part because evangelicals have, with the passing years, taken such a vocal and public stance on the matter, is appealed to, oftentimes, as the event that brought about the genesis of evangelicalism, molding this religious community into the shape we see before us. Scholars and other observers often point to the legalization of abortion as, if not *the* cause of evangelicalism in its totality, then the issue which brought about this religious community's overt turn to things political. In 2006, through the research of Randall Balmer, the "myth of abortion," as he calls it, and its supposed role as political catalyst, was dispelled, and with it this "myth's" power of generation. "One of the most durable myths in recent history," said Balmer in an article written in 2014, "is that the religious right, the coalition of conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists, emerged as a political movement in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 *Roe v. Wade* ruling legalizing abortion."¹¹⁸ In Balmer's book *Thy Kingdom Come*, he explained, with respect to the legalization of abortion throughout the 1970s, that "...the vast majority of evangelical leaders said virtually nothing about it; many of those who did comment actually applauded the decision."¹¹⁹ Thus, according to Balmer, this initial favor in some sectors of evangelicalism and ambivalence in others, with respect

evangelicalism as a "traditionalist" reaction set against the cultural upheaval and revolution of the 1960s, see *Ibid.*, 235.

¹¹⁸ Randall Balmer, "The Real Origins of the Religious Right," *Politico Magazine*, May 27, 2014, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/religious-right-real-origins-107133.html#.VLFy86mRnww>.

¹¹⁹ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 12.

to the legalization of abortion in the United States, undermines any claim that politicized evangelicalism grew as a mere response to this issue. On one occasion in 1971, according to Balmer's findings, the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant denomination in the United States, and stalwart of American evangelicalism, called for legislation that permitted abortion in certain cases.¹²⁰ It was only when evangelicals became aware of the galvanizing power, the polarizing effect, of the issue of legalized abortion, Balmer believes, that evangelicals reversed their position and began to use the issue of legalized abortion as a motor of expansion and activism.¹²¹

Having shattered the notion that the legalization of abortion was this movement's cause, Balmer was poised to replace it with a theory of his own, which was plucked out of the events of the Cold War era. For Balmer, the affair of Bob Jones University, a fundamentalist Christian secondary education institution in South Carolina, was the necessary impetus for evangelicalism's politicization; this controversy is the origin, Balmer affirms, of the Religious Right in the United States.

Following the 1972 court case, *Green v. Connally*, which found that any non-profit institution that practiced racial discrimination would no longer be granted tax-exempt status, and in a more general effort to implement the letter and the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Bob Jones University found itself at the center of controversy.¹²² At that time, the Christian educational institution, according to Balmer, had in place discriminatory admissions policies and forbade interracial relationships, which resulted in the Internal Revenue Service revoking the university's tax-exempt status.¹²³ To Balmer's mind, it was the gross intrusion, as evangelicals saw it, on the part of the federal government, this unwarranted interruption in the holy affairs of evangelicalism, which was the seed out of which the religious and political movement of evangelicalism grew. Balmer, in the lecture entitled "True Origins of the Christian Right," which was delivered at Emory University in 2009, explored the myth of abortion and offered his theory as the most plausible explanation of evangelicalism and its politicization.¹²⁴

All of these theories contain some grain of truth. There was a disjunction, as McLoughlin averred, in the collective American mind following World War II. The social changes taking place in American society, during this period, were of interest to

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Randall Balmer, "True Origins of the Christian Right," Emory University, May 11, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Gf4jN1xoSo.

¹²² Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 14.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 16.

evangelicals; moreover, they, very often, were a source of fear, anger, uncertainty, and incomprehension both to evangelicals as well as many segments of the American population. Abortion and its legalization and the ability of a private institution, to put it simply, to practice discrimination based on race, were both critical issues for evangelicals.

Despite the undeniable importance of these factors, these theories present us with problems that cannot be ignored so easily. With the explanations that scholars have created we find in them something mechanical. By mechanical, we wish to say that the theories work like a well-oiled machine: the parts are identified, the process is set in motion and the results are unified, well known, predictable. Faced with an event such as the legalization of abortion, for instance, the theory leads us to believe that everyone in evangelicalism responded in the same way—the collective response of evangelicals was a sort of mechanical process. The undeniable fact is that, when confronted with an event, be it the legalization of abortion, communism, and terrorism, there is an infinite possibility of ways in which we may respond. Moreover, we have already spoken of evangelicalism's incredible growth.

The second problem with these theories is the fact that these explanations attribute to a single event, or a series of events, an undue and expansive power. The fact is that the legalization of abortion, the Bob Jones University incident or a general malaise in society, are not capable of explaining evangelicalism in its totality, nor even the movement's entrance into politics. We are meant to believe that, with the legalization of abortion in the United States, all that pertains to evangelicalism was gathered and set into place. We are, to state it expressly, concerned not only with the politicization of evangelicalism, but the birth of evangelicalism in its entirety. What correlation might one find between Bob Jones University's loss of a tax-exempt status and, for the sake of argument, the fact, which shall be explored, that American evangelicals regularly employ a language of war and militarism, a language that made its appearance well before the legalization of abortion would make its appearance? Or, to take another example, what connection might one establish between these two occurrences and, for instance, the evangel's proclivity for organic metaphors, which will be explored in the next chapter. As to the origins and essence of evangelicalism, these theories are limited in their ability to explain anything of consequence relating to this religious movement. We have seen that evangelicalism, already in 1967, was growing

¹²⁴ Balmer, *True Origins of the Christian Right*.

rapidly and, outside the United States, evangelicalism enjoyed the same patterns of expansion.

Another problematic aspect of these theories, especially those connected with the issue of legalized abortion and Bob Jones University, is one of chronology. It is a commonly held belief that, prior to the 1970s, evangelicals were apolitical and that suddenly, with the presidential election of Carter, evangelicals emerged from their cave of withdrawal. Balmer spoke, in his 2014 article, the reader will be reminded, of evangelicals as *emerging* from a realm of political inactivity into the realm of politics. An article in the magazine *Newsweek* to which scholars often refer proclaimed that 1976 was the Year of the Evangelical, their coming of age, their presentation to the world.¹²⁵ The irrefutable fact is, as will be demonstrated, evangelicals were politically active after the Second World War, and, long before 1976, they were organizing politically, weighing in on current events and political issues through a myriad of sources, and from Maine to the West Coast, instructing the faithful on how to think about political issues and what was of importance in the political realm. In the furious search for the single event, the one seed, which set evangelicalism in motion, something seems to have been forgotten. In short, these theories rest on a particular, and we would argue artificial, distinction: evangelicalism and its evolution through the 1940s, 1960s, and 1960s is seen as separate from the polarized religious movement of the 1970s.

To return to Armstrong, she also placed the emergence of religious fundamentalism, as we now conceive it, in the second half of the twentieth century. It was, in her opinion, a concerted backlash against secular society. “But in the late 1970s,” she writes in *The Battle for God*, “fundamentalists began to rebel against this secularist hegemony and started to wrest religion out of its marginal position and back to center stage.”¹²⁶ That there was a gulf between secular society and religious fundamentalism is an assertion with which most scholars would agree.

Armstrong’s theory of origins hinges on a very specific understanding of the role and purpose of religion. In the past, argues Armstrong, there have been two primary ways in which the world was handled and understood, and knowledge was divided and organized, which she designates as *mythos* and *logos*.¹²⁷ “Both were essential,” Armstrong asserts,

¹²⁵ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 55-56.

¹²⁶ Armstrong, *The Battle for God*, xii.

¹²⁷ An additional problem, which is of secondary importance, is Armstrong’s understanding of the Greek term *logos*. To cite Armstrong again: “*logos* forges ahead and tries to find something new: to elaborate on old insights, achieve a greater control over our environment, discover something fresh, and invent something

“they were regarded as complementary ways of arriving at truth, and each had its special area of competence.”¹²⁸ Armstrong explains *mythos* by saying, “Myth was regarded as primary; it was concerned with what was thought to be timeless and constant in our existence.”¹²⁹ The ultimate focus of myth in the past was meaning. Myth was connected to ultimate questions. “*Logos*,” on the contrary, “was the rational, pragmatic, and scientific thought that enabled men and women to function well in the world.”¹³⁰ To Armstrong’s mind, the appearance and flourishing of religious fundamentalism in the modern world came about as the result of a situation in which *mythos* had been supplanted by *logos*. She describes religious fundamentalists as trying to “turn the *mythos* of their faith into *logos*.”¹³¹ One of the reasons Armstrong provides for this overturning is that, in the West, science and technology come to the fore in annihilating exclusivity, discrediting and undermining, in the minds of many, the attractiveness, value, and relevance of religious belief.¹³² More generally, fundamentalism rises to the surface within and in opposition to modernity: “Fundamentalists feel that they are battling against forces that threaten their most sacred values.”¹³³

Armstrong, with this theory, unveils an essential aspect of religious fundamentalism: that *mythos* no longer holds sway. The casting aside of myth, in the sense of a certain mental framework of thinking about the world, as a way to approach meaning and to ask fundamental questions about who we are, is a permanent and easily recognizable aspect of religious fundamentalism and, in our case, American evangelicalism, a fact that we will encounter repeatedly throughout this dissertation. What Armstrong seems to be saying is that the meaning one can encounter through belief no longer has meaning; it no longer proves attractive to the adherent. In religious fundamentalism, the searching for answers to ultimate questions, in large part, is a thing of the past. Surfacing to take its place, Armstrong avers, is the desire for a religion with practical applications, one that can be used in the world.

novel.” *Ibid.*, xvii. The definition provided in the glossary (376) is “rational, logical, or scientific discourse.” This definition runs counter to Heidegger’s understanding of the original Greek meaning. In Martin Heidegger, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* Θ 1-3: *On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), 2-3, he describes *logos* as “to glean,” “to harvest,” “to gather.” “*λόγος* as discourse is the combining and making manifest in the saying, the unveiling assertion of something about something.” Understanding *logos* as the mere functional and practical logic is something that Heidegger believes to be a step away from this word’s true meaning.

¹²⁸ Armstrong, *The Battle for God*, xv.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, xv.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, xvi.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, xviii.

¹³² *Ibid.*, xvii.

In irreconcilable juxtaposition to Armstrong's theory, we are confronted with an entirely different understanding of religious fundamentalism. In *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*, written in 2005, which is more of an apology for religious fundamentalism than a psychology, Ralph W. Hood, Jr., Peter C. Hill, and W. Paul Williamson offer their own explanation of the origins of Christian fundamentalism in the United States. The authors assert that, in order to properly understand Christian fundamentalism, we must do so on "its own terms. If we only view it from afar as outsiders and attempt to provide secular models, then the true essence of the phenomenon will have escaped us."¹³⁴ While the approach to understanding Christian fundamentalists, in the United States, on their terms might be noble, the fact remains, and we will encounter it throughout this dissertation, that there are vital aspects of evangelicalism that religion or theological ideas fail to explain. The commodification of religion and the evangelical's relationship to technology are just two areas in which relying on evangelicals to shed light on their own doings would be folly.

The authors embark on their analysis of fundamentalism by way of a particular understanding of religion in general: "...we operate from the underlying premise that religion provides the structure for an implicit belief system that creates meaning and through which purpose is experienced."¹³⁵ Religion, the authors argue, is "a 'core schema'...that may be born out of the need to comprehend many of life's deepest existential issues."¹³⁶ Through this belief system, which seeks to provide answer to life's deepest questions, "it creates a way for them [fundamentalists] to interpret the world, as well as themselves in relation to the world. This meaning system encompasses all of life and is strongly felt, for it deals with issues of general importance."¹³⁷ The crux of the matter, for these authors, is that fundamentalism is a meaning system to be counted amongst others, which emerges for men and women besieged by an "inhospitable culture."¹³⁸ It is a meaning system bound up in the role, interpretation, and implementation of sacred texts.¹³⁹ To their minds, this search for meaning and the importance of sacred texts constitute the origin of religious fundamentalism, and are thought to be capable of explaining sufficiently the essence and origin of Christian fundamentalism.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, xviii.

¹³⁴ Ralph W. Hood Jr., Peter C. Hill, and Paul W. Williamson, *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*, (The Guilford Press: New York, 2005), 5.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 3, 5.

With Armstrong, on the one hand, and the authors of *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*, on the other, we are guided across the widest possible spectrum of understanding when it comes to Christian fundamentalism. Armstrong sees in this form of religious belief and practice a manifest development away from meaning, away from *mythos*, and a sustained clash with the world of modernity. The most salient feature of religious fundamentalism, in her eyes, is religion as a tool, a practical system for intervening in the world. In a way, it becomes a scientific tool, a means of solving all problems, no longer simply questions of *meaning* nor life's ultimate questions. The authors of *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* would have us accept very different ideas regarding Christian fundamentalism in the United States. Yet, the same problems we encountered with the other theories remain. Secularism replaces the legalization of abortion, the Bob Jones incident, and is presented as the external force, pushing evangelicalism towards that which it was and that to which it continues to become. With these theories, we are left perplexed. Despite the fact that, as a whole, we do not accept these various hypotheses as explanations of the origins of evangelicalism nor do we see them as adequate in explaining and bringing to the fore who evangelicals were, they are important to us for one particular reason, which, though already mentioned, deserves to be reiterated. The plethora of ideas, which scholars have set down to explain modern, American evangelicalism, signal to us that on this ground, there is something worthy of questioning, that, when it comes to evangelicalism, something was afoot and therefore in need of explanation.

There is another theory as to the origins of religious fundamentalism taken as a broad phenomenon, which seems to better, and more deeply, explain the essence and emergence of this religious movement. This theory, which comes to us from Bauman, is, in its way, relegated to obscurity, for it is absent from any historical discussion concerning evangelicalism, and the ideas that Bauman formulated, do not seem to have influenced, in the slightest, the general understanding of religious fundamentalism in our modern world.

It is Bauman's 1997 work, *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, in which he touches upon the subject, not of evangelicalism or Christian fundamentalism specifically, but of religious fundamentalism in all of its guises and manifestations as a now universal phenomenon. But what Bauman says of religious fundamentalism can only be understood in light of what he has to say about identity in the modern, or for him postmodern, world. Bauman begins the work with a standard, lamenting critique of the world we have created, of the society—or lack thereof—that we, as humans, have fashioned into existence and

which takes us through a powerful and, in Bauman's eyes, unforgiving, education. Bauman's lament, as if from one who is in exile, of the gradual and concerted destruction of a common and permanent world, we see echoed by dozens of voices over the last century. The contemporary world, which is evermore characterized by its impermanence, its fleetingness, Bauman describes thus:

Indeed, the message conveyed today with great power of persuasion by the most ubiquitously effective cultural media...is a message of the essential indeterminacy and softness of the world: in the world, everything may happen and everything can be done, but nothing can be done once for all—and whatever happens comes unannounced and goes away without notice. In this world, bonds are dissembled into successive encounters, identities into successively worn masks, life-history into a series of episodes whose sole lasting importance is their equally ephemerical memory.¹⁴⁰

To Bauman's understanding, one of the permanent aspects of the world in which we now inhabit is uncertainty.¹⁴¹ Bauman, throughout his works, fingers many culprits responsible for this state of affairs; one of the most important seems to be that, in Bauman's opinion, we have constructed our societies, indeed all of life, on the vaporous clouds of consumption.

Amidst the ephemerality of our society, a perpetually altering *mise-en-scène*, one of the principal difficulties of existence becomes, as Bauman envisions it, the problem of identity: creating an enduring, meaningful notion of who one is, which may accompany us throughout life, becomes an always more elusive possibility. "Instead of constructing one's identity," intimates Bauman, "gradually and patiently, as one builds a house—through the slow accretion of ceilings, floors, rooms, connecting passages—a series of 'new beginnings,' experimenting with instantly assembled yet easily dismantled shapes, painted one over the other; a palimpsest identity."¹⁴² What is most significant about Bauman's theory is that identity is conceived of as a task, a patient building, a painstaking erecting over and through time. It is also vital to point out that, for Bauman, the conditions of the modern world create a situation of uncertainty, of flux, yet they do not appear as a force from which one cannot escape. Still, in the midst of modernity's development, there stands, in beckoning silence, the imperative to create one's identity *for* and *by* oneself. Men and women, in Bauman's understanding, remain the ultimate agents of becoming who they are.

Bauman's theory of the genesis of religious fundamentalism is a reversal of the predominant way of conceiving of this religious phenomenon, as it takes our attention away

¹⁴⁰ Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, 24.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 24-25.

from events, like the legalization of abortion to which we attribute the power to create, like the hand of God, an entire religious movement and provoke, in millions of hearts and minds, the same response, an identical reaction. The uncertainties, growing and accumulating, in contemporary life, Bauman believes, press upon the “individual identity” in a tyrannical manner, creating an almost unbearable situation of “existential insecurity.”¹⁴³ Despite the ominous way in which modernity presents itself, the ground from which fundamentalism springs is the ground of a decision. The making—Bauman believes that we create our identities over time through a long and arduous process—of our identities is connected with, in Bauman’s estimation, freedom: that ability to reach out into the world and choose for oneself. Religious fundamentalism, more accurately, those who have created fundamentalism and those who adhere to it, the sociologist instructs, is a rejection of this principle, a decision to not decide for oneself, a repudiation and abandonment of the arduous and omnipresent task of the creation of a personal identity. Bauman states:

The bitter experience in question [concerning fundamentalism] is the experience of *freedom*: of the misery of life composed of risky choices, which always mean taking some chances while forfeiting others, or incurable uncertainty built into every choice, of the unbearable, because unshared, responsibility for the unknown consequences of every choice, of the constant fear of foreclosing the future and yet unforeseen possibilities, of the dread of personal inadequacy, of experiencing less and not as strongly as others perhaps do, of the nightmare of not being up to the new and improved formulae of life which the notoriously capricious future may bring. And the message arising from that experience is: no, the human *individual* is not self-sufficient and cannot be self-reliant. One cannot go by one’s own judgment; one needs to be guided, and directed, and told what to do.¹⁴⁴

To Bauman’s mind, beneath the insupportable burden of freedom, the horror of open horizons, religious fundamentalism emerges. It is of great significance that, according to Bauman, fundamentalism offers an escape from freedom itself, a flight from the weight of decision, a guide for the everydayness of life; this, as a counterpoint to renewed promises of eternal life, the salvation of the soul, or redemption of Fallen Man. In this way, evangelicalism can be seen as responding to a larger set of problems, as opposed to mere reaction against and opposition to modernity, secularization, or the legalization of abortion. For Bauman, “Fundamentalism is a thoroughly contemporary, postmodern phenomenon,

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 178.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 183.

embracing fully the ‘rationalizing’ reforms and technological developments.”¹⁴⁵ But Bauman, in *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, does not demonstrate how the problem of identity comes into play in the emergence of religious fundamentalism; the task of tracing the problem of identity as the origin of religious fundamentalism, in a way, has been left to us.

It is through Bauman’s theory that, in this dissertation, we will attempt to understand the origin of evangelical Christianity in the United States and capture, if only for an instant, the essence, the ethos, of this spiritual way of being in the world. In conformity with our search for the genesis of evangelicalism, for the reason *why* evangelicalism emerged as it did, we move away from any limiting notions of American evangelicalism as purely a political force. Indeed, Bauman’s interpretation of religious fundamentalism as a substitute for decision, an alternative to freedom, moves evangelicalism out beyond the purely political. With the other theories of evangelicalism’s origin, which point to social dissolution, Bauman seems to be in fundamental accord. Thus, we can restate Bauman’s formulation by saying that, on the one hand, in our contemporary world, it is increasingly and agonizingly difficult to construct an identity, which has the ability to last the inexorable flux of time, the whirlwind of change, the demands that appear in the form of imperatives from almost all corners of life. Despite the ominous accent of the times, for Bauman, the wondrous and captivating possibility of decision remains. Bauman’s point of departure is a decisive and vital one in that he turns away from historical events as satisfactory explanations of the emergence of religious fundamentalism. While acknowledging that such events can perplex, confuse, alarm, and disperse one’s efforts to create a stable identity, he sees in them no primary cause. It is not only that identity’s creation is rendered, by events, exceedingly difficult; for Bauman, it would appear that, in religious fundamentalism, there was a renunciation of the imperative to create, to engage, a decision to not undertake the task. On the other hand, we are confronted with the notion that religious fundamentalism presents the would-be adherent with a semblance of an identity, an ironclad and total explanation of all the aspects of human life, or as Bauman deemed it, “a *compleat mappa vitae*.”¹⁴⁶ The dual nature of this hypothesis—a situation in which the creation of identity is difficult and, in these circumstances, there is a repudiation of the endeavor of bringing identity out into the world, as well as the idea that religious fundamentalism offers the religious aspirant the ostensible possibility to circumnavigate this necessary aspect of living

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 182.

in the world—will provide a framework in which to study the phenomenon of evangelical Christianity in the United States, a lens through which to inquire into evangelicalism's origin and approach that which evangelicalism was, who evangelicals were. As the theory prescribes, we will necessarily be concerned with that which is absent, the fear and uncertainty, which work together to create a situation in which it is difficult to act, to think to speak, to be, without adopting already existing modes or frameworks, reproducing already existing formulas, in a word, the absence of identity. Moreover, there is not merely an absence, but a rejection of these human faculties, a decision not to decide. Intricately connected with this is what evangelicalism provides: the identity, the life-map, the script, to which we will pay constant attention.

Bauman's noble attempts at explaining and understanding the origin and character of religious fundamentalism does something else, which is unexpected and goes against the grain of a great deal of the literature and journalistic commentary on evangelical Christianity: he places religious fundamentalism back into our midst. No longer are we forced to accept the juxtaposition, imperiously imposed and erroneous, that evangelicalism is a dangerous, irrational and undemocratic aberration in the presence of a just and contemporary world, a society, which seeks only to edify, to care for its inhabitants and to create a better world. This is not to say that, with evangelicalism, considerable problems do not arise. The point is that evangelicals have appeared and they are, as Bauman suggests, much more citizens of our world than they are intruders. Therefore, apart from examining evangelicalism with the backdrop of identity, we will attempt to demonstrate, whenever possible, the parallels evangelicalism shares with contemporary society, with contemporary ways of being. In a word, we will uncover their true place alongside us.

In sum, and for reiteration, the task of this dissertation in the field of history differs from many other academic works in that we are not concerned with the emergence of evangelicalism, between 1945 and 1981, merely or exclusively as a political phenomenon. On the contrary, what is of interest to us is the emergence of evangelicalism in its totality. We, with the help of Bauman, are moving away from singular events, which can be grasped and groped as causes that occasioned evangelicalism, pointed to as the source from which all other things flowed. We now turn to the central theme of Bauman's theory: the problem of identity.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 185.

The essential component of Bauman's theory is, as we have said, the problem of identity; naturally, clarification of this central concept is in order. Bauman, apart from his conceptualization of identity as a project, does not clearly define what he means by the concept. Generally speaking, identity as such defies easily definable boundaries; it is, in a sense, ungraspable.¹⁴⁷ Bauman did, however, see our contemporary period as one in which the formation of identity, the achievement of this project, was not only elusive but thwarted at every turn. The American historian Craig Calhoun, in his 1994 essay on the subject of identity, echoes Bauman's supposition that identity is a sort of project.¹⁴⁸ Calhoun also sees modernity as a moment when identity formation becomes problematic.¹⁴⁹ Modernity, to Calhoun's mind, was a historical moment in which we can touch the frightful thawing of long-congealed, "all-encompassing identity schemes."¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, we can examine how identity is used in academic literature, specifically in the field of history, in order to further clarify what is meant by the concept of identity.

Identity, looked at etymologically, means "sameness, oneness," a unity of sorts. Identity is ultimately derived from the Latin word *idem*, which means "the same."¹⁵¹ A word that is closely connected with this Latin root is *identidem*, meaning "over and over."¹⁵² Thus, we are presented, upon further investigation, with the idea of "sameness," "oneness," "unity," "over and over," repeated through time. A unified repetition of what, we might ask? Is this an outward unity or a unity that transcends mere appearances?

Etymological inquiries shed only the dimmest of lights on this concept. The appearance of the word identity predates, of course, the twentieth century.¹⁵³ Despite this, the concept, which we now use so freely in daily life, first entered American academic, and then popular, discourse in the middle part of the twentieth century.¹⁵⁴

In the United States, one of identity's chief exponents and expositors was the German-born psychologist Erik Erikson.¹⁵⁵ Erikson, a Jew who had narrowly escaped the rise of the Third Reich, settling eventually in the United States, fashioned his new

¹⁴⁷ Regarding the undefinability of identity see Philip Gleason, "Identifying Identity: A Semantic History," *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 4 (1983): 920, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1901196>.

¹⁴⁸ Craig Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Politics of Identity," in *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), 13, 23.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵¹ "Identity," Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=identity&searchmode=none.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ Philip Gleason, "Identifying Identity: A Semantic History," *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 4 (1983): 911, accessed July 1, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1901196>.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 912-914.

understanding of identity against the horrific and grotesque events of the Second World War.¹⁵⁶ The course of world history, the troubling events and trajectory of the world, had opened up a gulf in which questions of meaning and belonging became evermore acute and pressing.¹⁵⁷ For many scholars during the Cold War, identity served as a moniker for the problems associated with the tumult, transformation, and fears of the age.¹⁵⁸

Identity was, from the onset, connected to the question of “who” one was.¹⁵⁹ But for Erikson, the question of identity went beyond a superficial and insignificant response to the question “Who am I?” Instead, to Erikson’s mind, the concept of identity had gathered to itself considerable weight, signaling a deep process of “interior development,” a continuous movement of inner growth.¹⁶⁰ In contradistinction to Erikson’s suppositions concerning identity, other scholars in the 1960s and 1970s understood identity as something “shallow, external, evanescent,” in short, as a mask.¹⁶¹

As the concept spread, identity began to acquire different meanings depending on who employed the term and in relation to what specific historical occurrence. Its usage in historical academic discourse has been marked most notably by the tendency to speak not of identity but of identities. Identity *qua* plurality has been most clearly expressed, in the field of history, with the conceptual division between collective and personal identity.¹⁶² Historians have used the term collective identity to describe one’s participation in a certain group—be it nation, religion, class, ethnic group, gender group—and this group’s relation to others.¹⁶³ Collective identity, as historians conceive it of, is construed and formed in a

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 914.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 928.

¹⁵⁸ One scholar, Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek, wrote in 1963, “It is common knowledge that identity becomes a problem for the individual in a rapidly changing dynamic and technological society such as we have in America.” Quoted in Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” 913. Gleason remarks on the timeliness of “identity.” The most important consideration, I would say, was that the word identity was ideally adapted to talking about the relationship of the individual to society as that perennial problem presented itself to Americans at midcentury. More specifically, identity promised to elucidate a new kind of conceptual linkage between the two elements of the problem, since it was used in reference to, and dealt with the relationship of, the individual personality and the ensemble of social and cultural features that gave different groups their distinctive character,” *Ibid.*, 926.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 912, 928.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 914, 918. “*Personal identity* means more; it includes a subjective sense of continuous existence and a coherent memory,” Erik Erikson, “Psychosocial Identity,” *A Way of Looking at Things*, ed. Stephen Schlein (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 675. Calhoun refers to identity as a “integral individuality,” Calhoun, “Social Theory and the Politics of Identity,” 10.

¹⁶¹ Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” 920.

¹⁶² Chris Lorenz, “Representations of Identity: Ethnicity, Race, Class, Gender and Religion. An Introduction to Conceptual History,” in *The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Religion, Class and Gender in National Histories*, ed. Stefan Berger (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 25-28.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 25. Alongside collective identity or subsumed beneath this category, one encounters the term “cultural identity.” The American anthropologist Richard G. Fox uses this concept in such a way as to transmit the notion

negative way, that is, in dichotomous opposition to the other.¹⁶⁴ In the most well-known pairs of antithetical concepts one finds the Greek as the negative image of the barbarian; likewise, the Christian saw or continues to see himself as the redeemed reflection of the unregenerate pagan.¹⁶⁵ At the center of a group's collective identity is difference.¹⁶⁶ In an essay from 2008, the historian Chris Lorenz remarked that what is oftentimes bound up with collective identity is "some sense of being under threat and is therefore embedded in power struggles."¹⁶⁷

Personal identity, in contrast to collective identity, pertains to the identity of the individual.¹⁶⁸ For Lorenz, it is interchangeable with "personality," and "character."¹⁶⁹ Personal identity, just as was the case with the identity of the collective, is a conceptualization used to distinguish oneself from the other.¹⁷⁰ But just where the personal ends and the collective boundaries of identity begin is always difficult to discern. The evolving image of personal identity is often, or even always, transected by collective understandings of self, enriched or impoverished by one's participation in the group and one's adoption of the collective's accepted notion of itself, its role, and its relation to others.

In this dissertation, we will be guided by Bauman's understanding of identity (examined previously), which by this point is clear. His elucidation of identity ties into the historical use of the concept in a specific way. Bauman, in *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, was clearly writing about what historians call personal identity.¹⁷¹ Bauman conceived of identity, just as did Erikson, as something created, something born out through time. Erikson's characterization of identity as "inner development" corresponds to Bauman's metaphor of identity as a building slowly erected.¹⁷² The abandonment, which Bauman perceived taking place with respect to identity pertains, therefore, to the individual. If we were to reformulate Bauman's understanding in conformity with the historical use of

of participation via ritual, a tradition or passing through a threshold; literally, in one instance, as "baptism." Fox also uses social identity. See Fox, *The Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 7, 10, 12, 99, 109, 115.

¹⁶⁴ Lorenz, "Representations of Identity: 25-28.

¹⁶⁵ Pim den Boer, "Civilization: Comparing Concepts and Identities," *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 1, no. 1 (March 2005): 52, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23730938>.

¹⁶⁶ The question of difference, and its relation to identity—sameness, is pursued in Lorenz, "Representations of Identity," *passim*.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁶⁸ Lorenz, "Representations of Identity," 27.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ A more detailed exploration of personal identity can be found in James D. Fearon, "What Is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)?" (unpublished working paper, Stanford, CA, 1999), 20-26.

¹⁷¹ Bauman speaks of "individual identity," *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, 178.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 24-25.

identity, we might say that collective identity overtakes and serves as a surrogate for personal identity.¹⁷³

Here, we have not unraveled the enigma of identity; nor was this our intention. We have, on the contrary, come to a clearer understanding of what we mean by this term and the nuances of its usage. The question of identity, specifically personal identity, will be a perennial concern in this dissertation. Following Bauman's observations, we consider personal and collective identities as long-term projects, as extended periods of construction.¹⁷⁴ We can further problematize Bauman's definition by saying that identity is created and demarcated through language;¹⁷⁵ that identity seeks and is in need of an intellectual framework of transmission and orientation—it feeds off of ideas;¹⁷⁶ is revealed and constituted through action;¹⁷⁷ is given expression through certain forms, patterns of organization, and centers of focus;¹⁷⁸ and, finally, is elaborated vis-à-vis the other, emerging in the unavoidable and undeniable plurality of the world.¹⁷⁹ Proceeding from these aspects of identity, we will organize this dissertation thematically as opposed to chronologically. We wish to explore if the evangelical movement coincides with what, according to the experts, are the most important and salient aspects of identity.

¹⁷³ Erikson was a psychologist and the methods, concerns, and aim of his field differ from that of history; we do not wish to conflate history and psychology. That said, Erikson, in 1959, made allowances for that possibility that collective identity and the problems and barriers associated with its formation can be overcome, perhaps superficially, by collective identity, for a situation in which personal identity is enveloped by the collective. Erikson speaks of the "collective cure of identity-diffusion," "Late Adolescence," *A Way of Looking at Things*, ed. Stephen Schlein (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 640, 642-643;

¹⁷⁴ See also Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Politics of Identity," 12, 23; José Álvarez Junco, [Inaugural lecture] *Historia y mito: Saber sobre el pasado o cultivo de identidades* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2011), 3, 5, 8, 10, 45; José Álvarez Junco, "La nación posimperial. España y su laberinto identitaria," *Historia Mexicana* 53, no. 2 (2003): 447, 448, 449, 446, accessed December 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25139505>; José Álvarez Junco, "The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptation to the Age of Nations," *History and Memory* 14, no. 1-2 (2002): 21, 24-25, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/his.2002.14.1-2.13>.

¹⁷⁵ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 179. Scott brings to the fore the overwhelming importance of language and the creation of history: "...Without meaning, there is no experience; without processes of signification, there is no meaning...a theory that does not take it into account misses the powerful roles that symbols, metaphors, and concepts play in the definition of human personality and human history," Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," 1063. Scott also makes the fundamental connection between the construction of "an identity" and "conceptual language that at once sets boundaries and contains the possibility for negation, resistance, reinterpretation, the play of metaphoric intervention and invention," *Ibid.*, 1067.

¹⁷⁶ This is a reformulation of Arendt's understanding of the nexus of ideology and the inner life, that is, ideology's telos is the transformation of the inner life, one's identity, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: A Harvest Book - Harcourt Inc., 1968), 458.

¹⁷⁷ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 179.

¹⁷⁸ Cruz, 1997

¹⁷⁹ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 183-184; James Baldwin, "The Devil Finds Work," in *James Baldwin: Collected Essays*, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: Library of America; distributed the U.S. by Penguin Putnam, 1998), 537. Calhoun writes, "There is no simple sameness unmarked by difference..." Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Politics of Identity," 9.

Methodology and Primary Sources

We arrive, now, at the important question of methodology. How are we to carry out this study? What sources will we use for this dissertation? Fortunately, there are thousands of different sources with which to enter into proximity with evangelicalism in the United States; this is due partly to the contemporaneousness of evangelical Christianity and to the myriad of media through which evangelicalism is given expression. Magazines and the radio, words spoken in crusades and in churches, television, and the Internet, are all ways in which this particular branch of Christianity makes its fleeting yet sustained appearance in the world. Contemporary evangelicalism flourished in an age when new methods of recording and of capturing these words became available. These modern media and the multitudes that use them have created a situation in which there is an overabundance of information. To paraphrase an evangelical, there is, in our contemporary world, a veritable deluge of words.¹⁸⁰ With American evangelicalism, the question becomes very clear: What sources do we take and what sources do we keep at a distance?

The impossibility of handling and moving into a coherent narrative so many different primary sources necessitates the exclusion of much of what evangelicals have said. Thus, from the outset, our inquiry can be said to be only partial. Yet, in our attempt to understand evangelicalism in light of Bauman's thinking, we can draw from this vast quantity two different primary sources with which to carry out our questioning. This decision, this singling out of two sources—the magazine *Christianity Today* and the evangelist Billy Graham—amongst the possible thousands, is not a mistake. For the two sources that have been chosen are a faithful representation of—in a way epitomize—the religious phenomenon of evangelical Christianity in the United States during its period of crystallization.

The first of these two sources is the evangelical magazine *Christianity Today*. The bi-monthly periodical, which is still in print, was founded in 1956 at the behest of Billy Graham, along with his father-in-law L. Nelson Bell, and the evangelical theologian and author Carl F. H. Henry.¹⁸¹ Though the publication was, from the beginning, connected to the figure of Graham, it evolved and was influenced primarily by different evangelical individuals. An editorial in the very first edition of the magazine in 1956 entitled “*Why*

¹⁸⁰ See Bird, George L. “The Real Crisis in Communication.” *Christianity Today*, June 10, 1966, 16 [932].

¹⁸¹ “Our History,” *Christianity Today*, accessed November 15, 2015.

<http://www.christianitytoday.org/ministry/history/>. See also Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 100.

Christianity Today,” provided the *raison d’être* of the magazine and sketched out the framework in which the publication, as well as the larger evangelical movement, would be operating. The magazine’s mission was to bring “historical Christianity” to a generation that, the editorial argued, had grown up “unaware of the basic truths of the Christian faith.”¹⁸² Candidly, and very much in keeping with the future trajectory of evangelicalism, *Christianity Today* proclaimed that the Word of God was a font of authority and *power*.¹⁸³ What this power was, who was to wield it, for what purpose the evangelical was seeking it out, and what business the church had on this expedition to acquire power for itself were questions left unasked. The stability of the United States and its very survival, warned the magazine, were tied to the success of its spiritual life; in a word, the triumph of the Cross.¹⁸⁴ Alongside this, the editorial pronounced, there had been, up until October 1956, an acute failure to spread the “total gospel message,” and impose this message on “every area of life.”¹⁸⁵

The evangelical publication started by Graham and his associates was conceptualized as a counterpoise to the prestigious and well-established liberal Protestant publication *Christian Century*.¹⁸⁶ The happenings, thought, and trajectory of liberal or mainstream American Protestantism were always in the field of vision of the contemporary evangelical both before and during the Cold War. *Christianity Today*, as a fledgling publication, received in its first two years substantial financial backing from one of Graham’s close and wealthy friends, J. Howard Pew. Pew, of Sun Oil Company, used his wealth as means to further the evangelical movement, undergird its presence, power, and reach in the American Republic.¹⁸⁷

Since *Christianity Today*’s inception in 1956 and until 1968, the editorship of the magazine was held by the aforementioned Henry, a pillar of American evangelicalism in the twentieth century. For the evangelical community in the United States, *Christianity Today* has been the leading voice and a constant point of reference. Amongst scholars, there is a wide consensus to support this claim. In the words of Phyllis Elaine Alsdurf, in her 2004 dissertation “*Christianity Today Magazine and Late Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism*,”

¹⁸² “Why Christianity Today,” [Editorial] in *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (New York: Meredith Press, 1966), 1.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ “National stability and survival depend upon enduring spiritual and moral qualities. Revival as the answer to national problems may seem to be an oversimplified solution to a distressingly complex situation. Nevertheless, statesmen as well as theologians realize that the basic solution to the world crisis is theological,” *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 6.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 188.

this magazine was and is “the foremost representative of evangelical thought and ideas.”¹⁸⁸ McLoughlin, in full agreement with this position, stated, with respect to *Christianity Today*, “it speaks most effectively for these new-fundamentalists or evangelicals.”¹⁸⁹ The entry for the periodical in the *Encyclopedia of Evangelicalism*, compiled by Balmer, confers to *Christianity Today* the honor of the most-cited periodical in the non-religious press.¹⁹⁰ Diamond, with respect to *Christianity Today*, arrived at the same conclusion as to its importance.¹⁹¹

Apart from the pride of place and its wide subscription base, some 200,000 people by the end of the 1970s—the readership is estimated to have been much higher.¹⁹² Initially, *Christianity Today*’s audience was comprised of clergymen; eventually, the magazine’s leadership reoriented the publication giving it a more general appeal.¹⁹³ The publication is of immense value to us for its variety. The magazine is an admixture of evangelical thought on a variety of topics: theology, biblical interpretation, politics, news, historical Christianity, and social commentary. The variety extended also to those who used the magazine as a vehicle for their thoughts, hopes, and fears. The magazine immediately attracted members of the clergy, writers, professors, laymen, and theologians, all of whom were part or at least sympathetic to the evangelical cause. Additionally, *Christianity Today* frequently featured written pieces from important political and military figures, including, for example, numerous contributions by the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) J. Edgar Hoover and Charles Habib Malik, the thirteenth president of the United Nations General Assembly. The variety of the magazine also extends to geography as letters, articles, essays, and poems poured in from all areas of the United States, as well as from abroad, which seems to dispel, at least to some extent, any notion that evangelicalism was a superficially localized religious awakening, a product of the American South.

With respect to *Christianity Today*, this source was studied between roughly June 2013 and March 2014. The earliest editions of this religious magazine, from 1956 through the early 1970s, are available on microfilm. The source was accessed through the microfilm collection at the University of Austin, in Austin, Texas, which, at the time, was located in

¹⁸⁸ Phyllis Elaine Alsdurf, “*Christianity Today Magazine and Late Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism*,” (doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2004), 1.

¹⁸⁹ William G. McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” 60.

¹⁹⁰ Balmer, Randall, *Encyclopedia of Evangelicalism: Revised and Expanded Edition* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2004), 138.

¹⁹¹ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 98.

¹⁹² Elaine, “*Christianity Today Magazine and Late Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism*,” 274.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 276.

the Perry Castañeda Library. The first two volumes of *Christianity Today*—corresponding to 1956 and 1957—were not part of the University of Texas’ collection. In addition, volumes VII and VIII (part of 1962 to part of 1964)—were missing, as well as volumes XV and XVI (part of 1970 to part of 1972). A *Christianity Today* reader, published in 1966, with a selection of articles from 1956 to 1966 has also been consulted.¹⁹⁴

The second source, which will also be used to approach evangelicalism, is the American evangelist Billy Graham. In the year 1918, a mere few days before the First World War came to an end, a man was born who would have an undeniable and permanent impact on the course of American religion and society.¹⁹⁵ Graham hailed from North Carolina and his southern heritage would place an identifiable stamp on his long career as a Christian messenger. The evangelist began his Christian work in the Youth for Christ movement, a group that, according to McLoughlin, staged “flamboyant rallies” across the United States.¹⁹⁶ Youth for Christ was started in the 1940s.¹⁹⁷ By 1945, an estimated 300,000 young Americans attended weekly Youth for Christ gatherings across the United States.¹⁹⁸ As Graham’s career progressed and his notoriety spread, he became a favorite of American politicians and celebrities, relations to which he often boisterously alluded. Graham used all means at his disposal to spread the message with which he felt himself to have been entrusted: films, television, books, radio, articles, and sermons. So popular was Graham’s appeal, that, by 1961, an article in *Christianity Today* claimed, Graham had preached to thirty million people across the world and, through the sweet embrace of his voice, had led 900,000 souls to eternal salvation.¹⁹⁹

Graham and the words he uses, the ideas he creates or reproduces, are of concern to us in that he represents one of the most visible faces of American evangelicalism. What was it, in this man, that resonated, decade after decade, with so many people? Given Graham’s popularity and respectability both in evangelicalism and in American society, we find in the story of his life, but mostly in his words, his sermons, his articles, his crusades, and radio addresses, an authentic representation of evangelicalism, a glimpse of its essence.

There is an occasional overlap between Graham and *Christianity Today*. This appears in the form of articles written by the evangelist himself, reproductions of his

¹⁹⁴ *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank G. Gaebelein (New York: Meredith Press, 1966).

¹⁹⁵ For a more detailed assessment of Graham’s career and impact see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 169-207.

¹⁹⁶ William G. McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” 67; FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 175.

¹⁹⁷ Turner, “Selling Jesus to Modern America,” 48.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁹⁹ Ralston C. Smith, “Billy Graham’s Evangelistic Thrust: The Crusaders and Changing Times,” *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1961, 4.

sermons, enthusiastic commentary and updates concerning his successful religious crusades, and interviews of the famed evangelist. These, on occasion, have made their way into this dissertation. Contact with Graham, coming into proximity with his message and his words, can be established in various ways. Our primary approach to Graham as a source is not through *Christianity Today*. Instead, with regard to the American evangelist, attention has been paid almost exclusively to his sermons, those delivered at crusades as well as those broadcast through the radio, from the 1940s to the end of the 1970s. The vast majority of these sermons are audio recordings or audiovisual sources. They can be accessed and studied through various avenues. Some of his earliest sermons—three to be specific—were printed in a collection *The Early Billy Graham*, published in 1988.²⁰⁰ Other recorded sermons are available online; many of these can be found on YouTube. By far the largest repository of Graham's sermons and radio addresses are available online at the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association.²⁰¹ The recordings can be accessed publicly. The digital collection is divided into television,²⁰² radio, and World Wide Pictures, the film production arm of Graham's evangelistic organization. Only the first two have been used for this dissertation. The radio archives house over 1,600 recordings spanning over 60 years.²⁰³ The audio archives are searchable by year, country or topic. The only criteria used for selecting video and audio sources were that they fell within the specific time period—1945-1981.

Keeping in mind the objectives of this dissertation: the historical exploration of the premises of Bauman related to the birth and growth of fundamentalism, in our case the evangelical movement between 1945 and 1981 in the United States, as a manifestation of the crisis of identity that characterizes the modernity era, as well as the sources we are using to accomplish this task, we move in close proximity to already established historiographic trends. Of interest for us are the fields of cultural history, conceptual history, and, to some extent, the contributions made by scholars concerning the discourses of gender, which is, after all, a discussion and questioning of relations of power. The organization of this dissertation, we would do well to remember, hinges upon concepts and manifestations of identity, the constant dialogue and navigation between the personal and the collective.

²⁰⁰ Billy Graham, *The Early Billy Graham: Sermons and Revival Accounts*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland Pub., 1988).

²⁰¹ *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, accessed June 6, 2016, <https://billygraham.org/>.

²⁰² "Video Categories, Classics," *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, accessed June 6, 2016, <https://billygraham.org/tv-and-radio/television/classics/>.

²⁰³ "Audio Archives," *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, accessed June 6, 2016, <https://billygraham.org/tv-and-radio/radio/audio-archives/>.

The methodological orientation of this work, then, stems in part from cultural history. The sources we have used to carry out this study in history do not emanate from the highest institutions of power. On the contrary, our sources emerged as cultural expressions from a distinct social group in the United States. Following the studies of the political historian Bernard Bailyn in the 1960s and 1970s, the expressions and manifestations of popular cultural have served to study the political cultures of the United States.²⁰⁴ Through the work of Bailyn, other and hitherto neglected primary sources received the necessary legitimacy to be the subject of historical inquiry. First, there were the pamphlets and the press of the revolutionary period in the United States, followed by political vignettes, rallies, and discourses. Since then, the incorporation of audiovisual sources as well as all of the tools of popular culture, television programs, advertising, movies, and television series, have all become the subject of the historian's attention. Bailyn in his famous 1967 work *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* strove to capture the "assumptions, beliefs, and ideas—the articulated worldview—that lay behind the manifest events of the time."²⁰⁵ Bailyn attempted to capture states of mind: the pattern of ideas, beliefs, fears, and aspirations of a historical period.²⁰⁶

Thus, Bailyn demonstrated a path forward for historians interested in other historical moments. Uncovering the cultural component, the values, the ideas in circulation from which political, social, and cultural discourses emerge and are debated implies, amongst other things, an attempt to comprehend a determined reality. The discourse of the evangelical and their tools of diffusion achieved remarkable success because they were perfectly aligned with the aspirations, fears, and ideas of American citizens in the historical moment of the Cold War. The communication media of the evangelicals and the ideas the promulgated were well received because they dealt with problems that occupied the American mind and because they took full advantage of new alterations in the channels of communication. The study of these multifaceted aspects of American evangelicalism, as Bailyn showed, brings us ever closer to a nuanced and deeper understanding for the diversity and the fierce debate of different intellectual, social, cultural, and religious currents in vogue during the period of the Cold War.

²⁰⁴ Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1967), v-xii, 2-21.

²⁰⁵ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, vi.

²⁰⁶ Bernard Bailyn, *On the Teaching and Writing of History*, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (Hanover, NH: Montgomery Endowment, Dartmouth College: Distributed by University Press of New England, 1994), 54.

Closely linked with cultural history and, in some cases, with the linguistic turn, there emerged a field of historical analysis known as conceptual history. The framework and vision of conceptual history will be another important methodological orientation in this dissertation, above all in the first chapter where we examine the evangelical lexicon of the Cold War. This dissertation is not a complete and seamless application of the methodology and ideas of conceptual history; this field of historical inquiry will, however, serve as a springboard. The history of concepts, which will be treated with greater detail in the following chapter, first emerged in Germany after the Second World War. Since its inception, conceptual historians make the central affirmation that language, specifically concepts and the transformations they are made to undergo, serve as the primary ground and motors of historical continuance or change. Through concepts the boundaries and trajectory of political and social metamorphosis are drawn. Through the study of concepts historical transformation can be uncovered.²⁰⁷

Another theoretical framework stems from gender studies, which has emerged in the American academic milieu. We have, with Joan Wallace Scott, reflected upon the discourses of power intertwined with values that are presented as prototypically masculine.²⁰⁸ For Scott, the category of gender was not only a constitutive element of social relations but was also a determining factor in relations of power. As such, her analysis transcends the historiography related to gender and can be transported to other fields of inquiry, becoming a way in which to reflect on power. The social process of the masculinization of hegemonic discourses, according to dominant social constructions, will also be considered when we examine evangelical rhetoric, concepts, and ideological constructions during the Cold War.

The approach to the question of identity and evangelicalism *qua* origin of this movement, the exploration of Bauman's thesis, will be carried out thematically and from a historical perspective. The themes to which we will direct our attention stem from our understanding of identity. With these two sources, which serve as a barometer of evangelicalism in the period between 1945 and 1981, we will begin this journey at the most basic and perhaps the most important human level: speech. In this first chapter, we will examine, amongst American evangelicals, the use of clichés; evangelical concepts of destruction and militarism; the incorporation, into the evangelical lexicon, of concepts

²⁰⁷ Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

²⁰⁸ Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis."

relating to the market and to business; and the development and deployment of a theological biologism, the use of organic or biological metaphors.

Following our examination of certain aspects relating to evangelical speech, we will observe evangelicalism in its ideological form, attempting to understand the system that evangelicals have created to explain and affect the world. Evangelicalism, in short, is an ideological system. We might call this a limited examination of the content of their thinking. The subsequent chapter is concerned with the question of action and what role evangelicals played in shaping a particular understanding of this aspect of identity. Alongside action, we will attempt to flesh out Bauman's idea of this map of life, those attempts by evangelicals to draw for the believer a detailed course of what one should do in the world. The fourth chapter deals with the flourishing of new evangelical forms, new ways, patterns, through which evangelicals have attempted to, for lack of a better term, express their faith and give solid shape to their religious sentiments. These forms are ways of organizing and bringing direction to the actions and activities of men and women. They are organizational and technical. In this chapter, we will consider expansion *qua* form; the commodification of religion by evangelicals; the form of technique or technology; and the idolatry of might, the glorification and quest for power, as prizes for the evangelical adherent.

Identity, as we shall come to understand, is a phenomenon that does not emerge in isolation, but, on the contrary, in the world, a peopled world and one teaming with life and with others. With this understanding in mind, in the final chapter, we will bring our discussion more fully into the relation evangelicals established with others. We will try to understand how evangelicals related to African Americans during the movement for civil rights; to homosexuals who appeared in a very public way in the 1960s and 1970s; and to women, who, during the period under scrutiny, were continuing a struggle for equality, which to this day has not been brought to completion. These were all areas or people, which confronted, in a decisive and unavoidable way, who evangelicals were and who they believed themselves to be. The emergence of these three groups undermined dearly held preconceived notions about the United States. The confrontation stemming from these areas not only undermined evangelicals understanding of themselves and the United States, but it forced them to search for answers, explanations, and solutions. In this search, evangelicalism necessarily moves away from a system of faith towards a system, which deals with the minute details of life, which endeavors to regulate an ever-increasing range of life's spheres.

I

Speech and Identity¹

...No one knows better how to mix praise with poison.

—Friedrich Nietzsche²

It is the crucible of language upon which old identities are melted down and identities are forged anew. Indeed, it is here, in the realm of speech, that we will begin to understand the evangelical identity that was in a process of crystallization as the violence, murder, and destruction of World War II slowly faded into the grayness of memory. We begin our journey by turning, first, to the concepts that evangelicals used. Our doing so is no mistake, for human speech is a fundamental and universal aspect of human life. The concepts we utilize are inextricably connected with our identities and to their expression. Not only is speaking one of the most elemental of human faculties, but it is through words and concepts that our primary contact with evangelicalism is to be established.³

In the grinding routine of modern life, the exhausting and frenzied running to and fro, the myriad of tiny, additional requirements of work: the long commute, the draining keeping up of appearances, the extra hours toiling, there lies the promise that the eternal and fundamental importance of human speech can be forgotten, lost in the race. In such circumstances, thinking about the words we use becomes something of a luxury. We can go through an entire day, an entire week, a whole lifetime without becoming aware of the miracle and mystery of language; thus, we remind ourselves of this important and inescapable fact. But the reason for beginning here moves beyond the universal and central reality of language, speech, in our lives, its power and its mystery. Human words and

¹ A distinction is made, in conceptual history, between language and speech. Language is the “means of communication for society.” Whereas speech is the use of language by an individual or, for us here, a specific community, see Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 44.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols,” in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1952), 514.

³ The Venezuelan political scientist José Javier Blanco Rivera, in an article from 2012, wrote of our—we who are in the present—connection to the past through “linguistic sources,” that is, through concepts: “De modo que para la historia no existen hechos en sí, sino fuentes lingüísticas que nos hablan sobre hechos, por lo que la forma y manera en que se interroguen esas fuentes condicionará lo que estas nos dirán del pasado. En definitiva, el acontecimiento histórico es algo que se construye; es una realidad que está más allá del texto, pero de la cual solo se puede tener una idea a través del texto,” José Javier Blanco Rivera, “La historia de los conceptos de

concepts are of importance because, through them, we are able to create, to create literature, to forge bonds, to found communities, to form values and to give birth to new ideas.

Numerous scholars, thinkers, and philosophers in various capacities and academic disciplines have pointed out the power and importance of language.⁴ Among them, it was the political theorist and philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) who not only signaled the importance of speaking in general but firmly established the link between speech and identity. Her thought has a unique bearing on the subject and the possibility of the emergence of evangelicalism as a question of identity. In *The Human Condition*, published in 1958, Arendt asserts:

In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world...This disclosure of 'who' in contradistinction to 'what' somebody is—his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide—is implicit in everything somebody says and does.⁵

Beyond the connection, which Arendt established between speaking and identity, justification for our examination of the evangelical lexicon, between 1945 and 1981, can be found in the claims and tradition of a branch of historical inquiry known as conceptual history [*Begriffsgeschichte*],⁶ which has long placed an overwhelming emphasis on the importance of speech and concepts. Moreover, the nexus of identities and concepts has been a point of inquiry for numerous conceptual historians.⁷

Despite the fact that the German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831) was the first to use the term *Begriffsgeschichte*, conceptual history flourished as a particular and distinct school

Reinhart Koselleck: conceptos fundamentales, *Sattelzeit e histórica*,” *Politeia* 35, no. 49 (2012): 9, accessed December 2016, <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=170029498009>.

⁴ To name a few: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 133; Nancy T. Ammerman, “North American Protestant Fundamentalism,” in *Fundamentalisms Observed. Fundamentalism Project*. Vol. 1, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 5; Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), *passim*.

⁵ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 179.

⁶ Melvin Richter, “*Begriffsgeschichte* and the History of Ideas,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48, no. 2 (1987): 247-264, accessed June 19, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709557>.

of history in the two decades after the Second World War.⁸ It emerged concretely around the figure of Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006)—though there are other important contributors—and in Germany—though this approach to history has now spread to other countries. Conceptual history posits that concepts, the most basic unit of language, both register and shape historical change.⁹ This is its fundamental proposition. It is around concepts themselves that historical change becomes visible, where historical divisions may be uncovered, and where continuance is verified. The American historian Melvin Richter writes, “...concepts also affect political and social change because it is through them that a horizon is constituted against which such changes are seen, projected into the future, or contrasted to the past.”¹⁰

Conceptual historians have elaborated an important temporal distinction in their approach to uncovering conceptual change. The history of concepts distinguishes between, on the one hand, synchronic analysis: an examination of concepts and their meanings in a particular period of time; and, on the other, diachronic analysis: the tracing of a concept over a period of time.¹¹ Though distinct, the two modes of conceptual analysis are, at all times, interrelated.¹² In addition, conceptual history has created numerous and useful theoretical tools with which to undertake the analysis of speech and concepts, which will, from time to time, be used in our examination of evangelical speech and the concepts they used between 1945 and 1981.¹³

⁷ Javier Fernández Sebastián, and Juan Francisco Fuentes, “Conceptual History, Memory, and Identity: An Interview with Reinhart Koselleck,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 2, no. 1 (March 2006): 99–127, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23731013>; Pim den Boer, “Civilization: Comparing Concepts and Identities,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 1, no. 1 (March 2005): 51–62, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23730938>; Chris Lorenz, “Representations of Identity: Ethnicity, Race, Class, Gender and Religion. An Introduction to Conceptual History,” in *The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Religion, Class and Gender in National Histories*, ed. Stefan Berger, (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 24–60. See also Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 1063.

⁸ Jan-Werner Müller, “On Conceptual History,” in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford University Press, 2014), 77.

⁹ Richter, “*Begriffsgeschichte* and the History of Ideas,” 252.

¹⁰ Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 42. Koselleck describes the inescapable interconnectedness between history and concepts as follows: “A history does not happen without speaking, but it is never identical with it, it cannot be reduced to it,” Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 25.

¹¹ Richter, “*Begriffsgeschichte* and the History of Ideas,” 260.

¹² *Ibid.* On the relatedness of these two temporal modes of investigation see also: Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 30.

¹³ Some of the more important ideas are “basic concept” [*Grundbegriff*], “contested term,” “the whitening out of meaning,” Richter, “The Concept of Despotism and L’abus Des Mots,” 7-8. As well as, “ideologification” [*Ideologisierung*], democratization [*Demokratisierung*] and politicization [*Politisierung*], Richter, “*Begriffsgeschichte* and the History of Ideas,” 252-253; see also Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 37-38.

In sum, there are three reasons for our brief overview of conceptual history. In the first place, we find justification, from within history itself, for our turn to language and the elaboration of what will primarily be a synchronic analysis of evangelical concepts during a period spanning the majority of the Cold War. Second, through conceptual history, we are afforded a framework from which to proceed as well as conceptual tools with which to undertake our examination. Lastly, despite the vast secondary literature on American evangelicalism there exists no conceptual history of the twentieth-century evangelical community. Nor can one find in the existing historiography on this religious movement a significant emphasis on the evangelical lexicon and the concepts evangelicals utilized during the Cold War.

Reminded, now that we are, of the importance of speech in historical change and its possible connection to identity, which Arendt intimated, we may begin our examination of evangelical concepts, which will be carried out by first directing our attention to the frequent use of clichés. Second, we will focus on the propensity, within evangelicalism, to employ a language of destruction and militarism, a language of warfare. Next, we will examine the incorporation, into evangelical discourse, of economic concepts, a language drenched in capital, i.e., the free market and its varied attributes and phenomena. Lastly, we will turn our attention to the widespread use of organic metaphors and concepts and biological terminology.

Clichés and Evangelicalism

With *Christianity Today* and the numerous addresses and sermons of Billy Graham, between 1945 and 1981, as the Second World War came to a close and the United States intensified its ideological struggles with the Soviet Union and communism in general, one finds most glaringly and most clearly a clichéd language. What occurred within the evangelical church was not a mere and insignificant proliferation of platitudes; the cliché, we will come to understand, served a particular historical purpose. The historical moment in which such language emerges was, as we know, the Cold War and it was a conflict to which evangelicals were very much attuned.¹⁴ The ideological struggle between the United States and the agents and governments of communism was carried out on many fronts and in many ways. Abroad, already in 1950, the horrors of the Second World War still smoldering and

fresh, the struggle would turn into open hostility as military forces from the communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea overran the 38th parallel.¹⁵ With this invasion, the United States would once again see its armies marching through Janus' gates, which for the Romans signaled the beginning and end of war. In the Korean Peninsula, the "land of the morning calm," war lasted just over three years.¹⁶ With the cessation of hostilities, devastation was left in its wake. Of the United Nations forces, 94,000 lost their lives. According to some estimates, three million or more Korean civilians were killed.¹⁷ Those not killed awoke in the midst of a frozen and barren desert, a country whose infrastructure lay broken, whose countryside was riveted under the brutality of mechanized war, whose homes no longer sheltered them from the cold of the North. Yet, even upon the wings of death, for some, comes prosperity. The conflict and destruction unleashed on the Korean peninsula ushered in and facilitated a sevenfold increase in American military production compared to before the war.¹⁸

On the heels of the armed and bloody intervention in the Korean peninsula, the attention of the American government, with the aim of halting the spread of communism, would turn its attention elsewhere.¹⁹ In 1955, during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States, through the CIA, helped carry out rigged elections in South Vietnam, bringing Ngo Dinh Diem to power. In an attempt to prop up Diem's regime, the Eisenhower administration sent billions of dollars in financial aid and hundreds of military advisors.²⁰ Following Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, elected in 1960, was faced with the task of whether or not to support a regime in South Vietnam that was beleaguered by mounting opposition from the North, most clearly in the form of the National Liberation Front (NLF). President Kennedy initially chose to confront this inherited problem by sending elite American troops as well as economic advisors. Towards the end of 1963, the year of his assassination, Kennedy sent a total of 24,000 American soldiers.²¹ The United States' military build-up in Vietnam presaged and promised war, made it all but inevitable. After the attack on the American destroyer *Maddox*, in August of 1964, Congress passed the

¹⁴ For anticommunist sentiment amongst American evangelicals see Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 95-96, 100, 102-103, 106, 112.

¹⁵ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 917.

¹⁶ James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of the Korean War* (New York: William Marrow and Company, Inc., 1988), 15, 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 254.

¹⁸ John M. Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 920.

¹⁹ For the policy of containment see *Ibid.*, 920-923.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 946, 947.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 964.

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, the authorization for open and sustained conflict.²² The result of all of this was, of course, that once again, the United States found itself in the quagmire of another foreign war, in a far-off land. The Vietnam War would last until 1973, with the remnants of the American presence abandoning the country in 1975, and leaving Vietnam devastated, terrorized, broken in terms of infrastructure, and poisoned by toxins from both defoliants and weapons, which were used to carry out the American war effort. Such were the fruits of containment, the violent and valiant struggle against communism. For American society, the war in Vietnam had lasting ramifications as the United States' role in this armed conflict became the simmering focal point of student protest and organized and widespread dissent. Just as with the Korean War, the war in Vietnam was yet another violent squandering of American resources and lives, as well as the lives of others.²³

The wars in Korea and Vietnam were, of course, the two most notable foreign interventions on the part of the American government, which took place in the period between 1945 and 1981. To these two interventions, greater nuance can be given. These military conflicts must be taken together with the lesser-known and less-visible military invasions carried out by the United States, the funding and fomenting of localized dissension abroad, and the prominent role this country played in overthrowing foreign leaders. Iran, Guatemala, Chile, and the Dominican Republic were only a few of the scenes in which American foreign policy was played out increasingly through destabilization and bloodshed.²⁴ Each passing year brought new or revived conflict, armed intervention, and the propping up of regimes that would support the goals of American officials, the military, and corporations abroad. From the perspective of the citizens of countries directly affected by the United States' foreign policy of the Cold War era, the situation was, no doubt, lamentable. But for Americans the status quo of Cold War politics was also incredibly problematic as the citizens of the United States were forced to laud and look with favor on their government against the backdrop of the Republic as an agent of ongoing violence. Numerous countries in Latin America, following the Second World War, become the scene of American intervention, the destabilization of democratically elected governments, and the propping up of dictators in the region.

²² *Ibid.*, 988.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ The litany of the American government's foreign military and clandestine interventions is too long to recount here and is already well documented. See, for example, Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Owl Books, 2006).

The United States had become the world's procuress of freedom and of democracy. Outside of the United States the price one would pay to acquire such gifts varied greatly; death and destruction were often the nexus of the transaction. But the Cold War was not only warfare conducted abroad, it was also a conflict of ideas. The period of ideological tensions between the capitalist West and the communist East gave birth to new doctrines, namely, the Domino Theory and the theory of the containment of communism. These ideas were to become ends in and of themselves and to govern the foreign policy of the United States. After the end of the Second World War, in the United States during the 1950s, the conflict of ideas was ushered in with growing vehemence in the form of Senator Joseph McCarthy's crusade against communism. McCarthyism, together with the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), a congressional committee that worked, after the end of the Second World War, to ferret out communist sympathizers, would introduce insinuation, accusation, and fear into the minds of American citizens and into public discourse.²⁵ Abroad, the Soviet Union's development of the atomic bomb, which was first tested in 1949,²⁶ and their expanding atomic program, heightened the United States' collective anxiety concerning the capabilities and intent of the Soviet Bloc.

Against the rise of communism in parts of Europe and Asia and in the midst of the astounding economic expansion during the Cold War, Americans re-articulated their understanding of American values and the essence of American life.²⁷ This unique American way of life was linked, as we have mentioned, to a lifestyle and identity built around conspicuous consumption. The apex of this quintessentially American way of life was increasingly depicted through home and car ownership. The new pathway of consumption, littered with a constant flurry of new consumer goods, was at once a political statement and personal fulfillment. The "freedom" to consume as one pleased, to choose between various brands and products, was offered as the antithesis to a state-planned economy and a communistic society. Through advertisement, television, film, radio, and even religion consumption was positioned, displayed, and promoted as the culmination of personal identity's construction.

It was amidst such happenings that evangelicalism would come into its own, solidifying and quickly gaining traction as a movement, finding new rivulets and crevices in which to flow. The Cold War no doubt exerted a certain influence on evangelicals in the

²⁵ John M. Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 925-926.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 915

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 933-937, 947-956.

United States. But rather than looking at the Cold War era as an occasioning of certain aspects of evangelical forms of speech, as forcing evangelicals to speak in any particular way, to employ certain concepts, we may consider it as making room, creating space, for words and ideas that were latent, waiting in silence to make their appearance amongst men and women.

No concept better typifies this era, the period marking the synchronization of American evangelicalism, than “communist” or any of its related terms. “Communist,” “communism,” “red,” were used with such liberality by some sectors of American society that the words themselves would venture to the boundaries of meaninglessness. During this period so many things and so many people, at one time or another, would be labeled and smeared as communist that this concept and its associated terms would become clichés *par excellence*. Generally speaking, we may say that this was a type of speech into which evangelicals freely entered, in which they vigorously participated. It deserves to be mentioned that the bold stance taken by evangelicals, with respect to communism after the Second World War, was not something entirely new. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent consolidation and institutionalization of power by communists in the following decade, had already confronted Americans with the frightening prospects of ideological Marxism. In the United States, during the 1920s, Marsden points out in *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, “labor unrest” as well as terrorists bombings combined to foment a “Red Scare” in the American mind.²⁸

Concerning fears of communism and anti-communist sentiment in evangelicalism after the Second World War, we stumble upon an indictment against the overuse and misuse of words like communist and the realization that language can be used so as to manipulative the images and feelings of the listener or reader from an evangelical himself. Harold B. Kuhn, a frequent contributor to *Christianity Today*, and who, in 1968, was the Chairman of the Division of Theology and Philosophy of Religion at Asbury Theological Seminary, is important to us.²⁹ Kuhn provided a notable exception to the trajectory of much of evangelical speech; in short, he thought about the concepts that he used and he raised questions about the use of language that are intimately relevant to our discussion of clichés and evangelicalism. His condemnation of clichéd forms of language, in evangelicalism, provides important testimony that such language was rampant. Unfortunately for Kuhn, his noble call for

²⁸ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 55.

semantic integrity both in his religious community—evangelicalism—and the rest of society in general was not heeded, as these terms would be thrown about in a crescendo of abandon and with an increasingly identifiable purpose: the installation and manufacture of fear. The specter of communism haunted evangelicals and they devoted a considerable amount of time and effort, through the religious press, sermons, associations, and radio programs to the vanquishing of this threat. Sightings of this specter were seen everywhere, and evangelicals wasted no time in employing the concept to any phenomenon that, to their mind, had a resemblance to this ghost. One example can be found with B. C. Goodpasture, the editor of the most important publication of the Protestant denomination the Church of Christ, who according to a news piece in *Christianity Today*, suggested that there was a “possibility the Communist sympathizers might be behind some demonstrations.”³⁰ The demonstrations to which Dr. Goodpasture was referring were the sit-ins carried out by civil rights activists.

In 1958, an initiative to abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee was met with dismay on the part of some evangelicals. In a letter to the editor of *Christianity Today*, Ewing E. Clemons expressed the nightmare of what he calls the “internal threat.” “I am deeply concerned,” Clemons said, giving voice to his palpable fear, “for the safety of our nation today—not from being bombed...but by being destroyed internally from a force that evidently is not visible to many or even understood.”³¹ The author of the missive, we may observe, though he did not use the word communist, transferred, with a sleight of hand, the focus away from the House un-American Committee, its role, its legitimacy, its ethical implications, to the conspiratorial belief that communists were scheming to undermine the institutions of the United States; it was, in his mind, evidence of the fifth column, which never quite materialized. Arendt, in her 1978 *The Life of the Mind*, remarked that clichés served to mask and protect us from reality. With Clemons, we see begin to see Arendt’s theoretical understanding of clichés in concrete form.

The clichés that surfaced during the Cold War era, in various parts of the evangelical community, were not limited to an abundant and sweeping use of the specific term communist; evangelicals found new and tantalizing ways to name their ideological opponents. J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1924 to 1972 and frequent contributor to *Christianity Today* during the 1960s, was a distinguished employer of clichés. In an article from 1962 entitled “Spiritual Priorities: Guidelines for a

²⁹ Harold B. Kuhn, “Burning Issues in the Life of Sanctity,” *Wesleyan Theological Journal*, vol. 3 (1968): 10.

³⁰ “Reaction to ‘Sit-ins’ Divides Southern Clergy,” CT News, *Christianity Today*, April 11, 1960, 25.

Civilization in Peril,” Hoover stated, in a tone swimming in doom and destruction, “Almost every area of American life is touched in some manner by the organized empire of evil.”³² The notion that those persons or groups of people, whom some political leaders define as enemies, constitute an evil empire, a smooth and cohesive and nefarious movement, has been a popular theme among American political leaders, most memorably with Ronald Reagan’s labeling of the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and George W. Bush’s ominous “Axis of Evil,” which included Iran, Iraq and North Korea.³³

Another example of evangelicals’ use of clichés with respect to communism manifests itself with color labels. The utilization of the infamous *reds* was, and perhaps still is, in some circles, a widely used epithet and evangelicals visibly participated in this way of speaking. The label “red,” perhaps the cheapest of all clichés, has been widely used both in the United States and in other countries. What is important about its use in American evangelicalism during the Cold War, as we shall see later in this dissertation, especially in relation to the Civil Rights Movement, was that it, in the hands of the evangelical, became a political weapon, a means of defiling, delegitimizing, and was an attempt to play upon the deepest fears eating away at the collective American mind. Surprising, too, was that such clichés and tired concepts spilled forth from a religious community that had solemnly avowed strict removal from the political life of the nation. One example of this trend is provided by Hoover in his article “The Communist Menace: Red Goals and Christian Ideals,” where he spoke, in 1960, of the “highly malignant cancer” and “violent hurricane” that was communism.³⁴ Billy Graham, the brightest star in the evangelical firmament, also had a penchant for this kind of speech. One example, from 1954, was when Graham spoke of, in defense of American politicians who were on the hunt for communists, the “...pinks, lavenders, and the reds who have sought refuge beneath the wings of the American eagle.”³⁵ That same year, Graham, in another instance, according to John G. Turner, in his 2005 doctoral dissertation, “Selling Jesus to Modern American: Campus Crusade for Christ,

³¹ Ewing E. Clemons, “Internal Threat,” [Letter to the Editor] *Christianity Today*, June 8, 1959, 26. See also ““Push Button’ Riots Now Promote Communist Goals,” [Editorial], *Christianity Today*, March 13, 1961, 25-26.

³² J. Edgar Hoover, “Spiritual Priorities: Guidelines for a Civilization in Peril,” *Christianity Today*, June 22, 1962, 4 [916].

³³ Elisabeth Bumiller, “White House Letter; Axis of Evil: First Birthday for a Famous Phrase,” *The New York Times*, January 20, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/20/us/white-house-letter-axis-of-evil-first-birthday-for-a-famous-phrase.html>.

³⁴ J. Edgar Hoover, “The Communist Menace: Red Goals and Christian Ideals,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 3.

³⁵ Billy Graham quoted in Turner “Selling Jesus to Modern America,” 131.

Evangelical Culture, and Conservative Politics,” warned of communism and the “mysterious pull of this satanic religion.”³⁶

It is evident that the emergence and the polarizing effects of the Cold War created a situation in which evangelicals felt compelled to thwart the expansion of communism, but with communism looming on the horizon, evangelical Christians also hurriedly moved to differentiate the United States from the Soviet Union and other communist governments. The distance between the United States and the Communist Bloc was one that was, in large part, created, manufactured, by evangelicals through concepts. One way in which evangelicals carried out this task was through the use of clichés. If, to the evangelical’s understanding, the U.S.S.R. was the epitome of depravity, the empire of evil, then the United States was something uniquely and exceptionally different. In the face of the menace of communism, evangelicals extolled, time and again, the virtues of their country. The most cherished concept of the evangelical chorus of praise was freedom. The United States, in evangelical parlance, was synonymous with freedom; it was the “bulwark of world freedom,” as one editorial in 1958 put it.³⁷ Along these same lines, Hoover wrote in 1962 that it was in the United States where one was to find “the foundations of freedom.”³⁸ Not only was the American Republic the locus of freedom in the world, or to put it differently, the United States was in eternal and virtuous possession of freedom, but evangelicals promoted the belief that Americans were cut from a different, nobler, cloth. In an article by Walter S. Robertson, from 1959, which discussed the best tactics for halting the advance of communism in the Far East, the author refers to his compatriots as “freedom-loving people.”³⁹

In much the same way, Americans, according to Dr. Gordon Palmer in 1962, as he made clear on his radio broadcast Christian Patriotism Hour, which on this occasion was reproduced in *Christianity Today*, were not only great lovers of freedom, they were also lovers of truth. As the title of his radio program suggests, Christianity and patriotism, the cause of Christ and the historical entity of the United States, were, to evangelicals, issues that were inseparably intertwined. Dr. Palmer duly instructed the listener, “Christian patriots must be known as men of the right [politically speaking], because they are dedicated to

³⁶ Billy Graham quoted in *Ibid.*

³⁷ “The Christian Citizen in the World Conflict,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, October 27, 1958, 21.

³⁸ J. Edgar Hoover, “Spiritual Priorities: Guidelines for a Civilization in Peril,” *Christianity Today*, June 22, 1962, 4 [916].

³⁹ Walter S. Robertson, “Meeting Communism in the Far East,” *Christianity Today*, March 30, 1959, 11. See also C. Stanley. Lowell, “If the U.S. Becomes 51% Catholic,” *Christianity Today*, October 27, 1958, 11.

God's truth, to the whole truth. They endeavor to be truth-tellers, because they are truth-lovers, and therefore, truth-livers."⁴⁰

The cries of freedom and truth, as descriptions of the American experience, issued from evangelical tongues according to certain patterns, most notably that of ignoring. It is altogether unsurprising that, from the perspective of white Protestants, life in the United States would present itself, and demanded to be equated with, the epitome of justice, freedom, and truth. This, to be quite clear, was only one part of a larger whole. Thus, the evangel's utterances of freedom and truth emerged as an attempt to erase, whitewash, the undeniable reality of suffering of so many in the United States. To speak of the United States, as evangelicals often did necessitates, the suppression of other histories, other stories, other realities. For the evangelical, these other aspects of American history and American life were not to be included, they were to be ignored, banished from one's thoughts. What we have in mind here are, of course, the two most obvious blights on the American landscape, the treatment of African Americans through slavery, segregation, and a lingering and latent form of institutionalized racism, as well as the near extinguishment of Native Americans, events which were present from the establishment of the colonies to the foundation of the United States.

Continuing with our discussion of clichés, the political struggle with communism abroad and at home was not the only realm in which evangelicals took shelter by employing platitudes. As the decades of the fifties melted into the tumultuous sixties, and stemming from the events surrounding the presidential election of John F. Kennedy, Roman Catholicism, in the eyes of evangelicals, was an equally significant threat. Evangelicals writing in *Christianity Today* demonstrated overt anti-Catholic prejudice, which seems to confirm the suspicion of the American historian Richard Hofstadter that: "Anti-Catholicism has always been the pornography of the Puritan."⁴¹ What is perhaps difficult to extract from Hofstadter's cleverly crafted remark, from an essay published in 1964, entitled *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, was the fact that anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States was something of an institution. Hofstadter cites one Texas newspaper from 1855: "...It is a notorious fact that the Monarchs of Europe and the Pope of Rome are at this very moment plotting our destruction and threatening the extinction of our political, civil, and religious institutions."⁴² According to Hofstadter, anti-Catholic sentiment in the United

⁴⁰ Dr. Gordon Palmer, "Men of the Right," *Christianity Today*, June 22, 1962, 7 [919].

⁴¹ Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 21.

⁴² *Ibid.* See also 19, 23. See also Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 14.

States rose in the second half of the nineteenth century following an increase in immigration from Catholic countries. This sentiment would spill over into the twentieth century.⁴³

Another way that anti-Catholicism was kept alive and continued to play a part in American society was through the efforts of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). In the aftermath of the American Civil War and the era of Reconstruction, the KKK made its first appearance. By 1923, the KKK's base of support had swelled to some four million members.⁴⁴ The Klan promoted a version of white supremacy, which advocated for white Protestants. Jews, Catholics, and other races were all excluded from the KKK's vision of a future world.⁴⁵ Members of the KKK used violence and harrowing imagery to promote the Klan's message as well as intimidate and terrorize their opponents.⁴⁶ Though the Klan was not affiliated directly with any one Protestant denomination, it was, in the end, a thoroughly Protestant endeavor. In the words of Marsden, it "represented a notable segment of the professing Protestant community."⁴⁷ Alongside this association's hatred of American blacks and Roman Catholics, the KKK had marked Jews and all other non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups as inferior.⁴⁸

Those who called themselves evangelicals, after the Second World War, participated in anti-Catholic rhetoric in their own way. With respect to the language that evangelicals began to use concerning their fellow Christians, refuge was taken in concepts such as "Romish," "Romanism," and "Romists," concepts which had already been tried and tested.⁴⁹ But the language concerning the adherents of the Catholic Church extended beyond petty epithets and airs of condescension, which "Romish" was intended to be. Kennedy's possible ascension to the highest echelons of power revived anti-Catholicism in the evangelical's heart.⁵⁰ The American historian and journalist Frances FitzGerald, in her 2017 comprehensive study *The Evangelicals*, observes that, for *Christianity Today*'s editorial team, Kennedy's Catholicism was a "major factor" in the presidential election and there was

⁴³ For more on the long history of anti-Catholicism in the United States see Martin J. Burke, "Conceptual History in the United States: A Missing 'National Project'" *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 1, no. 2 (2005), 131, accessed June 20, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23730882>.

⁴⁴ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, 829.

⁴⁵ Aurora Bosch, *Historia de Estados Unidos, 1776-1945* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2010), 393.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Marsden, George M. Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 54.

⁴⁸ John M. Murrin, et al., *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, 829; Marsden, George M. Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 54.

⁴⁹ See: "Bigotry or Smear?" [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, February 1, 1960, 20; "The American Scene: Are Cults Outpacing our Churches?" *Christianity Today*, December 19, 1960, 4; C. Stanley Lowell, "The Protestant-Catholic Dialogue," *Christianity Today*, October 24, 1960, 4. This entire semantic field—Catholicism as menace—has long been a conceptual component of American history, see Burke, "Conceptual History in the United States: A Missing 'National Project,'" 131.

a fear that the Vatican would intrude in American politics.⁵¹ But, in fact, those writing in *Christianity Today* said a great deal more and the tenor of their words was much more dire. They fixed their response to Kennedy and the prospect of a Catholic president deeply within, as we have said, a tradition of anti-Catholicism and they made use of tested concepts, which were ideally suited for their intervention and discourses in the political realm. In 1959, C. Stanley Lowell wrote, with cutting condescension, in connection with Kennedy's rise in American politics, "Most Catholic politicians do not seem to understand the subtleties of a system like ours...They may flaunt their religious practices and virtually force them on the entire community."⁵² "They have," he continued, "an astonishing faculty for never suspecting that the symbol or observance which inspires them may be shocking and abhorrent to persons of another faith."⁵³ Evangelicals went beyond using disparaging terms and framed Catholics as a menace to American society and democracy. Freedom of religion itself, said this evangelical, was in peril. One editorial from 1961, less than three months after Kennedy's inauguration, the wounds of defeat still fresh, in contemplation of the alleged attempt of Catholic parochial schools to acquire federal funding, described the problem that Roman Catholicism posed for evangelicals and in so doing elevated the ethos and intent of their speech: "Whether Romanism eventually dominates America may well depend on the stalwart faithfulness of men and women who look back to the past, study the present, and see the storm warnings of the future" (Catholicism being one of these approaching tempests).⁵⁴ Here "Romanism," which was used to convey the image of a menacing ideology issuing forth from Rome, served a similar purpose as the concept "communist" or "red." Catholicism, like communism, according to the evangelical, had the capability to overcome and to undermine the foundations of the United States. Thus, evangelicals employed clichés, which were able to generalize and erase the unbecomingness of nuance, one example being the complexities of the Catholic community in the United States. These complexities were exchanged for the more beguiling image of the destructive and dangerous horde. Evangelicals, in short, had identified a threat, and it was more important for them to create and expand the image of this threat than to attempt to depict and understand the true character of American Catholicism. Evangelicals *decided* to participate in existing forms of language, to partake in "standardized codes of self-expression." As

⁵⁰ FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 236-237.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 236.

⁵² C. Stanley Lowell, "Protestants, Catholics and Politics," *Christianity Today*, July 20, 1959, 8.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Arendt so adeptly observed in her last work *The Life of the Mind*, left unfished at the end of her life: “Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of self-expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence.”⁵⁵ The newly emerging evangelical movement during the Cold War participated in the historical ebb and flow of various concepts, a fact that binds them ever closer to the bosom of the world, a world, which we know well, they had pretended to abandon.

An important aspect of the evangelical’s participation in the vilification of Roman Catholicism is that it emerged, in concrete form, around the specific issue of the presidential election of Kennedy. Here we witness the use of clichéd concepts with clear rhetorical and political objectives. Evangelicals were continuously tolling the bells of alarm, which sonorously marked the eventual dominance of the Roman Church in the United States, always with an eye to this momentous political event looming on the horizon.

Scouring the pages of *Christianity Today* or sermons, now forgotten, we encounter other platitudes, which were of a wholly different order. Some of the evangelicals’ obscurantist and generalizing language concerning communism and Catholicism is, in short, to be expected. Evangelicals did, to varying degrees, know about Catholicism and, to various extents, understand the ideology of communism. The concepts they used reflected the fact that they loathed the Roman Church and they despised anything that might resemble Marxism. “Communist” and “Catholic” were not merely words; they were two concepts whose semantic strata were expanded to include new layers of meaning. The two clichés, which are of a different nature, differ, from what we have previously seen, in that they were directed towards people whom evangelicals—exceptions aside—did not know. “Pagan” and “heathen” were, in the United States of the mid-twentieth century, two of evangelicalism’s most treasured concepts of denigration. Evangelicals used these two terms to describe beliefs and practices that they found distasteful. “Pagan” was utilized to describe communism, certain modern philosophies, and phenomena of culture, which seemed, from the standpoint of the evangelical, to only emerge so as to scandalize this particular Protestant community.⁵⁶ Always hanging around this concept were noxious fumes of depravity.

⁵⁴ “Roman Catholic Interests Demand U.S. Funds for Parochial Schools,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 27, 1961, 22.

⁵⁵ Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York: A Harvest Book Harcourt, Inc., 1977), 4.

⁵⁶ For some examples of these concepts and their use see “Churchman Look at Communism,” [Panel discussion] *Christianity Today*, June 23, 1967, 12 [948]; Henry R. Van Til, “The Relation of Religion and Culture,”

But in 1967, as the United States found itself propelled and stuck in the morass of the war in Indochina, evangelicals would find new subjects upon which to project their feelings, divvy up their disdain. One editorial from 1967 makes reference to the “pagan lands” of Vietnam.⁵⁷ The editorial goes beyond categorizing Vietnam as simply pagan and even subtly suggests that such paganism was responsible for the then emerging conflict and that if these pagan elements had been previously extracted from the Vietnamese soul, the United States might not have become embroiled in the conflict in the first place. “A greater investment of our material resources,” the editorial declared, “in the spiritual plight of pagan lands [the author means through missionaries] may save our grandchildren from having to waste billions on the implements of war.”⁵⁸ But the denomination of Vietnam as simply “pagan,” and therefore less, in some way expendable, cannot be taken as a mere slip of the tongue, an insignificant turn of phrase. Instead, it signifies to us a great deal. On the one hand, we see with what ease and calm evangelicals moved to denigrate those of whom they knew nothing. On the other hand, such practices of speech, as was the case with Catholicism and the presidential election of Kennedy, emerged in a highly charged political context. As the American involvement in Vietnam grew more complicated, bloodier, and extended in time, to what extent did such conceptual mechanisms serve to edify the American war effort? To what degree had the evangelical, who was said to have been far removed from all political dealings, presented himself as a proponent of the international military interventions of the American government?

Likewise, evangelicals employed the concept “heathen” in this period in much the same way. One example that illuminates the usage of this demeaning concept, its meaning, its purpose, occurred with the evangelistic efforts of the Moody Bible Institute, a prominent evangelical institution located in Chicago. The Moody Institute printed a propaganda booklet for American military personnel stationed in Japan. In 1959, the evangelical communiqué created a scandal and resentment with the Japanese, as *Christianity Today* reported, for the document warned, “of the perils in taking a bride of ‘heathen religion’ and different cultural background.”⁵⁹ A similar example comes to us from a certain Jacob Gartenhaus in 1966. In his article, “How to Approach the Jew with the Gospel,” he instructs his fellow evangelicals believers that “The Jew is not like the heathen, for whom

Christianity Today, September 14, 1959, 6; L. Nelson Bell, “Shifting Values,” *A Layman and his Faith*, *Christianity Today*, January 2, 1961, 16.

⁵⁷ “Missions and Missiles,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, October 13, 1967, 31 [31].

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Protestant Panorama, *Christianity Today*, January 5, 1959, 26.

Christianity is something new, something strange that arouses his curiosity.”⁶⁰ In Gartenhaus’ estimation, a social and moral hierarchy was in place whereby the Jew, narrowly escaping heathenism, was still inferior to the Christian elect but was of more worth perhaps than the rest of humanity, whose geographic and social remoteness from Christianity marks them with a brand, which disfigures body and soul.

Evangelicals, instead of using words such as *non-Christian* or *unsaved*, chose, at times, concepts that carried a greater weight and were imbued with other, perhaps more enthralling, connotations. Why did evangelicals address people whom they most likely knew nothing about in such ways? What is the meaning of such language? “Heathen,” we must concede, can be used to indicate a person of another religion; however, this term, along with “pagan,” carries with it the notions of wanton savagery and depraved barbarism. When the evangel speaks, “choked and cloaked with formulas,” to borrow a phrase from James Baldwin, does he or she know the realities of existence in Japan?⁶¹ Did the evangelical man or the evangelical woman know the desires, sufferings, and triumphs of a person living in Vietnam? Did evangelicals speak of these foreign people out of intimate knowledge or out of the barrenness of ignorance?

The list and examples of the clichés that evangelicals employ are not exhaustive; this, of course, was never our intention. Instead, we have set out on our discussion of these specific aspects of evangelical parlance for the purpose of painting an impression of the evangelical lexicon of the Cold War. We are now, with what we have witnessed, in a position to begin to speak about who evangelicals, through their words, have revealed themselves to be; we may now glimpse into a facet of the evangelical identity. The first and most obvious observation is that evangelicals were experiencing fear and, by this assertion, we do not wish to convey the idea that evangelicals were merely anxious, for anxiety is a feeling that is overarching and not connected immediately with a single event. Fear arising from events in the world was not only to be found with communism; Roman Catholicism and its role and future in American society, was a source of tangible angst. But it appears that, with evangelicals, fear was also something that could be created, reproduced through words.

Without a doubt, the most important aspect of this language was its ability to insulate the adherent from the complexity of the world itself. In this period, men and women were

⁶⁰ Jacob Gartenhaus, “How to Approach the Jew With The Gospel,” *Christianity Today*, December 9, 1966, 13 [253].

seeking, and evangelicalism provided, an enclosure from the befuddling events and changes of the world. Protection and insulation from the world thrives as one of evangelicalism's most powerfully compelling promises. In this conceptual framework, with its accompanying rhetorical objectives, "America" could be built up as a heavenly creation, a utopian force spreading freedom and truth in the world. This framework appeared in a context in which, perhaps frightening to some, the reality of the American experience, the actions of the American government, and the Republic's essence as a nation presented a less flattering picture. From here, a connection can be established to identity. Was evangelicalism's condemnation of some things and edification of others a gradual taking to itself the faculty of judging, speaking, thinking? Were men and women turning to this religious movement for answers?

It also imperative to note that increasingly the evangelical parlance was a form of participation in already existing conceptual histories and a use of concepts laden with fear and prejudice. It is the case, therefore, that evangelicals *decided* to participate in such patterns of speech, to draw from particularly American ways of speaking and thinking. The long-cultivated animus of evangelicals towards Roman Catholicism, whose genesis lay rotting in the past, was a continuation of an old and fond American tradition. From such a perspective, the evangelical comes to us, not as a unique champion of biblical religion, a devout promoter of the spirit of Christianity, but as a perpetuator of mundane and moribund sentiments and prejudices. From out of this language, something of who the evangelical was claws violently to the surface and we are brought into the presence of a worldlier creature than we are often urged and pressured to imagine. The inability to rise above and move beyond, to take one example, the institution of anti-Catholicism in the United States solidifies the evangelical's identity in history. As such, the evangelical becomes for us a fomenter of particular aspects of world, as opposed to the bringer of some spiritual kingdom.

Brief mention can be made of the historical context in which much of this language makes its appearance. We have already alluded to, through our contact with some of the historical and sociological literature about evangelicalism, the evangelical's alleged withdrawal, their supposed apoliticism, and apparent opposition to the worldly things of politics, which was thought to characterize this community prior to the 1970s. Despite the repeated efforts of scholars, on the one hand, and evangelicals, with their formula of being "in the world but not of the world," on the other hand, we are already, at this early stage,

⁶¹ James Baldwin, "No Name in the Street," in *James Baldwin: Collected Essays*, ed. Toni Morrison (New

presented with evidence that seems to undermine such a theory. Much of the evangelical's clichéd speech takes form in and around purely political questions. The presidential election of Kennedy, we saw, drew out repeated and numerous evangelical invectives and barbs, which were designed to undermine a Catholic's ascension to political office. The evangelical's celebration and clichéd patriotic pronouncements concerning their country can be taken, amongst other things, as a political position, as the United States, throughout the Cold War, began to spread its influence, which often had violent and bloody consequences. As the United States continued its wars, continued its interventions, its clandestine undermining of democratic governments, its propping up of despots, the evangelical's assertion that United States was the "bulwark of world freedom," stands, not only as an attempt to protect men and women from the brutal and unseemly realities of the world, but as an advocacy of a particular type of foreign policy, a specific political program.

Concepts of Destruction and Militarism

In *Righteous: Dispatches from the Evangelical Youth Movement*, published in 2006, Lauren Sandler recounts the story and religious career of Ron Luce, who founded Teen Mania. An integral part of this youth ministry is the Honor Academy, which Sandler claims is a center where participants enter into a "yearlong training program" to become "Christian soldiers."⁶² At the Honor Academy, located in Texas, Sandler reports that young evangelicals "undergo army-style physical training."⁶³ Luce also wrote a book, a kind of manifesto for this particular movement within evangelicalism, entitled *Battle Cry for a Generation*. Luce's military training is not a widespread trend in evangelicalism. But this anecdote is indicative of the ethos, within evangelicalism, which was flourishing after the Second World War. This ethos of militarism and destruction was given vivid and varied expression, indeed it was made concrete, in evangelical speech.

The trend was, on the one hand, a language of destruction and, on the other, the prolific and increasing employment of concepts relating to war, the military, and the implements of warfare. What bound these two linguistic trends was the semantic field of violence. The violence inherent in many of the examples that follow is not always

York: Library of America; distributed the U.S. by Penguin Putnam, 1998), 373.

⁶² Lauren Sandler, *Righteous: Dispatches from the Evangelical Youth Movement* (New York: Viking, 2006), 16-18.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 17.

completely transparent but violence, as shall be made clear, is the backdrop of this particular way of communicating with and about the world.

Let us first turn to the language of destruction, which pervaded evangelical parlance in the Cold War period. One of the most striking examples of the language of destruction can be found in evangelicals' usage of metaphors relating to the natural world, specifically to disasters of nature. In the evangelical milieu of the United States at mid-century, there was a fascination with the destructive power of nature. And very much in keeping with this spirit, one finds in *Christianity Today* references to tides, floods and waves. In 1968, after years of struggle for civil rights and as anti-war protests grew to be an ever-larger component of American life, one editorial wrote of the "current wave of student rebellion."⁶⁴ We come across another example from 1966 with George L. Bird, a professor at Syracuse University, who spoke of the crisis in communication and its result, to his mind, was, "Our world is nearly drowning in a rising tide of words that pour forth through every kind of medium."⁶⁵ Bird continued his lamentation thus: "Books, pamphlets, magazines, and newspapers emanate from high-speed, automated typesetters and presses. From the radio and TV come cascades of words. Even the skies are profaned by devices reflecting words that cross all boundaries. If Christ returned to this word-choked world, could his voice be heard?"⁶⁶

With the gradual secularization of certain realms of American life, evangelicals made the decision to turn once again to metaphors of nature, with the hope that this language would be able to capture and transmit the depths of their fear and displeasure. The passing of the National Defense of Education Act of 1958, a piece of legislation whose purpose was to provide funding to the American education system, was perceived by evangelicals as a sign of darker things to come, a foreboding that such actions, on the part of the federal government, would result in further and unsolicited intrusion into a realm, which evangelicals felt to be of their own private dominion. In response to this event, an editorial urged readers, "These facts should arouse the sluggish national conscience and elicit a wave of indignation and protests."⁶⁷ Some years later, as the process of secularization continued apace, and with the landmark Supreme Court decision of 1962, which effectively removed prayer from American public schools, a news article in *Christianity Today* voiced the same

⁶⁴ "The Rationale of the Student Left," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 8, 1968, 31 [127].

⁶⁵ George L. Bird, "The Real Crisis in Communication," *Christianity Today*, June 10, 1966, 16 [932].

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ "Government Intrusion Widens in American Education," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, December 8, 1958, 21.

sentiment: “The wave of indignation over the court’s decision was bathed in the fear that it had opened a new precedent toward a secularization of American culture.”⁶⁸

Secularization was a phenomenon whose reach, evangelicals believed, was not limited to the public sphere; the growing number of people, in the United States, who did not personally profess a religion was an additional cause for concern—it was the secularization of the inner life. “Modern man,” one editorial in 1964 said starkly, “conceals his inner anxieties from his neighbors, who are busy submerging their own discontents. He scarcely remembers the strands of tragedy that scar the hinterlands of contemporary existence.”⁶⁹ One of the causes of this situation of suffering and concealing, which the editorial expounded upon so poetically and so hauntingly, was to be found in “the rising tide of irreligion.”⁷⁰ What is intentionally transmitted in this example was irreligion’s perceived destructiveness. The gradual moving away from religion, on the part of some individuals, was not something to which the evangelical was merely opposed or looked upon with disfavor, it was described and promoted as inherently ruinous, like a wave, it could batter catastrophically the vessel of the United States. Another example of a metaphor taken from nature, whose purport was to create the maximum dramatic effect, is given to us by Hoover. “Communism,” the director of the FBI warned in the autumn of 1960, “is today literally a violent hurricane, rocking not only the chanceries of the world but seeking to capture the bodies, mind and souls of men and women everywhere.”⁷¹

The writers of *Christianity Today* found other forms of expression, which were better equipped to transmit the desired image of impending destruction to the reader; these are the flood metaphors. In the controversy that stemmed from the allegation that the Catholic Church was attempting to expand the parochial school system by way of using public funds, we find, in the evangelical response, one such metaphor. According to the 1961 editorial: “The immediate threat lies in Romanist demand for federal aid to non-public schools. The long-range threat is posed by federal incursion into public education.”⁷² The American citizenry, much to the evangelical’s satisfaction, was addressing this threat. “But a flood of American conviction,” one editorial rejoiced, “is cresting against pressures for federal aid to non-public schools would swiftly transform long-established patterns.”⁷³

⁶⁸ “Church-State Separation: A Serpentine Wall?” CT News, *Christianity Today*, July 20, 1962, 29 [1033].

⁶⁹ “Life for a Wayward Society,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, December 4, 1964, 28 [244].

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ J. Edgar Hoover, “The Communist Menace: Red Goals and Christian Ideals,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 3.

⁷² “Public Funds for Public Schools,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, April 10, 1961, 23.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 20.

We would do well to pause and contemplate the fact that evangelicals were in no way unique in their use of flood metaphors or other metaphors pertaining to the world of nature. One area of contemporary life where such metaphors often come into play is with immigration. As is well known, immigrants are often spoken of as a flood, a coming and devastating wave, a force against which one is powerless. In such instances, the rhetorical purpose of such speech is abundantly clear and what is imparted is the underlying notion of destruction, unmanageable largeness, invasion.

An additional example outside of evangelicalism, which demonstrates the pervasiveness of these types of metaphors, can be found in the work of Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies: Women, Floods, Bodies, History*. Theweleit's 1987 book is a study of the *Freikorps*, paramilitary groups that existed in Weimar Germany. Theweleit discovered innumerable references to floods and waves by the members of these roving bands of men, so much so that his findings prompted him to ask, "And why floods, torrents, raging water; why did they [members of the *Freikorps*] not say, for instance, 'The Bolsheviks advanced like the fourth Ice Age,' or like a 'hurricane,' or an 'Asiatic sandstorm?'"⁷⁴

For Theweleit, the metaphors of floods and waves are significant in and of themselves, for they impart, subtly yet clearly, a particular meaning. In Theweleit's estimation, these metaphors are not merely figurative or poetic. Further on, the author tries to uncover meaning of these conceptual forms, saying, "The flood is abstract enough to allow processes of extreme diversity to be subsumed under its image. All they need have in common is some transgression of boundaries. Whether the boundaries belong to a country, a body, decency, or tradition, their transgression must unearth something that has been forbidden."⁷⁵ Through Theweleit's insight, we are able to arrive at an understanding that, inherently and inextricably, the flood metaphor connotes the idea of transgression, but not transgression of a trivial and inconsequential nature, for floods and waves are forces of nature that can and do destroy, they have the power to obliterate life and the worldly foundations upon which life is built. Thus, it is clear, that for those who utilize such rhetorical devices, the transgression that is involved is believed to be of a violent and destructive sort or, simply, it is advantageous that such events are painted with the light of destruction. The student protests of the 1960s, the reader will recall, were described as "a wave of student rebellion." From this stark and sharp judgment, we can gather that

⁷⁴ Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies: Women, Floods, Bodies, History*, trans. Stephen Conway in collaboration with Erica Carter and Chris Turner. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 230.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 232-233.

evangelicals felt the action of student protests not to simply be bothersome, ill executed or, perhaps, the product of misplaced youthful exuberance, but a violent violation of the American order. And the student rebellion, like a wave, had the power to appear on the American scene and crush and drown all that stood in its path. In a way, it seems that the word transgression does not capture the horror that this event, along with others, inspired in evangelical hearts.

It is also revealing of who the evangelical was in that he did not limit the usage of such metaphors to events, which affected them from the outside and which they believed to harbor the seeds of violence and undoing. Evangelicals, too, desired to participate in this metaphorical violence, to transgress, to violate. The editorial that hoped that the national conscience would awaken and create “a wave of indignation and protests” and thereby smash and destroy this unwanted intrusion by the government. And, in the issue of Catholic schools, we saw the evangel welcome with open arms the “flood of American conviction,” which was swelling and poised to ruin the intrigues of the Church of Rome. Thus, we may say that evangelicals, on the one side, identified themselves as the innocent victims of violence and violation, lambs being led to the slaughter. On the other side, we behold the evangelical who yearns to usher in the wave of destruction and who was more than willing to call down, from their God in heaven, a flood upon the heads of those whom they saw as their enemies. The concepts of flood, destructive waters, annihilating waves, which evangelicals took from nature, are what conceptual historians call *Kampfbegriffe*, “concepts designed for combat.”⁷⁶ Evangelicals repeatedly used these concepts to designate both successes achieved against their ideological foes and the incursions, which the forces of secularization, irreligion, communism or any other perceived opponent were carrying out in the United States of the Cold War.

Very much in keeping with floods of ruin and waves of devastation, are the forms of expression found in Billy Graham’s 1965 book, *World Aflame*, to which we now briefly turn. Graham’s book follows the standard logic and pattern of evangelical thought: men and women are fallen, the world, as well, is in chaos and the only balm for this *Weltgeist* is evangelical Christianity. “Our world is on fire,” railed Graham, “and man without God will never be able to control the flames. The demons of hell have been let loose. The fires of passion, greed, hate, and lust are sweeping the world. We seem to be plunging madly toward

⁷⁶ Reinhart Koselleck, “Crisis,” trans. Michaela W. Richter, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 2 (2006): 367, accessed September 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30141882>.

Armageddon.”⁷⁷ On the following page, Graham continues, “The flames are licking all around our world—the roof is about to cave in—man is caught in a fire raging out of control.”⁷⁸ In Graham’s eyes, just like the floods, waves and ominously rising tides, the flames were varied both in their source and their intensity. Communism, as might be expected, was one of the flames ready to engulf the world in the mid-1960s: “...the Communist flame becomes evermore dangerous—and in some areas of the world it is out of control.”⁷⁹

Let us pause to consider if irreligion was truly the flood that evangelicals affirmed it to be. Was the world on fire as Graham said? Was the roof caving in? Was communism hurling the world to conflagration? Were all of the events, which evangelicals described in such terms, truly violations? Or did evangelicals use such concepts to manufacture and drum up the idea of violation itself? Were the flood warnings, the heralding of rising waves and fire, tools in which to create the image of violation, to transport the adherent onto the ground of alarm?

There is another concept, which carries with it, though with greater opaqueness, these same connotations of destruction. This word stems from the fact that, in the life of the evangelical, one will find the primacy of the doctrine of evangelization. The evangelical is first and foremost a bearer of the Gospel of Christ, a messenger of the Good News. And, subsequently, evangelicals have adopted, as a way to describe one of the central elements of their collective identity, a peculiar concept: “penetration.” In short, the evangelical wishes and prays to *penetrate* everyone and everything, all the while oblivious to the possibility that penetration, by an evangelical, may not rank high on the list of some people’s desirable experiences. “Penetration” has become one of the watchwords of evangelicalism.

Billy Graham, while addressing the World Congress on Evangelism in Berlin, in 1966, spoke of the task of evangelism, the spreading of the Word, in the following way: “We have one task, the penetration of the entire world in our generation with the Gospel!”⁸⁰ Graham’s speech in Berlin makes reference to and echoes the sentiment of an earlier call for universal evangelization in a single generation, which was given, *urbi et orbi*, in 1886 by A. T. Pearson.⁸¹ While Pearson’s statement closely resembles the words of Graham, it is Graham who imbues the slogan with the mystique of penetration.

⁷⁷ Billy Graham, *World Aflame* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965) 1.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁸⁰ Billy Graham, “Why the Berlin Congress,” *Christianity Today*, November 11, 1966, 7 [135].

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

The writers of *Christianity Today*, too, spoke of “penetration.” The use of this concept in the magazine was not only tied to the religious mandate of evangelization, it was inspired by a more sweeping idea: the belief that all things were to be brought into harmony with evangelical Christianity, which is to say, that the evangel works for the “extension of Christ’s lordship over all areas of life...”⁸² It was in this spirit, this dream of influencing all spheres of human existence, that Leighton Ford, the vice-president of Billy Graham’s Evangelistic Association, said, “If our goal is the penetration of the whole world, then for the agents to carry out this task we must aim at nothing less than the mobilization of the whole Church.”⁸³ Pushed by the winds of this new doctrine—total evangelism, as Ford called it—the vessel of American evangelicalism sailed into new waters where they would bring about the penetration “of government, of school, of work, of the home.”⁸⁴

Another example of this total evangelism comes to us by way of Hudson T. Armerding (1918-2009), the then president of Wheaton College, one of evangelicalism’s leading educational institutions. In Armerding’s letter to *Christianity Today*, he called for “a more effective penetration of the inner city in order that the saving and healing power of the Great Physician [Jesus] may be made available to those who so desperately need his touch upon their lives.”⁸⁵ And Graham, in a 1958 discussion with Carl F. H. Henry and Harold John Ockenga (1905-1985), the later was intimately invoked with *Christianity Today*, praised the penetrating power that television had given evangelicals.⁸⁶

Another concept similar to “penetration” both in its usage and its underlying meaning, which was featured prominently in the evangelical rhetorical repertoire, was “thrust.” Evangelicals used the concept in a variety of ways; most often it was used to draw a mental picture of the expansion of evangelicalism. C. Ralston Smith (1908-1998), a Presbyterian minister in Oklahoma, titled his 1961 article “Billy Graham’s Evangelistic Thrust” in which he discussed the successful expansion of Graham’s ministry of evangelization.⁸⁷

⁸² “Who are the Evangelicals?” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, June 23, 1967, 23 [958]. For the notion that Christianity should impact the totality of the human being and the whole of life, that is, evangelicalism’s totalitarian conceptualization of religion, see also Francis A. Schaeffer, *Death in the City* (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1969), 26.

⁸³ Ford Leighton, “Total Evangelism: A Strategy for Today,” *Christianity Today*, June 10, 1966, 15 [931].

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Hudson T. Armerding, “Call the Great Physician,” Eutychus and his kin. [Letter to the editor] *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1967, 21 [125].

⁸⁶ Carl F. H. Henry, Robert J. Lamont, Billy Graham, and Dr. Harold John Ockenga, “Billy Graham Speaks: The Evangelical World prospect.” [Interview] *Christianity Today*, October 13, 1958, 5.

⁸⁷ C. Ralston Smith, “Billy Graham’s Evangelistic Thrust: The Crusaders and Changing Times,” *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1961, 4.

Carl F. H. Henry wondered if the ecumenical movement, which was taking form in the 1960s, would, structurally speaking, allow for the “greatest possible evangelical thrust,” that is, the maximum extension of evangelical Christianity.⁸⁸ In 1959, Henry attempted to unfold a program for social action and in this program he hoped to provide “the definition of a sound social thrust,” the promulgation of his order.⁸⁹ Just as Henry was advocating an evangelical social thrust, he watched with horror at “the lunge of communism,” in the Cold War era that, for him betrayed, “a verifiable lightning thrust of social revolution.”⁹⁰ In the mind of Henry, the communism that lunges and the social revolution that thrusts were entirely undesirable, indeed dangerous occurrences, not only were they negative, they represented, as was the case with destructive floods, acts of transgression, of profound and violent violation. An editorial with the title “A Time for Moral Indignation,” is an additional example of the underlying meaning of thrust. The editorial bemoaned, “Americans are having sex thrust upon them every waking hour of their day.”⁹¹

Thrusting and penetrating into all realms of life, the Cold War evangelical applied to these concepts both a positive and negative valence. They were employed to denote the expansion of evangelicalism as well as opposition to their movement. When the evangelical was the one doing the penetrating, it was clear, to their mind, that it was a joyous and holy affair. But what is this penetration? What is meant by such a concept? Is there more here than meets the eye? Many might explain away “penetration” as strictly a synonym for conversion or evangelization. When it comes to penetration, we are compelled not to accept such an answer at face value. “To penetrate a thought” can be used in language to impart the notion of “delving into,” “entering into profundity,” passing successive thresholds into an inner courtyard.⁹² In this sense, penetration speaks to the mind as an approach to what is hidden or difficult to grasp. In contradistinction to the penetration of a thought, evangelicals present us with the penetration of others, of human beings, and of the entire world, and we maintain, that, in such speech, something entirely different was intended. What might be involved in the penetration of another?

⁸⁸ Carl F. H. Henry, “Evangelicals and Ecumenism,” *Christianity Today*, May 27, 1966, 10 [870].

⁸⁹ Carl F. H. Henry, “Perspective for Social Action, Part II,” *Christianity Today*, February 2, 1959, 13.

⁹⁰ Carl F. H. Henry, “Perspective for Social Action,” *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 9.

⁹¹ “A Time for Moral Indignation,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 12, 1965, 28 [624].

⁹² The etymology of the Latin word *penetrare* is “to put or get into, enter into;” *penitus*, to which the former word is related, connotes “within, inmost.” The archaic meaning supports such an interpretation. See “Penetrate,” *Online Etymology Dictionary*, accessed November 15, 2015, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=penetrate&allowed_in_frame=0.

The penetration of the world, which evangelicals so often vocalized, presupposes the penetration of those living in it, that is, of men and women. Is it possible that in such parlance the underlying intention of evangelicalism as a movement is revealed? The meaning of thrust and penetration, in American evangelicalism, went beyond simple notions of ecclesiastical expansion. “Penetration,” fraught with sexual overtones, when it pertains to human beings, retains the notion of entering into, arriving at the innermost part, yet it encapsulates notions of domination, probing, stabbing and impaling. It is not a thought that is being entered but a human or something that pertains to *being* human. The usage of such terms almost always engenders an idea, as we have said, of violation. A corporation, with its commodity, penetrates new markets and even though such an occurrence is an accepted part of contemporary life, it is, in its way, an instance of violation. A commander, leading his troops, penetrates hostile territory. And as one article in *The New York Times* recounted, a Chinese hacker “penetrated the agency’s systems.”⁹³ All of these examples exemplify penetration’s attendant meaning of violation. While the idea of penetrating another human being on the surface betrays a comfort with the violation of others, it seems to say even more. Here, we are not attempting to discover a “subconscious,” psychological yearning that might characterize evangelicals. In fact, we are striving towards the opposite. In evangelicalism, the use of such forms of speech was no mistake; “penetration,” unlike other concepts, captured the evangelical’s desire to enter into others and remove their difference, leaving behind the seed of themselves.

But what do we mean by this? What is involved in this penetration, in this reaching into? Here we encounter one of evangelicalism’s defining characteristics, a characteristic that differentiates being evangelical from simply being religious, but it is one that we, at this time, are not in position to fully unravel. In the meantime, we may take leave of the discussion of this particular and confounding aspect of evangelicalism by saying that, in evangelicalism, one is not merely content with being evangelical, in living out one’s faith and practicing one’s belief; instead, others outside the fold, beyond the *ecclesia*, are to be penetrated, thrust into, and reached into (not merely converted). The desire to *penetrate* others, to *thrust* into the entire world speaks to the often unspoken understanding that the existence of something different outside of the evangelical Church was intolerable. This

⁹³ Michael S. Schmidt, David E. Sanger, and Nicole Perlroth, “Chinese Hackers Pursue Key Data on U.S. Workers,” *The New York Times*, July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/asia/chinese-hackers-pursue-key-data-on-us-workers.html?_r=0.

difference confronted evangelicals and was comprehended as a threat to their collective identity, one that needed to be removed.

The idea we are attempting to flesh out is brought into more striking clarity with the case of the Amish in the United States, in this clarity we may begin to see what we take as an essential factor in Christian fundamentalism. In *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*, which was mentioned in the introduction, the authors erroneously introduce the Amish into their understanding of fundamentalism. What is non-existent in the Amish, we find, with abundance, in evangelicalism. The Amish community, according to the authors, “is sectarian, in that it stresses the necessity of absolute separation from all other religious and civic loyalties.”⁹⁴ But separation, to varying degrees, we might argue, is a characteristic of all communities, religious or secular. Division, in a sense, is the alloy of collective identity. The authors point to the *Ordnung*, the strict religious understanding of the Amish, “the blueprint for expected behavior,” as quintessentially fundamentalist.⁹⁵ While there can be no denying that the Amish, as a community, have constructed a strict and traditional way of life, the most important factor, which the Amish are noticeably lacking, is their religious life brought into relation with the other. For the Amish, there is no outward projection of their faith, no overwhelming desire to penetrate other realms, other human beings. The faith of the Amish is only for themselves. All fundamentalisms, and especially in its evangelical form, lack this insularity.

The authors attempt to explain away this glaring and undeniable difference between Amish life and Christian fundamentalism and evangelicalism by saying that the Amish are “an ‘introversionist’ Christian sect, as opposed to the far more common ‘conversionist’ groups.”⁹⁶ But we have seen, through our examination of evangelical speech, a fundamental aspect of who the evangelical was, which we are unwilling to dismiss so thoughtlessly. This essential aspect comes to the surface as the evangelical relates his faith to others. With the Amish there is separation, with the evangel, penetration. The concepts evangelicals often utilized to describe this relation is telling. The concept of “penetration” as it was deployed in evangelicalism, as opposed to the mere idea of conversion, is ideally suited for what evangelicals had in mind. “Penetration” was fused with a wider and more powerful field of meaning and connoted something more, the exacting of a deeper influence, a more fundamental change in the other. The willingness and the repeated attempts to bring those

⁹⁴ Ralph W. Hood Jr., Peter C. Hill, and Paul W. Williamson, *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*, (The Guilford Press: New York, 2005), 133.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 137.

outside the church into conformity with one's system, to "penetrate" the unsaved, to *integrate* all realms of life into one's *Weltanschauung*, were all indispensable parts of being evangelical. The fires of uncertainty and fear during the Cold War were stoked to new heights. It was an act of violation that evangelicals gladly embrace. The conceptualization of one's faith as an implement with which to penetrate others we take as indispensable to our understanding of evangelicalism.

We said at the beginning of this section that there were two ways of speaking among evangelicals, which emanated from the same source, which we named as violence. If flood metaphors, talk of fire and flames, and words such as penetration were standard components of evangelical parlance, then the second area of evangelical speech—militarism—is even more frequent and more overtly violent. The language of war became, in this historical period, a standard form of self-expression and this tradition of militaristic language, amongst the evangelical fold, has continued ever since.⁹⁷

An objection might arise that, in the past and in the context of the United States, figurative language invoking war, armies, and violence has long been a visible feature of Christianity. This is, of course, true. In Marsden's previously mentioned 1991 book, for example, he wrote, "At the height of the Civil War, Northerners often equated the advances of the Union armies with the advances of Christ's kingdom."⁹⁸ Concepts derived from the lexicon of war enjoy a longer diachronic course of historical transformation than can be fully explored here. That said, the context in which the language of war was taken up in the evangelicalism of the twentieth century is entirely different. The presence of such forms of speech began to have a ubiquitous reach, and the intent of the language in question seems to bring with it new and astounding implications.

One can find examples of evangelicals using concepts related to war throughout Marsden's *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*. For example, Marsden remarked, "For over a century warfare has been the dominant popular image for considering the relationships between science and religion."⁹⁹ Marsden's scholarship is important for the reason that he appears to be one of the few individuals to mention, in any way, the use of a terminology of warfare in evangelical Christianity in the United States. Unfortunately, one

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁹⁷ Mark W. Muesse, "Religious Machismo: Masculinity and Fundamentalism," in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 1996), 94.

⁹⁸ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 9.

finds in Marsden's historical account, an uncritical acceptance of this language and an unquestioning attitude towards deeper possible meanings. "Warfare," said Marsden, with an air of satisfied praise, "was now indeed the appropriate metaphor for understanding their [the fundamentalism of the 1920s] relationship to the scientific culture."¹⁰⁰

War is unquestionably the basest of man's—it is primarily an affair of men—activities and the activity of war, always a collective one, gives birth to a whole host of other crimes: genocide, rape, starvation, the destruction of the world that, through the slow passing of time, humans have built, and the befouling of the environment, not to mention the fear, loss and pain, which always remain, to a certain extent, inexpressible. Moreover, our language, though we may still speak of heroes and service, duty and valor, has not caught up to the realities, butchery, and detachment of modern warfare, which is evermore mechanical, indiscriminate, remote, and destructive. Thus, the sanctimonious yet joyous invocation of war, and all things connected with it, which, from time to time, occurs in evangelical speech, was always a return, a celebration, of the most violent activities that humankind saw fit to unleash upon the world. Marsden, for whom such language was appropriate, never considers the ultimate connection such language establishes to violence.

It deserves to be mentioned that the lexicon of war did not only emerge in relation to modern science. In contemporary evangelicalism, this language was widespread. Concepts stained with the blood of warfare made their appearance in the evangelical movement in a number of ways, through a myriad of sources, and in connection with varied ideas. The central figure of Christianity presents us with a telling starting point, for the God of the Christians, at the hands of evangelicals, underwent a thorough militarization and, therefore, a profound conceptual transformation.

One illustrative example can be found with Graham, who, in a radio address delivered in 1960, pleaded for his listening audience to "yield to the conquering Christ..."¹⁰¹ In Graham's speech at the previously mentioned Berlin Congress, he revealed to the international audience the trajectory of his thoughts: "There should never be any doubt that the Commander-in-Chief, the Head of the Church, the Lord Jesus Christ has given a command" and that command was, Graham believed, the conversion of all people to the

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 177. See also 66, 105, 139, 149, 177.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁰¹ Billy Graham, "Atonement and Blood of Christ," [Radio Address] *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1960. <http://billygraham.org/audio/atonement-and-blood-of-jesus-christ/>.

Gospel of Christ.¹⁰² Graham's title of Commander-in-Chief is straightforward enough. Here, the Savior and the looming figure of the American president were intermixed. The conquering Christ is a notion that is infinitely more complex. To the evangelical, Jesus appeared in the world to conquer sin, to eliminate, in the Christian worldview, the consequences of fallenness. Therefore, on the one hand, we are confronted with an understanding of God, which some might designate as purely spiritual. But with Christ as the Commander-in-chief and as conqueror, it already begins to become clear that, in Graham, there was an attraction to the concepts of war and destruction, for what these lexicons convey, the power they project on the mind, the destruction and the triumph they impose.

Evangelicals, we should point out, do not have a monopoly on this way of speaking about God. Adolf Eichmann, as Arendt points out in her controversial reportage of the Eichmann trial, saw fit to militarize non-military aspects of life. Arendt seems to have been perplexed and disturbed by this phenomenon and comments that "To call God a *Höheren Sinnesträger* [Higher Bearer of Meaning—a Nazi appellation of God]," as Eichmann had done, "meant linguistically to give him some place in the military hierarchy."¹⁰³ We mention Arendt here for the simple fact that she raises an important question, namely, Are we to accept this type of language as a passing trifle? Or, in the connection of war and God, are we forced to come to terms with deeper conceptual meanings? To Arendt's understanding, the mere act of invoking God through a certain category, via a specific conceptual pathway, in this case relating to war, is to fundamentally alter the understanding a group of people has towards their God. Through such speech, God is made an accomplice and defender of one's earthly, ideological system. And what Eichmann did esoterically with the cryptic phrase "Higher Bearer of Meaning," Graham was willing to do quite literally.

It follows, logically, that if the redemptive figure of the Christ was recast into a military mold then the rest of the faithful should also take up their places in the military ranks. Evangelical Christians in the United States found many new roles for anxious believers in the decades that followed the Second World War. L. Nelson Bell, the previously mentioned author of *Christianity Today*'s column A Layman and His Faith, demonstrated religious thinking, which was suffused with military categories. In 1967, Bell wrote and informed his readers, "The analogy between soldiers at an outpost and Christians is a valid

¹⁰² Billy Graham, "Why the Berlin Congress," *Christianity Today*, November 11, 1966, 5 [133].

¹⁰³ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 27.

one.”¹⁰⁴ Bell, using the context and the imagery of the war in Vietnam, tried to expound upon the nature of living as a Christian. Graham, who had turned Jesus into a conqueror and a Commander-in-Chief, was entirely in agreement with his father-in-law on the issues of Christians as a combative force. The young Graham began as early as the late 1940s to incorporate military language into his sermons. In one such sermon, “Retreat! Stand! Advance!” Graham asked the faithful gathered before him, “Are you one of God’s minutemen? Are you a commando for Christ?”¹⁰⁵ In the same sermon, the United States’ most influential evangelist, the confessor of American princes (the presidents) and the intimate confidant of American celebrities, had another appellation for Jesus, “general” and “Our Great Commander.”¹⁰⁶

Evangelicals, from time to time, did attempt to clarify the meaning of their military jargon. One example can be found with Bell, who argued, “We are here to witness, not to conquer; to give consistent and continuing evidence of the transforming power of Christ.”¹⁰⁷ Graham, too, attempted to show that the battle to which he was frequently referring was one of a spiritual nature.¹⁰⁸ Notwithstanding these attempts at clarification, evangelicals would continue and expand the use of this bellicose language.

Masumi Toyotome, a director of a missionary agency in the United States, was swept along by this militaristic trend and offers evangelicals the military post of paratrooper in his own brand of evangelism. “The name,” Toyotome gave his new evangelism in 1967, the conflict and bloodshed of Vietnam now well underway, “comes from the military maneuver of dropping soldiers by parachute into the midst of the enemy as advance units to capture and hold strong points beyond the front line. The principle in paratroop evangelism is to send out into the world beyond the church walls to win those who would never step inside.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ L. Nelson Bell, “Roger, Over,” A Layman and His Faith, *Christianity Today*, April 28, 1967, 28 [764].

¹⁰⁵ Billy Graham, “Retreat! Stand! Advance!” [Sermon] in *The Early Billy Graham: Sermons and Revival Accounts*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland Pub., 1988), 44. Vietnam did not mark the boundary of Graham’s desire for violence, war, and destruction in his holy crusade against communism. Prior to this conflict, he, for instance, decried the cessation of hostilities in Korea, calling Truman “cowardly” for his actions at the end of the Korean War. During that war, Graham also desired that the United States bomb military facilities in China, see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 178-179.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 32, 44. For more on Graham’s assiduous, calculated, and sustained cultivation of his celebrity as well as his fraternization with figures of American governmental power see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 5, 175-177, 197, 236-238, 244.

¹⁰⁷ L. Nelson Bell, “In But Not Of,” A Layman and his Faith, *Christianity Today*, March 16, 1973, 22 [618].

¹⁰⁸ Billy Graham, “Retreat! Stand! Advance!” [Sermon] in *The Early Billy Graham: Sermons and Revival Accounts*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland Pub., 1988), 41-42.

¹⁰⁹ Masumi Toyotome, “Let’s Escape Our Fortress Mentality,” *Christianity Today*, September 15, 1967, 15 [1183].

The editor of *Christianity Today*, Carl F. H. Henry, is another example of an evangelical who used concepts related to war so as to understand the place of the evangelical in the world. In an article dealing with the role of education in American society, he stated, in typically belligerent tones, “Convinced of the reality of Christ’s redemption for and in life, evangelical forces must challenge and storm the high places of culture and learning.”¹¹⁰ Henry’s utterance provides us with a clear example of the fact that such militarized speech was not solely a spiritual conceptualization, a metaphorical battle taking place in the locus of the soul and projected towards the eternal. Culture and learning were aspects of the world, endeavors of living bodies, and they were, to evangelicals, “battlefields,” their conquest was one of the highest aims of evangelicalism.

A 1961 advertisement in the magazine reveals the undercurrent of meaning, which is to be found in such linguistic formulations. An evangelical group called Personal Christianity placed an announcement in *Christianity Today* by the title of “Operation Manhunt” in which they describe what they perceive to be the essence of evangelism, “Pastors” reads the advertisement for Personal Christianity’s product, “are Commanding Generals in this fabulous plan to convert a local church into a Commando station and *take an entire town for Christ! Churches double in 6 months*” (italics original).¹¹¹ Here we see the real and secret object of the pastor *qua* commanding general: it was the town itself and its inhabitants, which were to be taken, taken and conquered, as opposed to converted. Unsurprisingly, the spiritual dimension of such speech melts away.

Other examples abound, and some of the most interesting of these cases are those utterances that pertain to the weapons and machinery of war and destruction. These expressions are significant in that all possible figurative meanings are perfumed, ultimately, with the blood and violence, which these tools of destruction so unmistakably represent. In Hoover’s 1960 article “Communist Propaganda and the Christian Pulpit,” he masterfully invoked Cold War imagery stating plainly that it was the Christian faithful who will destroy communism: “The spiritual firepower of the Christian Church—based on the love of God—is sufficient to destroy all the Soviet man-made missiles and rockets and extirpate this twentieth century aberration.”¹¹²

Another case of using tools of violence in religious language comes to us through the documentary *God Loves Uganda*, which was released in 2013. The documentary examines

¹¹⁰ Carl F. H. Henry, “Christian Education and Culture,” *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1958, 5.

¹¹¹ “Operation Manhunt!” [Advertisement] *Christianity Today*, December 8, 1961, 36.

the fruits of the efforts of American evangelical missionaries working in Uganda in the first decade of the twentieth century. The film centers on the American church known as the International House of Prayer (IHOP). In IHOP, both the religious leaders and the laity fall back upon militaristic language. The documentary is of value to us in that it demonstrates the continuity in evangelicalism, beyond the period in which we are focused, of these concepts. In addition, we encounter, outside our primary sources of *Christianity Today* and the sermons of Graham, these same militaristic concepts.

Religious leaders at IHOP refer to their flock as “prayer warriors” and, during religious services, invite the congregation to participate in “rapid-fire prayer,” which, of course, propels the mind to guns and bullets.¹¹³ Jesse Digges, a young American missionary working in the African nation and featured in the documentary, shared his religious outlook: “God has what I like to call an army of young people...they’re not a military army...they don’t have guns, they have Bibles.”¹¹⁴ Whether evangelicals believe that they are armed with guns or Bibles, it is as an army that they see themselves.

Another example of military jargon making its way into early evangelical organizations, in the period with which we are concerned, can be found with Campus Crusade for Christ. In 1944, members of this organization coined the term “gospel bomb” to describe the proselytizing practice of delivering religious pamphlets to unbelievers.¹¹⁵ The Gospel, that which was most holy, was paired with the quintessential implement and symbol of destruction.

With Graham, we come across yet another peculiar amalgam of war motifs and religion. Christ, in the evangelical lexicon, not only was a general who commands, a conqueror who vanquishes, but was also seen as a supplier, through his body and his sacrifice, of weapons. In one of Graham’s sermons, “Christian Soldiers on the Battlefield,” delivered to military personnel at West Point, he played on the obvious predilections of his military audience, stating, “In this great spiritual battle that every one of us must fight daily, there are several weapons that we can use. First, there is the weapon of the blood of

¹¹² J. Edgar Hoover, “Communist Propaganda and the Christian Pulpit,” *Christianity Today*, October 24, 1960, 5.

¹¹³ *God Loves Uganda*, directed by Roger Ross Williams (2013; New York: First Run Features, 2014), DVD.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ John G. Turner, “Selling Jesus to Modern America: Campus Crusade for Christ, Evangelical Culture, and Conservative Politics” (doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2005), 50.

Christ...Secondly, there is the weapon of faith...Thirdly, the next is the Word...The fourth weapon is prayer.”¹¹⁶

One of the few authors who has been perplexed by the essence and trajectory of violent imagery and themes in evangelical language is Kristin Dombek. In her previously mentioned dissertation, a study of the popular evangelical book series *Left Behind*, she deals frankly and extensively with the violent and militaristic speech so visible in twentieth-century evangelicalism. From her work, though it focuses on a period outside of our time frame, we may glean yet another example of the evangel’s fascination with war, destruction, and violence. With the *Left Behind* evangelical book series, not only do we find further evidence of this undeniable aspect of evangelicalism but we begin to grasp the diachronic continuance, the continuation through time, of such modes of speaking and we can begin to ground historically a careful maintenance and cultivation of certain conceptual tendencies. Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins’ *Left Behind* series, the most popular novels for evangelical Christians, published between 1995 and 2007, are set as the world is coming to its end and the events of the New Testament Book of Revelation are playing out in all their horror. The faithful, the novels relate, constitute an army and they prepare to do battle with the soldiers of the Antichrist, according to Dombek, not in the realm of the spirit but by shopping for modern technology, gadgets, and weapons.¹¹⁷

The *Left Behind* series is burdened, informs Dombek, with numerous images of death and destruction, war and carnage, and a parade of modern weaponry, which evangelical Christians use to hasten into existence Christ’s Kingdom. But for Dombek, beyond a mere mention of war and weapons, there lies at the core of this particular evangelical narrative, a perennial enchantment with violence itself. To this point, Dombek observed, “What the narratives [of *Left Behind*] seem more interested in—fascinated by, in fact—are the less general more personal scenes of somatic violence: the injuries, markings, brandings, scarrings, and bloody deaths.”¹¹⁸

The return of the Messiah, which was the climax of the book series, is particularly grotesque. In the final installment, *The Glorious Appearing*, Dombek writes that the Second Coming of the Christian Savior, as depicted in the book, is a “bloodbath of monumental proportions, in which Jesus, by speaking the Word, makes nonbelievers blood boil and then

¹¹⁶ Billy Graham, “Christian Soldiers on the Battlefield” [Sermon] *Billy Graham Evangelistic Association*, West Point, NY, 1957, <http://billygraham.org/audio/christian-soldiers-on-the-battlefield/>.

¹¹⁷ Kristen Dombek, “Shopping for the End of the World: *Left Behind*, Evangelical Culture, and Apocalyptic Consumerism” (doctoral dissertation, New York University, 2005), 359-361.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 365.

burst through their skin. As millions of non-Christians explode,” Dombek continues the description of the scene, “Israel is flooded with rivers of blood.”¹¹⁹ Amidst this chaos and violent ruination, the remnant of Christian believers, God’s holy elect, hasten the final journey of the damned to their eternal place of torment by firing advanced weaponry upon them. Dombek attempts to explain the constant presence of violence in these books through the idea of sacrifice, which is to say, that the faithful Christians, who are maimed and bloodied, have become “living sacrifices,” the mutilation of their flesh a testament to their salvation.¹²⁰ The series has sold more than sixty million copies.¹²¹

In the modern world, and most acutely in contemporary society, concepts relating to war and militarism have become common currency, some of the most useful and powerful modes of describing a variety of phenomena: politics, business, religion, as well as many others.¹²² So pervasive are these concepts, so uncritically are they applied, that they have even made their way into the secondary literature dealing with American evangelicalism, that is, they are concepts employed by scholars to describe the evangelical community in the United States. Scholars describe the masses of the evangelical faithful quite frequently as an “army,” evangelical activities as “battles” and “war,” the evangelical movement as a participant in the oft-cited “cultural wars,” and evangelicals as using a vast array of weapons.¹²³

Indeed, and at the risk of digressing further, but in the hope of further elucidating this point, the entire framework in which the struggles between various groups in the United States would subsequently become known as, both by evangelicals and by those outside evangelicalism, was “culture war.” Marsden used the concept of culture wars to depict the political and social climate of the seventies and describe the position of evangelicalism in American society.¹²⁴ The idea that the citizens of the United States found themselves, as the twentieth century flowed into the past, in a state of war over cultural issues would come to

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 364.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 373.

¹²¹ Karl W. Giberson, and Randall J. Stephens, *Anointed: Evangelical Truth in a Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 18.

¹²² Christopher Ronwaniente Jocks, “Defending their People and their Earth: Native American Men and the Construction of Masculinity,” in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 1996), 141.

¹²³ For a by no means exhaustive list of the scholarly uses of concepts related to warfare, as a way to describe American evangelicalism, see the following works: Turner, “Selling Jesus to Modern America,” 4; David Lee Russell, “Coming to Grips with the Age of Reason: An Analysis of the Evangelical Intellectual Agenda, 1942-1970” (doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1993), 96, 97, 110; Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 3, 22, 67, 89; Hedges, *American Fascists*, 113; Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 57-58, 66.

¹²⁴ Marsden, *The Twilight of the American Enlightenment*, xxvi, 140.

dominate the thinking of both the conservative and the liberal elements of American society.¹²⁵ What we are describing here is a pervasive tendency, both at the core of American evangelicalism as well as outside the church, to frame all occurrences, all events, all beliefs, and even the most lofty ideals—God, faith, Christian life—in the images of war and destruction, violence and bloodshed.

That which has remained in the background, the question of identity, must be brought to the fore. What do all these ways of speaking, these modes of expression, have to do with identity? Moreover, can we begin to understand, in a more profound way, the meaning of these utterances through the lens of identity?

We have already, albeit briefly, seen one attempt to explain the violence, as expressed through the phenomenon of war, which was and is ingrained in much of evangelical speech, on the part of Dombek. In the context of the religious scenario of the Apocalypse, Dombek found that the bloody scenes depicted in the *Left Behind* evangelical book series, seems to demonstrate that believers were living their lives through the Christian script provided by evangelicalism; believers were living sacrifices.¹²⁶

Turner sought to explain the appearance of a language rooted in militarism through evangelicalism's proximity to a militarized American culture, that is, as a symptom of the Cold War. In his study, he hypothesizes, "In keeping with the militaristic tone of American culture that affected everything from politics to literature to swimwear—the two-piece bathing suit took its name from the site of a hydrogen-bomb test—some evangelical activist conceived of themselves as an army primed for spiritual combat."¹²⁷ Turner is, of course, correct in making note of the militaristic tinge of American culture, before and prior to, the Second World War. Dombek and Turner's theories prove interesting at least when we are dealing with issues that are unquestionably religious.

Allusion has been made to the idea that all realms of life are to be brought under the Lordship of Christ, all things are to be joined in the unity of the heavenly Kingdom, all spheres of human existence were simply another battlefield in the evangel's spiritual war. What evangelicals have united, we would do well to put asunder. It is in this union that these two scholars have attempted to explain the language of war and violence in evangelicalism.

¹²⁵ See also Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 26-31; Giberson, *Anointed: Evangelical Truth in a Secular Age*, 8-9, 105.

¹²⁶ Dombek, "Shopping for the End of the World, 373.

¹²⁷ Turner, "Selling Jesus to Modern America," 86.

Dombek and Turner have accepted the evangelicals' explanatory scheme of the world; we have no reason to follow in their footsteps.

In the first place, many of the issues, which evangelicals were concerned with, were in no way purely spiritual, exclusively connected with salvation or sin, as evangelicals would have us believe. But already a chorus of objections is raising its voice in song, arguing that, for the evangelical, such utterances and conceptualizations were merely figurative descriptions of spiritual life. To which we might retort that such a state of affairs is all the more terrifying for it would lend credence to the fact that the modern mind was and is so beholden and entranced by war and carnage, that even in the holy realm of the spirit, even in the life of the soul, war and violence seep through. Even in the misty indeterminacy and holiness of paradise, death makes its horrific appearance. Even in faith, war and destruction cannot be escaped, and, in such speaking, God becomes a lowly manifestation of man's darkest ambitions, a deity of armies and conquest, bombs and bullets. But, alas, the gaze of the evangelical was not exclusively and otherworldly directed, for they were overwhelmingly concerned with the events of their time. Communism—as threatening as it might have been—was not related to the life of the spirit but was an ideology, a product of the human mind. Student protests were forms of opposition to a social, political, and economic order. Politics is still politics though some may call it by another name.

Secondly, these issues, the vast majority of which were mundane in essence, are in no way relatable to the human activity of war and destruction. Almost all of the examples that we have seen explicitly show that the issues are conflicts between people, disagreements, which were ideological in character. Some of these conflicts were more pressing in nature, others were more trivial, but all of them were, nonetheless, conflicts whose resolution needn't be discovered in the realm of war and violence.

Thus, having clarified in our own minds the quality of these occurrences, that is, that they are conflicts neither of the spirit nor of war, we are faced, once again, with the question, Why have evangelicals chosen to understand conflicts in the most extreme of ways? Why do evangelicals insist on viewing so many things through the lens of violence? When it came to natural metaphors of destruction, there is no question that evangelicals felt themselves to be violated, victims of unwarranted aggression. In addition to being victims of violation, evangelicals wanted to violate, to thrust themselves, penetratingly, upon all realms of human life. With metaphors of war, evangelicals stylized themselves as conquerors, as armies, their God was a follow deliverer of violence. Through these concepts, evangelicals constructed a powerful, imperious, and seemingly unstoppable collective identity. We see in such

evangelical rhetoric a heightening of tensions in which all things acquire, through their thought and by virtue of their words, the dark shadow of doom and the smallest conflict, the most minute discrepancy, has the power to spill over, like the destructive flood, engulfing all of existence in its path of devastation. It is in the environment of heightened tensions that was the Cold War period that evangelicals fashioned for themselves a remarkable new role. This role is dual in nature, for the evangelical is now the innocently violated and the perpetuator of violence.

The union of faith and war, which evangelicals moved to establish, confronts us in two startling ways. In the first place, the firm connection between, on the one hand, God, faith, religion and, on the other, violence and war is a celebration of violence itself, a macabre, midnight mass of destruction. It was a debasement of their highest values. Generally speaking, scholars have not even considered the possibility that concepts of war might change the evangelical relation, conceptualization, and meaning of God. They have not considered that the Cold War evangelicalism produced new concepts of God. In both the evangelical's words and the works of scholars, which frame things in the machinations of war, we see a complacent and tacit acceptance of violence and warfare, an affirmation that this was an acceptable way to engage, understand, and relate to the world. Through this affirmation, this way of relating, we see a facet of the evangelical identity, which was coming together in this period, slowly shinning through. The evangelical was one who handled violence, one who spread concepts of war and destruction to all realms of life. With respect to such an occurrence, we may say more. Although, as Marsden points out, the metaphor of war predates the period with which we are concerned, appearing in concentrated form around the issue of evolution and its spreading influence in American life, we may consider such speech, from the perspective of religion, as something altogether peculiar. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim, in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, first published in 1912, observed, "the sacred and the profane have always and everywhere been conceived by the human mind as separate genera, as two worlds that have nothing in common."¹²⁸ Later in this work, Durkheim posited that this separation was also established in religious parlance, saying, "For the terms of everyday language are excluded from religious life..."¹²⁹ Despite the fact that Durkheim had in mind religion in its most primordial state, the distinction he discovered is, in our discussion of evangelicalism, an important one. In American evangelicalism, insofar as religion has historically distanced the

¹²⁸ Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 38.

profane from the sacred, such a division no longer exists. For what could be more mundane, more unspeakably profane than war, bombs, and destruction? For a community that presents itself as religious, the convolution of God with war, Christ as a general, the adherent as a commando, stands as a blunder from which the evangelical cannot easily recover. From the blind acceptance of evangelicalism as a religious community, we are already moving away.

Second, through such language, the evangelical was making a pronouncement on the activity of war itself, attempting to reify the militarization of the world, which was occurring around them, coercing and coaxing their adherents into laudatory praise, into bovine acquiescence. To what extent did men and women turn to evangelicalism for sanctification of the world that was being fashioned as the American government, after the Second World War, expanded its military apparatus across the entire planet? To what extent was the faculty of questioning the phenomenon of war increasingly answered by evangelicalism? To what degree was questioning itself no longer a faculty of the individual, but of a system outside the individual man or woman? When God too is made a conqueror, when those who believe in him are made soldiers, commandos, and armies, what critiques concerning war and violence can still be posed?

To an extent, the concepts of war, which enjoyed such enthusiastic favor amongst evangelicals, were the logical conclusion of an idea upon which we have already touched: the notion that all realms of life were to be brought under the lordship of Christ. This idea presages a conflict with the world outside evangelicalism. Such a position, the belief that one is predestined to rule over all things, can only emerge from a group of people who understand themselves to be the rightful and sole inheritors of the earth; it was the collective identity not of the downtrodden and forgotten but of those who already possess and who are ready to defend their earthly treasures. It is the collective identity of a group, which already thinks itself the sovereign of the earth.

The Lexicon of the Market

Through the employ of clichés about the United States and concepts relating to war and militarism, through the horizon these concepts provided, a certain collective identity could be forged, one that was in placid harmony with prevailing American values in the ideological conflicts of the Cold War. Through the formation of a collective, too, the

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.

problems of personal identity could be, in a sense, skirted. Through the emerging collective identity of the evangel, the obvious and unavoidable confrontations between Christian fundamentalism and evangelicalism, on the one hand, and an increasingly secular and materialistic American society, on the other, could be overcome. Nowhere did evangelicals establish more fully this harmony between evangelicalism and their American environs than with the inclusion of the lexicon of the free market and capitalism.¹³⁰ The undulations of late capitalism [*Spätkapitalismus*], the new successes and expansion of an economy based on consumption, were, with the work of the Cold War evangelical, integrated into the Christian Church and made palatable for the American people.

Language associated with the area of life that is concerned with business, that is to say, concepts related to capitalism and the values inherent in this economic organization of human existence, which has come to exert uninhibited dominance across the globe, was a favored, natural, and central way of speaking among evangelicals in the period between 1945 and 1981, which we are studying in this dissertation. The hopes of the evangelical heart, the prayers flying off the evangel's tongue, the beliefs of this form of Christianity, and the latent aspirations of a people were all given expression through economic concepts extracted from a capitalist world.

That evangelicals looked with favor upon market capitalism, after the Second World War, is easily verifiable and a lengthy discourse is not needed to ascertain such a fact. However, in this period, evangelicals moved beyond simply advocating a system of free enterprise and incorporated into their voice, into their ways of speaking, aspects of capital.¹³¹ Before delving into these economic concepts themselves, we may briefly turn our attention to the state of the American Protestant Church during the Cold War. What activities had this church taken on? What ways had it begun to interact with American citizens?

¹³⁰ Perhaps, the conceptual as well as the actual combination of wealth and religion in American evangelicalism in the Cold War era, which strikes us as so incongruous, is not as foreign to Christianity as we might suppose. Peter Brown remarks in a recent work on wealth and Christianity in late antiquity, "We have now [in the modern period] created two distinct spheres—the world of buying and selling and the world of religious actions. To join the language of one sphere—that of commerce and treasure—with the sphere of religion now strikes us as a joining of incompatibles so inappropriate as to seem almost an off-color joke. Plainly Roman Christians did not share this modern inhibition. They did not consider themselves to be dealing with two distinct spheres—commerce and religion—in which the ethos of one sphere was considered deeply inappropriate to that of the other," Peter Brown, *Through the Eyes of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West, 350-550 AD* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 84-85.

¹³¹ So great is capitalism's hypnotic power that even some scholars enthusiastically use market concepts—*laissez-faire*, entrepreneur, religious marketplace—to describe evangelicalism both in its twentieth-century form as well as for evangelicalism in earlier periods of American history. These economic and market concepts are

What we uncover is the fact that a conceptual change was accompanied by organizational changes. It was an evangelical who, to an extent, uncovered the realities of many American churches, which points us in a promising direction. Many churches in the United States began operating for-profit business ventures, whose connection to the work of the Christian was, at best, dubious. O. K. Armstrong, writing in *Christianity Today* in 1961, provided testimony and condemnation of this fact. The problem that emerged, at the beginning of the 1960s, involved the tax-exempt status of churches and whether the for-profit ventures of these churches were legally and morally exempt from being taxed given that such activities were not in the least religious. Therefore, the question facing many thoughtful evangelicals was “Does the Church render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s?” Armstrong, a Baptist layman, wrote:

In a nation-wide study I found that many religious denominations and their subordinate agencies have gone into competitive profit-making businesses on a large scale. Churches own radio stations, hotels, office buildings, parking lots, bakeries, warehouses. They do contract printing, invest in stocks and bonds, and speculate in real estate. They have investments in stocks and bonds that for some major denominations run into millions of dollars.¹³²

According to Armstrong, in the 1930s, around twelve percent of property in the United States fell under the protection of tax exemption for religious organizations; at the time Armstrong wrote his article in 1961, the percentage had risen to thirty.¹³³ In Armstrong’s opinion, there was no question that such activities should be taxed.

Yet another concrete manifestation of this increasing capitalistic dynamism, in American Protestantism, was the creation of financial products on the part of various Christian institutions. In 1907, the Moody Bible Institute created the charitable gift product known as Moody Annuities. According to the Moody Global Ministries’ website, donors received a “lifetime income in exchange for a charitable gift that helps fund the ministries at Moody.”¹³⁴ *Christianity Today* frequently gave advertising space to organizations such as the Moody Bible Institute to promote these financial products. In 1959, a Moody Annuity advertisement in the magazine asked seductively, “Would you like to receive double

employed, in a positive sense and are meant to demonstrate the dynamism, diversity, and continued success of American religion, see, for example, Balmer, *Blessed Assurance*, 5, 101.

¹³² O. K. Armstrong, “Tax churches on Business Profits?” *Christianity Today*, October 13, 1961, 19.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ “Charitable Gift Annuities,” Moody Global Ministries, accessed September 15, 2015, <http://www.moodyglobal.org/donate/charitable-gift-annuities/>.

dividends on your money?”¹³⁵ Similar investment products were advertised in this particular evangelical publication. Another example from 1967 was the World Vision Gift Annuity Plan, established by an organization that worked with Vietnamese orphans.¹³⁶ The American Leprosy Missions also created a similar product. “More Income for you More Help for Leprosy Victims,” ran, charitably, the advertisement in 1961.¹³⁷ Through these annuity plans, one could act charitably while, of course, earning a profit.

The relation between American Protestantism and capitalism, whatever it had been before, was, in the period after the Second World War, strengthened through the evangelical movement’s incorporation of financial products, the transformation of churches into profit making businesses, and most importantly through a constant and varied inclusion of concepts derived from the lexicon of the economic world. The cementation of free market terminology in the evangelical’s dealings with the sacred leads us in a new direction concerning the evangelical and identity, that is to say, evangelicalism’s origins.

We observed in the previous section that it was Christ himself who was the subject of much of the evangel’s military jargon; a similar transformation of the role of and the relationship to the Christian deity took place through the concepts of the market. God, oftentimes in evangelical parlance, was recast into the character of the business associate. Stewart M. Robinson, a pastor and writer, was one such example of the trend to understand God as a fellow owner of capital. “From the prophet Haggai to Roger Babson, men have seen that social, economic, and other troubles stem from the realm of the spirit,” wrote Robinson in 1961.¹³⁸ Robinson, as the title of the article in *Christianity Today* indicates, equated faith in God with “built-in prosperity.” “Tithing is the expression of faith in God through material resources and possessions,” according to Robinson, “It makes God a partner in business...Tithing is the biblical promise of blessing. What is this blessing? It can be in the form of large gross income from business, farm, or profession...Prosperity is the right word for any of these.”¹³⁹ Robinson’s inclusion of these concepts in his explanation of Christian faith, his steadfast devotion to prosperity, corresponded to the economic and social changes taking place in American society as the Cold War intensified. It points to the

¹³⁵ “Moody Annuities,” [Advertisement] *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1958, 29.

¹³⁶ “Put Your Annuities to Work for Christ in Vietnam,” [Advertisement] *Christianity Today*, April 14, 1967, 21 [701].

¹³⁷ “American Leprosy Missions Gift Annuity Plan” [Advertisement] *Christianity Today*, November 24, 1961, 49. The American Sunday School Union also issued an annuity which was advertised in 1967; see “Highest Income Annuity Investment American Sunday School Union,” *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1967, 42 [146].

¹³⁸ Stewart M. Robinson, “Built-in Prosperity,” *Christianity Today*, July 17, 1961, 12.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

increasing dominance and significance that consumption would have in American society, in the unfolding of social relations, and in the inner life of the American during the second half of the twentieth century. Robinson's radical and materialistic vision of the essence and purpose of Christian life should not, however, be misread as an inevitability, as a predestined occurrence in the evangelical theological framework. Though the gospel of prosperity had a long and slow development in American religion, the first glimmers of which appeared towards the end of the nineteenth century,¹⁴⁰ the reason for this marked theological reorientation in contemporary American evangelicalism does not stem from external economic changes. Rather, its origins can be found in a burning desire, an overwhelming need within the evangelical community, to make the evangelical's collective identity congenial, even a reflection of, the predominant values of the American Republic.

Robinson's particular theological inclinations have received a number of names: it is most commonly known as the gospel of prosperity, and such beliefs, understandably, have aroused the interest of scholars.¹⁴¹ The religious doctrine holds that the devotee, through conversion to evangelicalism or by merely living as a Christian or by executing one's Christian duty, will receive material blessings. The gospel of prosperity as an understanding of faith seems to go beyond viewing religion as a secret avenue to prosperity; very often, with such theological convictions, material wealth becomes one of the ends of religion itself, suppressing or removing entirely the traditional and historical power previously held by the promises of eternal salvation. To be sure, the gospel of prosperity is not entirely new as a facet of American Protestantism. As Marsden reported in *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, there was, in the United States, already in the nineteenth century, a sort of proto-gospel of prosperity in emergence, which was asserting itself upon the American mind. Marsden, in one specific example, reveals this through the Baptist preacher Russell H. Conwell (1843-1925). Conwell, as a Baptist preacher, had earned notoriety for his lecture "Acres of Diamonds," which, informed Marsden, was delivered some six thousand times, "Specifically," wrote Marsden, providing the essential message of Conwell's speech, "it was the duty of Christians to become rich: you can find acres of diamonds in your own backyard if you only look."¹⁴²

Thus, we cannot speak of the gospel of prosperity, in twentieth-century evangelicalism, as some unprecedented and unforeseen occurrence in the story of American

¹⁴⁰ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 21.

¹⁴¹ See, for example, Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 180.

¹⁴² Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 21.

religion. Despite this, despite this prior existence, there can be no doubt that the gospel of prosperity, the idea of faith as a conduit to riches, as an ironclad contract to material fortune, would reach its ascendancy in evangelicalism after the Second World War, becoming an undeniable facet of what it meant to be an evangelical, what it meant to believe.

The direct and explicit connection between the evangelical's faith and material abundance, which was said to lay in wait for the future evangelical disciple, was not the only way that the language of capital insinuated itself into the Christian message. A certain Donald McGavran provides another example of the widespread presence of business terminology in the evangelical church. McGavran was an advocate of what is called "church-growth thinking," which is an approach to the planning and organization of religious communities so as to bring about the greatest possible growth. "Church-growth thinking," McGavran championed in 1973, "is paying off around the world. In country after country it brings hope and effectiveness to those who use it. It introduces new methods, opens up new fields. As they swing into growth thinking, churches in the third world are declaring dividends. They find it profitable."¹⁴³ From McGavran's religious perspective—his mention of profitability, dividends and church-growth thinking, which resemble very much a business plan—we can gather that he does not only approach his religion as a business, but he also sees religion, his faith in God, as an intriguingly lucrative investment: "Expect rich dividends in the Christian life-style. As millions become Christians, we shall see more kindness, more honesty, more justice, more brotherhood, and more beauty."¹⁴⁴ Although the fruits of a Christian life, which McGavran had in mind, were admittedly pleasant, he envisioned them as dividends, as payments owed, and as such, in a purely transactional way.

Very much in harmony with church-growth thinking are some of the suggestions that *Christianity Today* offered the evangelical clergy. One article by James W. Carty seems to urge evangelical leaders to transform themselves, to be relevant and to participate in and make use of the new modes of modern life. Carty pleaded for pastors to "make a systematic study of how mass personal communications influence religious behavior," and continued by informing, "he [the preacher] should capitalize on the interest engendered by mass media."¹⁴⁵ Carty's trust and faith in the fascinating and novel techniques of mass

¹⁴³ Donald McGavran, "The Dividends We Seek," *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1973, 4 [384].

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5 [385].

¹⁴⁵ James W. Carty, "Get Your Message Across," *Christianity Today*, May 25, 1959, 17-18.

communications is driven home by his appeal for pastors to *capitalize* on the interest, which mass media enjoyed.

Are we perhaps reading too much into Carty's choice of words? The answer is clearly no. The undeniable fact is that the incorporation of business concepts extended beyond the occasional mention of profitability, dividends and capitalizing on the latest trends of the market for personal gain.

Carty, writing in 1959, was not alone that year in his use of such language; the article "Space Age Teaching Tools," spoke of the "gains," much as a businessman might, in terms of converts, churches were experiencing as a result of the use of audiovisual materials.¹⁴⁶ In such language, people become nameless statistics, simply one more number. C. Stanley Powell, in 1960, an occasional contributor to the magazine, wrote with excitement about the "productivity" of pastors in Latin America. For Powell, the pastor was an agent of reproduction, and his productivity was measured in the perpetually increasing congregation.¹⁴⁷

Another way in which evangelicals expressed their faith, in *Christianity Today*, was through the term *enterprise*, which is closely connected to business life. A certain C. Ralston Smith, writing in 1961, spoke of Billy Graham's evangelistic ministry as an enterprise.¹⁴⁸ F. Dale Bruner, a doctoral student, also employed this term to portray the role and nature of foreign, evangelical missions.¹⁴⁹ Of course, we must concede that enterprise can be used to indicate many things; it can mean a complex undertaking, a bold venture, but its connection to corporate culture is already solidified in the mind and this word, just as with gains, productivity and dividends, has an undeniable economic hue.

Perhaps one of the clearest indications of the influence of business life upon evangelicals, or, stated differently, the economic concepts that evangelicals brought to bear upon Christianity, was the attention many evangelicals paid to statistics. Rumors of growth in churches or denominations, numbers of those who attended and those who converted at evangelical crusades, are the evangel's manna sent down from heaven, they nourish the evangelical soul. News of increase and rumors of expansion, in the eyes of evangelicals, were manifestations of the quality, appeal, and truth of the evangelical product. "The statistics of growth are impressive," said Richard C. Wolf in 1959. Citing a survey of

¹⁴⁶ "Space Age Teaching Tools," *Christianity Today*, August 31, 1959, 8.

¹⁴⁷ C. Stanley Lowell, "New Protestantism in Latin America," *Christianity Today*, January 18, 1960, 9.

¹⁴⁸ C. Ralston Smith, "Billy Graham's Evangelistic Thrust: The Crusaders and Changing Times," *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1961, 4.

religious trends in the United States from 1900 to 1950.¹⁵⁰ Wolf reported that membership in Christian churches had risen 204 percent in that period. According to Wolf, and to his great pleasure, conservative denominations had far outpaced liberal churches in the race for more souls.¹⁵¹

Graham's evangelistic crusades, in which massive stadia were filled to the brim, were always an occasion for promising reports and a constant flurry of numbers. Like Wolf, one editorial declared in 1958, "The statistics were impressive," speaking of Graham's latest crusade at an American military base, "60,000 present; 1,243 decisions [conversions to evangelicalism] for Christ..."¹⁵² Numbers and figures, statistics and percentages, were often accompanied by detailed graphs and charts, mapping out where evangelism stood and the prospects for future expansion. *Christianity Today* very often utilized such visual aids. One example is a table, which charted the progressive and substantial increase, in terms of dollars, of the construction of churches in the United States. The table shows an increase from 472 million dollars in 1935 to 950 million dollars in construction expenditures in 1959.¹⁵³

The examples of economic concepts we have seen in evangelicalism are both varied and manifold, and our survey of them has been by no means comprehensive; here, we are attempting to paint a picture. An obvious conclusion emerges from the fact that these concepts, this way of speaking, and the values commonly glorified in business—productivity, utility, profitability, gains, capitalization—make their way into evangelical speech and thought, as if they were grafted onto the religious body of evangelicalism directly from American environs. We see, in this type of speech, a clear and coherent articulation of one aspect of the evangelical collective identity: it is the collective identity of a group of people who were enmeshed in the fabric of capitalism. Evangelicals availed themselves of market terminology in order to describe and understand their religion. From church-growth thinking to dividends to the gospel of prosperity, we begin to comprehend

¹⁴⁹ F. Dale Bruner, "A New Strategy: Statesmanship in Christian Mission," *Christianity Today*, August 1, 1960, 3.

¹⁵⁰ Richard C. Wolf, "1900-1950 Survey: Religious Trends in the United States," *Christianity Today*, April 27, 1959, 3.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

¹⁵² "Rally in Retrospect," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, December 8, 1958, 28. Max Weber, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), 35, made note of the spellbinding daze under which men and women are held in a capitalist society, with respect to numbers: "When the imagination of a whole people has once been trend toward purely quantitative bigness, as in the United States, the romanticism of numbers exercises an irresistible appeal to the poets among business men." For Weber, the fetishism of numbers is quintessentially capitalistic.

¹⁵³ "Toward a Billion," CT News, *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 31.

the primacy of capitalism in the evangelical mind. The laboring activities of Americans and the process of the accumulation of capital were commingled with evangelicals' most sacred beliefs, most cherished values, loftiest understanding of the human condition.¹⁵⁴

The marriage of capitalism and Christianity, specifically Protestant Christianity, was neither a natural occurrence—it is an historical development—nor was it the brainchild of contemporary evangelicalism. This temporal union reaches deep into the soil of the past. The affinity between certain trends of Protestantism and capitalism, with its accompanying social organization of human life, has intrigued many scholars in the twentieth century.¹⁵⁵ Foremost among these was Max Weber who, for those who have read him, established firmly the tangibility of the warm bonds of affection between Protestantism and capitalism. We might take a moment to consider what Weber discovered. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, first published in 1905, Weber wrote that, in Puritanism, “labour came to be considered in itself the end of life, ordained as such by God.”¹⁵⁶ Weber discovered that the secular notion of a “calling,” of a “vocation,” emerged first and most sharply in Protestant countries. It was a conceptualization of the world that was to have lasting consequences for the economic arrangement of modern life. “The emphasis on the ascetic importance of a fixed calling,” observed Weber, “provided the ethical justification of the modern specialized division of labor.”¹⁵⁷ What was achieved with this doctrine—the notion that some voice was calling one to a specific task—and its eventual acceptance, was to realize a conversion in man’s beating breast, it was to make him ready for modern economic life. To Weber’s mind, intimately enmeshed in the notions of a calling and the exaltation of labor, was a generally ascetic view of the world, which Protestantism vigorously worked to plant in the human heart. “This worldly Protestant asceticism...acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions, it restricted consumption, especially of luxuries.”¹⁵⁸ These new economic strictures, this worldly asceticism, which Protestantism preached, were necessary for the articulation and coming into existence of “the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ See Rosa Luxemburg, “Women’s Suffrage and Class Struggle,” in *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. Dick Howard (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 220; Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society*, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 220; Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1942), 50.

¹⁵⁵ See, for example, Kruse, *One Nation Under God*, 7-8, 10, 37, 86, 293;

¹⁵⁶ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), 83.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Weber concluded his work with a curious remark concerning the asceticism, which Protestant Christianity had furnished and which had proved necessary to the initial formation of the capitalist ordering of the world: “But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its [religious asceticism and religion’s approval] support no longer,” which is to say, that capitalism, now so firmly established, was in a position to continue without religious consent or approval.¹⁶⁰

R. H. Tawney, the British historian and well-known, for some, as the author of *The Acquisitive Society*, also concerned himself with the perplexing relationship between religion and capitalism in his 1926 work *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. Tawney provides us, in powerful prose, with further evidence of religion’s interconnectedness with and benediction of the economic and social organization of life engendered by capitalism:

The shrewd, calculating commercialism which tries all by pecuniary standards, the acquisitiveness which cannot rest while there are competitors to be conquered or profits to be won, the love of social power and hunger for economic gain—these irrepressible appetites have evoked from time immemorial the warnings and denunciations of saints and sages. Plunged in the cleansing water of later Puritanism, the qualities which less enlightened ages had denounced as social vices emerged as economic virtues. They emerged as moral virtues as well. For the world exists not to be enjoyed, but to be conquered. Only its conqueror deserves the name of Christian. For such a philosophy, the question, “What shall it profit a man?” carries no sting. In winning the world, he wins the salvation of his own soul as well.¹⁶¹

According to Tawney, through the sieve of Puritanism, credence and legitimacy were given to values that had hitherto been categorically condemned or at least viewed with suspicion. Through Weber and Tawney, we have come to understand the influence that religion can bring to bear upon society. And what these two men observed with regard to capitalism and Protestantism, as it began to unfold, we may say that evangelicalism, in the aftermath of World War II, endeavored to do the same. The world of productivity, profitability, dividends, financial products, growth, economic conquest, and numbers was, through the evangelical’s words, reified, strengthened. But in the presence of such reification, such valiant affirmation of this particular manifestation of world, a perplexing question reaches toward the surface concerning who, in fact, the evangelical was and what, in the twentieth century, he or she was working to achieve. We are wont to view the evangelical in the

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.

blinding confines and categories of religion. We see their efforts and their zeal, their continuous citations of Scripture, their loud denunciations of unrighteousness, their perpetual appeals to God, as undeniable attestations of their Christian spirit, their unbending and unyielding focus on the world to come, on salvation, on godliness. We see rebirth as a purely spiritual concept. Yet, in their words, we come across something altogether unexpected, something that seems to chip away at the religious exterior of this particular religious ism. What we find is that the evangelical movement emerged, not only to proclaim the Gospel of Christ, to reassert the dominance of Christianity in an increasingly secular world, but also, or perhaps above all, to herald the gifts of capital, to ready men and women to accept its order and the changes it would bring. Evangelicalism stands as a confirmation of sorts, readying the initiate to receive the graces of capital.

Capitalism has evolved a great deal from the economic and social organization that Weber and Tawney studied. In its early stage, these authors show that Protestantism and Puritanism lent credence to the values that gave capitalism its expansive power and that accompanied capitalism's early struggles in the world. While capitalism in its fledgling state invited the individual to bring his inner life under strict control in order to accumulate capital, fresh and more dynamic models of accumulation would later be developed and promoted. Twentieth-century capitalism, in contrast, called for the individual to move outward, to abandon oneself to the never-ending cycle of consumption. American evangelicalism, in numerous ways, but especially through the standard evangelical lexicon, the concepts they routinely employed, promoted and normalized these arresting economic and social changes among the evangelical faithful, which were in a state of transformation during the Cold War. American evangelicals, as we can gather quite clearly from our primary sources, were fundamental in facilitating capitalism's passage into this new phase marked by conspicuous consumption.

But what underlying relation might exist between the evangelical as the bearer of this gospel of capital and the question of identity? Such a problem is difficult to unravel. That the evangelical, as we have said, was a champion of capitalism was all too apparent. But we would do well to move away from a simplistic interpretation of such speech as a trivial advocating for capitalism and begin to think about the evangelical's inclusion of market concepts, their *decision* to understand faith and God through an economic lens, as an answer to unuttered or latent questions. What questions were being asked in the United States of the

¹⁶¹ R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952),

Cold War? To what questions was the evangelical rushing to respond? These questions existed at both the political and the personal levels. In terms of politics, a new system—communism—had overtaken many parts of the world, which presented itself as an ostensible alternative to Western capitalism. The Second World War had created a space in which Soviet communism could expand. As the ashes of war dissipated, the United States found itself face to face with a world power that it could not control. Some four years after the end of World War II, Mao Zedong achieved dominance in China, establishing yet another large communist state in the Asian continent.¹⁶² The existence of an economic alternative was an inherently dangerous prospect. In a way, the language of the market serves to bolster the American economic order over against communism, which was in that moment a powerful geopolitical foe. This system of concepts had, therefore, a political quality.

On the level of the individual, the hypothetical question might have been more fundamental. It was a questioning of the viability of the economic system of capitalism itself. Was a life devoted to acquisition, to the amassing of wealth, to economic conquest and expansion, a life at all? What joy in living, what wonder at existence, could be derived from a situation in which, as Weber shrewdly observed, “material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history?”¹⁶³ And to such questions, evangelicals stood ready with answers. Although evangelical Christians often spoke out in favor of market capitalism, the answers, very often, came in the form of the concepts they used, the subtle connections they created. And the answer provided was a resounding affirmation. In the devotion of one’s life to labor, to prosperity, to acquisition, one would not only find happiness but also holiness. For God too was one of us, said the evangelical; he too paid out his blessings in dividends; he too had entered the fray, acquiring, and amassing, and his promised treasures sat, in the vaults of heaven, waiting to rain down on the believer. God, in short, had answered that mysterious call from nowhere, the call to direct one’s life in this particular way. Religion, that which was most holy in the evangelical’s mind, was very often conceived of as nothing more than a vehicle to material accumulation. But to what extent had the faculty of questioning, just as was the case with warfare, insofar as it is an aspect of identity, a facet of who one is, of being human, been taken in by evangelicalism, annexed by the movement itself?

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¹⁶² Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 917.

¹⁶³ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 96.

Up until this point we have seen, in full blossom, new conceptualizations of God. We saw with the increasingly bellicose speech of evangelicalism that the triune God of the Christian, in addition to saving the soul, was also the conqueror, the Commander-in-chief; what was to be conquered, vanquished, was never, when it came to the evangelical, explicitly clear. We have come to comprehend now, with the language of the market, that God was also conceived of as a dispenser of economic favors, a provider of prosperity. This was not a mere spiritual allegory, a hope for gifts of the spirit. The gifts that evangelicalism promised its adherents were purely monetary, material. Hitherto, we have left unasked what such reformulations might mean. It is apparent that what was emerging, established through the concepts of the American evangelical movement, was a visceral confrontation with the historical and accepted understanding of the Christian God. Why were evangelicals pulling away from the Christian God, who, in all his bounty, deemed it fitting to save the human race body and soul? Why were they seeking new ways to describe that which was most sacred to them? Unfortunately, we lack sufficient time to trace out fully the historic, Christian understanding. But only a remote knowledge of Christian belief is necessary, when brought into contact with the ideas of evangelicals concerning their deity, for the mind to draw important and new distinctions, distinctions that unfold with perplexing consequences. Why, in fact, did the evangelical move to understand God in this way? Why did evangelicals stress the role of God as conqueror, as provider? Was this the God as Christians usually understood him? In the new evangelical conceptualizations, God was to a considerable extent bound by the role he had been given, by the mold into which he was recast. As conqueror, God was forced into doing the evangelical's bidding. As banker, he was constrained to fulfill a contract, to deliver payment. In a way, the presence of God was felt only inasmuch as it was an expression of evangelical sentiment and aspirations.

To recapitulate, our brief examination of market concepts has uncovered many things. What stands out most starkly in this mode of speech was the evangelical's bold endorsement of the cosmos of capitalism. It was a continuous reification of an economic system. Just as the evangelical was the bearer of the Gospel of Christ, so too was he the advocate of a certain organization of life, particular relations among men and women, and the devoting of one's life to the fulfillment of capitalism's most fleeting virtues.

We saw, as well, that the relation between Protestantism and capitalism was by no means an unprecedented historical phenomenon, but what is the source of this language? A possible answer is that it was meant to preemptively answer a question in the follower's mind. In connecting God and capital, faith and wealth, the evangelical makes a clear

economic pronouncement, which seems to go deeper than a simple affirmation of capitalism itself. The virtues of the capitalist world, which the evangelical spread, were the virtues of God. In addition, we have been confronted with notions of God, which, at least on the surface, appear to diverge from the nucleus of Christian understanding and belief. Does the promise of eternal life, the salvation of the soul, despite the fact that it was everywhere preached, begin to lose its weight, the vigor of its celestial light? Or, does the obsession with numbers, the need for concrete demonstrations of God's favor through material wealth, which can be experienced and touched, seem to indicate a monumental shift of focus? Was it a turning away *from* God and *to* the world?

The Tradition of Organic Thought

Men and women, whether as a product of ingenious creativity or stemming from a more nefarious element of the human character, have brought into existence the most seemingly natural and mesmerizingly powerful of rhetorical devices, conceptual tools: the organic metaphor. The naturalness stems from the enticing connection such metaphors establish with our corporeal existence, our participation, through our bodies, in the natural world of which, by our pain and pleasure, sickness and health, we are daily made aware. The power of these organic concepts emerges at their conception, in the mind, and at their birth, upon the lips; the striking power they impart, resonating at the deepest levels, is connate, signifying life and death, the miraculous beginning and the mysterious end. The biological concept, shaped with such weighty elements, impresses indelibly upon the mind a frenzied urgency and a vital necessity.

The origin of these metaphors taken from nature is not to be found in American evangelicalism. Arendt was one of the few thinkers keenly aware of the inherently violent logic that was to be found in organic metaphors, which were cropping up around her in the United States during the Cold War. She once said hauntingly in a lecture: "...organic metaphors have crept into our language."¹⁶⁴ To Arendt's understanding, organic metaphors were a perilous tradition. In 1970, in "On Violence," writing about the racial tensions in the United States, which were heightened by the struggle for civil rights, Arendt wrote unequivocally:

Nothing, in my opinion, could be theoretically more dangerous than the tradition of organic thought in political matters by which power and violence are interpreted in biological terms...The organic metaphors with which our present discussion of these matters, especially of the riots, is permeated—the notion of a “sick society,” of which riots are symptoms, as fever is a symptom of disease—can only produce violence in the end.¹⁶⁵

Arendt adds that “Racism, as distinguished from race, is not a fact of life, but an ideology...”¹⁶⁶ In Arendt’s understanding, two important factors come to the fore. The first of these is, as we have said, the implicit violence in such utterances. But exactly what is inherently violent about them? The violence in organic metaphors passes before us unnoticed. The violence lies in what is implied. In the invocation of cancer, sickness, tumors, fevers, poison, life and death have been thrown into the mix; now, survival is at stake. Our response to disease, to illness, to sickness, is to eradicate it. Organic concepts, when dealing with elements of society that have been branded as biological threats, in an unspoken way, propose to do the same. In Arendt’s example of riots as a symptom of a sick society, the utterance presupposes their elimination, their swift removal.

Arendt’s second observation to the metaphor itself and the relation it moves to establish. Racism, Arendt was quick to point out, had nothing to do with life, with its survival, for racism was undeniably an ideological construct. Though this might seem trivial or insignificant, Arendt uncovered the essential the fact that organic metaphors, which deal with society and politics, in almost all instances, relate creations of the human mind to the most perilous extremes, reducing so many occurrences to the poles of life and death. In the use of organic concepts, we are led to believe that survival itself hangs precipitously in the balance. Consequently, we may assert that organic metaphors are a tradition, a style of speaking, which relates ideological concepts, to the plane of life and its natural processes, which bear no relation to life itself; moreover, it is a tradition that suggests violence as a remedy and as an instrument to be wielded for survival.

Let us turn now to the evangelicals’ participation in this tradition, reminisce about how evangelicals used such concepts, examine towards whom such organic speech was aimed, and what, in terms of identity, is the import of such language. One example can be found in Graham. In a sermon delivered in 1958, “What’s Wrong with the World,” Graham

¹⁶⁴ Hannah Arendt, “Power and Violence (Speech)” (lecture given at Bard College—Stevenson Library, Annandale-On-Hudson, NY, 1968), <http://www.bard.edu/arendtcollection/gallery.htm>.

¹⁶⁵ Hannah Arendt, *Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), 172.

preached, “Man has a disease and that disease is called S-I-N. Now ladies and gentlemen that is what is wrong with the world...Man’s nature has a disease.”¹⁶⁷ The spiritual had become material.

Graham’s words reflect his religious conviction that all men and all women are in a fallen state, are living a corrupted existence. Evangelicals do not rest here, in the contemplation of humanity’s folly, but strike out into diverse fields, in their use and development of an organic lexicon. Bell, in 1959, boldly connected the ideological phenomenon of communism with human life. “‘Communism,’” Bell enthusiastically and approvingly quotes a certain Dr. Schwarz, “‘is a disease. It is a disease of the body, of people, and purposes to kill millions more.’”¹⁶⁸ Hoover, a little less than two years later, echoing Mr. Bell, expanded, imaginatively and nightmarishly, the destructive biological powers of communism:

The twentieth century has witnessed the intrusion into its body fabric of a highly malignant cancer—a cancer which threatens to destroy Judaic-Christian civilization. One fourth of the world’s land surface has been seared and blackened by this cancer, while one out of every three human beings is caught in its tentacles. At this very hour, some are wondering whether we as a free nation can survive the frontal and underground assaults of this tumorous growth of communism.¹⁶⁹

Communism, as evangelicals assessed the situation of the United States during the Cold War, was not the only phenomenon to have darkened the horizon; a multitude of other ills had arisen, clad in the mantle of death, ready and waiting to deliver bodily corruption, natural decay. Pitirim A. Sorokin, in an article in *Christianity Today*, as the title of his piece indicates—“Demoralization of Youth: Open Germs and Hidden Viruses”—believed that he found a connection between the rebelliousness and corruption of modern youth and biology. “Hidden,” Sorokin wrote in 1959 with shadows of intrigue, “in the ‘normal’—cultural and social—milieu in which we live, these viruses reach practically everyone of us, are incessantly and unsuspectedly absorbed by us, and continuously affect us.”¹⁷⁰ It is

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 173.

¹⁶⁷ Billy Graham, *What’s Wrong with the World?* [Sermon], video, Charlotte, North Carolina, 1958, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXcsIIP3bdg>.

¹⁶⁸ Dr. Schwarz quoted in L. Nelson Bell, “Christianity and Communism,” A Layman and his Faith, *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 19.

¹⁶⁹ J. Edgar Hoover, “The Communist Menace: Red Goals and Christian Ideals,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 3.

¹⁷⁰ Pitirim A. Sorokin, “Demoralization of Youth: Open Germs and Hidden Viruses,” *Christianity Today*, July 6, 1959, 3.

abundantly clear from Sorokin's words that he believed that an infectious agent has been introduced into society, and the magnitude of this agent's corrupting power was capable of destroying the youth of the United States. Who were the hosts of these viruses? Who were the deliverers of biological terror in this new theological biologism? Amongst other factors, Sorokin felt that pornography, its purveyors and those engaged in its reproduction were all representatives of this deadly virus. "A rigorous prosecution of all manufacturers and peddlers of this smut," Sorokin theorized, "assisted by the aroused public opinion and by an active cooperation of the family, religious, civic and educational agencies, would have been sufficient to cut out this cancerous growth from our culture and social life."¹⁷¹ So pervasive and threatening were these dangers, Sorokin thought, that he was moved to express his belief that viruses, in some form or another, had lodged themselves, imperceptibly, in all areas of life in the United States.¹⁷² Here, in Sorokin's formulations, the pornographer was presented, not as a human being engaged in a certain activity, but rather as a nonhuman or subhuman agent of death.

In "Compromise and Decadence," an article by Dr. Gregg Singer, a professor of history in North Carolina and a Presbyterian minister, we find another instance of an organic metaphor. "The American dream is vanishing in the midst of the terrifying realities and visible signs of decadence in our contemporary society," wrote Dr. Singer in 1961.¹⁷³ To Singer's mind, the source of biological destruction was not communism, but unbiblical philosophies, which had, as Singer leads us to believe, permeated the political, social and economic realms of the American Republic. "The awesome conflicts," taught the professor of history, "of our era are not the cause of the dilemma but rather are they the outward manifestations of the deadly cancer which is in fact eating away at the very soul of the West."¹⁷⁴

We saw with flood metaphors that evangelicals used them both for people whom they found to be threatening and for themselves: they were also a flood, a natural force of violation and destruction. The same and unexpected reversal occurs with organic metaphors in which evangelicals not only identify agents of biological destruction, which are capable of weakening and destroying, but see themselves through a biological lens, as biological agents.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ C. Gregg Singer, "Compromise and Decadence," *Christianity Today*, June 19, 1961, 5.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Diamond, in *Spiritual Warfare*, mentions, with extreme brevity, a certain biological conceptualization in early twentieth-century evangelicalism in the United States. Referring to Bill Bright, the founder and director of Campus Crusade for Christ, Diamond notes the peculiarity of some of Bright's terminology saying, "...Bright developed the concept of 'spiritual multiplication,' using 'Christian cells.'"¹⁷⁵ Diamond explains that Bright's strategy of spiritual multiplication through the expansion of Christian cells was born out of Bright's belief that communist cells operated on similar biological principles in the United States, yet, with what we have learned and what we have seen, it is hard to suppress the similarity between Bright's biological thinking and other instances of organic concepts used by evangelical Christians.

In *God Loves Uganda*, we are provided with another example, outside of our two primary sources, of the evangelical as biological agent, naturally bent on expansion. This example is important, in a diachronic sense, in that it shows the durability of this theological biologism. One young lady featured in the documentary, prior to her stay in Uganda, ponders and articulates the underlying motives of her work as an evangelical missionary: "One of my greatest hopes is to deposit what I've kind of received at IHOP [the International House of Prayer], that DNA of prayer and worship. DNA replicates itself, and so I think that everybody wants to replicate their values and the core parts of who they are."¹⁷⁶ Another member of the same American missionary church and wife of the leader of an evangelical mission in Uganda, Rachelle Digges, had a similar way of expressing her goals as an evangelical white woman in Africa. With an inviting smile, sitting alongside her husband, the lush green of Uganda providing the backdrop to this foreign couple's ideals, Digges instructs, "There is a very strategic position that Uganda is in. Fifty percent of the population is under fifteen years old. This is a youth nation. What Jesse [her husband] and I could do is limited but we can multiply ourselves in these young people, and they can reach multitudes."¹⁷⁷ Though the factors are reversed—the evangelical is now the bearer of biological change through the insemination, as it were, and multiplication of their DNA—the equation remains the same: the future host is to be invaded and fundamentally altered. What we see, in these two cases, is, not so much the desire to spread the Gospel, but spread themselves.

Returning momentarily to Arendt's thoughts concerning the meaning and intent of organic metaphors, we see, in evangelicalism, the crystallization of Arendt's ideas.

¹⁷⁵ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 51.

¹⁷⁶ *God Loves Uganda*, directed by Roger Ross Williams (2013; New York: First Run Features, 2014), DVD.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

Communism, the demoralization of the American youth, and the activity of evangelization all were conceived of and explained through the use of organic concepts, relating an ideology, in the case of communism, the reproduction and distribution of pornography, and the promulgation of the evangelical faith, to life. Inasmuch as these phenomena exist as the result of men and women's creation, they are a product of human hands; their relation to natural life is non-existent.

The problem with organic metaphors is not purely one of mistakenly linking things, be they mental or physical, with nature. With the biological metaphors of the evangelical, the other is made to undergo a process of dehumanization, which in and of itself was a sort of violence, whereby men and women were no longer human, but cells, bacteria, an infectious virus. As we have said, a further problem with such metaphors is the violence that it discreetly seeks to sanction. The other, as a source of death, destruction, decay, is marked for destruction, for surgical removal. The communist, as a virus, was to be eradicated. The pornographer, too, spreading his vile contagion was to be destroyed.

Another aspect of the evangelical's use of organic metaphors, which emerges as peculiar for an avowedly religious group, was the fact that it represented a moving away from exclusively religious categories such as sin. It seems that the charge of sin itself, as a form of damning critique, no longer held the same weight. Newer, more attractive, more galvanizing forms of disparagement were sought. The communist was not, because of his convictions, merely a sinner; he was no longer a human being. Communism was not only an opposing ideology, it was the harbinger of decay.

As a final remark regarding the evangelical's fervid reproduction of organic concepts, we may say that this did not bubble to the surface *ex nihilo*. In Europe, during the nineteenth century, a general discourse on degeneration had already emerged, coalescing around the fields of medicine, psychiatry, anthropology, science, philosophy, and even literature. This new organic thinking was an amalgam of evolution, pathology, and abnormality, which eventually spilled over into social and political writings.¹⁷⁸ Various academic works have traced this curious emergence, the vogue and attraction of decay, decadence, and other biological motifs. One such study is Daniel Pick's 1989 *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder*, where he probes into the various rhetorical and linguistic sources of degeneration in France, Italy, and England from the middle of the nineteenth century until 1918. The

¹⁷⁸ Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848 - c. 1918* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 2, 20. See also Richard G. Fox, *Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making* (Berkeley,

evangelical's return to these types of biological concepts occurred in a moment in time when the social sciences had all but abounded notions of decay and organic concepts. The evangelical of the Cold War, in many ways, echoed ideas curated in Pick's study: "In medico-psychiatric investigations, alcoholism, sexual perversion, crime, insanity, declining birth rates...economic performance, and so on, become the intertwined signifiers of cultural crisis."¹⁷⁹ Imbued in the lexicon of degeneration, in organic concepts of societal decay, indeed the very source of their abiding attraction was that "degeneration also connoted invisibility and ubiquity...it was a process which could usurp all boundaries of discernible identity, threatening the overthrow of civilisation and progress."¹⁸⁰ Pliable, easily transferable from one area of life to another, and suffused with the awe-inspiring visions of society's destruction, such metaphors become powerful and useful conceptual tools in the fulfillment of one's aims. In the words of Pick, such instances of human speech contain "ominous political implications."¹⁸¹ Despite the fact that many scholars signal the nineteenth century as the decisive moment in which organic concepts enter a new phase of semantic history, traces of it can be felt much earlier. Rosemary Radford Ruether, an American Catholic theologian, feminist activist, and author of numerous works, in her 1974 study *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, uncovers the emergence of biological thinking in relation to Jews in Christian Europe already during the Middle Ages. While the Jew had already been the unfortunate recipient of a devoted demonization for over a millennium, on the part of the Church and society, what emerged around the time of the crusades was a new manner of conceiving the Jewish "threat." "This notion of 'Jewishness,'" Ruether observed, "as a kind of contagion that one might catch by any kind of association was to become a virulent source of notions such as 'well-poisoning.' It also provided," Ruether went on to say, "the stock imagery of racial anti-Semitism, which was always to depict the presence of the Jew as a kind of dangerous or insidious 'contagious disease.'"¹⁸²

CA: University of California Press, 1985), 149. See also Sander L. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 11-12.

¹⁷⁹ Pick, *Faces of Degeneration*, 43.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸² Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), 209, see also 223. The birth of degeneracy as a discourse, in the nineteenth century, is also touched upon by the American anthropologist Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 31-32.

That the evangelical availed himself of existing and long-tested linguistic formulations, far from diminishing our discovery, wafts it to new heights of importance. What we see with the evangelical and their concepts of biologism, of organicism, was a participation in what we might term a modern way of speaking, naming, and classification. It places evangelicals in league with something, in complicity with a certain picture of the world and with a certain tradition of speaking about this world. What that thing was can only be answered by unraveling what or who benefits from this discourse, from the division into degenerate, abnormal, diseased, cancerous, on the one hand, and uncorrupted, normal, healthy, pure, on the other, which the rhetoric of organicism promotes.

The evangelical movement's descent into organic thinking went well beyond the few organic metaphors, which we have examined in this chapter. Indeed, what emerged during the Cold War was an entire theological organicism that was inextricably interwoven with and furthered by concepts related to the biological, the full weight and scope of which we cannot explore here. Some of the concepts evangelicals utilized to develop their organic thinking were, for example, "crisis,"¹⁸³ "degeneracy," "decline." Once the concept of "crisis" was transferred into national languages in Europe in the seventeenth century, Koselleck made clear in his entry in the seminal work of conceptual history, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*,¹⁸⁴ the first volume of which was published in German in 1972, it acquired an immediate connection to the biological, to pathology.¹⁸⁵ The fear, conflicts, and changes of the Cold War, created a space in which the evangelical developed a mélange of biological and theological thinking of which, here, we are only afforded a glimpse.

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¹⁸³ The concept of "crisis" was used extensively in *Christianity Today* during this historical period. For some examples see, William G. Pollard, "The Christian and the Atomic Crisis," *Christianity Today*, October 13, 1958, 6; Hudson T. Armerding, "Call the Great Physician," Etychus and his Kin," [Letter to the Editor] *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1967, 21; G. George Fry, "The Meaning of the Reformation For the Contemporary Crisis," *Christianity Today*, October 27, 1967, 6; Carl F. H. Henry, "Perspective for Social Action," *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 9; "Pressures on Education Call for Spiritual Alertness," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, July 20, 1959, 21; "Collective Bargaining Crisis Shadows Steel Strike," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 9, 1959, 22; "Crisis in Communication," [Roundtable discussion] *Christianity Today*, October 14, 1966, 5; Carl F. H. Henry, "Evangelical Advance: Do We Need a Christian University," *Christianity Today*, May 9, 1960, 3; "Crisis In Morality," [Advertisement] *Christianity Today*, Vol. IX, No. 2 – October 23, 1964, 45; "Sex in Christian Perspective," [Roundtable discussion] *Christianity Today*, July 4, 1960, 6; Pitirim A. Sorokin, "The Depth of the Crisis: American Sex morality Today," *Christianity Today*, July 4, 1960, 3.

¹⁸⁴ *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe; historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1972-1997).

¹⁸⁵ Koselleck, "Crisis," *Journal of the History of Ideas*: 362.

The concepts and modes of speech we have seen here designate some of the most important features of the evangelical lexicon; as such they become rooted to who the evangelical was. Evidence for such language can be found, as we have shown in some instances, outside the timeframe we have established and the primary sources we have chosen, indicating that these were not passing and inconsequential trends. One might assert, in contrast to what we have uncovered here, that the evangelical spoke of other things and not only about bombs, floods, and dividends. The evangelical, one might argue, spoke of love, of redemption, and God. Prayers, song, and not only venom, issued from their lips. This is, of course, true. But side by side the evangelicals' invocations of love, their highest ideals, their God of everlasting goodness, one encounters, if one chooses to look deeper, a speech full of invectives, violence, alarm.

In bringing this chapter to a close, we would do well to recapitulate some of the ideas we have encountered. The first of these was that evangelicals created and used types of speech whose purpose was to insulate the adherent from the infringing reality of the world: the foreboding created in which the destruction of the world through nuclear power was now possible; the flux generated by massive and constant economic transformation. Evangelical interpretations of the world were meant, oftentimes, to conform to preexisting inclinations, to protect and embolden certain prejudices. As such, the evangelical was the bearer of convenient truths. These interpretations, these utterances, should be seen also from the perspective of the adherent, the lone worshipper or the fresh convert. American men and women, after the Second World War, were turning to evangelicalism in ever-increasing numbers, not only entranced by the promises of salvation, but because this religion was able to offer an ostensible consolation from the facts of life and to preserve the edifice of one's feeble worldview. Evangelicalism flourished in the uncertainty of the Cold War because, among other things, it was capable of offering an apparent resolution to life's problems, life's questions. Here, we find early indications of identity's role in the origin of modern evangelicalism. Judgment, the decision and willingness to decide upon a certain issue, was swiftly becoming the prerogative of the movement itself, as opposed to the individual.

The second fact that we have been able to gather from our survey of the evangelical's modes of speech was that the evangelical movement emerged, following the Second World War, not only as a proclamation of the relevance and dignity of the Christian message, in the midst of secular modernity, but in order to reify certain aspects of the world, the world as it had been given. To speak of the evangelical only in terms of the bearer of the Gospel of Christ is to obscure and obliterate the undeniable circumstance in which evangelicals took it

upon themselves to champion particular aspects of contemporary life. Foremost among these instances was the reification, the strengthening, the giving of new life, to the global order of capitalism. The vapid recognition of the evangel's pro-capitalist sentiments does not begin to approach what the evangelical was, in actual fact, doing. Beneath the evangelical's role as advocate of American capitalism, their participation in American anti-Catholicism, and the never-ending crusade against communism, a greater question seems to be in play. To what extent was the message of evangelicalism purely Christian? To what degree was it merely American? In the third place, our confrontation with evangelical parlance draws out a more fundamental question about God as evangelicals conceived of him. Changes in the concept of God as used by evangelicals are already beginning to seep through. Was this the Christian God of old? Or was the Godhead, through evangelical speech, a mere caricature? Was the God of the evangel always there or was he only there in order to give speed to evangelical conquests, to fill their own private coffers? More fundamentally, in the evangelical system, did God exist independently, separately, or only as a manifestation or function of evangelical ambition and desire?

A fourth point we would do well to reconsider is that with the evangelical concepts we are beset by unforeseen problems; these problems emerge concretely in relation to other people. There was, in the words evangelicals used, frequent and unapologetic violence and dehumanization. We are already in a position to move beyond the simplistic framework provided by many scholars as a way to define evangelicalism, which persists in exclusively religious categories. Something of the collective evangelical identity comes rushing to the fore. We may say that the evangelical, amongst other things, was one who handled violence and dehumanized others. The violence in evangelical speech was subtle as well as explicit. The evangelical of the second half of the twentieth century avidly sought to "penetrate" others, to multiply evangelical DNA, to remove the sin of the other's difference. With the frequent use of a language of war and destruction we encounter, not mere figures of speech, but overt and morbid celebrations of the most grotesque aspects of being human. The instruments and *dramatis personae* of war and destruction were not only celebrated, used joyfully to expound upon evangelical ideas, but brought into connection with that which, ostensibly, to evangelicals, was most sacred. Dehumanization was also a prominent feature of their lexicon. Whole swathes of humanity were painted with the broad brush of "pagan" and "heathen," that is, as manifestly inferior. With organic metaphors, we have encountered the quintessence of dehumanization. Men and women were spoken of as mere things, dangerously primitive forms of life, which surface to threaten one's very existence. In such a

characterization, with men and women viewed as nothing more than bacteria, the evangelical returns to his preferred theme, presaging violent eradication.

And we might ask, What would the Cold War have been without the evangelical's songs of destruction and warnings of apocalypse? The evangelical's concepts of biological terrors, gods of war, and deification of the market, spread far and wide, through radio, crusades, and television, gave color, tension, and intensity to the period we call the Cold War.

II

The Gospel of Despair

But woe, woe to the Christian Church if it would triumph in this world, for then it is not the Church that triumphs, but the world...

—Søren Kierkegaard¹

...America is freedom...

—Ronald Reagan²

In the previous chapter, sharp attention has been paid to concepts themselves, the lexicon that evangelicals, between 1945 and 1981, freely chose, the metaphors they created, the underlying and neglected meanings of such discourse, and the already existing ways of speaking of which evangelicals availed themselves in order to create a collective identity and aid adherents navigate the difficulties of personal identity and its formation. Often, we have seen, the evangelical's voice was the one that breathed new life into cherished forms of prejudice, long-established ways of describing the world and those living in it. Through this task, something of identity begins to move out from under the shadows. Generally speaking, what was intimated in these forms of speech, in so many ways, was the growing preoccupation with the world itself, which we might speak of as a gradual eclipse of the supersensuous realms, which have, at many times in human history, exercised an enthralling occupation over the human mind. The question arises as to how the increasing emphasis on the world of the *hic et nunc*, amongst evangelicals after the Second World War, was played out. To answer this question we move now to the movement of evangelical thought, to the ideologization [*Ideologiesierbarkeit*]³ of their religion and its relation to identity.

The Cold War development of this ideology brought the evangelical movement into tense and at times combative contact with numerous social groups in the American

¹ Søren Kierkegaard, *The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard*, ed. W. H. Auden (New York: New York Review of Books, 1999), 221.

² Ronald Reagan, "Reagan's Farewell Address" *PBS*, 1988, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/reagan-farewell/>.

³ In conceptual history "ideologization" is the term used to describe the phenomenon in which concepts can be incorporated into ideologies, see Richter, "Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas," 252; Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 38.

Republic, ideas about the United States its history and its future, theological divisions within Protestant Christianity, as well as the political sphere and its accompanying discourses. An important consequence of this ideology was that it seeped into the ambit of gender and masculinity, moving evangelicalism away from its singular task of evangelization and the goal of eternal salvation and towards relations of power.⁴ The primary focus, in a part of this chapter, will be on the development of a hegemonic masculinity in the United States during the Cold War, its perceived crisis both inside and outside the evangelical church, and the zealous efforts of evangelicals to shore up this identity in crisis.⁵

The assertion that, in Christian evangelicalism, this form of Christian fundamentalism, one was encountering something ideological in character has been hinted at before. The American theologian and historian, Harvey Cox, was the first, it appears, to have understood and articulated the semblance between Christian fundamentalism in the United States and a specifically ideological movement of thought. In an essay published in 1987, in the collection of essays entitled *Piety and Politics: Evangelicals And Fundamentalists Confront The World*, Cox affirmed, “Fundamentalism is not only a theology and subculture, but an ideology. They want not only to ‘keep the faith,’ but to change the world so that the faith can be kept more easily.”⁶ Which gives immediate rise to the question what exactly is ideology? How does ideology work this change into the world? What sway did ideology have over men and women? Cox provides no answers nor does he clearly spell out what evangelicalism as an ideology looks like. In like manner, Armstrong also described religious fundamentalism as an ideology.⁷ Indeed, Armstrong’s theory as to the origins of fundamentalism—the supplantation of *mythos* by *logos*, a kind of practical tool with which to wield and bring about the submission of the world—seems to place religious fundamentalism, conceptually, along the pathway of ideology.

Fortunately, evidence, which seems to suggest this point, can be found in evangelicals themselves. Then, as now, the nuanced meaning of such utterances might not

⁴ Scott understands gender as “a primary way of signifying relationships of power,” Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” 1072-1073, see also 1063, 1067.

⁵ Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001).

⁶ Harvey Cox, “Fundamentalism As an Ideology,” in *Piety and Politics: Evangelicals and Fundamentalists Confront the World*, ed. Richard John Neuhaus and Michael Cromartie (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Lanham, MD: Distributed by arrangement with University Press of America, 1987), 289.

⁷ Armstrong, *The Battle for God*, 368. See also Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 145. Ruether, in her feminist theology, considers religion’s relation to ideology. In a system of injustice, where religion has a prominent role in propping up the unjust status quo, she sees that “ideology in this context is primarily religious,” Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 24.

strike one as categorically ideological; they might be perceived as simply one more voice muted by the rising cacophony of voices, more words against a constantly increasing abundance of words. Yet, in these utterances, something deeper was intended, something of far-reaching consequences was intimated. In the period with which we are now concerned, there was an inkling, in the evangelical milieu, that the world needed to be changed, that the chaos, which everywhere seemed to reign, needed to be harnessed and subdued. The world was in need of a new system of ideas. Karl Marx, in his 1845 “Theses on Feuerbach,” provided the world with his famous adage: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however is to change it.”⁸ In 1969, the evangelical Leighton Ford, who at the time was the vice-president of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, writing in *Christianity Today*, revived Marx’s dichotomy of philosophy and worldly intervention, contemplation versus action. In Ford’s mind, the question was a theological one. Ford wrote, “I agree with Karl Marx—the world needs to be changed. But how? That *is* the point.”⁹ Ford framed the emerging problem, in the United States, as one of revolution, affirming, “Today revolution is fueled by the freedom drive that is surging through the entire world of men—the struggle for identity, dignity, security, and equality. In America the flash points of the freedom revolution are poverty and racism.”¹⁰ The revolution that Ford invoked was being perpetuated, he thought, by radicals: “Radicals in contemporary America have made their goal clear: they are convinced that American society is so corrupt and unworkable that they system cannot be changed but must be destroyed.”¹¹ In the midst of such tumultuous and allegedly annihilating change, to Ford’s mind, the only viable option, the only saving power, was evangelical Christianity. Evangelicalism, in Ford’s conceptualization, was a form of counterrevolution. *How* the world was to be changed, a response to Marx’s affirmation, was through evangelicalism.¹² But in such a position, where evangelicalism is the motor of changing the world, as opposed to the vessel upon which men and women were transported to God and to his salvation, is not something altogether different proposed? In Ford’s agreement with Marx, where the *point*, that which was most important, was the altering of the space of world, acting upon history, the principle aims of evangelicalism were revealed. The means may differ, but the end was manifestly the same.

⁸ Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 145.

⁹ Leighton Ford, “Evangelism In a Day of Revolution,” *Christianity Today*, October 24, 1969, 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7 [63].

¹¹ *Ibid.*

We may offer yet another clear example of this candid understanding of evangelicalism, this brazen declaration of intentions, this overt reformulation of the precepts and purpose of Christian religion. In 1958, an editorial in *Christianity Today* vividly and openly captured the sentiment that the traditional Christian message of eternal salvation was *insufficient* for modern life, that it was in some way lacking, and that if a reshaping of existing conditions was to be effected new methods needed to be found:

A more powerful proclamation of the law is the desperate need today. The preaching of the gospel, defined in the narrow sense of the atonement alone, is not sufficient...the conscience of the nation will only be awakened in the presence of the law—and then when awakened, it will feel the wounds of its own transgressions. The conscience must be lashed with forty stripes save one. The conscience must be scourged till it is raw and bleeding. And if that is not sufficient, the law must be woven into a crown of thorns and pressed into the brow of the nation.¹³

Clearly, what is most striking about this editorial's pronouncement is that an evangelical publication rejected, as insufficient, the central belief of Christianity: the miraculous generosity of God, from a Christian point of view, where he offers his son as atonement and a means of salvation for the world. While it appears that the editorial was calling for a national confession of shortcomings, the eagerness with which this editorial moved to fashion a system, weave a thorny crown through which to scourge the flesh of the body politic, seems to indicate the underlying urge to reforge American society, direct human behavior, and institute change. The call for awakening, through the "law," appears to be a subtle suggestion for and promulgation of an ideological system.

What is left for us, before moving forward and entering the architecture of the evangelical ideology, and this ideology's interplay with identity, is clarifying ideology itself, its meaning and the way in which it functions. For such a grounding, we may direct our attention to Arendt, for she provides a compelling and profound understanding of ideology, one that will guide us in our uncovering of the ideological aspects of this particular branch of American Christianity. In the last chapter of Arendt's 1951 *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, she wrote, "An ideology is quite literally what its name indicates: it is the logic of an idea...Ideologies are never interested in the miracle of being. They are historical, concerned with becoming and perishing, with the rise and fall of cultures, even if they try to

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ "Law and Reformation," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, October 27, 1958, 20.

explain history by some ‘law of nature.’”¹⁴ “Ideologies,” Arendt continued, “pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process—the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future—because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas.”¹⁵ It is of great importance for our discussion to note that Arendt’s confrontation with the subject of ideology reveals a hidden and specific structure, one that brings to light a subtle dialectic in which a thesis concerning the past, an antithesis that deals with the present, and a synthesis that illuminates the future are blended into an intoxicating mélange that can, on the surface, explain and “reshape” the world. Arendt’s understanding was grounded in temporality.

What Arendt states in the previous chapter is even more pertinent to our discussion of ideology and identity and gives us a clear indication of the mode in which ideology operates. “What totalitarian ideologies therefore aim at,” Arendt averred, “is not the transformation of the outside world or the revolutionizing transmutation of society, but the transformation of human nature itself.”¹⁶ From Arendt’s assessment, we learn that, beneath the mask and promises of earthly transformation, that it is in fact one’s inner life that is the ultimate goal of ideology. Ideology is a system that seeks to transfigure the most hidden and intimate aspects of who one is, to bring this inner life, one’s identity, into conformity with the ideological system. Thus, ideology does not act directly upon the world, but works indirectly, through the inner, coercive change of the individual.¹⁷ Within the beating breast of the human being, disruptive struggles of power and dominance are played out.

Despite the fact that, at times, evangelicals overtly shared their ideological inclinations (as with the previous two examples), the ideological essence of their thought did not reveal itself so openly; instead, it was through the temporal movement of thought, which Arendt described, that ideology was brought into the evangelical mind. Therefore, we must attempt to uncover this hidden type of thinking in a particular way, tracing, as it were, the corridors of evangelicalism’s ideological structure, the evangelical ideology’s temporal fabric.

First, we will single out the evangelical thesis, that is, those assumptions that evangelicals present to the world as absolute truths. This premise—something assumed yet

¹⁴ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 469.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* Richter, in his introductory study of conceptual history, remarked on the totality and imperialism of ideology’s claim, saying that ideologies “claimed to encompass the whole of reality, social and historical,” Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 30.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 458.

¹⁷ Another important study of ideology and its conceptual development is the historian Fritz Stern’s *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, *passim*.

not proven—dealt primarily with the past: the history and origins of the United States, who Americans were, and the role of this people in the world. From these truths, which evangelicals held to be inviolable, we proceed to the rhetoric of evangelicals related to the epoch in which they were living. This rhetoric is that of the prophet of doom.¹⁸ The words spoken by evangelicals concerning their own times (the 1940s through the 1970s) represent an effort to frame the events of the second part of the twentieth century into the ominously terrifying visage of destruction and despair. The pronouncements of doom that evangelicals uttered in this period dealt with the present, its dangers and risks, and fostered the belief that all of these occurrences were conspiring to introduce, into life, a process of decay from which there was little chance of escape.

Finally, following the echo of the voices of despair and the creation of the process of decay, which evangelicals believed to be festering in the totality of events of their time—the period between 1945 and 1981—we are brought to the future or the historical “solution” that these evangelical Christians offered American citizens. This final step we may call the Gospel as synthesis, for it is here that we may observe how many evangelicals turned away from their faith as the promise of eternal life to holding up, in the sight of an anxious world, Christianity as the panacea for all the problems of humankind, as a universal balm that had the hopeful power to heal all wounds.

Evangelical Presuppositions

The past, or our conception of it, bears inextricably upon who we are and who we envision ourselves capable of becoming. And time passed had an exceptionally significant role for evangelicals in the decades following the Second World War. The political, social, and economic changes of the postwar years had radically transformed the American landscape, called into questions fundamental understandings of the American experience, and created new threats to life and existence. Firm confidence in American values, in the sweet and endless fruits of economic prosperity, in the divine benevolence of the United States and its role in the world, were now, for many, no longer a *fait accompli*. It was not the truth of the past, its multifaceted reality—here we are concerned with the history of the America experience—that attracted evangelicals; instead, they were interested in making the

¹⁸ FitzGerald, preserves the portrait of Graham as the prophet of doom, saying “In his revivals Graham rarely failed to bring up the threat of Communism, atomic weapons, and World War III. Indeed, these secular dangers

past congenial to the present, in shaping people's belief and understanding. It is here, in the evangelical thinking about the history of the United States, that we may uncover the starting point of the evangelical ideology. The "silent assumptions," as Blücher called such ideological propositions, which evangelicals developed, related to the historical essence of the United States.¹⁹ To Arendt's mind, as we saw, ideology's point of departure was an accepted premise about the past from which all subsequent thinking flowed.

Amongst evangelicals, the first step towards ideology—their premise—dealt with the historical essence of the United States, its foundation, its origin. In a mysterious unison of ideas, evangelicals gathered together diverse elements in the elaboration of their thesis. Perhaps the most important component of the evangelical premise concerning the past was that the Christian God had created a covenant with the American people, that the God of all creation was and is intimately invested, so to speak, in the preservation and wordily triumph of the American Republic.

While the belief that God established a covenant with the American people, chose them as special stewards and tools through whom his will was to be done, figured prominently in the minds of evangelicals in the twentieth century, we must concede that this self-edifying idea did not originate in contemporary evangelicalism, but was an inherited concept. It is well known that, in the American context, the notion of chosenness was the brainchild of Puritans, who were some of the first to be washed, by the waves of history, to American shores. To these Puritans, it seemed as if God himself had preordained the appearance of a new and unknown world ripe for the taking, a haven from the religious tensions and persecutions of early modern Europe. The historian Andrew Preston, in *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, written in 2012, which worked to uncover the relationship between religion and war in the United States, described the mindset of these early colonizers, saying, "The Puritans had settled Massachusetts and Connecticut under the sway of powerful myths, centered on faith, about their role in the world. They saw themselves as God's specially anointed people who had been chosen for their virtue, their faith, and their righteousness."²⁰ Not only did Puritans believe themselves to be God's chosen vessels, these men and women were exceedingly satisfied with the object of their creation, with the new country they conquered, and with the fledgling world they were bringing into existence. It

often seemd to substitute for the fear of hell, or the coming of Armageddon, that previous revivalists had used to spur to conversion," FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 180.

¹⁹ Heinrich Blücher, "The Age of Logos, Part I," [Lecture] Bard College - Annandale-On-Hudson, NY: n.d., <http://www.bard.edu/bluecher/listen.htm>.

was, as John Winthrop's famous sermon clearly conveyed, "a city upon a hill," something above and beyond, something looking down and something to gaze up to in admiration.

Puritans, explained Catherine Brekus in 2015, a professor at the Harvard Divinity School, sought to justify their ascension to the throne of chosenness by drawing parallels between American colonizers and the Jews struggling for freedom in Egypt. "Perhaps no biblical story was more inspirational for American patriots than Exodus, the story of the enslavement of the Israelites and their journey to freedom," wrote Brekus in a short article. "Drawing on a long Puritan tradition of identifying New England as 'God's New Israel,' many New England ministers argued that there were striking similarities between the plight of eighteenth-century Americans and the plight of the Israelites in Egypt."²¹ *Sensu stricto*, the dawning of the sun of chosenness in the American wild, amongst the Puritan faithful, can only be described as a reanimation of the same idea, which had been developed by the Church at the very moment of its birth as a theological and differentiating weapon against the Jews. It was the Church and its people that had supplanted "apostate" Judaism, stepping into its preordained role as the new and true Israel.²² The Puritans self-designation as an elect nation goes beyond mere flights of imaginations. They believed they had signed a new covenant with God. And, in the words of Winthrop, the Massachusetts Bay colony's first governor, if this New Israel kept "the Articles of our Covenant with him wee may live and be multiplied, and the Lord our God may blesse us I the land whither we goe to possess it."²³

With incredible resilience, this Puritan belief has trickled down, decade after decade, permeating great swathes of American life. Ruether, in 2007, writes of the persistence of this belief in the United States:

It is the Puritan version of this claim to be God's elect people, translated to a New 'Promised Land' in America, that is the root of the concept of the United States as an elect nation, a claim that continues to be central to U.S. American identity long after the European nations that once held such views have left them behind.²⁴

²⁰ Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2012), 38.

²¹ Catherine Brekus, "Examining the Roots of American 'Chosenness,'" Harvard Divinity School, July 2, 2015, <http://hds.harvard.edu/news/2015/07/02/examining-roots-american-chosenness#>.

²² For a captivating study of the meticulous elaboration of this theme in the early Church and in the writings of the early Church Fathers see Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide*, 94, 106-107, 129, 131, 134, 138, 158, 162-164, 180, 184. See also Rosemary Radford Ruether, *America, Amerikkka: Elect Nation and Imperial Violence* (London: Equinox, 2007), 8.

²³ John Winthrop quoted in Rosemary Radford Ruether, *America, Amerikkka: Elect Nation and Imperial Violence* (London: Equinox, 2007), 29. See Maldonado Gago, "Política y religión en la derecha cristiana de los Estados Unidos de América," *La balsa de piedra* 3, (April 2013), 3.

This belief presses in upon the American mind in two ways. There is the religious idea, which evangelicals have embraced, that sees the foundation of the United States, as well as the conquest and colonization that made this foundation possible, as irrefutable evidence of God's intervention in history. Later, in the 1840s, these notions of chosenness would be placed beneath a new and more secular rubric: Manifest Destiny. This doctrine of divine sanction and was, as the historian Frederick Merk said of it in his 1963 study, "...expansion, prearranged by Heaven, over an area not clearly defined."²⁵ The other way in which this idea was promulgated and made to survive is the secularized and dubious version wherein Providence chose the United States and its people, calling them as it were, to greatness, to exception. In this view, the United States has a destiny to fulfill, a wondrous role to play.²⁶

So pervasive was the belief that the United States had been chosen, in twentieth-century evangelicalism, that it has been theologically codified. Clarkson, a journalist who has written extensively on the subject of Christian fundamentalism in the United States, wrote, in his 1997 *Eternal Hostility*, of the importance of this tenet in the evangelical Church: "Another key doctrine is 'covenantalism,' the idea that biblical 'covenants' exist between God and man, God and nations, God and families, and that they make sense of the world."²⁷ Marsden, too, acknowledges the overwhelming significance of this belief in modern Christian fundamentalism in the United States. "Consider, for instance," remarked Marsden, "the important fundamentalist belief that God relates to the nation covenantally, awarding or punishing it proportionately to its moral record. This is a belief, deeply held on religious grounds, about some causal connections in the universe. Throughout the history of America this conception about causality," Marsden continued, "has survived through a number of revolutionary changes in the class and status of its adherents."²⁸

Marsden, it deserves to be mentioned, not only expounded upon the importance of such beliefs among evangelical Christians, but moved to defend these ideas, in a way, to cut them off from questioning. "To reduce beliefs to their social functions," he averred in connection with the belief in God's covenant with the modern political entity of the United States, "is to overemphasize a partial truth and so to underestimate the powers of the belief

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁵ Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: a Reinterpretation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 24.

²⁶ For more on the history of the concept of chosenness in the United States see: Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), *passim*; David Minter, "The Puritan Jeremiad as a Literary Form," *The American Puritan Imagination: Essays in Revaluation*, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 50-66.

²⁷ Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 82.

²⁸ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 117.

itself.”²⁹ Marsden attempted to strike a balance in his assessment, affirming, “While...social and cultural circumstances strongly influence the expressions of this belief, there is no doubt that the belief itself is sometimes a powerful force in determining the way people behave.”³⁰ But in Marsden’s uncritical acceptance of the belief among American Christians that the United States had been chosen by God, that a special covenant had been established, a fundamental question is obscured. Did early Puritans or later evangelicals come first to the belief of their chosenness, the special election of the American people; was this something revealed? Or did the belief in a covenantal relationship with God emerge as *a posteriori* theological justification for the actions of a people, for the history of a nation? Is the belief in God’s covenant with the United States a belief as such or is it a tool, a contrivance, with which to realize and bless one’s aims? These nagging questions cannot be dismissed so easily. Ruether, unlike Marsden, sees the ominous implications of such claims to election, saying, “There will be much in this claim that is primarily an assumption of entitlement, an assumption of a superiority that merits wealth and power over other peoples and nations of the world.”³¹

The particular colonial context in which such pronouncements of chosenness came together is also an area that could be fruitfully pursued. The scope and constraints of this dissertation preclude such an inquiry to its fullest extent. Yet, we might simply raise the question: Does the Puritan’s early self-endowment of the title of God’s chosen people emerge in contradistinction to those whom they fled in Europe? Or was it a voice and a thought uttered in the woods of the American wild, a wood peopled all around with those of a “different” visage. *To be chosen* is necessarily a relation of separation, of excluding something. Was this notion one locus of colonial power’s formation? Does the declaration of the Puritan’s chosen status presage the dissolution of those not bathed in its pure and heavenly light?

Returning to the subject at hand, as we have seen, the concept of chosenness, the idea that God established a covenant with the American people, is widely understood by scholars to be a vital component of contemporary, twentieth-century evangelicalism. Some examples, from evangelicals themselves, during the period in question, will lend further credence to the importance of this idea.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 116-117.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 117.

³¹ Ruether, *America, Amerikkka*, 32. Full a more detailed history of the idea of chosenness and mission in the United States see Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History*, *passim*.

In evangelicalism, after the Second World War, evidence of the biblical relationship between God and the American Republic, which evangelicals claimed existed, can be found in various and diverse ways. The occasion of Graham's address to the United States' congress in 1950 is one such example. "Our father," Graham prayed before American political leaders, "we give Thee thanks for this greatest nation in the world. We thank Thee for the Stars and Stripes that wave above the land of the free and home of the brave. We thank Thee for the highest standard of living in the world."³² As early as 1950, Graham, the preeminent evangelist, had incorporated ideas of American chosenness into the Gospel he was charged with sharing and, in this short excerpt, he encapsulated the most important themes of American exceptionalism. In thanking his God for the greatest nation on earth, the Christian deity is brought into the handiwork of foundation. The United States, as a modern political and social entity, was thought to be a gift from God, its people chosen out of the stream of history. As a product of God's doing, one of the indispensable facets of exceptionalism comes to the fore: greatness. Evangelicals, along with other Americans who espoused such ideas, were convinced and constantly trumpeted the "greatness" of the United States. The vague notion of greatness was, of course, among other things, a moral assertion. The plasticity of greatness, the fact that is never grounded as a concrete term, allows for a whole host of subtle ideas to be transmitted to the reader or listener. The source of American exceptionalism was, to the evangelical mind, God, but the intent and import of such an assertion was to position the United States, vis-à-vis other nations, other people, in a place of superiority.

In a very similar fashion, in 1958, Graham gave a sermon that evoked the same ideas, though in slightly different terms; he preached, "Our Father and our God, we thank Thee tonight for America and for the faith of our fathers that made this and all of its liberties possible."³³ Again, Graham moved to establish God as the primal cause of the United States. Here, Graham also says something slightly different: he ascribes to Christianity, to faith itself, awesome powers of creation. It was Christian belief, the "faith of our forefathers," that had extended to the United States its greatness, its power, its prosperity, its freedom. Graham discreetly weaved, into the mind of his listeners, the idea that, through Christianity, one would not only find salvation, but an unending source of worldly treasures.

³² Graham quoted in Steve Bruce, *Pray TV: Televangelism in America* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 82.

³³ Billy Graham, *The Handwriting on the Wall* [Sermon], video, 1958, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MirmwuqPeCQ>.

For Graham, the United States, in addition to being founded at the behest of the Creator, its people chosen from amongst the nations of the world, enjoyed a special favor with God. In 1949, at an evangelistic crusade in Los Angeles, California, Graham employed characteristic rhetoric. “And I believe that God loves America, I believe that God loves Los Angeles,” said Graham adding that the United States was “built upon the principles of the Word of God.”³⁴ In another sermon Graham gave before 1950, “America’s Hope,” which can be found in a collection of sermons published entitled *The Early Billy Graham: Sermon and Revival Accounts*, the young evangelist professed, yet again, the same belief. “America,” informed Graham, “has been a land of religious freedom; a land of law and justice; a land of revival; a land whose foundations rest upon the Bible.”³⁵ Though in a slightly different way, Graham relayed the same message, namely, that the origin of the United States, was something holy and that this origin was the cause of his country’s strength, the force of its seemingly implacable rise as a world power, as a land of prosperity. In Graham’s thinking, in his theology, “America” itself becomes a concept, one that conveys, when used by evangelicals, distinctive and historically charged meanings. “America” *qua* concept was intermingled with the concept of “chosenness.”

Of course, Graham was not the only evangelical to see the United States awash in roseate and edifying hues. Many evangelicals writing in *Christianity Today* reproduced the same ideas, attempting to establish, in the heart and in the mind, the sanctity of the American political, social, and economic system. Hoover provides us with an excellent example. In his article “Soviet Rule or Christian Renewal?,” from 1960, where he lays out the extreme alternatives with which the United States was said to be facing, he stated, in the same glorious overtones as Graham, “A God-centered nation, ever humble before the majesty of the divine creator, can keep alive freedom, justice, and mercy. This is the heritage of America.”³⁶ According to Hoover, and in keeping with the predominant evangelical understanding, the heritage of the United States was its connection with the Christian God. This special relationship provided the United States with a unique destiny, with the role of preserver of all things good, the protector of freedom.

One editorial from 1964, as a final example, fleshed out the idea of the United States’ destiny more explicitly, giving divine sanction to its historical role in the world:

³⁴ Billy Graham, “Amos the Hillbilly” [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Los Angeles, CA, 1949, <http://billygraham.org/audio/amos-the-hillbilly/>.

³⁵ Billy Graham, “The World’s Darkest Hour” [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Charlotte, NC, October, 18, 1958, <http://billygraham.org/video/the-worlds-darkest-hour/> Charlotte, North Carolina October, 18, 1958.

“America’s freedom and power,” the editorial argued, “are providential gifts for the preservation and promotion of human liberty.”³⁷ Here, we see reinforced the idea of the United States chosenness, its special election. Once again we are given a glimpse of what we have mentioned before: the belief that the divine hand of God reached into the stream of history singling out the United States amongst all the nations in the world. Not only did evangelicals introduce God, in the form of a *deus ex machina*, as an explanation of American power, they moved to sanctify the actions of their country, ascribing to themselves a divine mission. In such a frame of mind, what the United States—the guardian and promoter of human liberty—was doing in the world was supremely good, beyond reproach or critique.

Ultimately, and above all, in the scheme of Christian salvation, it remains to be seen out of what necessity American chosenness was born and later continued by twentieth-century evangelicalism. With the salvation of the eternal soul in mind, which heretofore has figured as the central tenet and guiding belief of Christianity, the attachment to notions of a chosen nation, a new Israel, strikes one as entirely superfluous. We may say that there was a desire, amongst evangelicals, for the United States to be seen and understood in a certain way. Evangelicals, in the years that followed the Second World War, were not only spreading the Gospel of Christ, they were also spreading and advocating for the acceptance, among their adherents, among those who might be listening, of certain ideas concerning the United States. With respect to evangelicalism in our period of study, it is a fundamental mistake to consider the idea that the United States was founded by God, was somehow chosen, was the physical space of a new covenant, was forged in the holiness of the Bible, as a belief to be counted among others, simply an addendum to the evangelical’s creed. That is, this thought should be considered ideologically, as the first step in a certain movement or process of ideological thinking. Nor can it be considered in isolation. By this we mean that the assertions that evangelicals maintained about the United States cannot be fully understood until they are brought into connection with what evangelicals had to say about the tumultuous times in which they were living. Only through fully establishing the ideological character of contemporary evangelicalism, will we be able to consider what implications might be brought to bear on identity.

³⁶ J. Edgar Hoover, “Soviet Rule or Christian Renewal?” *Christianity Today*, November 7, 1960, 11.

Decline, Decadence, Decay

In the preceding section we dealt with what one might call the central premise, which formed the foundation of the evangelical ideology. Now we must bring into consideration what evangelicals had to say about the moment in which they were living, the world that was coming into being in the period between 1945 and 1981. More important than the idea evangelicals tried to install in the hearts of their followers concerning the American past, was the commentary that evangelical's ceaselessly provided regarding their contemporary age. It is in this period, in these times, that evangelicals adopted an additional role, beyond that of earthly bearers of Christ's Gospel: they became prophets of doom, rhetoricians of decline. As many evangelicals saw it, almost all realms of life, all areas of human existence, were entering into a process of crisis, decay, decadence, decline.³⁷ The frequency with which the evangelist availed himself of these concepts, of the terminology of crisis and declension, demonstrates the quivering depths of their unrest. Or, in it, we see the intensity of their desire to impose upon the believer such ideas. The sheer ubiquity of such terms in both *Christianity Today* and in Graham's sermons and addresses speaks to a situation in which crisis, decay, decline begin slowly, in their overuse, to become meaningless.³⁸ Around the evangelical sophistry of decadence, a decadence that they argued was poised to destroy the United States, there floats a certain aura, a tangible mystique; in the repugnance of decay there is a forbidden and foreboding attraction. In may be that a degree of the evangelical fascination with decay and dissolution was wrapped up in the fact that, according to Blücher, there existed a certain pleasure in pessimism.⁴⁰

Whether or not this form of pessimism does indeed provide one with pleasure, the rhetoric surrounding decay and decadence, became a powerful tool in the hands of the American evangelical. And the warnings of doom, issued time and again by evangelicals, have not gone unnoticed by scholars. The findings of these men and women lend credence to the assertion that despair itself, a new gospel of undoing, became an essential aspect of

³⁷ "From the Tumult to the Task," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 20, 1964, 32.

³⁸ Balmer acknowledged this aspect of evangelicalism, albeit in a highly simplified and understated way, calling the rhetoric of evangelicalism in this period "a cry of frustration," *Blessed Assurance*, 108.

³⁹ In conceptual history, this overuse of a term and the meaningless that can accompany this practice is referred to as the "whiting out of meaning." Koselleck, Melvin Richter points out in an article, has already identified the possibility of such an occurrence in connection with the overuse of the concept *Krisis* [crisis], which Koselleck explored in the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, "The Concept of Despotism and L'abus Des Mots," 10.

⁴⁰ Heinrich Blücher, "Myth and the Artist: Reasons for Thinking and Buddha," [Lecture] Bard College - Annandale-On-Hudson, NY, n.d. <http://www.bard.edu/bluecher/listen.htm>. Stern, writing at the beginning of the

American evangelicalism. In McLoughlin's 1960 biography of Graham, he plainly states, "In every sermon he stressed the same notes of fear and anxiety. 'Tonight,'" McLoughlin cited the evangelist, "'this world is in fear. Tonight this old city is fearful...in Europe everyone knows that war is coming—war is inevitable...They know the atomic bombs are going to start dropping...'" Far more than Moody or Sunday [other American evangelists], Graham assumed the role of a prophet of doom."⁴¹

Hedges, in *American Fascists*, identified the spirit of despair permeating both evangelicalism and American society:

This despair does not always arise out of severe want, the kind of want that plagues much of the developing world, or out of the immediate threat of war, but rather is the product of the disconnectedness and loss of direction that comes with living in vast, soulless landscapes...where centers of existence and meaning have been obliterated. It is a response to a national malaise. This despair has created, perhaps more than any other force, the opening for these option visionaries.⁴²

Hedges argued that a general decline in American society, the undermining of meaning, was the stage upon which the evangelical appears. It was in such a meaningless world, a world without a stabilizing center, that the evangelical was summoned. For Hedges, the evangelical, in essence, was responding to an almost unbearable situation, reaching in and saving those fixed in despair's invisible jaws. "They [evangelicals] seek meaning out of meaninglessness," said Hedges, "worth out of lives they felt worthless."⁴³

Let us consider for a moment another scholar, Jason C. Bivins, a professor of religious studies at North Carolina State University, who has also written about evangelicalism, which he described, in his 2008 book *Religion of Fear: The Politics of Horror in Conservative Evangelicalism*, as a "political religion."⁴⁴ Throughout this work, Bivins demonstrates how, in the service of this political religion, many evangelicals throughout the United States pander a religion of fear, which seems to relate, at least on the surface, to the idea of the evangelical as the prophet of doom. What figures most prominently in Bivins' account of American evangelicalism is the frequent and often

1960s, also saw this strain of pessimism in the United States: "Cultural pessimism has a strong appeal in America today," *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, xxii.

⁴¹ McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 50.

⁴² Hedges, *American Fascists*, 49.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴⁴ Jason C. Bivins, *Religion of Fear: The Politics of Horror in Conservative Evangelicalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8.

grotesque religious imagery of Satan and his minions, hell and its torments, sin and its horrific and holy punishment. While Bivins acknowledged the fact that “the fearful and demonic have surfaced regularly [as themes] in American religion,” the author perceived, in evangelicalism, a growing intimacy with and attraction to fear and destruction, which he designated as the “erotics of fear.”⁴⁵ The erotics of fear, a term Bivins coined to draw out this essential aspect of evangelicalism, is defined as “the desire for or fascination with that which is condemned or consigned to the realm of darkness and demonology.”⁴⁶ Ultimately, Bivins’ focus rests on the traditionally religious categories of hellfire and Satan, which stretch the fabric of reality into Manichaeian poles of darkness and light.

What Bivins sheds light on, concerning American evangelicalism, was and is a vital aspect of this religious movement; it is decidedly not what we are concerned with here. Instead, we will hone in on the evangelical’s overwhelming and ever-increasing preoccupation with the supposed decline of the United States, the dissolution of this entity. It was a rhetoric of fear born out of and exclusively concerned with the political and social happenings of the United States. In contradistinction to Hedges, we do not see the despair that characterizes American evangelicalism simply as the inevitable outcome of what Hedges denotes as a culture of despair, an unfortunate byproduct of a society unloosed and without moorings. We will come to see that the evangelical himself was not simply one besieged, at every turn, by the alleged meaninglessness of the world, but was also a manufacturer of despair itself, the bearer of a mesmerizing and enthralling new message of destruction. Nor do we consider the evangelical’s message of decline as an isolated occurrence, which seems to be McLoughlin’s position, i.e., that Graham was simply a prophet of doom. Rather, we view the ever-renewed thought of “crisis” as a turn of events that must, if it is to be understood, be brought into relation with the evangelical’s thinking about the past and considered as a component of the evangelical’s ideology.

Having examined some of the ideas that scholars have put forth regarding the atmosphere of despair surrounding American evangelicalism, we are prepared to consider more closely how this was manifested in the evangelical movement of the Cold War. What is clear, in the period between 1945 and 1981, was that evangelicals decided that American society had become unspeakably decadent, and there arose, from various quarters of American evangelicalism, a chorus that sang of the coming decline, the expectations of

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

doom. The common thread that runs through all of these utterances was the general idea that, in the United States, a reversal was taking place, a frightful and dangerous departure from the historical essence of the chosen land was being carried out. The evangelical, we have seen, maintained the presupposition that the United States had been chosen, that its power, economic prosperity, and military capabilities were divine instruments, used in the accomplishment of some divine mission. In our primary sources, most concretely in *Christianity Today*, we find a plethora of these statements of despair. Indeed, we can say with confidence that, through the evangelical's actions and words, almost all aspects of life in the period between 1945 and 1981 would be singed with the searing brand of decadence.

In 1970, for example, an article by Robert J. Lamont painted a bleak picture of his country and identified the pessimism in his midst, bemoaning, "Everywhere the prophets of gloom and defeat are raising their voices."⁴⁷ Many of the voices that Lamont heard were from the growing evangelical community. An editorial in 1968 warned with starkness, "The age of innocence in America is past. The acceleration of degeneracy in the public and private lives of Americans shows itself in increasingly bitter disunity and in devil-may-care attitudes toward morality and law."⁴⁸ The result of the increasingly lax attitude of Americans towards questions of morality, the editorial prophesied, meant, "America may have passed her peak and begun to decline as the moral and political leader of the world."

The events surrounding 1974, with the turmoil of president Richard Nixon's resignation, moved the editors of *Christianity Today* to write, "The turn of the year finds North America courting despair. Too much has been happening," the editorial deplored, "Our consciences are being drained of sensitivity."⁴⁹ The editorial continued:

Problems in the Middle East and the apparently consequent energy crisis compound our gloom. A major depression may ensue with widespread unemployment and perhaps an increasing crime rate. What is infinitely worse, we could be plunged into a nuclear war over oil...Today the threats to our quality of life, even existence, come from an unprecedented number of different sources.⁵⁰

The most disconcerting factor, which was threatening Americans' quality of life, the editorial imparted to the evangelical readership, was the "ideological vacuum" dominating

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴⁷ Robert J. Lamont, "Another Look at the American Dream," *Christianity Today*, April 24, 1970, 6.

⁴⁸ "Has America Passed Her Peak?" [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 1, 1968, 28 [552].

⁴⁹ "The Hope of the Hour," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, January 4, 1974, 30 [406].

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

the American scene. “There is currently *no* movement,” said the editorial, “capturing the imagination of those who have the power to mold if not control society...We are left with a sobering question: Can or will evangelical Christianity rise to the challenge, or will it let itself be numbed by the surrounding adversity. If true believers do not seize the initiative,” the piece presaged, “the ideological vacuum will be filled by some alien influence. The opportunity will not be with us very long, for nature abhors a vacuum. Would-be messiahs will surface soon and take over the cultural leadership.”⁵¹ Once again, falling back into the emotionally arousing rhetoric of war, the editorial concludes, trying to stamp upon the mind the urgency and vital importance of its idea, “The great battle today, after all, is the battle for the mind.”⁵² In the tenebrous landscape of societal collapse, with this particular editorial, we find illuminated the very telos of the evangelical ideology. The battle was for the mind; evangelicals needed, at the behest of the editorial, to fill the vacuum with an ideology of their own making; the molding and control of society, in contradistinction to the gift of eternal salvation, and the rise of evangelicals to cultural leadership, were all the ultimate ends of contemporary evangelicalism in the United States. While the editorial urged fellow evangelicals to seize the opportunity, exerting influence on the trajectory of society, it was in the end, as Arendt so perceptively pointed out, the mind—one’s thoughts and feelings—that was to be arrested and controlled, molded and reforged. It was not a vacuum in the world outside, but the vacuum slowly expanding in the secrecy and unknown inner life of men and women that was so to be filled, brought into conformity.

Graham, as McLoughlin indicated, also participated, with great finesse, in this rhetoric of despair. In a sermon from 1958, wherein he reverses much of his usual laudatory words about the United States, Graham warned, “But we today are a pagan and heathen country. We are away from God, living on the very brink of hell itself, living on the brink of annihilation.”⁵³ The idea that is set up is one of departure, the United States was moving away from the place of its essence. In the sermon “America’s Hope,” Graham rejected the plausibility of destruction through communism, attributing the dangers apparent in American society to an internal process of corrosion. “America’s greatest enemy is not the ‘hammer and sickle.’ America’s greatest enemy,” Graham revealed, “is the internal decadence that is causing us to rush faster than any civilization before us toward destruction

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, 31 [407].

⁵³ Billy Graham, “The World’s Darkest Hour” [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Charlotte, NC. October, 18, 1958, <http://billygraham.org/video/the-worlds-darkest-hour/> Charlotte, North Carolina October, 18, 1958.

and hell.”⁵⁴ Let us momentarily consider the object of Graham’s perceived decadence? Was it the soul? Was the individual the one who stood atop the precipice of hell ready to cast himself into its fiery abyss? For Graham, as well as for other evangelicals, the principal fixation was on the United States, on its triumph or decline, its continuance or its melting away.

At other times, while persisting in the mental category of decadence, some evangelicals gave voice to ideas that seem to serve no other purpose than that of creating a concrete feeling of alarm. Graham, in 1960, while attempting to elucidate the obstacles to the bringing about of a spiritual awakening in the United States, entered into, as he almost always did, a commentary on world affairs, saying, “The world is facing the greatest crisis in modern history, a fanatical madman is in control of a nation [presumably the Soviet Union] that could destroy civilization. I’ve been on the phone to some of my friends in Washington,” said Graham never divulging his sources, “and I’m informed that several government leaders are expressing concern privately that Russia may press the button [to launch nuclear weapons] this summer.”⁵⁵

Another example of this alarmism was given by *Christianity Today* through an advertisement from the American Board of Missions to the Jews, which asked in 1961, unrelated to its purported goals, “Are you prepared for the Atomic Bomb? Are you ready for mass destruction? Is the smash-up of civilization ‘just around the corner?’ Is there a way out? The Bible has the answer.”⁵⁶ In both of these examples, we are confronted with a new aspect of evangelicalism’s culture of despair: the evangelical as expert. Evangelicals presented themselves, alongside their pronouncements of decline, as uncanny experts, holders of secret knowledge, and equipped with hidden answers. The threat of imminent destruction was often proffered together with a remedy. In evangelicalism, in such instances, the religious leader becomes not only a guide in spiritual matters but a uniquely privileged and specially anointed commentator and actor in the affairs of the world.

Despite the fact that, as we have already alluded to, evangelical denominations and individual evangelical churches associated with evangelicalism enjoyed an abundant and dazzling growth—a fact that evangelicals often greeted with boundless joy—the state of

⁵⁴ Billy Graham, “America’s Hope,” [Sermon] in *The Early Billy Graham: Sermons and Revival Accounts*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland Pub., 1988), 21.

⁵⁵ Billy Graham, “Stumbling Blocks to Spiritual Awakening” [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Miami, FL, 1960, <http://billygraham.org/audio/stumbling-blocks-to-spiritual-awakening/>. FitzGerald quotes a sermon from the 1949 crusade in Los Angeles in which the evangelist employs similar tones of apocalypse and fearmongering, see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 174.

⁵⁶ “Pre-Millennial? Post-Millennial?” [Advertisement] *Christianity Today*, December 8, 1961, 35.

Christianity, to many of these particular Christians in this period, was one of disarray; for them, it was another manifestation of an alarming process of decay, which was already making headway. The general mood of the church and the happenings of American society, such as the growing trend of secularization, moved some evangelicals to wonder with consternation if their country was entering a post-Christian period. Crisis, in short, had become ecclesiastical and theological. Once again, the notion of a departure from the essence of the United States comes to the fore. The title of one editorial from 1962, “Hope in a ‘Post-Christian Era,’” sheds light on the fear that the United States was drifting into dangerous and uncharted waters. The editorial demonstrated the dichotomy that evangelicals were attempting to inject into the societal discourses: the dichotomy of a formally Christian nation abandoning the wellspring of its truth, its collective identity.⁵⁷ One of the causes of this post-Christian transformation was, the same editorial proposed, the appearance of non-Christian sects: “...the wavering phalanx of Protestantism has been beleaguered by the astounding growth of the so-called ‘sects.’ Our country has itself made room for over 200 of these aberrant denominations...”⁵⁸ Another example of the frightening belief that the United States was entering a period of deracination, in terms of religion, comes to us from Edmund W. Robb, a Methodist minister in the wealthy oil town of Midland, Texas. In an article from 1965, Robb asked somewhat regretfully, “Is the decline of the Church inevitable? Are we truly entering a post-Christian period? Is the Christian church really unable to reach an affluent, sophisticated, and materialistic society?”⁵⁹

Perhaps the most frightful occurrence for evangelicals, and, in a way, the clearest evidence of decay in the church, was the direction some so-called liberal Christians were taking theology. Long pervaders of the Social Gospel,⁶⁰ liberal Christians were moving to a realm of thought, in the 1960s and 1970s, where evangelicals simply could not follow. As the title of one editorial suggested in 1965, modern liberal theology was at the end of its tether.⁶¹ Theological developments such as the Death of God school,⁶² which theorized, as the name suggests, that God was dead, absent from the world, scandalized evangelicals. For

⁵⁷ The notion of a post-Christian United States was also a prominent feature in Francis A. Schaeffer’s 1969 *Death in the City*, a series of lectures delivered at Wheaton College that had, by 1972, entered its fifth edition. Schaeffer, an important figure in the evangelical movement, spoke often of the United States’ abandonment of its heritage and the dawning of the post-Christian era, see Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, 11, 14, 15, 37, 67.

⁵⁸ “Hope in a ‘Post-Christian’ Era,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, August 3, 1962, 20.

⁵⁹ Edmund W. Robb, “Effective Evangelism,” *Christianity Today*, April 23, 1965, 8 [764].

⁶⁰ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 29-30.

⁶¹ “Modern Theology at the End of Its Tether” [Editorial] in *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank E. Gaebel (New York: Meredith Press, 1966), 186-193.

⁶² Charles Boleyn, “God Is not Dead!” *Christianity Today*, December 17, 1965, 7 [1295].

example, F. B. Huey, Jr., an assistant professor at a Baptist seminary, wrote that the Death of God theology was a form of rebellion.⁶³ Evangelicals took all of these new trends, these new fads in theology, as irrefutable evidence of a decline in the church. “There is no doubt,” wrote Graham in 1968, “that secularism, materialism, and even Marxism not only have invaded the Church but deeply penetrated it.”⁶⁴

The growing trend towards secularism in the United States—a subject we have touched upon briefly—most notably in the removal of religious ceremony and regalia from public schools, was yet another manifestation of, to the understanding of evangelicals, the depths of the American decadence. Graham expressed his view that the American Union was drifting away from its religious heritage, an occurrence that would have its climax in utter catastrophe. “...Unless we bring Americans back to awareness of God’s moral laws,” Graham was quoted as saying in *Christianity Today* to over 100 members of the House and 50 senators in 1960, “unless the spiritual fiber of character is put back into the structure of our nation, we are headed for national disaster.”⁶⁵ The masquerade of the United States’ doom, looming just above the horizon, was highly favored by Graham; it was used constantly as an inducement to conversion. At the same time, the role of Christianity in American life was placed furtively into the sphere of necessity. But this was no longer the historical and traditional necessity of freedom and deliverance from sin and its eternal reach. Now, Christianity, evangelicalism, was necessary for the survival of the United States.

Despite the fact that secularism, theological infighting, and political uncertainty all fueled the fire of despair that evangelicals were kindling, the changes taking place in the realm of human sexuality proved to be an area of greater disconcertion for these American Christians. We will address the subject of sexuality in a more direct fashion elsewhere, but we might remember that the years that followed the Second World War marked a new direction in the discussion and thinking about the use of the human body, its relation to society, and the body as symbol and depository of historical constructed meanings. From the beginning of the twentieth century, Freudian theory slowly trickled into the United States, assaulting the mind and sensibilities of many with new ideas concerning human behavior

⁶³ F. B. Huey, Jr., “Obedience—A Neglected Doctrine,” *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1968, 6 [374]. For a more general and extensive condemnation of trends in liberal Protestant theology see Carl F. H. Henry, “Where Is Modern Theology Going?” *Christianity Today*, March 1, 1968, 3 [527]-4 [528]; see also Billy Graham, “False Prophets in the Church,” *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1968, 3 [371]-5 [373].

⁶⁴ Billy Graham, “False Prophets in the Church,” *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1968, 3 [371].

⁶⁵ Billy Graham quoted in “Graham Crusade Stirs National Capital Area,” CT News, *Christianity Today*, July 4, 1960, 31. The notion of the United States’ holy and Christian foundations was also transmitted through the idea that Christianity had given the world freedom, that freedom, the great American virtue, was only possible through Christianity. See Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, 15.

and the unrevealed desires of the human subconscious. The Kinsey Reports, published in 1948 and 1953, dealt frankly with issues that previously had been somewhat taboo.⁶⁶ Marital relations and homosexuality were touched upon; human sexuality was represented through a new understanding.⁶⁷ The report presented human sexuality as a spectrum as opposed to some true path of nature from which none could deviate. These scientific approaches to the question of sexual relations began to gain ground against long-respected and theologically infused paradigms. Not only were there groundbreaking alterations in sexuality as a subject of inquiry, the 1960s and 1970s were decades of rapidly changing social and sexual mores. In response to the changes taking place in the United States, evangelicals issued numerous warnings and denouncements of the way in which human bodies were being used and the categories that were used to understand them. From what the eyes take in, in the case of pornography, to the expression of one's gender identity, all were issues of pressing importance in evangelicalism, and evangelicals cleverly crafted them as stations along the Republic's road to perdition.

After a trip to Moscow in 1959, Graham, in a piece in *Christianity Today*, expressed his view that, in the United States, "...sensuality and immorality...seem to be engulfing us as a nation."⁶⁸ Charles E. Fuller (1887-1968), a well-known American evangelist, especially for his evangelical radio programs, portended, in 1959, the beginnings of a cycle of decay, stemming from the spread of what he believed to be sexual immorality. "There is a moral declension evidenced on every hand in America," wrote Fuller in our source *Christianity Today*, "The predominant emphasis upon sex in literature, advertising, family relations, the avarice exhibited in love of money and position, the indulgence in ease, the dependence upon the state paternalism for security, all reveal the weakening of the moral fiber of this nation."⁶⁹ An editorial from 1965, "Facing the Tide of Obscenity," voiced similar concerns, couched in the same language of destruction. "The decline of decency imperils wide reaches of modern culture and life. We are headed for doom unless pervasive immorality is arrested."⁷⁰

The evangelical's rhetoric of decline was a resurrection of the organic metaphor and Bell, with whose words we are already acquainted, entered, while dealing with the subject of

⁶⁶ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 923; Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 67, 82-83, 114.

⁶⁷ Eric Marcus, *Making Gay History: The Half-Century Fight for Lesbian and Gay Equal Rights* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 21.

⁶⁸ Billy Graham, "Impressions of Moscow," *Christianity Today*, July 20, 1959, 15.

⁶⁹ Charles E. Fuller, "God's Mercy in an Age of Change," *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 13.

⁷⁰ "Facing the Tide of Obscenity," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, April 9, 1965, 29 [729].

sexuality, into this biological category.⁷¹ Halfway through the year of 1959, Bell issued his censure against the licentiousness, which he felt to be rampant in contemporary American society, “Untreated cancer almost always means death to the affected individual...Sex obsession is a moral and spiritual cancer which has fixed to destroy us as surely as untreated cancer destroys human life. It is the promotion of, acquiescence in, and submitting to this godless concept of life that is destroying America.”⁷² In the article “A Moral Counterattack,” Joe E. Trull, a professor of sociology in Tennessee, writing in 1965, weighed in on the debate raging in the United States with regard to how the human body was used. “One does not have to be a prophet to discern the disintegration of mores in our nation,” observed Trull.⁷³ “A return to the Christian ideal in sex relations is a second phase of the counterattack necessary for a victory in this moral war.”⁷⁴ Steeped in the imagery of warfare, attacks and counterattacks, victories and defeats, and, of course, moral corrosion, Trull ultimately concluded, “the transformation of the individual is central to this moral counterattack.”⁷⁵ With Trull, as with others, we see that the body itself, as well as gender and sexuality, were conceived of not as the private domain and affair of the individual but as public acts in a societal drama, as performing some social role. What the evangelical viewed as a sexual sin was not merely a demonic blot on the soul of the offender; it imperiled nations and had the power to undo empires.

Enmeshed with the issues surrounding sexuality was homosexuality, and its gradual acceptance or toleration in some segments of American society, which began to take place towards the beginning of the 1960s. To evangelicals, such a change in attitudes towards homosexuality was yet another sign that society was disintegrating, that the continuation of the American Republic was imperiled. Due to the complexities involved with the emergence of the homosexual and evangelicalism’s response, we will return to this issue in Chapter IV.

During the Cold War, in close conjunction with the subject of homosexuality and alongside the vast upheaval and anxiety of the period, there emerged a palatable tension regarding masculinity, which deserves to be examined. The United States had experienced, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, the cultivation of certain programs and narratives of acceptable manhood.⁷⁶ Though it was in the upper echelon of American society

⁷¹ For more evangelical examples of decline see Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, 15, 21.

⁷² L. Nelson Bell, “The Bible and Sex Education,” A Layman and his Faith, *Christianity Today*, June 8, 1959, 19.

⁷³ Joe E. Trull, “A Moral Counterattack,” *Christianity Today*, May 7, 1965, 9 [821].

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 10 [822].

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 17-18.

that “imperial manhood,” as the historian Robert Dean called it in his 2001 study of gender and Cold War foreign policy in the United States, first began to assert itself, these conceptualizations of proper manliness would eventually enjoy greater circulation in the wider American culture.⁷⁷ Notwithstanding the fact that the expression of this manhood varied among different socioeconomic classes, the underlying values and ideals were the same.⁷⁸ The gradual fabrication of these standards of manliness were carried out primarily through various institutions: the strict education of elite boarding schools, rituals of hazing and peer subjugation in such schools, fraternities, Ivy League universities, men’s clubs, and alumni organizations.⁷⁹ Additionally, the spread of organized sports served to reinforce and perfect the masculine education one received in these social institutions. Organized sports were a means of disseminating these values beyond, what Dean describes as elite, “patrician” institutions, to the awaiting masses. Achievement in this realm was and continues to be seen as an auger of coming triumphs. The physical strain, the participation in sanctioned and codified violence, and the potential bodily harm—even death—were viewed by many as purificatory, turning the body away from the slovenly and “feminine” pleasures of modern life and preparing it for the trails of future duty and sacrifice.⁸⁰

Though not novel, another emblematic and vital aspect in the creation of the twentieth-century’s manly ideal in the United States was participation and heroism in war.⁸¹ John F. Kennedy, with his military exploits in the Pacific Theater during World War II, used and circulated the tale of his heroism as the crowning symbol of his virtue and masculinity when he eventually turned his ambitions to politics.⁸² Likewise, Lyndon B. Johnson, transformed and employed “his brief exposure to battle” during the Second World War into an indelible aspect of his *Selbstdarstellung*, his self-presentation.⁸³ War, and the hero worship that often accompanies it, was one of the most valued social and political currencies in the United States. In this these discourses of war and heroism power can be displayed, relations of power can be established, and institutionalized power can be achieved.

As Dean shows in the aforementioned study, many of the men in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, especially those men in charge of foreign policy as

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 17-35.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 29-31.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 37-62.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 43-49.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 52.

the Cold War intensified, came from this milieu of imperial masculinity.⁸⁴ To offer a single example, three top advisors to the Kennedy administration—Dean G. Acheson, John J. McCloy, and Robert A. Lovett—had participated in the requisite rights and ceremonies that were thought to be essential in forging the ideal American man. Their prominent roles in the “foreign policy establishment” demonstrate the worth American society attributed to these values. The process of creating a certain collective masculine identity, which had begun, as we said, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the values that accompanied this process, prospered unchallenged until the 1950s and 1960s.⁸⁵

Despite the apparent solidity of this version of masculine self-understanding for much of the twentieth century, the Cold War was the moment of its gradual unravelling, it was the ground of increasing anxiety regarding sexual and gender relations,⁸⁶ the space in which what scholars of gender and sexuality call hegemonic masculinity was challenged.⁸⁷ Challenges to the masculine ideal, both in its popular conceptualization and its elite elaboration, came from numerous fronts, which are beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, we will briefly pursue one of these sources of anxiety here as it is illustrative of this historical epoch and it ties into the topic of homosexuality, which we will turn to in the final chapter.

During the Truman administration, the United States was thrust into the chaos of another Red Scare (the first having emerged in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution and various incidents in the United States).⁸⁸ Conservative congressman attempted to politically undermine the Truman administration by charging that its policies were ineffectual and that it was weak in the presence of communism’s growing power. Not only was the government of the United States weak abroad, many charged, but was being crippled and subverted at home.⁸⁹ The fear of subversives and communist sympathizers was almost immediately connected to the issue of homosexuality and was wafted into what is referred to by historians as the Lavender Scare.⁹⁰ Many of the men leading the witch hunt for communists in the United States argued that homosexuality, especially homosexuals in government

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 9-16, 62-64, 170.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁸⁷ For more on the concept of hegemonic masculinity, that is, the dominating and predominately accepted mode of masculinity, see: Mark W. Muesse, “Religious Machismo: Masculinity and Fundamentalism,” in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 1996), 93, 95, 99.

⁸⁸ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 795-797; Robert McDaniel, *Dying for Joe McCarthy’s Sins: The Suicide of Wyoming Senator Lester Hunt* (Cody, WY: Wordsworth, 2013), 145-151.

⁸⁹ Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 63-69.

positions, was a unique threat, which was intertwined with the internal and external danger of communism. The homosexual, in his person, these men affirmed, was subverting the “natural” order and perverting the moral fiber of the nation just as the communist, with his or her ideology, was “polluting” the political order. Communism, just as with homosexuality, was a disease.⁹¹ Simple comparisons were drawn between the rumors of clandestine communist operatives and the withdrawn, secretive, and shadowy world in which the homosexual was forced to live.⁹² Because homosexuals were argued to be soft, morally weak, it was thought that they were uniquely susceptible to the seduction of communist ideology and were, therefore, a national security risk.⁹³ So, too, were they open to blackmail. The secret of their deformed and degenerate nature, which in the 1940s and 1950s was jealously guarded from a disapproving society, it was thought, could be used by communists as leverage against them. Those who perpetuated the Lavender Scare did not rest at mere allegation or alarm but endeavored to produce suitable and visible victims, living sacrifices to their ideas and their longings. This was achieved, from 1947 to 1953, through a series of purges in which some four hundred State Department officials were fired or forced to resign for what Dean describes as “real or imagined homosexuality.” In 1953, the efforts to root out homosexuals were intensified by Republicans, producing hundreds of more victims.⁹⁴ In April of that year, President Eisenhower participated in the Lavender Scare by creating additional barriers for homosexuals through the Executive Order 10450, which listed “sexual perversion” as a disqualifying factor for government employment.⁹⁵

At times, as evidenced by letters to members of congress leading the anticommunist and anti-homosexual purge, the fear of sexual depravity, registered greater angst in the American public than the thought of communist sympathizers.⁹⁶ The expulsion of homosexuals impacted a far greater number of people than the hunt for communists.⁹⁷ And the effort to ferret out sexual “perverts” fostered an atmosphere of shame and distress that resulted in numerous suicides.⁹⁸ The underlying basis of the homosexual purges, and the Lavender Scare that made them possible, was, of course, animosity towards homosexuality in general. Alongside this animus and anxiety, there was an antagonism and abiding

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 65; McDaniel, *Dying for Joe McCarthy's Sins*, 151-167; Marcus, *Making Gay History*, 80, 84.

⁹¹ John M. Murrin, et al., *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, 923.

⁹² Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 64-69.

⁹³ McDaniel, *Dying for Joe McCarthy's Sins*, 160.

⁹⁴ Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 66.

⁹⁵ McDaniel, *Dying for Joe McCarthy's Sins*, 166.

⁹⁶ Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 80.

⁹⁷ McDaniel, *Dying for Joe McCarthy's Sins*, 152.

⁹⁸ Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 166; McDaniel, *Dying for Joe McCarthy's Sins*, 239.

resentment towards the wealthy, well-educated, and powerful elite of American politics, on the part of Republican congressmen who hailed from humbler origins.⁹⁹ Thus the charge of homosexuality constituted a social condemnation as well as a political weapon of defamation. This nuance of the Lavender Scare—class struggle—is outside the framework of this dissertation.

The scourge of these purges, still fresh in the American mind, gave way to new anxieties concerning masculinity. Despite the fact that evangelicals were not directly involved in the purges of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the issues of gender, masculinity and its qualifying aspects, as well as homosexuality, in various regions of American culture during the Cold War, were intimately tied to the birth of the evangelical movement in two principle ways, as it coalesced in the post-war years.¹⁰⁰ First, we find in our primary sources a sustained attempt to delineate the confines of proper masculinity and to construct the ideal American male. Second, we discover, amongst the evangelical faithful, the same fears of masculine decline, the anxiety of resolute and virtuous American man's dissolution, which were being voiced in various quarters of the American Republic. The question of gender, as we have seen, had become bound up in politics, foreign policy, and a source of debate and uncertainty in American society in general. Thus, the assertion that the evangelical movement in the United States was one of cultural separation—evangelicals were *in* this world but not *of* this world—and politically neutral, claims supported by evangelical and scholar alike, begins to lose credibility as we see the evangelical inextricably drawn into this Cold War pattern and participating, reproducing, the various discourses on gender, which were circulating around American society.¹⁰¹

The supposed decline of and dangers to American masculinity, which evangelicals began to articulate, fit in seamlessly with the rhetoric of decline that had become an undeniable staple of American evangelicalism in the Cold War period.¹⁰² In *Christianity Today*, we see this attempt to sketch, for the reader, the beatific vision of the masculine ideal. In one instance, the vision was transposed to the context of the nation. An editorial

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 72-75, 122.

¹⁰⁰ For more on evangelicalism's preoccupation and attempt to control gender and sexuality see: John C. Fout, "Policing Gender: Moral Purity Movements in Pre-Nazi Germany and Contemporary America," in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Westminster John Know Press: Louisville, KY, 1996), 112-113.

¹⁰¹ On American evangelicalism's supposed apoliticism and cultural separatism see Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right*, 2; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 92; Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, xvi; Balmer, *Blessed Assurance*, 96.

from 1959, a contemplation on the Resurrection of Christ and its relevance to modern life, celebrated American vigor, connecting it to world dominance and power. “The United States,” informed the editorial, “young and virile, has come to world prestige and power.”¹⁰³ Despite the youth and virility of the United States, a source of pride for evangelicals, the editorial warned, that these attributes alone could not ensure the safety and wellbeing of their nation. “But storms of judgment,” said the evangelical oracle, “will overtake any culture or nation which disregards the incarnation, the atonement, and the resurrection of Jesus, the axis of human history...This message alone has the power to rescue a pagan, perishing generation from the dregs of certain doom.”¹⁰⁴

In the well-known sermon “The Sin of Tolerance,” also from 1959, Graham offered a contrast to the once historical, manly American male, and in bringing forth these undesirable, indeed sinful traits, he conveys with determined flair the idea that men in the United States were not what they once were. “...Over-tolerance in moral issues has made us soft, flabby, and devoid of conviction,” Graham observed.¹⁰⁵ Incidentally, during his presidential campaign in 1960, Kennedy played on the same anxiety surrounding a weakening masculinity in the United States,¹⁰⁶ even decrying that Americans had “gone soft—physically, mentally, spiritually soft.”¹⁰⁷

Softness and flabbiness were, of course, a regrettable departure from the brawny tension of what, in the evangelical’s eyes, a man should be. A letter to the editor of *Christianity Today* from 1960 communicated the selfsame sentiment, expressing at once the idea that American men, in more joyous days, were admirably intrepid and strong, and that, now in the second half of the twentieth century, the United States was in the midst of a destruction of virility, a process of emasculation. The letter, a denunciation of American Catholicism’s inroads in American politics and the supposed intrigues of Rome, lamented that, formerly, Protestants “were purer and more virile in our convictions,” and therefore might have confronted more forcibly Catholicism’s affront.¹⁰⁸

The attention paid to masculinity, by evangelical men, as was the case with images of war and capital, eventually spilled over into the evangelical’s relation to and

¹⁰² While the obsession with masculinity was a dominant feature of evangelicalism during the Cold War, it extended beyond the Cold War period and up to the present. Balmer explores this with the evangelical male organization Promise Keepers, see *Blessed Assurance*, 84-92.

¹⁰³ “The Resurrection and Modern Life,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 16, 1959, 20.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Billy Graham, “The Sin of Tolerance,” *Christianity Today*, February 2, 1959, 4.

¹⁰⁶ John F. Kennedy quoted in Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 180.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹⁰⁸ “Papacy and Politics,” Eutychus and his Kin, [Letters to the editor] *Christianity Today*, January 18, 1960, 16.

understanding of God. God made man was the ultimate screen upon which to project evangelical angst and desire surrounding the question of gender. God incarnate was the perfect figure to use for the purpose of reassuring themselves of the validity of stereotypically and rarefied masculine qualities and Christ was made, at the touch of the twentieth-century evangel, an *exemplum divinum* of masculinity. The virility of Jesus Christ became, in this period, a cliché to be formulated and promoted over against the mystery of a God taking human form, a selling point that attested to the authenticity of Christian belief. In McLoughlin's biography of Graham, he quotes the evangelist as speculating, "Christ was probably the strongest man physically that ever lived. He could have been a star athlete on any team. He was a real man, with his strong shoulders, His squarish jaw..."¹⁰⁹ The author offered no comment or insights as to the possible meaning of such imaginings.

In a sermon in 1958, Graham was drawn by his excitement at the physical form and budding prowess of the Savior¹¹⁰ a step further in his erotic depictions of Jesus of Nazareth:

I can follow that Christ. I can believe in that Christ. I can make him my pattern and my ideal. I'm not believing in some sissy. I'm not believing in some effeminate character, I'm believing in a real he-man, a real man who had a square jaw and strong shoulders. I believe that Jesus Christ was the most perfectly developed physical specimen in the history of the world. He never had sin to deform his body. His mind was perfect. His nervous system was perfectly coordinated with the rest of his body.¹¹¹

The fascination with masculinity in American Christianity is not altogether new. Preston, for example, in his previously mentioned work, pointed out, in the context of the Spanish-American War, which took place at the end of the nineteenth century, that there was a "renewal of muscular Christianity, an assertive, sometimes aggressive religious outlook that did not compromise or retreat."¹¹² Preston went on to say, "Coinciding with the nation's

¹⁰⁹ Graham quoted in McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 90.

¹¹⁰ Christianity, as the historian Peter Brown shows in his study of early Christianity, has long had focus on the human body, see Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), *passim*.

¹¹¹ Billy Graham, "The Problems of Youth" [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Birmingham, AL, 1972, <http://billygraham.org/audio/problems-of-youth/>. For a similar sermon from Graham see McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 127. For an attempt to make of Jesus a masculine ideal in *Christianity Today* see Norman V. Hope, "Was Jesus Meek and Mild?" *Christianity Today*, November 22, 1968, 7 [159].

¹¹² Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, 207. For Hedges' treatment of the problem of masculinity in evangelicalism see Hedges, *American Fascists*, 73-94.

imperial turn and first foreign war of humanitarian intervention...American clergy invoked a Christ who was literally muscular, ready to battle for the cause.”¹¹³

From the evangelical’s conjectures about the waning virility of the American male and the attempt to transform their God into a hyper-masculine ideal, something more speaks to us. We see in the ubiquity—there can be no doubt that this is a predominant feature of evangelicalism—and character of such utterances the idea that the question of who man was became not a question related to being or becoming but something fixed, an ideal to which men must humbly submit themselves, and one that the evangelical was willing to impose. The ground of the evangelical’s thought on the subject was not a mental space coinciding with who one is, but, rather, a principal of subjugation¹¹⁴ One’s identity as a man now rested on faulty ground.

What we have seen in this section was the tendency, amongst evangelicals, to frame so many disparate events into a seemingly inescapable process of decay. The organic wasting away, which evangelicals argued to be afflicting the world, dealt almost exclusively with the United States. It was the American Republic that evangelicals felt to be melting away, withering in the heat of change. Yet, there was more to such an occurrence. Once again, we encounter the object of the evangelical’s obsession, the secret locus of their longing and their faith. We see now more clearly than ever that notions of decline, the Gospel of Decay, were not a mere theological contrivance. Evangelicals were not only concerned with rebirth, with spiritual conversion, with the salvation of the soul. The continuance of the United States becomes the principal aim of evangelicalism, the subject of so many commentaries and warnings, the topic of numerous predictions of destruction. As such, the evangelical’s rhetoric of decline emerged in a distinctly political and a markedly temporal context.

The Gospel as Synthesis

Up until this point, we have examined two phases of the evangelical ideology: first, the fabrication of an idealized past; second, the attempt to plant into the minds of many the

¹¹³ Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*), 207.

¹¹⁴ With exceptions, evangelicalism’s elaboration of a collective masculine identity corresponds to the prevailing hegemonic masculinity of the Cold War era, most importantly it is a form of control where gender roles, relations, and sexuality are brought under strict vigilance and regimentation, an idea explored in Muesse, “Religious Machismo: Masculinity and Fundamentalism,” in *Redeeming Men*, 92, 94, 100.

idea of decadence, of impending doom, which, for the evangelical, exemplified a departure from the foundations and the true path of the United States, from its true collective identity.

The collective identity evangelicals were developing through ideology moved, in almost all instances, in the pathways of personal identity. Woven into the very fabric of denunciation, into the woeful lamentations of moral decline, the loss of faith, the discourses and strictures regarding sexuality, as well as the attempt to erect and impose a particular masculine ideal were ensconced old and new relations of power, ways by which evangelicals attempted to bring the lone individual, battered by the rapidity, uncertainty, and change of the modern world, to heel.¹¹⁵

Evangelicals used the concept of “decline,” and other interchangeable concepts related to it, to impart the sentiment of a moving away from something, an abandonment of the American *Sonderweg*. While prospects of doom and decay may prove initially attractive for the millions of faithful, the crowds of new converts, stealing momentarily one’s attention and resonating on primal levels with individuals, they were not effective tools in and of themselves. The endpoint of ideology must hold a promise, must shine with the luster of restoration, and must reestablish an iron order. We see in *Christianity Today* and in the figure of Graham that the evangelical ideology was always moving *beyond* mere flights of pessimism. Despair was not some evil and horrid end but the beginning, a threshold into a new age, a new moment in human history. The evangelical’s Cold War lament, the decades in which they warned of ruin and decay, did not end with the final thought of the world’s ultimate corruption or an overriding sense of hopelessness. The evangelical’s sentiment of horror vis-à-vis the present was not the result of a millenarian political theology, preaching the forlornness of the world and its inhabitants. Their ideology, taking into consideration its final step, its synthesis, lacks all the familiar garb of otherworldliness. Instead, the so-called age of decadence was nothing but a prelude to the evangelical’s earthly utopia of rebirth, of transformation in which the United States returns to itself, to its foundations.¹¹⁶ The new kingdom they presaged was one in which the chosen would rule.

¹¹⁵ Scott understands gender as a socially constituted way of “signifying relationships of power” Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” 1067.

¹¹⁶ In Stern’s history of the politics of cultural despair, prior to the rise of the Third Reich, he demonstrates that the pessimism of the present moves oftentimes beyond a mere cry of resignation. Stern finds in Paul de Lagarde, one of the expounders of cultural despair in Germany of that period, evidence that, wrapped up with this lament, there was a clear and easily identifiable position regarding the ideal state of the world—how the world should be. Stern writes, “But Lagarde sought to be more than a prophet of doom. He believed in a rebirth of Germany and he sought to bring to his people the vision of a Germany reborn,” *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, 3; see also 152.

Between pessimistic prophecies, evangelicals provided men and women with a glimmer of hope and presented themselves as bearers of a powerful and mysterious antidote for the poison taking effect on the world. In this period, the Gospel itself, faith and salvation, the very purpose of religion, would become, for evangelicals and for those whom they converted, the remedy for all of life's problems. Above all, the Gospel of Christ was offered up as the only path to salvation for the United States. Only the Gospel could rescue a nation that had become increasingly, to their eyes, pagan and wayward; only they, evangelicals, could save, not the soul, but men and women from utter doom, from themselves. Only evangelicals could restore the image of a fractured identity.

Evidence of this shift from the Gospel of salvation to a nostrum by which to achieve the deliverance of the United States, the safeguarding of masculinity, the pushing back of the flood waters of sex and filth, can be found in both of our historical sources. Before exploring the numerous examples of this process of synthesizing the gospel, converting it into a means to ends other than the soul's salvation, it is best to begin with a notable and noble exception, which came from evangelicalism itself. Robert Paul Roth, writing in *Christianity Today* in 1959 on the subject of pastoral care, said something entirely unique and which counteracted, at least in this one instance, the trend of contemporary evangelicalism. "We must never seek to control, have power over or even influence," urged Roth, "for to do so is not to know our neighbor but merely to name him, and it is not to love our neighbor but merely to use him."¹¹⁷ Roth goes on to warn and to denounce communications techniques, which work through manipulation and seek to direct individuals and society.¹¹⁸ Despite the fact that Roth's renunciation of attempts to influence others, to control them, was mentioned in the context of pastoral care, his dictum has a wider applicability. This particular evangelical, at this moment, did not understand his role as a religious being as one of exerting controlling others. For Roth, to participate in such activities was to enter a relationship that was profoundly inhuman. We might conclude from Roth's words that evangelicalism could be nothing more than salvation itself, the salvation of the soul, a pervasive intentionality towards the eternal. For evangelicalism to promise something else, for it to seek to influence or have power over the nation marked the beginning of the flight from the centrality of Christianity's message. Evangelicalism, as an ideological movement, seeks to move itself into a position of control, a place of power. We find in Roth evidence of the wide spectrum that was American evangelicalism, but, more to

¹¹⁷ Robert Paul Roth, "The Consolation of Israel," *Christianity Today*, March 2, 1959, 4.

the point, we find one evangelical who directly undermined the direction of this outwardly religious movement.

In Roth's statement, there is a sort of isolating loneliness, for all around him evangelicals were zealously participating in the activities, which he had decried. Alongside Roth, there were of course others; but his renunciation of influence and power over others stands coldly and singularly alone. Naturally, one of the most fantastic and colorful examples of transmogrifying the purpose and end of religion, and of attempting to influence others through fear and thereby bring them under control, can be found with Hoover. Extremity and doom were the general drift of Hoover's speech in this evangelical publication. Hoover, during his tenure as the director of the FBI, was perhaps one of the most committed American public officials to the cause of anticommunism. Through his directives, the FBI was an integral component in the purges of alleged communists and homosexuals carried out by McCarthy and other Republic congressmen. Hoover kept dossiers on unorthodox individuals and political opponents, spied on suspected subversives and those who deviated from sacred sexual norms, and, finally, blackmailed individuals within the government in order to utilize them as informants.¹¹⁹ The Director also used the Bureau to continually and aggressively squash any malign rumor uttered as to Hoover's homosexuality, which, we are well aware, was at the time closely associated with the political sin of communism.¹²⁰ In light of Hoover's activities, it was altogether unsurprising that the FBI director would employ some of the most fantastic and vivid language in his crusade to defeat communism. "The Communists," Hoover maintained in October of 1960 in *Christianity Today*, "are today spraying the world with ideological and propaganda missiles designed to create a deadly radioactive cloud of Marxism-Leninism. From bases behind the Iron Curtain and in the non-communist world, this cloud of communist propaganda is drenching many lands, with a particularly heavy fall-out in this nation."¹²¹ Having brought the mind of the reader to the bleak, desert scene of nuclear destruction, Hoover informed his public that the radioactive cloud of his imagination was primarily aimed at American Christianity. "No assignment," said Hoover, "is more strategic in the communist world today than the disruption of the Church of God..."¹²² Thus, Hoover deduced, "The pulpit is today one of America's most formidable barriers against

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

¹¹⁹ Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 72, 79, 97, 101-103, 105, 108, 110, 123-124, 126, 154-159.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 156-158.

¹²¹ Hoover, J. Edgar, "Communist Propaganda and the Christian Pulpit," *Christianity Today*, October 24, 1960, 5.

communism.”¹²³ The director of the FBI continued his counter-propaganda campaign, saying that communism was a “deadly plague which threatens to extinguish our way of life.”¹²⁴ “Have you, as a minister,” asked Hoover to his Christian brethren, “preached any sermons describing the frightful challenge which communism poses for the spiritual heritage of America?”¹²⁵ With this article, we encounter themes with which we are now familiar: organic concepts slipping silently in, the ruse of utter destruction pornographically displayed before the reader, the divine, spiritual heritage of the United States solemnly invoked. But, here, something subtle occurred, which might pass before us almost unnoticed, like the inconnu rushing by on a busy metropolitan street. The pulpit, urged Hoover, the Christian Church, was charged with a new mission. This entity was now a barrier against communism, its purpose was the conquest of communism, which in turn would bring into existence the triumph of the American way of life. Far from shying away from such a role, evangelicals unquestioningly inserted this position in one of their principal intellectual publications.

In another article, from the same month, Hoover once again reinforced his conviction that Christianity was vital in the final judgment and defeat of communism. Hoover first reminded evangelical readers of communism’s monstrous visage. “The rejection of God gives communism a demonic aspect,” Hoover wrote, “transforming it into a fanatical, Satanic, brutal, phenomenon.”¹²⁶ Not only was communism of the devil, those who aligned themselves with this ideology, according to Hoover, were not human, could not be counted as members of humanity. “He [the communist] is truly an alarming monster, human in physical form, but in practice a cynically godless and immoral machine.”¹²⁷ “If,” Hoover explained, “communism is to be defeated, the task must rest largely upon the theologians and the ministers of the Gospel...’Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and his righteous,’” Hoover spiced the article with a line wrenched from the Bible, “In this way you [the American citizen] will be playing the vital role in helping defend our cherished way of life.”¹²⁸ Though no theologian, Hoover expounded, in a more explicit way, upon his understanding of the use of religion. In the hands of Hoover, and evangelicals were of course accomplices in this transformation, the seeking of God was no longer for the sake of

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ J. Edgar Hoover, “The Communist Menace: Red Goals and Christian Ideals,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 4.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* See also Charles Malik and Carl F. H. Henry, “A Civilization at Bay,” [Interview] *Christianity Today*, November 24, 1961, 7.

God, the search for His kingdom, no longer to enter into its goodness, righteousness was not sought because *dignum et iustum est*. The very purpose of faith itself in this new conceptualization was that it was an instrument with which to do battle with the foes of the passing moment—in this case, with communism.

J. Howard Pew (1882-1971) was a distinguished Presbyterian layman, and in the 1940s, the president of Sun Oil, a massive petroleum and petrochemical corporation.¹²⁹ In the person of Pew, we see the great variety of evangelicalism's composition. Evangelicalism counted among its faithful some of the most influential and wealthy of American society, which belies any claim that this was a religion of economically marginalized American citizens. Pew, though an example of the variegated economic constitution of the emerging evangelicalism, interests us for another reason, namely that he shared Hoover's transformative vision of Christianity as the means through which communism would ultimately be destroyed. In 1962, Pew observed, "During the last 50 years, the church has increasingly become involved in social, economic and political affairs. And is it not true that during this period the spiritual and moral life of our nation has deteriorated to a frightening degree?"¹³⁰ Then, in the next breath, contradicting himself by propositioning the church to confront and destroy the political, social, and economic force of communism, he shared, "I believe that the church is the only institution that can save this country from communism. The reason for this is quite simple," Pew argued with exacting logic, "Communism is atheistic; the Church is Christian."¹³¹ With Pew, we are confronted with more of the same: the preeminent importance of accomplishing a specifically mundane task through Christianity.

Faced with threats such as communism, as well as those harbingers of decadence evident in so many areas of American life, one editorial from 1962, tried to strengthen the evangelical resolve, breathe new life into the struggle that evangelicals were waging: "Evangelicals are no longer on the defensive. They are aggressively at work on all sides. At the same time their spirit is irenic. Willing to engage in conversation no less than in open battle, they are determined to *occupy* until the Lord comes [*italics original*]."¹³²

Those evangelicals aggressively working to expand their ideology found new ways to present their faith and new ends to which evangelicalism might be used, new promises of the power of Christian belief. The promise of evangelicalism as a solution, as a remedy of

¹²⁹ Kruse, *One Nation Under God*, 16.

¹³⁰ J. Howard Pew, "Calvin's Influence in Church Affairs," *Christianity Today*, May 11, 1962, 10 [770].

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 11 [771].

decay, extended beyond the question or possible dangers of communism. In an article written towards the end of the decade of the sixties, William J. Martinset presented readers with a catalogue of the many possible uses of belief in God, of adherence to the Christian faith. Through evangelicalism, and only evangelicalism, as this was the only branch of American Christianity, according to the previous editorial, that was “Championing the authority of the Scriptures [and] witnessed boldly against theological compromise,”¹³³ one could enjoy privileged access to “prosperity,” “freedom from want,” “freedom from decline,” “freedom from the fear of death,” and “freedom from insecurity.”¹³⁴ From Martinset’s litany, the soul and its salvation are absent. Who would deny the desirability of such promises, their universal attractiveness? But in them, do we not see, once again, hints of a new direction? In Martinset’s declaration that evangelicalism could stave off decline especially, we see the culmination of the evangelical’s ideology, where a departure from the wellspring of American power, an abandonment of the United States’ Christian foundations, precipitates a decline, a decadence, whose only remedy was to be found in the bosom of evangelical Christianity. In this way, evangelicals present their religion in the framework of worldly salvation and enter the opium den, with its intoxicating fumes, of the triumph of a certain aspect of the world, a certain way of life.

In the article by Edmund W. Robb, which we saw earlier, we find another example of the Gospel divorced from its original purpose. “Alcoholics can be made sober, prostitutes made pure, materialists made spiritually minded, sick personalities made well; broken homes can be restored, and wrecked lives can have a new beginning in Christ,” wrote Robb in 1965. “Our faith to obtain life-changing power must pass from the psychiatrist’s couch to the alter of prayer.”¹³⁵ It was life-changing power—what this power was to be used for was left obscure—in the present after which the evangelical lusted.¹³⁶

Another way that the Gospel was presented as the synthesis of the evangelical’s ideological thinking, as the final step in their logical line of thought, was through the notion that a spiritual revival, a reformation, a national rebirth, was paramount to the maintenance,

¹³² “The Evangelical Offensive in Contemporary Life,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, January 5, 1962, 26.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ William J. Martin, “The Shepard Psalm: Patterns of Freedom,” *Christianity Today*, March 15, 1968, 15 [591].

¹³⁵ Edmund W. Robb, “Effective Evangelism,” *Christianity Today*, April 23, 1965, 8 [764].

¹³⁶ Balmer identified this trend in American evangelicalism between 1945 and 1980, remarking that evangelical groups offer “a cornucopia of special-interest and support groups catering to the personal needs of congregants. Religion in this narrowed context becomes a form of therapy and a vehicle for self-improvement,” Balmer, *Blessed Assurance*, 7.

furtherance and ultimate triumph of the United States.¹³⁷ In Fuller's article from 1959, which we examined previously, we find one such example. "Unless this nation repents," Fuller said, both as a threat and as a prophecy, "the judgment of God is sure to fall...I pray that God in his goodness may bring about a genuine old-fashioned revival, such as has occurred at times in our nation's history, so that our country may contrive to enjoy his blessings."¹³⁸ In Fuller's ultimatum—the bitter choice between destruction or salvation—it can be seen that a return to faith, a spiritual renewal, was not viewed by him in terms of duty to God, but as a method, an instrument, with which the United States might continue to enjoy heavenly blessings. With such blessings, we are, of course, already familiar: prodigious wealth, the highest standard of living in the world, and power—all gifts from God.

An editorial from the same year also illustrates the popularity and seductiveness of linking a revival, a return to the biblical foundations of the United States as a requisite for temporal survival. "But storms of judgment," the editorial thundered, "will overtake any culture or nation which disregards the incarnation, the atonement, and the resurrection of Jesus, the axis of human history...This message alone," the editorial concluded, "has the power to rescue a pagan, perishing generation from the dregs of certain doom."¹³⁹

The next year, in 1960, an editorial entitled "The American Malaise," sang of the same existential alternative: destruction or salvation through evangelicalism. "We need, in fact, a fresh approach to American history if we are going to recreate a sense of American purpose," the editorial surmised, indicating that, for some, a sense of purpose was lacking. "Christians," the editorial proceeded, "believe that allegiance to God is the only foundation of national loyalty that he himself will honor. A revival of spiritual values by the turning of our people to the truth as it is in Christ is the one sure, effective, continuing way to stop the deadly attrition of the American malaise."¹⁴⁰ "And he who would offer a prescription of national purpose for America," the editorial advised, "must first listen to her heart. The heart of America is still as sound as oak, but her blood stream is being invaded by the toxins of secularism."¹⁴¹ Also in 1960, a contribution by the respected evangelical Ockenga, re-echoes the belief and explained the purpose of the contemporary Christian revival. To Ockenga's understanding, "the world is helpless in the presence of its problems."¹⁴² The only recourse for the helplessness of the world, the gradual paralyzation of men and women, Ockenga

¹³⁷ For an echo of the call in evangelicalism see also Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, 11.

¹³⁸ Charles E. Fuller, "God's Mercy in an Age of Change," *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 13.

¹³⁹ "The Resurrection and Modern Life," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 16, 1959, 20.

¹⁴⁰ "The American Malaise," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, June 20, 1960, 21.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

said, was a revival. “He [the evangelical] intends that Christianity will be the mainspring in many of the reforms of societal order.”¹⁴³ The nature of such a societal reform was left unanswered. Instead, it was the idea of reform, the promise of something new and transformative, which resembled in the mind a millennial kingdom, that was vastly more important than a detailed explanation of how, for what, and for whom, Christianity would reform society.

“Nations,” said Bell, spinning his theory of history at the beginning of 1973, “rise and fall primarily because of what they do about God. Civilizations have come and gone, not because of outward attrition, but because of internal disintegration, the neglect of spiritual and moral values because men knew not God or the saving power of his son.” Bell, like his fellow evangelicals, set up Christianity as an imperative, not as a means to avoid damnation but to perpetuate a specifically American civilization.

Turning to Bell’s son-in-law, we find in this American evangelist, the same arguments and urgings, and in similarly strident and eschatological tones. Between the radiant light of the American past and the decay of the present, a new way was said to be opening up. Evangelicals believed that they had divined an arcane truth that could fill the void and the empty, which was growing at the center of society. Only they, beneath the guise of God and faith, could save a sick and dying world. Graham in an article from 1969, wrote in *Christianity Today* that many in the United States were operating under the illusion that “democracy can survive without a religious faith,” by which he meant evangelical Christianity.¹⁴⁴ Not to heed Graham’s suggestions, to ignore his historical “truth,” was to allow the unabated continuance of a growing abyss in the form of “total secularism and total materialism,” which “will lead ultimately,” Graham foresaw, “to suppression and dictatorship.”¹⁴⁵ In the United States of 1969, Graham informed his reading audience that there was a “danger of losing confidence in ourselves as a people,” and, also, that “Something very dangerous is happening: a vacuum is developing in philosophical America.”¹⁴⁶ Having sketched the dangers of the times, Graham proceeded, following the pathways of his own dialectic, to prescribe the antidote, to offer the treatment that would save the United States. “What we need most in America today is a revitalization of Judeo-Christianity. Without that renewal, without a revitalization of the Church, the educational

¹⁴² Harold John Ockenga, “Resurgent Evangelical Leadership,” *Christianity Today*, October 10, 1960, 14.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Billy Graham, “Three American Illusions,” *Christianity Today*, December 19, 1969, 13-14 [261-262].

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 14 [262].

system, the government structure, and the mass media, our survival as a free democracy is, it seems to me, improbable.”¹⁴⁷ Survival itself, the perpetuation of the American Republic was, through Graham’s understanding, tied to evangelical Christianity. In a sermon in 1958, Graham stated with identical urgency, “The greatest need in America tonight is a return to a faith in God, a spiritual awakening, young people by the thousands marching under the banner of the Lord Jesus Christ.”¹⁴⁸ Such a revival would spare, Graham opined, the United States of the wrath to come, the death which accompanies societal decay.

During the Cold War, a time of heightened tensions, where the threat of destruction loomed always in the national consciousness, and was, as we have seen, exacerbated by the words of leaders like Graham, who offered vague and unqualified assurances of eventual oblivion, peace was a much desired state, a long-hoped for goal. But peace, the object of so many people’s desire, was only to be achieved, preached Graham, through a triumph of the evangelical movement, through the conquering Christ. In 1949, Graham told the audience, “We’re never going to have world peace until Jesus takes over and declares the peace.”¹⁴⁹

If peace was not an individual’s most pressing problem, Graham, and other evangelicals, had, in the Gospel, the solution to every possible concern—the Gospel was, in short, the remedy of remedies. Here, we begin to see faith as a solution not only to the decadence of the United States but to all possible personal problems. “Yes,” Graham said in the same sermon in Los Angeles, California in 1949, “Jesus has the answer to all of our problems.”¹⁵⁰ Graham continued, listing some of the problems that Jesus might put right:

The Lord Jesus Christ has the master key. I don’t care what your problem is. Some of you have marital problems tonight, you’re not getting along in the home—Jesus has the answer to that if you’ll turn your life over to him. Some of you have sin, some of you have disappointment, some have tragedy, some have pain in business, some are poverty-stricken, some have financial difficulties. I don’t know what your problem is tonight but I know one thing: the Lord Jesus can solve it.

In another sermon from 1958, Graham, playing on the *anomie* of modern life, said, “There’s the loneliness of society. There’s the poor creature that is living in a tenement in New York tonight...you never receive a letter,” Graham continued, painting the picture of

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 14 [262].

¹⁴⁸ Billy Graham, *The Handwriting on the Wall* [Sermon], 1958, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MirmwuqPeCQ>.

¹⁴⁹ Billy Graham, “Life’s Greatest Choice” [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Los Angeles, CA, 1949, <http://billygraham.org/audio/lifes-greatest-choice/>.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

one's hypothetical loneliness, driving home the pang of one's despair and isolation, "you never hear a word of encouragement, you never know the handclasp of a friend...Some of you living in the midst of the big city are lonely tonight. There's an emptiness in your heart."¹⁵¹ Faced with such loneliness, such alienation, Graham provided, predictably, the solution: "He [Jesus] can be with you in your loneliness."¹⁵² Through Graham, we see mirrored on the individual level, what evangelicals promised for the United States: escape from decay, personal and earthly salvation, not of the soul, but from the problems, frustrations, obstacles, and perplexities of one's life.¹⁵³

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To conclude this chapter, it is important to remind ourselves that evangelicalism was a growing phenomenon in the United States from roughly 1945 to 1981; it was distinctly a church of converts—mention of this has been made. But to what where these American men and women converting? Was it a purely religious conversion, simply a matter of faith? The answer is that it was also ideological; that which "called" men and women was the power of a certain *Weltanschauung*, it was Christianity as worldview.

In this chapter, we have traced the architecture of evangelicalism's ideology. As we have said, this ideology begins with an assumption about the past: the chosenness of the United States, its special place in the Lord's historical machinations. With extreme indulgence, scholars have entertained this idea as a thing that, in actuality, occurred, a belief to be counted amongst others, as opposed to a concoction brewed in the Puritan mind. This idea, which evangelicals inherited, marked the starting point of ideological thinking. But even here, with such an idea, we see the beginnings of a transformation. In this "belief," it appears as if the sole purpose of Christianity's emergence was to eventually bring into existence the United States. Christ's appearance in the world was nothing more than a setting in motion of events from which the American Republic would ultimately issue. In the

¹⁵¹ Billy Graham, "The World's Darkest Hour" [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Charlotte, NC. October, 18, 1958, <http://billygraham.org/video/the-worlds-darkest-hour/> Charlotte, North Carolina October, 18, 1958.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ FitzGerald is well aware of Graham's approach to or presentation of Christianity as a mere solution to earthly problems. She eloquently writes of Graham, "On some evenings he spoke about the problems of the modern condition—emptiness, loneliness, guilt, nervous tension, and the fear of death—offering a decision for Christ as [a] cure for every benighted soul," FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 196. The renowned Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, FitzGerald notes (see 204), leveled, in a quite devastating way, this critique against Graham

framework of Christian belief, it should be mentioned, the strivings for and ambitions of chosenness surface as entirely superfluous. Faced with the prospect of eternal life, of salvation, what need was there for a chosen nation?

Of all the aspects of the evangelical ideology, the ephemera of decadence, the conjuring of decay, was perhaps the most important conceptual turn, for it was a mold into which all things might be poured, a rhetorical device of universal applicability. The ominous threat of decadence was said to encompass all realms of life, all occurrences were visible manifestations of a process of decline beleaguering the United States and its people. Always and everywhere, decline as such dealt with society, with politics, in short, with the world. It was the American way of life, a term often invoked, that was in danger of perishing. In the evangelical's ideological schema, the flowering of decadence was considered a departure from the United States' historical and favored relationship with God, an abandonment of this country's source of truth and power. The importance of the expansive rhetoric of decay can also be found in the power that such thoughts have. In this form of pessimism, these continued cries of despair, alarm sets in, the prospect of ending, of a disastrous catastrophe, takes hold of and alters the mind. What emerges, when the mind is bathed, day and night, with the waves of despair, was a growing necessity, a need to escape, to pause the coming decline.

Evangelicals presented themselves and their religion as the necessary means of survival, as that much desired avenue of freedom. It was through faith itself that worldly redemption could be effected. In the final step of the evangelical's ideology, evangelicalism emerged as a necessity in and of itself, not for its promises of eternal life, but for its power to restore to the United States its former glory. Once again, we see the evangelical's resolve in transforming the Gospel, which they bore, into a tool, an instrument with which to achieve the consummation of their desires. Evangelicalism's power to save the United States from its descent into decadence was also extended to the lives of individual men and women. Evangelicals presented their faith as a solution to all of life's problems. In this, too, we have discovered something of import. In evangelicalism, after the Second World War, to what extent was Christ the Savior, to what extent was he merely a solver of the problems, which might be confronting men and women in the United States? With Christ the problem solver, with evangelicalism presented as the solution to societal decline, to national decadence, this particular faith, to adherents and to converts, become everything, that is, that

in the 1950s. Neither FitzGerald nor Niebuhr, it seems, saw in this, in Graham's evangelistic work, a radical and

through evangelicalism, any need could be met, any desire fulfilled. Through the sieve of ideology, the Gospel becomes whatever one wants it to be, its nature and purpose entering a permanent state of flux.

In the evangelical ideology, where the God of universality and transcendence, the God whose image is said to be reflected in all men and women, we see that this entity was slowly metamorphosed into a national idol, or a satisfier of personal hopes, a meager fixer of problems. What remained was not faith as we normally understand it. What remained was only the belief in one's own goodness, an undeniable, inextinguishable, and unquestioning faith in the veracity and benevolence of one's principles. Such is the way of all ideology. What the evangelical promised through faith in God, the eternal sustainer of the American economy, was not even the redemption of the world, which would have been nice enough, it was the triumph of one aspect of it, the glorification and expansion of one ideal.

As a final word, it might appear that we have lost sight of the question of identity, moved far from our original path. In actual fact, we have been moving at its very center. The nexus of identity and ideology may at first strike one as implausible, as strange. We would do well to remember that ideology cannot itself work upon the world, bring about change. For Arendt, the aim of ideology was not the physical transformation of the world. This was beyond the horizon of ideology. Instead, for her, ideology aims at transforming human nature itself. As such, ideology moves with identity in the most intimate of ways; it lays hold of people, of who they are. One's thoughts, one's feelings, one's comprehension of the world are the ultimate point upon which the evangelical ideology seeks, implacably, to converge. Men and women's thinking and sentiments about the past and the present, one's country and the events of the world, were to be molded, directed, recreated. Personal identity was to be born again through evangelical directives. Beneath the promises of worldly transformation, of national salvation, and a reversal of the process of decay, was the effort to take hold of, as Arendt so perceptively understood, the inner life. Once identity becomes a function of ideology, once identity is subject to the ideological movement, once one is taken away from oneself and brought into conformity with this message, the transformation of the world can begin.

III

The Evangelical and Action

...is man a being that can make a beginning?

—Heinrich Blücher¹

In the years that followed the Second World War, that to which American men and women were converting, that which also, apart from faith in the Christian message, captured their hearts and minds, was an ideology. It was a system of thought that could superficially explain all occurrences and was believed to convey to the world a certain salvation, an escape from the macabre monstrosity of decay, of which the evangelical had become a consummate purveyor. The points around which ideology hinged were the inner life of men and women, their personal identities, the intersecting lines of who there were and who they might become. Masculinity and the construction of the masculine ideal, to take one example, was a way in which the collective evangelical identity moved in the very midst of the personal.

But evangelicals, in this period, were not exclusively concerned with the elaboration of their ideological tools, with the creation of the mental space necessary for a certain collective identity to flourish. Something of paramount importance was taking place in the midst of the question of What can one *do*? It was also upon the ground of human action that evangelicalism was playing itself out. There the question of collective and personal identity was given yet another manifestation. The literature dealing with American evangelicalism is mostly silent on this point. Not even considered as a question, the possibility of evangelicalism's unfolding emergence in the realm of action escapes us. Action became, in the evangelical movement of the Cold War, a subject of discourse.

Twentieth-century evangelicalism's multifaceted origin, which also appeared around this question, primarily unfolded in two ways: first, the nullification, at least theoretically, of the possibility of acting at all; second, a detailed and constantly expanding codex of how to act, what to do—in short, a “complete map of life” of which, to us, Bauman has spoken.

¹ Heinrich Blücher, “The Age of Paper,” [Lecture] Bard College - Annandale-On-Hudson, NY: n.d., <http://www.bard.edu/bluecher/listen.htm>.

Arendt in a general way and not in relation to American evangelicalism, as we saw in the first chapter, firmly established the connection between identity and action. Action, she believed, along with speaking, was the principal means by which identity is revealed to the world. Through acting, the perceptibility of who one is comes to the fore. Thus, in accepting Arendt's position, our fleshing out of the theme of the evangelical and action involves, on a fundamental level, identity, which for us stands as the vital center of contemporary evangelicalism.

Yet here, on the subject of action, her thinking did not rest. Instead, throughout her thinking life, Arendt brought what action was into question. One of Arendt's fundamental propositions confronts us with its haunting simplicity, namely, that men and women are capable of acting at all. "We are *free*," said Arendt in *Crises of the Republic*, which was published in 1972, "to change the world and to start something new in it."² To Arendt's mind, action stands always before us in permanent and challenging confrontation. We already find ourselves in the presence of Arendt's principal understanding of action: the idea of action as beginning. So fundamental and integral for human existence is the faculty of action that Arendt connected it to birth itself, to the undeniable and irrevocable facticity of natality, whereby one's very appearance in the world heralds the coming of new things, bright and promising horizons, and is a sign of the possibility that one may breath, into the world, a fresh spirit. Arendt was moved to this judgment, at least in part, by St. Augustine. In *The Human Condition*, first published in 1958, Arendt cites Augustine: "(Initium ergo ut esset, creates est homo, ante quem nullus fuit) ('that there be a beginning, man was created before whom there was nobody'...This beginning," she went on to say, "is not the same as the beginning of the world, it is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner himself, with the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world..."³

By way of Arendt's thinking, we have seen the bonds between identity and action, action's integral importance for human beings, and action as a force of creative possibility in

² Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, 5.

³ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 177. The fullness of Arendt's thinking on the subject is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Arendt brings up many points concerning this human faculty that seem relevant to the emergence of contemporary evangelicalism. On the contingency of action, the fact that one is never master of his acts, see *Ibid.*, 235. Regarding the fact that action always occurs in a "web" of human relations, she writes, "The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of relationships which exists wherever men live together. The disclosure of the 'who' through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through action, always fall in to an already existing web where their immediate consequences can be felt," *Ibid.*, 183-184. Of the frustration with action, which results from these situations, a frustration Arendt felt to be growing in the modern world, see also Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, 180.

the realm of politics;⁴ there is a final reason what our brief aside with Arendt will prove useful. While Arendt's thinking about action helps us clarify and bring into perspective a subject that generally passes unnoticed, escaping contemplation; it also serves as a vivid and striking contrast to the predominant evangelical belief about what one can do. If, with the guidance of Arendt, a world of infinite possibilities opens up, with evangelicals, the world collapses in on itself. Action disappears from the horizon like the permanent setting of the sun.

Action and its Nullification

In the historical moment with which we are concerned, the period between 1945 and 1981, we find evangelicals doing a very significant thing: they set about, as we have already indicated, attempting to convince themselves and those who might be listening, that human action was not possible, was no longer available to us as a way to bring meaningful change into the world. To the world of the living, the evangelical sang that action was stillborn.

In our source *Christianity Today*, we are shown time and again this at least theoretical withdrawal of the possibility of acting. Often, and we have seen this already, the evangelical publication made preparations for this withdrawal by describing the contemporary situation in which men and women had been hurled as one so menacing and ruled by nefarious, autonomous powers that the ability to do anything, evangelicals hint at, was excluded. An editorial from 1968 described the times in the following way:

He [contemporary man] is caught in the whirlpool of existence, cast about by blind chance. He knows not where he came from or where he is going. He peers out into a world that has no purpose; he lifts his eyes to a sun that blinds him and he huddles in a darkness that offers him no protection from a multitude of enemies.⁵

Evangelicals went beyond painting an anarchic picture of contemporary life, a picture dominated and absorbed by helplessness and chaos. They set about to explicitly deny the possibility of acting in the world. In 1964, an editorial illustrated this belief to perfection. "Gone," the editorial bemoaned, "is the optimism that we can eliminate crime from our streets, and greed and hatred from human hearts. Gone is the cheery hope that the future is

⁴ Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, 82.

⁵ "Man Without God," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, December 6, 1968, 23 [224].

ours to shape.”⁶ “History,” the editorial definitively proclaimed, “is now showing what Christianity has long asserted—that man’s most critical problems are greater than he can handle.”⁷ In this editorial, we hear a clarion voice saying that not only was action no longer a part of being human, that it was precluded by external events, but that humans have never been capable of it, men and women’s freedom to act has always been and forever will be an illusion. The future, the evangelical advocated to the faithful, with all of its constraining implications, serving to deepen feelings of despair, was not ours.

A celebratory editorial on the subject of the successful Apollo 8 mission took advantage of the occasion to remind their vast readership that the capability of action had vanished. In 1968, the editorial observed, “Man often sags under the weight of his own helplessness. Solutions to very basic problems elude him.”⁸ Apollo 8, the mission that orbited the moon, was not described as an example of human action, of collective American effort. Rather, the editorial removed the space mission from the sphere of human action altogether, ascribing it to an *actus Dei*. “The flight of Apollo 8,” the editorial sanctioned, “showed what men can do if God grants them the will and the motivation...”⁹ The subtle idea that the editorial wished to impress upon the reader was that it is only through God, only by becoming an appendage of evangelicalism, that one may act. Again, what rested beneath the glassy surface was the notion the action, insofar as a space mission can be conceived of as *acting*, was absent as a human faculty.

Alongside evangelicals’ efforts to eliminate the existence of action from the human mind, we shall add that, to such propositions, there were of course exceptions. Samuel J. Mikolaski, for example, a professor at New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, made provision for the faculty of human action, although he qualified such freedom as deficient when it is not carried out under the tutelage of the divine. “As an individual, personal reality,” said Mikolaski in 1969, “man is capable of conscious, free, purposeful action. This action makes use of both the dependability and the contingency we observe in the world order. Man’s actions,” he went on to say, “register the use of qualified freedom, but for the Christian they point to perfect freedom when man’s acts will be under the control of a redeemed intelligence that is morally and spiritually oriented.”¹⁰

⁶ “A Future Big with Hope,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 20, 1964, 28 [188].

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ “On Reaching the Moon,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, January 17, 1969, 28 [354].

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Samuel J. Mikolaski, “What Is Man?” *Christianity Today*, January 3, 1969, 8 [296].

Exceptions aside, if we focus our attention on Graham, we find the same thoughts, which were fashioned to undue and conceal the hopeful prospect of human action. In October of 1979, Graham enlightened the attentive crowd: “Know [that] you might not be able to turn [life’s direction] by yourself, in fact, you can’t.”¹¹ In 1958, Graham spoke of the many problems of his contemporary world: tensions stemming from racism, the fear of war, and crime in the streets. While listing these problems, reminding the listener of the world’s frightful state, the evangelist simultaneously removed pathways of betterment, of change. “...we don’t have the intellectual ability,” averred Graham, “to solve our social problems even in rich, prosperous, intellectual America.”¹² In Graham’s configuration, the problems of the world were ever-growing trammels, surmounting and superseding one’s ability, leaving the inhabitants of the world floundering and struggling to stay afloat. But what is immensely more significant than Graham’s dire assessment was that action—here the “solving of problems”—was not something that one possessed, one did not *have* the intellectual ability, that is, the faculty.

Evidence of such a position, with evangelicalism’s most celebrated evangelist, can be found much earlier. In Graham’s crusade of 1949 in Los Angeles, California, while preaching on the topic of rebirth, the evangelist announced to the faithful, “And I tell you tonight as I stand here there is no answer to our political problems, there is no answer to our social problems outside the person of the Lord Jesus Christ.”¹³ Underlying the claim that there *is* no answer to political or social ills, these webs into which men and women act, was not only the idea that the current socio-political climate precluded easy resolutions but the posture that there was nothing that men and women can do to ameliorate their situation, transform their lives and the world, that action had been eclipsed. In this particular instance, we see something more. Having cut off the avenue of action, Graham opened up, *through evangelicalism*, the possibility of acting, of creating change, of altering the world. Only “inside” the person of Christ, within the folds of the church, could change be had.

In 1958, while in Birmingham, Alabama, Graham pondered the state of the American home, which, according to him, was in a state of decadence. The home, just like the United States, had numerous aggressors and was the victim of a continued effort to undermine it. One indication that the home was in danger, Graham thought, was that

¹¹ Billy Graham, “Zacchaeus” [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, October 29, 1979, <http://billygraham.org/video/zacchaeus/>.

¹² Billy Graham, *What’s Wrong with the World?* [Sermon], video, Charlotte, North Carolina, 1958, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXcsIIP3bdg>.

“Women [were trying] to be masculine and men to be feminine.”¹⁴ To this reversal of gender norms, Graham replied, “We’re [men and women] different and God made us different and we’re to stay different.”¹⁵ Apart from the men and women who, with sacrilegious audacity, decided to live as they chose, there was the ever-present and often invoked question of sex. Sex, warned Graham, had become “perverted and ugly and destroying.”¹⁶ Could men and women renounce temptation? Could men and women do what was needed to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the American home? Could men and women not act on their perverted and ugly temptations? The answer that Graham gave, unsurprisingly, was in the negative. “In these days,” Graham continued, “when the pressures are tremendous, when sex is thrown at you from every angle, how can you resist? You can’t.”¹⁷

A person’s supposed inability to resist sexual temptation, the ineffectuality of any attempt to change social problems, the general position that one cannot act was extended, by American evangelicals, beyond the confines of the United States. The new reality that evangelicals were endeavoring to create, wherein action had evaporated, was also applicable to the African continent, which, after 1950, began to experience the birth pangs of independence that came with the gradual process of formal decolonization, and the forced reckoning with the traumatic interaction between the African continent and Europe. Graham, in his evangelistic tour of Africa in 1960, said in a radio address, “Only God is the answer to the problems in Africa.”¹⁸ God, as was characteristic of evangelicals, was presented to the world in altered form; no longer the source of eternal salvation, the Creator of heaven and earth, the Christian deity was promoted as an omniscient solver of problems, which were beyond the ability of men and women to resolve. When Graham’s tour stopped in Kenya, the evangelist abroad hinted at this same idea. “And I am convinced,” he said, “that if the people of Africa will only let Christ in, let him dominate these new, rising governments, that Africa can lead the world in a spiritual awakening.”¹⁹ “...Christ offers the best solution to

¹³ Billy Graham, “New Birth” [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Los Angeles, CA, 1949, <http://staging.billygraham.org/audio/new-birth/>.

¹⁴ Billy Graham, “The Home” [Sermon], video, 1958, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cwg6ieMg-B0>.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Billy Graham, “Atonement and Blood of Christ” [Radio Address], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1960, <http://billygraham.org/audio/atonement-and-blood-of-jesus-christ/>.

¹⁹ Billy Graham, “The Christian in Kenya” [Radio Address], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Nairobi, Kenya, 1960, <http://billygraham.org/audio/the-christian-in-kenya/>.

the problems of East Africa,” said Graham.²⁰ Here, we are presented with more of the same, namely, that men and women, as well as governments, can do nothing. Although on the surface it may seem that Graham was calling the people of Africa to some nebulous renewal of the spirit, a curing of the diseased soul, we have seen the worldly content of what evangelicals took to be spiritual.

If we turn to the literature on evangelicalism, in the hopes of drawing out a greater understanding of this question, we will find that such a quest will yield little fruit. The isolated question of human action and identity has not been one of great concern for most scholars. The silence of historical works on evangelicalism with respect to this question—what can one do?—speaks to the forgottenness of such fundamental problems. Preston, whose *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, which in the later part deals with contemporary evangelicalism, seems to begin to broach the question. For example, Preston quoted Graham as saying, “Our world is on fire, and man without God will never be able to control the flames.”²¹ Preston also cited Chuck Smith, who, in 1977, was the pastor of Calvary Chapel in California, which at the time was one of the “fastest growing churches in America.”²² ““More and more our lives are being manipulated,”” said the pastor, ““We are victims, and we are helpless to do anything about it. These men play chess with the lives of the people of the world,”” he continued alluding to the actions of world leaders.²³ The context in which Preston placed such statements was that of rapid economic and technological changes, which were taking place in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Although Preston found these two quotes significant and perhaps an indication of a broader sentiment in evangelicalism with respect to action, beyond the explanation of economic fluctuation and technological development, he did not offer any insight. To what extent are these two quotes responses to the changing times, emotional and distraught cries for help, vocalizations of a perceived and actual helplessness; this, as opposed to a sustained effort to tell men and women that they are helpless, that without evangelicalism they cannot act?

Another possible explanation for this approach to action, this historical attempt to theoretically remove it as a possibility, has, at least in part, a theological explanation. On the theological side, there was the Social Gospel, the translation of the teaching of Christ into a

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, 550.

²² *Ibid.*, 557.

²³ *Ibid.*

program of social reform and improvement.²⁴ To the Social Gospel, which emerged towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, and which had long been supported by “liberal” Protestants, the evangelical was in fierce opposition. Evangelicals were almost always intensely aware of where their religious counterparts stood theologically. In short, evangelicals found the Gospel organized for the social realm of life, as an impetus to social betterment, to be a detrimental suppression of the central and guiding elements of the Christian faith. For them, it was a suppression of the transcendence of Christian faith into a project in the world. In the words of *Christianity Today*’s long-time editor, Carl F. H. Henry, “The social gospel became an *alternative* to the Gospel of supernatural grace and redemption (italics original).”²⁵ Running like a fierce subterranean flow of strength and hope, the adherents to the Social Gospel were moved by the convocation that something good can be brought into the world; of greater significance, and at the most basic level, that men and women are capable of creating something new, a new beginning.

In the decade prior to the Second World War, with the birth the New Deal,²⁶ the United States experienced parallel developments in the realm of politics. Though the historical conditions that occasioned the development of the Social Gospel and liberalism as a political worldview were entirely different, the fundamental premise of these two systems of thinking was similar: the call for intervention as well as the possibility to change and better the world. In contrast to the Social Gospel, with liberalism, the state itself would come to be seen by many as the avenue of change, a tool of transformation.²⁷ In late 1929, the clouds of historical change, which precipitated this shift in public and economic policy, began to form on the horizon. In 1929, the stock market crashed, the ramifications of which spread throughout the American economy leading to the Great Depression.²⁸ The onset of the Great Depression was accompanied by a massive increase in unemployment,²⁹ a 50% decrease in industrial production, the failure of over 100,000 businesses, and the closure of numerous banks, the result of which was the near crippling of the American financial

²⁴ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 29-30; Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, 550.

²⁵ Carl F. H. Henry, “Perspective on Social Action,” *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 10.

²⁶ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 846-847.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 841. See also Bosch, *Historia de Estados Unidos*, 411-414.

²⁹ In the year 1930, as the Great Depression began to take effect, the economic sectors of iron and steel, forestry and fishing, mining, heavy manufacturing, and carpentry, for example, all registered levels of unemployment exceeding ten percent. In mining and carpentry specifically, the unemployment rates were 18 and 19 percent respectively, *Ibid.*, 865.

system.³⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, previously the governor of New York (1929-1933), appeared on the scene in 1932 promising his country a new path out of the economic misery that had become, by that point, widespread.³¹ With his ascension to the presidency in 1933, Roosevelt enacted the First New Deal.³² Soon after election, in March of that year, a series of legislative initiatives provided the legal and conceptual framework for economic recovery and reform.³³ Alongside the legislative action undertaken early on by the Roosevelt administration, entities such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) provided economic relief, a welcome respite from the indiscriminate and unforgiving machinations of the market; while the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) employed some 2 million men; and the Civil Works Administration (CWA), through some 400,000 small projects, provided jobs to an additional 4 million unemployed people.³⁴ The Roosevelt administration's efforts to end the Great Depression had shown many in the United States that the state could be a tool through which the mystifying fluctuations of the market, which seem to follow autonomous and supernatural rhythms, could be brought under some degree of control. That which the economic liberalism of the Roosevelt era taught the United States was that conditions could be improved, employment created, infrastructure expanded, and a safety net spun around a world in which traditional barriers to social and economic destitution had been slowly eroded.

The success of the First New Deal led to a crushing victory in Roosevelt's 1936 campaign for reelection—he cornered an astounding 98% of the electoral vote.³⁵ Such a sweeping victory provided a mandate for the continuation and expansion of his economic vision for the United States, which made its appearance in the form of the Second New Deal.³⁶ This approach to governance and economic policy was not without its opponents and detractors.³⁷ Notwithstanding this, the actions and decisiveness of Roosevelt provided a framework for future intervention by the state, allowing the New Deal and its spirit to transcend the 1930s and 1940s. Perhaps the clearest continuation of the progressivism of the 1930s, was President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society. Following his election in 1964,

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 847-848.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 847.

³² *Ibid.*, 847- 860.

³³ *Ibid.*, 849.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 849-850.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 863.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 860-874.

³⁷ As Matthew Sutton points out in his 2012 article, during the 1930s, Christian fundamentalists vehemently opposed Roosevelt's New Deal and liberalism. These Christians labeled Roosevelt as the Antichrist and his

Johnson initiated a series of economic changes ranging from healthcare reform to housing and urban development.³⁸ All of these changes implied an increase in government expenditure and were an attempt to reposition the state so as to contain and alleviate the large and growing social disparities that resulted from the post-World War II economic boom. While the 1950s and 1960s were moments of unprecedented economic growth and expansion of the consumer market, for others, who lived chained to capitalism's underbelly, the second half of the twentieth century brought continued economic hardship and social alienation. As capitalism in the United States crowned its victors and crushed the defeated, as it eked out its profits and wreaked its havoc, the federal government was forced to follow close behind, sweeping up the pieces.

Just as fundamentalists had viscerally and vocally opposed Rooseveltian liberalism in the 1930s,³⁹ so too would evangelicals, in the 1960s, faced with the prospect of the Great Society, rise in opposition. President Johnson's Great Society was in many ways a continuation of this trend of American political thinking. But, in the decade of the 1960s, the political project of the Great Society provided yet another threshold through which evangelicals, who had avowedly renounced politics, could pass into the political space of their country. Those writing in *Christianity Today*, during this period, used the publication as an instrument with which to denounce the expansion of the welfare state. More than anything, Johnson's attempt to create a great society provided evangelicals the opportunity to decry the intervention of the state. Beneath this denunciation of the state's expansion and intervention, was the rejection of action as a feature of political life, of the possibility to act collectively at all.

An editorial in 1965, citing a thirteen percent increase in crime as evidence of the impotency of governmental social programs, affirmed that the increase in crime "marks the progressive decay of American culture at a time when the emphasis is on the creation of the Great Society. Let it be said plainly," the editorial stated with irrefutable authority, "that there can be no Great Society, now or ever, when crime continues to mount and persons and property are attacked wantonly by evildoers."⁴⁰

Bell exemplifies the evangelical position concerning what human beings were capable of, which he expounded upon in his column in December of 1968. Bell, ruminating

policy as a form of communism, Sutton, "Was FDR the Antichrist? The Birth of Fundamentalist Antiliberalism in a Global Age?" 1052–1074.

³⁸ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 985–986.

³⁹ Sutton, "Was FDR the Antichrist? The Birth of Fundamentalist Antiliberalism in a Global Age?" 1052–74.

⁴⁰ "Crime and Christianity," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 26, 1965, 27 [679].

on the subject of turmoil or peace, which perpetually confronted men and women, spoke of the Great Society, noting, “That the unregenerate world is acutely aware of the dangers of the existing turmoil is clearly shown by the fact that its leaders work so feverishly to reform and regulate society.”⁴¹ The prospect of regulating society, of acting in the world, was, for Bell, dubious. “Can we reform the world?” Bell asked, condensing the evangelical thesis to its most basic form, “The answer is no!”⁴² Bell provided one of the clearest and most candid expressions of the evangelical position on the subject. Bell’s affirmation appears at first merely as a rejection of the notion of the state as a possible organ of change, as a fulmination against leaders attempting to regulate society. Yet, his assessment seems to go further, appearing as an indictment and condemnation of action itself. The reformation of the world, said Bell, was beyond one’s powers, either individual or collective. The rejection of here of action, there of politics, was in the end, a political position. To Bell’s mind, the actions of the unregenerate, the very course of the world, was infected with a debilitating morbidity. “Unquestionably,” observed Bell, “one of the most serious of all problems is man’s insensitivity to sin, his unwillingness to admit that the virus of evil is working all through his actions and reactions, his thoughts and desires, and that its ultimate end is death.” So depraved was the human that nothing of worth could come out of his futile efforts. Even the evangelical conceptualization of sin, as we are now well aware, had passed into the lexicon of organicism and biological decay.

It is evident that the disdain and deep-seated distrust of human action was, in evangelicalism, multifaceted. On the one hand, it emerged from a theological conflict: the opposition to the Social Gospel. On the other, the animosity towards action was a product of the evangelical’s long-existing antipathy towards state interference in the economy. In the 1960s, this coalesced around the Great Society. Still, these theological and political justifications do not fully explain the development of this line of thinking amongst evangelicals. Once again, to fan out fully our understanding we turn to identity.

Insofar as Arendt’s conceptualization of action as a faculty through which identity is revealed (see Chapter I) moves closer to the truth, we may say that the denial, even theoretically, of the possibility to act, the passing of the bitter cup of its elimination, was an attempt to preclude identity’s *sui generis* emergence. With the theoretical withdrawal of

⁴¹ L. Nelson Bell, “Turmoil or Peace,” A Layman and his Faith, *Christianity Today*, December 6, 1968, 15 [215].

⁴² *Ibid.*

action, what occurred was the blocking of who one is and who one might become. Of greater significance still, we are presented with the convenient notion that it was only through evangelicalism that action could bear fruit. Thus, the question of acting, of making a new beginning, became an exclusive province of evangelical Christianity.

Although often connected to social and political occurrences, the evangelical's loud and repeated assertions that one cannot reform the world, transmitted the idea that one can do nothing, that no new beginning can be made, that action as the partial expression of one's personal identity was an illusion. Thus, hand in hand with the attempt to stifle human action, was the attempt to prevent this disclosure. The potentiality of meaningful human action, and the bringing to light of one's personal identity, was cleared from the experience of men and women in the world. Or, to put it differently, what, within this framework, might emerge was a "conditioned" identity.

To maintain action as a possible field in which evangelicalism's origins were striving to play themselves out is somewhat difficult. That action itself might be an object of desire and control for and of a movement is not something we are accustomed to thinking. To think of action in such a way, according to Arendt, is not without justification. In Arendt's elucidation of action, she connected it to birth, as we previously saw, but also to spontaneity, an organic, impulsive, unconstrained, and unconditioned upsurge of something into the world. This comes to the fore in an important study of Arendt's thinking. In Stephan Kampowski's *Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning*, from 2008, he identified the significance of spontaneity in Arendt's understanding of action. Kampowski, a professor of philosophy at the Pontifical John Paul II Institute in Rome, observed, "Already in her earlier work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt emphasizes that action is the result of spontaneity, i.e., 'man's power,'" quoting Arendt, "'to begin something new out of his own resources [which is] something that cannot be explained on the basis of reactions to environment and events.'" ⁴³ The emergence of totalitarian movements in the twentieth century represented, in the eyes of Arendt, a fundamental and direct threat to human spontaneity, and consequently to the ability to act. Kampowski spoke of this, saying, "For Arendt, the aim of these systems, in Germany and in Russia, was to abolish action and thus to destroy individuality." ⁴⁴ Here, a superficial comparison between evangelicalism and totalitarian ideologies and governments that emerged in the first part of the twentieth century

⁴³ Stephan Kampowski, *Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning: The Action Theory and Moral Thought of Hannah Arendt in the Light of Her Dissertation on St. Augustine* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), 55.

is not something we are moving to establish. Instead, what is fascinating in Arendt's thinking is the suggestion that action itself can become the object of a movement's pursuit, the center around which it orbits.

We find an echo of Arendt's intuitive thinking in Bauman, who, in his assessment extends the propensity to arrest spontaneity and the uncontrollability of action to an identifiable condition of modernity. Though he does not name action explicitly, in his 2002 book *Society Under Siege* he stated, "Modernity set about eliminating the accidental and contingent," which is to say, those aspects of human existence that, as a condition of their spontaneity, cannot be controlled nor predicted.⁴⁵ Action, its results always unforeseeable, is *par excellence* contingent.

Is this precisely what evangelicals wanted: the suspension of action, a kind of living *rigor mortis*, the complete withdrawal of action from the world? Our observation that evangelicals promoted the idea of the impossibility of action ought to be reconciled with the reality that, with evangelicalism, the opposite appears to be the case. Evangelicalism, as a movement, spurred in its followers a tremendous and unending *activity*. Hospitals, churches, universities, and orphanages were built, both in the United States and abroad. Men and women journeyed out into the world to spread their new and constantly evolving Christian message. Evangelicals were, from the beginning, pioneers in uniting religion and technology. During the Cold War, vast television and radio operations were undertaken. And the crusade, the traditionally American form of revival, was repeated in cities across the United States. Evangelicalism has from the outset exhibited a great, continuous, and hurried movement. Given this movement, this doing, this spurring on to action, we can say that inaction was not the ultimate aim of evangelicals. Instead, the pronouncement of the death of action, the effort to clear it from the scope of human possibilities, was done only so as to resurrect it in a new form. The evangelical made his entrance, informing men and women that they cannot act, they cannot, through creating a new beginning, bring identity into appearance. In the same breath, the way to action was opened up. Evangelicals stood before the world and offered themselves, their religion, their God, as the only means for change, the only way to transform the world. Only God could solve the problems of Africa or the United States. Beyond Christ, outside evangelicalism, all action was in vain, all attempts to reform the world, to resist temptation, to do good, were ineffectual. Thus, in the inducement of a feeling that action had been suspended, while at the same time presenting evangelicalism as

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

the only viable avenue for exercising the human faculty of action, evangelicals attempt to abolish the original uncontrollability and uncertainty of the phenomenon of action. Action was reduced to a preordained and monitored set of possibilities.

This too is difficult to conceptualize or might, as one of the possible aims of evangelicalism, strike one as unconvincing. We find a similar occurrence in capitalism, which might serve to deepen our understanding of what was taking place. Turning once again to Weber, the author makes an observation about the function of the capitalist system of reproduction, which is pertinent to our discussion. He asserted:

The capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an unalterable order of things in which he must live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is involved in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic rules of action. The manufacturer who in the long run acts counter to these norms, will just as inevitably be eliminated from the economic scene as the worker who cannot or will not adapt himself to them will be thrown into the streets without a job.⁴⁶

In short, as Weber says some pages later, “Whoever does not adapt his manner of life to the conditions of capitalistic success must go under, or at least cannot rise.”⁴⁷

Weber’s perceptive vision of capitalism, functioning and excluding in obedience to its iron laws, as if they were some natural process of nature, seems to mirror, on some level, what evangelicals were attempting to achieve. Namely, evangelicals forcefully suggested that outside of evangelicalism, action was not possible; they attempted to bring action in conformity with the principles of their Gospel, to inculcate, in the believer and the convert, the assumption that outside the church, action was without foundation.

What the cosmos of capitalism says to its inhabitants, living fixed in its system, is the same voice that arose from evangelicalism. The rules are set. In order to move, in order to act, one must conform authentically to the prescribed trajectories of orbit. Acting outside of evangelicalism, outside of Christ, the faithful were told, was beyond the bounds of possibility. Just as capitalism, according to the German sociologist, offers itself as the only avenue where men and women may pass, evangelicalism offered Christ, that is to say, themselves and their ideas, as the singular realm where meaningful action can be brought into existence. Peace, the evangel said, time and again, could never be achieved.

⁴⁵ Zygmunt Bauman, *Society Under Siege* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002), 28.

⁴⁶ Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.

Institutionalized racism in the United States could not be undone. “That Jesus Christ is *the* answer to the vacuum in the civil rights struggle is as certain as that he is the answer to every other human problem,” read one editorial in September 1966.⁴⁸ The only recourse for the United States entering into the mire of decadence, as was shown in the previous chapter, was a return to its biblical foundations. The underlying message of the idea of Christ as the problem solver, as the only extant means to bring about change, is that one can do nothing outside of the evangelical ideology. The struggle to dismantle what men and women had, for centuries erected—in this case a monstrous edifice of segregation, with its accompanying social and economic alienation—was inconceivable, so said the evangelical. The actions of the unregenerate heart, they propagandized, were as fruitful as a single drop of water in quenching the thirst of one wandering in the uncompromising harshness of the desert.

One of the few scholars to clearly comment on this aspect of evangelical Christianity in the United States was the American historian McLoughlin. In his previously mentioned biography of Graham, McLoughlin observes of the evangelist, “The message of the sermons...is that man can call upon the power of God, can harness the dynamic forces of the universe to his own personal life, and through Christian faith attain the solution for all his earthly woes. When preaching in this vein,” McLoughlin continues, “Graham offers the born-again Christian not only peace of mind and peace of soul but wealth, success, popularity, and influence.”⁴⁹

The Evangelical Forgets to Laugh

The evangel, striving to formulate and further the notion that one cannot act, with its immediate consequences for identity, and thereby bring action under direction and control, reveals precisely what this religious and social movement was attempting to achieve. Still, into the depths of this question, we can descend deeper. The unraveling of the problem of action and identity, as it emerged in evangelicalism, can be approached from an entirely different direction. As we saw in the introduction, Bauman spoke in his treatment of religious fundamentalism of the way in which said movements seek to create a *compleat mappa vitae*, a total, and universally applicable, charting of life. What this map might look like, Bauman did not pursue. Thus, we are compelled to explore it here, to undertake the task ourselves. In this blueprint, all things were explained and the question of how to act,

⁴⁸ “The Empty Place Must Be Filled,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, September 2, 1966, 37 [1205].

what should and can one do, comes unyieldingly into focus. How does this map come to emerge? What *terra incognita* does it attempt to chart? What markers are given on its various routes?

To be clear, what we might call a “map of life,” an unending series of commentaries on how to act, what to do, did not emerge as a cohesive, planned, and premeditated project. Instead, it was the outcome of a movement that sought to “place” Christ over all realms of life, to speak upon all happenings, to intervene in all fields. In a way, this blueprint, which evangelicals, with great toil, endeavored to create, emerged as a searching and an offering. American men and women—both inside and outside the church—were in search of answers on how to act, how to behave, in a way, how to be. At the same time, voices of apparent clarity and expertise arose from the evangelical community offering solutions, answers, and directions. This desperate searching and the offering of solutions, touched upon a myriad of topics. By dealing with some of these different issues, by tracing the lines of this map, we may become aware of the extent to which evangelicalism was moving along the pathways of action, and thereby in a silent dance with identity. In all of this, too, we see to what degree acting had become fraught with uncertainty, a conundrum in need of a solution, in the years of the Cold War. Through such an inquiry, we might begin to approach the extent to which individuals had relinquished the sovereignty of one’s own decision-making, one’s very spontaneity, and to what lengths evangelicalism moved to annex these faculties, making them extensions of their movement.

Turning now to *Christianity Today*, we find a poem written by James Wesley Ingles, a professor of English at Eastern Baptist College, which encapsulates the uncertainty facing the modern individual, the tribulations of the unmoored soul. In 1964, Ingles wrote in his poem “The Uncommitted:”

In the deep wood, no road,
on the dark sea, too many stars,
through old and new ways faring,
Without direction, mapless,
Wanders the untrammeled mind.⁵⁰

There was no road, no clearly traveled way through the woods of life, lamented Ingles. There were too many choices to navigate. There was, besieging the “uncommitted,” the

⁴⁹ McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 135.

difficulty of using and weighing old and new modes. One was mapless. A few lines later, the author asked, “*But what is beauty? What is good? / Who are the guilty? What is truth?*” [italics original].⁵¹ Evangelicalism, hinted the author, could provide the answers. Evangelicalism was the trammel, the map, a form of total worldly revelation.

The charting of the map of life reached into unexpected areas. In *Christianity Today*, we find that one realm of control, observation, and regulation with which evangelicals were concerned was emotions, their expression, and their management. In short, evangelicals provided guidelines and produced discourses as to how an evangelical Christian was to act, how emotions were to be governed, if, indeed, the sentiments were worthy of expression at all. In June of 1959, a certain Paul King Jewett (1920-1991), writing in the fledgling magazine *Christianity Today*, addressed the problem of laughter. He began his article with an anecdote: “Augustus Toplady, the Calvinist, and John Wesley, the Arminian, shared a common dislike for the lighter side of life. Watching some children frolic, full of pranks, Toplady is said to have called them ‘bubbling fountains of iniquity.’”⁵² In contrast to Toplady’s severity, Jewett claimed, “In our day, we laugh about everything; we feed on flippancy; we are convulsed in one unending guffaw.”⁵³ The writer assured the reading audience that we are “adults who are able and responsible enough to make decisions for ourselves. It is ours to develop fine ethical sense to know when it is time to laugh and time to weep.”⁵⁴ What is clear from Jewett’s article, despite his trust in the capable adult, is that some men and women were not aware, when it came to laughter, how to behave; for some, the naturalness of laughing had become a perplexing problem for which guidance was needed. No longer did contemporary men and women feel free to fall into the spontaneity of laughter, to give themselves up to reaction, to this expression of emotion. Now, suspended between the poles of stoic severity and ridiculousness, if our author’s understanding be true, people sought out ecclesiastical approval for the most basic and perhaps most human of experiences. In contradistinction to Jewett’s world, limned with the startling light of an intoxicating den of endless laughter, we are presented with a more stolid image. Arthur W. Klem, from Illinois, saw in the world not a surplus of laughter but its lamentable dearth. In a letter to the editor from 1962, he urged, “We need desperately to learn to laugh...” as if the

⁵⁰ James Wesley Ingles, “The Uncommitted,” in *A Christianity Today Reader*, ed. Frank G. Gaebelin (New York: Meredith Press, 1966), 193-194.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁵² Paul King Jewett, “The Wit and Humor of Life,” *Christianity Today*, June 8, 1959, 7.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

ability or willingness to laugh had been lost or forgotten.⁵⁵ The will to laughter was something that needed to be encouraged.

Passing through these two positions, invigorating them, was the gentle and silent breeze which said that laughing, insofar as it is an act, was a source of confusion and that it was evangelicalism that was to take the individual by the hand, leading one out of the mire of perplexity to the firmness of solid ground. Even here, in the navigation of humor and delight, evangelicalism positioned itself as a beacon, a directing force.

In November of 1969, added to the management of emotion, was “When Should a Christian Weep?” The title of John R. W. Stott’s (1921-2011) article suggested that this too was an area of confusion, something in need of evangelical explanation. “Should a Christian ever be unhappy?” asked Stott, who, at the time, was the rector of All Souls Church in London.⁵⁶ To the mind of this British rector, contemporary evangelicalism had been reduced, in his words debased, to “the simple invitation to come to Jesus and be happy.”⁵⁷ Stott was attempting to mitigate against a society that, he felt, increasingly moved to snuff out emotion, in particular, negative emotions. Stott urged, “But we are not forbidden to sorrow or to weep. Indeed, it would be unnatural not to. To regard natural sorrow as unmanly is more stoic than Christian. The Gospel does not rob us of our humanity.”⁵⁸ Stott’s gentle reminder that one is not forbidden to weep, which most would accept as sound and balanced advice, seems to point to a situation in which weeping, like laughing, had become unexplored and uncharted regions. There were some who needed to be led through the *terra incognita* of joy and sorrow, reminded that these emotions could, in fact, be expressed.

To take our exploration of Bauman's complete map of life in an entirely different direction, our source *Christianity Today* moved to pass judgment on the life of Jacqueline Kennedy. Although celebrity gossip did not feature prominently in this religious magazine, between 1956 and 1981, this specific example is consequential for a number of reasons. Following the remarriage of the widowed Kennedy to Aristotle Onassis in 1968, an editorial offered analysis of the actions of this national figure. “The marriage of Jacqueline Kennedy to Aristotle Onassis has rubbed many people the wrong way,” the editorial theorized.⁵⁹ The problem with Jacqueline Kennedy’s remarriage to Onassis rested, for the editors of *Christianity Today*, in the fact that the Greek shipping magnate had “been party to the

⁵⁵ Arthur W. Klem, “A Time to Laugh,” Eutychus and his Kin [Letter to the Editor], *Christianity Today*, August 31, 1962, 22 [1114].

⁵⁶ John R. W. Stott, “When Should a Christian Weep?” *Christianity Today*, November 7, 1969, 3 [107].

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 4 [108].

violation of one of life's most sacred vows [marriage]."⁶⁰ The editorial continued in desperate yet typical tones, ceremoniously informing "It is hard to see how this marriage could set a good example at a time when the home, the basic unity of society, is crumbling rapidly."⁶¹ In the face of such unruly behavior, the editorial admonished, "Of all people Mrs. Onassis must have an awareness of human depravity, shown so graphically by the assassination of her first husband and of her brother-in-law. We hope and pray," advised the editorial, "that she will reorder her life in a biblical perspective and that out of her past grief will emerge a desire to use the Onassis means and influence for spiritually beneficial ends."⁶² In the evangel's artful joining together of Mrs. Onassis and the idea of the dissolution of the family as well as human depravity, what is apparent was that the lives of celebrated individuals, public figures, had become objects to be consumed. Not only did evangelicals, on this occasion, enter into the process of consumption of a widow's experience, they moved to bring her life under surveillance, reorder it, and carry it into swift conformity with their "biblical perspective." Of greater importance, evangelicals offered others spiritual counsel in this consumption activity, instructing, with the authority of the Bible, men and women in the proper view, the Christian perspective. In an ideology, which publicly and repeatedly announced its willingness to annex all spheres of life, even the comings and goings of celebrities were brought under the just gavel of the elect, if only to serve as an additional waymark in the evangelical map of life.

While Jacqueline's alleged misdeeds, her flirtation with depravity, were of little vital importance in one's daily existence, evangelicals crafted answers, explanations, and served as escorts for other regions of contemporary American society, which were of more pressing concern. Work, labor, just as with the fateful decline of the family, were, claimed Henry, in a state of "remarkable deterioration."⁶³ Henry sought, in 1970, to resurrect the American institution of work, restoring it to its rightful place of prominence, and to alert evangelicals of the coming dangers accompanying the destruction of this sacred realm of human activity. "Every shoddy job," Henry cautioned, "for which people in the free world now pay... is a peg in the coffin of free enterprise... Given enough of that sort of thing, we will end up with nothing, and social chaos as well."⁶⁴ Even in the corridors of labor, degeneration and death cast their shadows. That evangelicals, along with every other American, should be devoted

⁵⁹ "Mrs. Aristotle Onassis," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 8, 1968, 33 [129].

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Carl F. H. Henry, "The Ailing World of Work" Footnotes, *Christianity Today*, January 2, 1970, 22 [310].

to work in order to preserve the system of free enterprise was also forwarded by another editorial. In 1969, the editorial stressed, “Vocational pietism is not enough. Especially in this crucial area, Christians have a responsibility to relate their faith to their work at a deeper level.”⁶⁵ Evangelicals promoted an understanding of labor that would work silently and continuously to protect and nurture the creation of human hands, namely, the global system of capitalism. One receives, by participating in evangelicalism, along with the promise of the salvation of the soul, advice on how to understand work, how to act, what one must do, instruction in all things.

This same editorial is worthy of our attention, in the piecing together of the evangelical map of life, for another reason. Drunk with the competition of the Cold War, the American government squandered vast amounts of capital in the “exploration” of space. Evangelicals, themselves inebriated with this competitive contest and with their cultivated hatred of communism, proved to be useful facilitators in glorifying, justifying, and extinguishing any doubt as to the virtues of this national endeavor. In 1969, as Americans prepared to set foot on the moon with the Apollo 11 mission, evangelicals proceeded to manufacture their hymns of praise. In ecstasies as the hour approached, the editorial stated solemnly that such “an achievement should be welcomed by Christians as a blessing and an opportunity. Let believers breathe prayers of thanksgiving that God has enabled man so to coordinate his energies as to make possible this dramatic new exploration of divine handiwork.”⁶⁶ The editorial also pointed out, “Perhaps, the most regrettable part of our space program so far—and the most subtle danger—is the public indifference to it. We seem to have become blasé.”⁶⁷ In closing, the editorial urged, “Let us hope and pray for a successful lunar landing. May it help dispel our gloom, and glorify our God.”⁶⁸ Through this particular editorial, the evangelical emerged not merely as a supporter of the space program, but as its sanctifier. The penetration of space, in the midst of the Cold War, was like the sacrifice of old, which, in clouds of billowing smoke, rose to the heights of divine favor. The reader, the adherent, the American, were instructed in *how* to think about space and the race towards it, towards its annexation; they were educated in how to act towards this occurrence. Evangelicals did not emerge as paltry supporters of the United States’ exploits, they moved to create and foment, within American society itself, important divisions. An internal danger

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 23 [311]

⁶⁵ “Man on the Moon,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, July 18, 1969, 21 [949].

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

had emerged, via the evangelical's words, a new agent of decay. Those who do not allow themselves to be brought into conformity with the American enterprise, who were indifferent, who did not fall over themselves in adulation, were conductors of an interior discordance, which had the power, not only to disrupt the United States' holy race, but to destroy it.

This editorial was not the only effort to color the exploration of space in an edifying and holy light. The feats and figure of the astronaut John Glenn were also seized upon and promoted by evangelical Christians. "In a time," remarked one editorial in 1962, "when patriotism and love of country are almost lost virtues, Glenn risked his life for the flag, the sight of which he says gives him a strange feeling inside."⁶⁹ Evangelicals discovered in the person of Glenn, who was a professing Christian, the exact values they wished to promote: "He [Glenn] honors God, loves his country, and is motivated by a deep sense of patriotism, uncommon in the cynical generation to which he belongs," reestablishing the powerful danger of division.⁷⁰ In the end, bringing in the same guiding interpretation we witnessed before with the moon landing, the editorial issued its seal of approval for Glenn and the American expansion into space: "We may thank God for what the rider of Friendship 7 did, but most of all we may thank God for what he is: a credit to his country, and a wholesome image for the esteem and respect of America's youth. Today none of them need feel that only sissies fear God and go to church."⁷¹

Interwoven with the subject of the American space program are other significant issues, which make the evangelical position an unavoidable participation in other forces at work in contemporary society, and not simply one opinion amongst many. In the first place was the development of the space program itself. To shed light on this we may turn to Rosa Luxemburg, the Marxist theorist who was assassinated on the streets of Berlin in 1919. In her well-known essay "Social Reform or Revolution," first published in 1900, she made an observation that, in a way, is directly related to the subject of space. "... Militarism and marinism as instruments of world politics," she stated, "have become a decisive factor in the internal as well as in the external life of the great states."⁷² Elsewhere, in another essay, published the same year, Luxemburg deduced:

⁶⁹ "New Teen-Age Idol Combines Devout Faith, Scientific Skill," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 30, 1962, 26.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁷² Rosa Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution," in *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. Dick Howard (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 111.

Militarism, which for society as a whole is a completely absurd squandering of huge productive forces which for the working class signifies a reduction of its economic standard of living in return for its social enslavement, creates for the capitalist classes an irreplaceable, and economically the most advantageous kind of investment and the best social and political support for its class domination.⁷³

Luxemburg concluded, “The power and domination of both the capitalist state and the bourgeois class are crystallized in militarism.”⁷⁴ We are faced with no difficulties in drawing out the similarities between space exploration and militarism. They are both state-directed undertakings and, in the case of the United States, of gigantic monetary proportions, which serve as an endless locus of capitalist investment, technological innovation, and an enlargement of scientific knowing. The massive and decades-long squandering of wealth was not only imposed on the American populace, but perhaps more grotesquely, it was to be loved, celebrated, and seen as a source of geopolitical power, an instance of national superiority. Indifference to the exploration of space, informed the evangel, was damnable as well as dangerous.

Following the lines of Luxemburg’s thinking, the American space program was not, as evangelicals would have us believe, a divinely guided coordination of energies and simultaneously an offering to God. As a gargantuan state undertaking, this colossal reallocation of resources was a means of furthering capitalist reproduction, as well as a means of spreading and strengthening the global technological apparatus. Thus, the evangel sought to champion and win support for an economic activity, which was deeply rooted in the American political, social, and economic structure. Their voices, raised in support of the exploration of space, worked more for the advancement of capitalism’s global apparatus of accumulation than *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*. On occasions such as this, evangelicals presented themselves more as priests of capital, calling for participation in its ceremonies, love of its greatness, and, wherever capital manifested its power, submissive awe, than of God.

Other men and women have offered similar injunctions as to the meaning and intent of the Space Age—Arendt and Abraham Joshua Heschel, for example.⁷⁵ The scope of this dissertation prevents a full exploration of their ideas. There is, however, one understanding

⁷³ Rosa Luxemburg, “Militia and Militarism,” in *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. Dick Howard (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 142.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁷⁵ See Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 260-274; Abraham Joshua Heschel, “The Moral Dilemma of the Space Age,” *Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity*, ed. Susannah Heschel (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), 216-218.

of the American space program, under swift development during the Cold War, which deserves our attention. In an essay by Michael L. Smith entitled “Selling the Moon: the U.S. Manned Space Program and the Triumph of Commodity Scientism,” the essence of space exploration is brought into new perspective. The leaders of the United States, as well as society in general, during the beginning of the space program, were governed, according to Smith, by “an image of national purpose that equated technological preeminence with military, ideological, and cultural supremacy.”⁷⁶ “The nation,” this line of thinking ran, “that could claim scientific and technological superiority would dominate the globe.”⁷⁷ What is important for Smith is not that technology, and by extension the exploration of space, became a means of dominance; in Smith’s eyes, the space program morphed into something entirely different. “Like the marketing of automobiles, the selling of the moon involved not just the problem-solving capacities of science and engineering, but above all the manufacturing of a reassuring image of technology and expertise.”⁷⁸ Smith’s essay was published in *The Culture of Consumption*, a collection of essays compiled by Richard Lightman Fox and T. G. Jackson Lears in 1988. It is through the lens of consumption that Smith understands the entire exploration of space, with its sanctimonious display of technology, and the pandering, far and wide, of its images. Space, and the human invasion of it, were made into commodities, like all things, something that could be experienced, seen, and consumed. Evangelicals aggressively enjoined their readers to accept this state of affairs and consume the images being placed before the eyes of the world. Evangelicals, apart from acting as conduits of these images, of these commodities, were in a nervous state that all of American society had not entered with abandon into the glorification of the United States and its new sites of reproduction. In the end, as Smith comprehended, “...each new product of technology was really two: the device itself, and the image of the device in the mind of the consumer or enemy.”⁷⁹ As such, in connection with the space race, as well as in numerous other ways, the evangel emerged as a conductor of the great symphony of consumption.

Conceiving of evangelicals as guides and inducers of commodity consumption might, initially, seem strange. The initial uncanniness is dispelled when one takes into consideration that the question of what to consume increasingly came, in the years following

⁷⁶ Michael L. Smith, “Selling the Moon: the U.S. Manned Space Program and the Triumph of Commodity Scientism” in *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980*, ed. Richard Wightman Fox and T.J. Jackson Lears (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 177.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 178.

the end of the Second World War, to occupy a greater space in the mind, to become a more integral part of life, evermore a way of answering the question of who one was. The commodity, entering into its apotheosis, evolved into the central element in the *manufacture* of one's "identity." The crippling uncertainty of knowing *what* to consume is revealed by Frank E. Gabelein, who writing in *Christianity Today* in 1965, articulated the illusionary world of the commodity, saying, "What should we read, what should we hear, what should we look at? The Bible has its clear criteria, summed up in the great Pauline phrase, 'brining into captivity every thought into obedience of Christ.'"⁸⁰ Through Gabelein's words we encounter the vexing dominance of the commodity; at the same time, the evangelical's self-promotion as the guide in the world of consumption. How to consume correctly? What to consume? Evangelicals did not banish the idea or the viability of consumption as a means to the elaboration of identity, they merely sought to steer consumption according to their own predilections. For the time being, we take leave of the commodity form, picking it up again in the following chapter.

In the evangelical blueprint of life, whose purpose was to provide men and women with ready-made formulas, thereby unburdening them of the tiresome and often daunting task of thinking and deciding for oneself, we may cite other examples. With evangelicals' issuances of urgent pleas for a restoration of patriotism, a resurgence of this idolatry of place, we are well acquainted. They begin, as do so many things in evangelicalism, with the standard warnings of destruction, the promises of decadence. Patriotism, like the family, like the United States, like the celebrated American work ethic necessary for the sustainment of capitalism, was moribund. In an effort to reanimate these ideals and provide a fuller and more universal script of life, evangelicals devoted much effort to fostering the practice of this dying virtue during the Cold War. Henry provides us with one characteristic example. In 1974, Henry set out to define the intricacies of true patriotism:

The patriot delights in the ideals of the land and people that establish his political identity. To the preservation of those ideals he is personally dedicated, being ready to resist at great personal cost, even to the point of death, any assault that gravely imperils them. The American patriot is grateful for all the natural and personal sources of his homeland, and for its commitment to transcendent justice and to man's dignity as a free and responsible agent.⁸¹

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁸⁰ Frank E. Gabelein, "The Aesthetic Problem: Some Evangelical Answers," *Christianity Today*, February 26, 1965, 4 [544].

Henry's words were more of an inducement to sentiments of patriotism than they were a definition, more of a glorification than an elucidation. In Henry's mind, "The present decline of American patriotism clearly requires a reversal. When a patriotic citizenry disappears, a country is done for. Patriotism is absolutely indispensable to the survival of a political sovereign power."⁸² Born out of the necessity of Henry's own making, his message strove to compel the American citizen that he or she *must* love one's country, one *must* give oneself over to it with fearless resolve, and, if necessary, offer one's own body and life as a sacrifice for the nation's continuance.

In 1969, with more than a decade of social and racial strife fresh on the American mind, with the conflict in Vietnam still underway, the editorial "Is Patriotism Dead?" warned that, on the occasion of Independence Day, not all would rise in spontaneous jubilation, in organic feelings of awe and respect. "But many of our people will offer no salutes, feel no sense of pride, and pledge no allegiance to the flag. Some will not respond because of indifference or calloused hearts."⁸³ With more nefarious individuals in mind, the editorial continued, "Others will be working to tear the fabric our national life to shreds; to worsen, not heal, our sickness; to destroy, not to build; to bring disunity, not unity, to the nation. For them, patriotism is dead; love of country is archaic."⁸⁴ After, with broad strokes, painting the noxious mists of disunity, sickness, and destruction, this particular piece in *Christianity Today*, moved to conjure up patriotism like a magician, to squeeze it from the beating human heart. "Christians ought to be the best citizens and the finest patriots," said the editorial, continuing:

Patriotism is not dead; our nation is not finished. Let us rally behind our flag; let us love our country with all its faults; let us work to improve it with all our strength; let us defend it with all our resources; let us hand it on to generations unborn better than it was when we received it; let us instill in our children the hope of our forefathers for the ultimate fulfillment of their dreams.⁸⁵

In both of these cases, that which reigned supreme was the idea that patriotism was something that one could spread, promote, sell, as opposed to a natural attachment to a

⁸¹ Carl F. H. Henry, "Has Patriotism Had Its Day?" Footnotes, *Christianity Today*, June 7, 1974, 26 [1054].

⁸² *Ibid.*, 27 [1055].

⁸³ "Is Patriotism Dead?" [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, July 4, 1969, 20 [908].

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 21 [909].

place. The various attempts to induce patriotism⁸⁶ seem to point to the project of continuously constructing a *Weltanschauung* through which the world could be understood and action directed. At the very center of this discourse was the identification of an unseen, but ever-present, phantom, an agent robed in shadows ready to destroy, infect, to, like a savage beast, “tear” the nation to shreds. The elaboration of the evangelical’s collective identity, a Cold War mixture of Christianity and nationalism, was crafted, increasingly, with a methodical and frequent delineation of the other, of the inherent danger born in the spirit of the other.

The evangelical charting of life extended to include all things and as such is too extensive to be covered in its entirety. But a final example of the variety of answers and directions that evangelicals attempted to provide their followers can be found with Ralph T. Overman’s 1959 article, “Will Science Destroy the World?” which concerned atomic weapons. Overman offered a worried American society the answers and assurance that many wanted to hear. “To those of us who take our Christianity seriously,” he began with a display of his piety, “the Bible has much to offer in helping us determine the relative values of different courses of action.”⁸⁷ “Our responsibility,” Overman concluded from his personal exegesis, “in a physical sense lies in showing the love of God, by giving to men the myriad benefits of nuclear power and radiation, and thus promoting physical health and welfare.”⁸⁸ Nuclear energy, like space, was a means of fulfilling one’s religious duty. Love of God and being a “serious” Christian were equated with nuclear weapons and their proliferation, according to this particular evangelical. Always traveling to new fields, new areas, evangelicalism revealed itself as a treasure-trove of answers, as a guide to those faced with all manner of questions—from laughter to nuclear weapons, evangelicals held the key.

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In our inquiry into the question of the evangelical and action, we have seen, in the first place, a deliberate, sustained, and coordinated manufacturing of the notion that action was no longer plausible, that it had been withdrawn from the field of play. This may stand before us in a twofold manner. On the one hand, action was presented as an impossibility

⁸⁶ FitzGerald is aware that the evangelical movement during the Cold War produced a dizzying admixture of Christianity and nationalism, see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 184-186. She does not, however, draw any conclusions from this realization or see this as an alteration of the essential Christian message, which evangelicals were charged with spreading.

⁸⁷ Ralph T. Overman, “Will Science Destroy the World?” *Christianity Today*, May 25, 1959, 4.

within an increasingly chaotic and nebulous social and political scene. On the other hand, on the individual level, the evangelical argued time and again that human action did not exist, that, in this world, a new beginning could not be had. Evangelicals did this not in the hopes of bringing about inaction, a type of paralysis. On the contrary, they advanced such a position only so as to present evangelicalism as the only possible direction through which action could pass. It was only through rebirth in Christ, i.e., adherence to the evangelical faith, that the world could be transformed.

In the second place, the evangelical emerges in the benign and disinterested guise of the expert, offering evangelicalism as a guide concerning the course of one's life. What evangelicals offered by way of their explanations, their exhortations, constituted a script wherein men and women could effortlessly assume their role. We can gather that the plethora of advice and the worldview they attempted to construct resonated in some way with American society. To what extent evangelicals were in fact searching for these answers is difficult to ascertain. But in the presentation of evangelicalism as a source of instruction on how to see, respond, interpret, and make sense of the world, we strike upon evangelicalism's hidden appeal. Yet again, the world and its transformation, the ability to bring about change, stood as one of evangelicalism most enchanting promises. No longer confined to lackluster vows of eternal peace and rest, bliss in the presence of the Creator, which for contemporary society holds little appeal, evangelicals refashioned themselves, as they did with the figure of Christ, into great solvers of problems.

This blueprint, too, has implications for the question of action. The attempt to extract from the Bible or from religion a universally applicable interpretation for the world, but more accurately an answer of how to approach every problem, answer every question, dispose of any doubt, shows the extent to which evangelicals understood that action, as an uncontrolled and spontaneous aspect of human life, needed to be compelled and controlled, channeled and contained.

Inasmuch as action is an elementary expression of who one is, a way in which personal identity is allowed to briefly make an appearance, the process of making action yet another evangelical domain, the true object of evangelicalism was revealed. To arrest action, guide it, control it, was an attempt to bring the process of the elaboration of personal identity under the auspices of the evangelical church. Here, the collective moves to replace the personal. The willingness with which many turned to evangelicalism in hopes of finding a

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

map through which to pass through life demonstrated the extent to which the proposition of identity's construction had been rejected.

IV

New Evangelical Forms

Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they labor not, neither do they spin.

—Matthew 6:28

Action, as the ground of identity's cultivation, was an essential locus of evangelical expansion, discourse, and attempted appropriation in the period of the Cold War. Despite the publicness of this discourse, the overt attempts to bring action under control and to nullify it, this remained an opaque and indeed hidden relation of power. American evangelicals worked feverishly to inform their followers and the world outside the church that the faculty of human action was nonexistent, that men and women were not the authors of their lives, that politics was powerless in the realization of societal transformation, and that human beings did not have the power to create new beginnings. In yet another way, evangelicalism in our contemporary period distanced itself from its earlier predecessors. The evangelical's claims were not a mere despairing at life and its difficulties. On the contrary, in removing the possibility of action, the evangelical was moving towards a clear and calculated purpose. With action no longer a possibility, at least in the intellectual framework of evangelicalism, evangelicals presented their faith and their community, the collective evangelical identity, as a total solution for all of life's problems and questions, a refuge from the storms of modernity. The pronouncements of negation moved, almost at once, to an incitement to and a production of action, but only through the narrow passageway of evangelicalism. In the quagmire of a fabricated inertia, new possibilities of motion, through the evangelical movement, abounded.

Beyond action, the evangelical movement developed in new and diverse ways, ways that were closely connected to collective and personal identity formation. Throughout history, the forms a religion takes, its spaces, its objects, its gatherings, its rituals, and its symbols, the modes in which religion comes into view, are set off from the profane: "...nothing that directly or indirectly concerns profane life must be mingled with religious life," observed Durkheim in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*.¹ To take as an

¹ Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, 227.

example one particular religious community, the Sabbath, for the Jews, according to Abraham Joshua Heschel, is the deliberately repeated sanctification of time.² It is a form in which time is different, set off and set against the daily rising and setting of the sun, the endless toil of labor and exertion. During the Jewish Passover, at the Seder, the meal that marks the beginning of the holiday, the youngest child asks the father the prepared question, “Why is this night different from all other nights?” The father responds by recounting the story of Exodus, the deliverance of the Jews from bondage in Egypt. What the simply profound and profoundly simple question conveys is that certain moments in time, and particular events in the past, are of overpowering significance. They are to be cherished, remembered, and, about such moments, we are invited to ponder. What we here call “form,” the way a religion is given expression, the pattern in which religious life is played out, is something intrinsically, though not exclusively, religious.

In the setting aside of a specific day, in the meticulous elaboration of religious language, in the crafting of hymns of praise and ceremonies of worship we become aware that constant care, in the religious milieu, is given to the choosing and perfection of such forms. And it is with such forms, the patterns of religious expression that contemporary evangelicalism took to itself, in the period between 1945 and 1981, with which we are, in this chapter, concerned. What has repeatedly surfaced in our historical analysis of evangelicalism is the gradual eclipse of the eternal. We have encountered a new lexicon that allowed evangelicalism to move away from traditional notions of sin and transgression, we have uncovered new conceptualizations of God, and we have seen the traditional culmination of Christian belief—the promise of eternal salvation—buried beneath vast sediments of worldly promises and mundane desires. The market—its language and its ideas—militarism and violence, organicism, and an attachment to the power of decay had taken hold of evangelical Christianity. In the midst of such historical change, Durkheim’s distinction no longer seems applicable. And the blurring of the sacred and the profane we uncovered in evangelicalism’s conceptual history has also taken place in evangelicalism’s forms. What is far more interesting than the fact that new forms have emerged or that the traditional terminus of the sacred and profane has fallen is why evangelicalism sought new ways of being religious and upon what stage these forms might make their debut—in what way they relate to identity.

² Abraham Joshua Heschel, *The Sabbath* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), xv, 8, 55.

Evangelicals, in the period with which we are now concerned, as is intrinsic to religion in general, hammered out forms of their own through which they might give their religion an outward expression, new patterns that might mold, direct, and possibly give meaning to one's life, bringing one into the presence of the holy.³ In the use, it should be clarified, of the word "new," we do not wish to transmit the idea that the forms we have identified here are entirely unprecedented. We use the term to express a distinction of quality, that is, in evangelicalism, these forms, *Gestalten*, are raised to new levels of intensity, elevated to a perhaps unprecedented centrality in the way in which they govern the lives of the evangelical faithful.⁴

Armstrong, whom we have discussed previously, was attuned to the emergence, in religious fundamentalism, of new structures, patterns, and forms. "All over the world," Armstrong wrote in *The Battle for God*, "people are finding that in their dramatically transformed circumstances, the old forms of faith no longer work for them: they cannot provide the enlightenment and consolation that human beings seem to need. As a result, men and women are trying to find new ways of being religious..."⁵ It is with these new forms, these new ways of being religious, that we are concerned.

In this chapter, we will examine how expansion became a form, a way of organizing religious life, how expansion for the sake of expansion slowly became an end unto itself. Next, we will examine the commodification of religion, that is, the transformation of the evangelical religion into a good of consumption. Here, we will examine the various ways in which consumption became an integral part of the evangelical movement, a center around which the collective group might unite. The commodification of evangelical faith leads us to one of contemporary evangelicalism's most visible and characteristic forms: technology. In this section we will explore the evangelical approach to technology as it was postulated in *Christianity Today* and in Graham's sermons. Finally, we will consider the question of

³ The historian George L. Mosse (1918-1999), a German-born Jew who escaped the Third Reich to the United States, noted, concerning political movements in the twentieth century (particularly fascism), the emergence of "new forms." What Mosse said in his 1975 book of modern political movements, the process of nationalizing the masses, resembles very closely what we see in contemporary American evangelicalism. Mosse wrote, "...each revolution created new political forms, new myths and cults; it was necessary now to use old traditions and to adapt them to a new purpose. Festivals, gestures, and forms had to be newly created which, in turn, would themselves become traditional," Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 1.

⁴ Other scholars have hinted at this reorganization of American evangelicalism in this period. The American sociologist Robert Wuthnow, for example, spoke in his now famous 1990 study *The Restructuring of American Religion* of a general restructuring and bureaucratization of American religion, especially evangelicalism. Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 5, 125. Ammerman remarked that fundamentalists Christians had adopted a "laissez-faire system of organization." Ammerman, *Bible Believers*, 208.

power, the evangelical's relation to power, and the incorporation of power as an essential aspect of the evangelical movement.

Our discussion of these different evangelical forms, these new ways of being religious, will be carried out against the backdrop of identity. Were these forms a way in which to elaborate, at least on the surface, a collective identity? Were expansion, the commodity, technology, and power ways of forging the collective imagination, cultivating an attractive and modern conceptualization of the group? What ways do these forms bisect the individual identity? What ways do they aid the individual in avoiding the task, imposed on us all, of elaborating a personal identity?

Evangelicalism as Expansion

Christianity, throughout its two thousand years of existence, has been characterized by expansion. Jesus' words, spoken at Galilee, "Teach all nations," (Matthew 28:19), acquires, depending on the group and historical circumstances, varying degrees of importance within Christian communities. It is therefore no historical mystery that evangelicals exhibited, to some extent, this time honored tradition of proselytization. The word evangelical, as has been noted, names that which was said to be most dear to these Christians: spreading the Good News of the Gospel, the message of God's salvation.

To view evangelical expansion in the period after the Second World War as mere evangelization is inadequate in the description of that which emerged in this religious community. What slowly solidified was expansion for the sake of expansion, the creation and organization of a pattern whereby expansion would beget and engender more expansion. Set up in this way, expansion becomes a self-enclosed process, a circle, where evangelicalism could direct action and seemingly give expression to their religion. It is an objective with no foreseeable end. We take up, first, expansion as a form for the reason that it serves as the primal plane, the cornerstone, of the other forms, which we will address in this chapter. Expansion is the underlying motif of all that we will come to see.⁶

In evangelicalism, organized to be extended, that quality and essence of what is spread is subordinated and of secondary importance. In an age when the United States was

⁵ Armstrong, *The Battle for God*, xiii.

⁶ Balmer is one of the few scholars to address the question of expansion and evangelicalism. Numbers, statistics, charts, are linked to expansion, indicate it, chart it, confirm its success or its failure. Balmer devotes one line to the subject: "Especially in the waning decades of the twentieth century, religious groups have become obsessed

made synonymous with freedom, biblical foundations with righteousness, Christian with good, expansion would come to be seen as an irrefutable sign of truth, emblazoned on the firmament of contemporary life, evidence that one's product had "value," that one's propositions were correct. That which succeeds, to the evangelical mind, was that which grows.

Intermittently in this dissertation, indicators of the predominant passion for expansion, in contemporary evangelicalism, have already been uncovered. We have seen the language of war and the constant framing of events in the world in the most extreme poles of decay, decline, and destruction, which transport the mind to necessary expansion and conquest. To the evangel's mind, society was not the place of community but the locus of a continuous war. Likewise, the evangelical's world was said to be threatened by the metastasis and growth of tumors, cancers, and the spread of viruses, which could only be eradicated by an extension of evangelicalism. Only if the Christian Church flourished, argued evangelicals, could communism's advance be halted. Above all, we saw the obsession with numbers, with their increase, with growth. All of these different aspects of evangelicalism point to our eventual coming to terms with expansion as a form of the evangelical movement. We move away from these things considered as a certain penchant for organic language, a fetishism and deification of the market, a special infatuation with war and the violence that accompanies it, and as vital components of a larger ideology. We consider all of them as part of a larger developing pattern, which came to characterize American evangelicalism.

Arendt, in various instances, pointed out the type of expansion we have in mind as a fundamental aspect of the modern world. Most importantly, through her judgment, she insists that, with respect to expansion, there is more than immediately meets the eye; of expansion, we are invited to ask more. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, she provides one of the clearest personifications of this will to expand: Cecil Rhodes. Rhodes, Great Britain's imperial business mogul, is said to have uttered the famous phrases "Expansion is everything" and "I would annex the planets if I could."⁷ Rhodes' words represent the quintessence of expansion where this goal is set up as the supreme aim of one's life. Expansion, even if it carries with it destruction, becomes a *summum bonum*. In the essay "Expansion and the Philosophy of Power," written in 1946, Arendt spoke of the implications of the zealous and never-ending process of expansion. Arendt takes for her analysis

with membership statistics and Arbitron ratings [a system of radio ratings], both of them indices of popularity," *Blessed Assurance*, 6.

⁷ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 124, 121.

European imperialism, which emerged hand in hand with the industrial revolution and the seemingly unlimited growth of reproductive capabilities, during the nineteenth century. To her, expansion was the “central political idea of imperialism,” for us it is the pivotal, animating form of contemporary evangelicalism in the United States.⁸ In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt fleshes out the operation and consequences of expansion for the sake of expansion in the following way:

...the discovery of expansion which was not driven by the specific appetite for a specific country but conceived of as an endless process in which every country would serve only as a stepping-stone for further expansion...once he has entered the maelstrom of an unending process of expansion, he will, as it were, cease to be what he was and obey the law of the process, identify himself with anonymous forces that he is supposed to serve in order to keep the whole process in motion; he will think of himself as a mere function, and eventually consider such functionality, such an incarnation of the dynamic trend, his highest possible achievement.⁹

Shifting our attention once again to evangelicalism, one finds the same zest for growth. Already, in 1886, at a revival in the United States, a Christian issued the proclamation, which is well-known and often repeated amongst evangelicals, for the “evangelization of the world in this generation.”¹⁰ Some eighty years later, in 1966, Graham would take his cue from his religious predecessor. Graham took up the slogan and saw the entire world as the object and scene of his religious expansion. “We have one task,” Graham said before the crowd at the Berlin Congress on Evangelism, “the penetration of the entire world in our generation with the Gospel!”¹¹ Now, there were no limits, all nations would come under the yoke of modern evangelicalism.

The most visible testament to the zealous lust for expansion in evangelicalism is this movement’s prodigious ability to grow numerically, to expand the flock. In the introduction, we were acquainted with McLoughlin’s astonishment at the purported 500 to 700 percent increase in the size of evangelical denominations during the two decades prior to 1967.¹² Hofstadter, too, in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, was astounded by the rapidity

⁸ Hannah Arendt, “Expansion and the Philosophy of Power,” *The Sewanee Review* 54, no. 4 (1946): 601, accessed January 30, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27537695>.

⁹ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 215.

¹⁰ Billy Graham, “Why the Berlin Congress?” *Christianity Today*, November 11, 1966, p. 7 [135]

¹¹ *Ibid.* The world as aspirational object of conquest can also be gleaned from the slogan of a quintessential evangelical organization, Campus Crusade for Christ (1951): “Win the campus today, win the world tomorrow.” Quoted in Turner, *Selling Jesus to America*, 84.

¹² McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” 43.

with which certain evangelical denominations expanded. The Southern Baptist church, to take just one example, in a period of thirty-six years, grew from 2,300,000 to 10,000,000.¹³

But what better reveals the evangelical fascination of and giving themselves over to the process of expansion, more than a procession of numbers, is the tangible exuberance that they showed in contemplation of the ever-increasing reach of their hand. One article in *Christianity Today*, “Billy Graham’s Evangelistic Thrust,” from 1961, displays the joy felt in the midst of increase. Counting the fruits of Graham’s still youthful career as an evangelist, C. Ralston Smith rejoiced, “He [Graham] has proclaimed the Good News to 30 million persons, and has seen,” up until that point in his career, “nearly 900,000 souls making decisions to yield themselves to Christ! These numbers, of course,” said Smith, beside himself with joy, “must be taken with the proverbial ‘grain of salt.’ Actually the recorded totals are probably too small!”¹⁴ Smith’s enthusiastic report was in no way an anomaly; almost all crusades, all mass evangelism events, were concluded with the solemn counting of heads in attendance and souls turned, redirected, to paradise. Each new soul and each new body were merely a sign of the many to come. The evangelical revivals of the twentieth century, the famous crusades of Graham, were centers of minute observation, quantification, and statistical analysis.¹⁵ In the evangelical practice of counting, in the celebration of numbers, we hit upon the essence of the expansionary form. Smith saw Graham’s value not in the truth of his message but in the vastness of the numbers preached to and converted; statistics, perpetually increasing, are presented, by the author, as irrefutable and quantifiable evidence of the truth of Graham’s task, the visible sign, the numeric cipher, of his success. The planning and calculating, parading and celebrating, of growth was part and parcel of a group that had set up expansion as a value and as an end unto itself. There were no limitations to this recitation of numbers; as we observed with market language, this activity extends to the charting and plotting of all manner of projects, trends, denominational growth, building expenditure, and the size of television audiences.

The constant invocation of numbers as an empirical demonstration of the veracity and heavenward trajectory of evangelicalism was a permanent fixture of this movement. It hovered over the evangelical head like an *idée fixe*, attracting to itself constant attention, alert devotion. An article from 1959, which addressed the slow demise of Unitarianism in

¹³ Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, 75.

¹⁴ C. Ralston Smith, “Billy Graham’s Evangelistic Thrust: The Crusaders and Changing Times,” *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1961.

¹⁵ The evangelical practice, obsession even, of counting heads and souls saved at revival events is described also by FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 176-177.

the United States, validated the evangel's trust in the assumption of mathematical totals; the article also conveys the underlying connotation of appeals to statistics, which often remain undisclosed, left unarticulated. The author, Lloyd F. Dean (1923-2007), then a professor of philosophy at Gordon College, used statistics of growth to demonstrate the theological bankruptcy of Unitarianism, saying, "It cannot be denied that Unitarianism had failed to reproduce itself...it has been able to count no significant increase in its constituency."¹⁶ In this short, quote from Dean, in his linking of expansion with reproduction, and therefore with life itself, we are granted entrance into the entire evangelical worldview concerning expansion. Unitarianism's failure to "reproduce" itself spelled, in the mind of this evangelical, its doom. The ability to reproduce was connected to evangelicalism's survival; only what grows was seen as real, only if some entity was characterized by and embellished with increase was it true and of value. Evangelicals were not content to abide in the truth of the revelation they had received; only growth could provide this confirmation. Looked at in this way, entering the expanse of expansion became, in this ideological movement, an imperative of vital necessity. To expand was to live; frustration of the process of expansion reeked of a mortal stench, of decay. The original religious justification for evangelism began to slowly fade, replaced with the attractiveness and coerciveness of the organic appeal.

In Sandler's *Righteous*, which we have already visited, the author stumbled upon a similar and more recent example in the Seattle megachurch Mars Hill, which rose to prominence at the beginning of this century. Though Mars Hill falls outside of our chronological time frame, it offers an example of both the continuity and pervasiveness of expansion, and expansion as a form of organic survival. Sandler quoted a female member of Mars Hill as saying that Christians must "do our best to repopulate our city with Christians."¹⁷ While such an utterance may at first appear to be stereotypical evangelical jargon, reminding us of their aspirations to convert the entire world, the woman's comment implies something more. It is clear for this evangelical woman that the other people of her city were not to be counted among the living, they were nonexistent, not human. In seeing the city of Seattle as depopulated, she demarcates her understanding in the tunnel of survival; the very continuance of her city rests on the evangelical's shoulders. Evangelicalism adds to itself the pretension of conferring personhood.

Further evidence of the gradually dominant role of expansion for its own sake can be found in those various and numerous organizations that began to appear under the umbrella

¹⁶ Lloyd F. Dean, "Withering Unitarianism," *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 6.

of church growth thinking after the Second World War, whose sole purpose was to perpetuate the motion of expansion, to continue the growth of the evangelical church. These groups, which have already been mentioned, emerged as external consultants in the business of growth. A 1973 article from C. Peter Wagner captures perfectly the evangelical ethos of expansion. Wagner, who participated throughout his life in the evangelical movement, was, according to his 2016 obituary in *Christianity Today*, a “Church Growth specialist.”¹⁸ Wagner was not merely a specialist in making churches grow, he was one of the central figures in this evangelical subgroup. In the article, Wagner wrote with enthusiasm, “[church growth thinking] has become an entire school of thought that is profoundly influencing missiology [the theological field concerned with promulgation] and the theology of evangelism.”¹⁹ The title of Wagner’s article “‘Church Growth’ More Than a Man, a Magazine, a School, a Book,” suggests the extent to which, in his eyes, church growth was the way forward for evangelicalism.

We find yet another telling example of how evangelical churches were organizing to further expand their ideology with IHOP, the church featured in *God Loves Uganda*. A church leader boasted, like an industrialist surveying his vast operations, that IHOP had 1,000 full-time staff and eighty different departments. IHOP is not alone in such an organizational structure, which seems to confirm the thesis of the American historian Robert Wuthnow that some churches in the United States were being organized in an increasingly bureaucratic manner; many churches, television networks, evangelization associations, and interest groups also have a similar structure. Megachurches, said Wuthnow, are characterized by their “vast network of committees, classes, community services, choices, schools, youth programs, and interest groups.”²⁰ Here, we see that evangelicalism not only spread in numbers of devotees but also in terms of the services and different groups that each church offered.

Other scholars have become aware of similar trends as those described by Wuthnow. For example, the authors of *Exporting the American Gospel* found the same type of restructuring in American evangelical missions abroad, a change that was designed to

¹⁷ Sandler, *Righteous*, 70.

¹⁸ Ed Stetzer, “C. Peter Wagner (1930-2016), Some Thoughts on His Life and Passing,” *Christianity Today*, October 22, 2016, accessed December 1, 2016, <http://www.christianitytoday.com/edstetzer/2016/october/in-memory-of-c-peter-wagner.html>.

¹⁹ C. Peter Wagner, “‘Church Growth’ More Than a Man, a Magazine, a School, a Book,” *Christianity Today*, December 7, 1973, 12 [284].

²⁰ Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 126.

further expansion. The dissemination of American evangelicalism beyond the United States, in the second half of the twentieth century, led the authors to observe:

In the period in which the new American missions were coming to life it is plain that whole aspects of American culture—the association of business methods, efficient organization, and financial reward, was unquestionably accepted not only as a fact of life but as something that could be consecrated and employed in Christian activity.²¹

All these examples show that, undeniably, expansion had been given priority in evangelicalism, that we have passed from mere evangelization to expansion; it became the dominant pattern by which to organize evangelical life, and, in turn, which allowed evangelicals to plan and calculate the extension of their ideology. Indeed, an entire industry emerged whose purpose was nothing more than to foment evangelical growth. For us, there remains the question of the impact of this form on identity. Where expansion appears and takes hold, only for the sake of further expansion, where a process was established in which expansion was only a means to expansion, where all movement was a stepping stone towards increase, we see that the process becomes the demiurge of the evangelical collective identity. But this collective endeavor—the never-ending process of growth—transverses personal identity and its formation. Expansion militates against the undeniable, and heretofore, irreversible plurality of human existence. All men and all women, in evangelicalism, were working for the same task. All were seeking to reproduce the image of evangelicalism, all, who had entered into such activity, worked to ideologically reproduce evangelicalism. All were brought into sameness so as to be further sameness. In the intensity of this concentration of energies, efforts, and wills, we may ask what is left to the individual. Expansion, like a voice from nowhere, calls men and women into its descent; this enticement to reproduce, to repopulate cities with images of oneself, acquires to itself the pretext and role of the giver of life. As we saw with the evangelical's observations concerning Unitarianism, through expansion life continues and death is held off. In a much more exacting and irretrievable way, evangelicalism, through the form of expansion, demands evermore of one's personal identity. Expansion channels thinking, doing, emotion, into the singular mold of continued increase. This is what Arendt so perceptively understood by her vision of the one who expands as the one who is degraded into a mere function. In the unending process of expansion, can personal identity still come together; can one work to

²¹ Andrew F. Falls quoted in Brouwer, *Exporting the American Gospel*, 187.

build its structure? Was the onus of identity exchanged for functionality? Does expansion as the ultimate end cast its shadow over who one is?

Evangelicalism's expansionary form goes beyond the question of personal identity. Expansion for the sake of expansion, the evangelical movement's bold, repeated, and ubiquitous efforts to grow, was instrumental in arresting the cultivation of personal identity. To the men and women of the United States, troubled and confused by the social, economic, and politics changes taking place during the Cold War, expansion provided a pathway of collective orientation.

Our discussion of this evangelical form also serves another important purpose: it tethers evangelicalism back to modernity, contradicting many who have attempted to establish a dichotomy between this religious movement and the modern world, who see evangelicalism as antiquated, as something separate, a dredging up of the past, an aberration. In evangelicalism's unyielding desire to expand, we catch a glimpse of the ubiquitous muse of modernity.

The Commodification of Religion

All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober sense, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

—Karl Marx²²

In 1958, with more than two decades of evangelistic work behind him and as the Cold War intensified and the possibility of conflict in Vietnam grew ever closer, Billy Graham, arguably the United States' most well-known religious figure and the man who, according to *Christianity Today*, preached to and converted millions, was awarded by the Sales Executive Club of New York the distinction of "salesman of the year."²³ "Sincerity," Graham remarked with pride and confidence on one occasion, "'is the biggest part of selling anything—including the Christian plan of salvation.'"²⁴ Some seven years later, Graham was ennobled with the illustrious title of salesman of the decade.²⁵ The Christian plan of salvation—a thing to be sold—was to benefit from another three decades of Graham's labor

²² Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 476.

²³ McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 237.

²⁴ Graham quoted in McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 30.

until he retired in 2005. In Graham's mind, there was no longer a distinction between religion and the activity of selling, between trust in God and his revelation, which the unmoored sinner might cling to as his only consolation in a hostile world, and a product that needed to be packaged, marketed, and sold at an always increasing, *expanding* pace. Few, it seems, have taken any notice of Graham's fusion of religion and capitalism, which seems to move beyond a mere nod in capitalism's favor. The psychologist, philosophy, and member of the Frankfurt School Erich Fromm (1900-1980), in his 1955 book *The Sane Society*, one of the few to take up this issue, demonstrated the consternation with which he viewed such an approach to religion:

How drastically commercial categories have entered even religious thinking is shown in the following passage by Bishop Sheen, in an article on the birth of Christ. 'Our reason tells us,' so writes the author, 'that if anyone of the claimants came from God, the least, that God could do to support His representative's claim would be to preannounce His coming. Automobile manufacturers tell us when to expect a new model.' Or, even more drastically, Billy Graham, the evangelist, says: 'I am selling the greatest product in the world; why shouldn't it be promoted as well as soap?'"²⁶

Graham's equation of God with soap and of religion with a "plan" to be sold was perfectly, even dynamically, in keeping with an age in which commodities were bought and sold with dreamlike ease, an age where men and women were constantly realigning themselves and society in order to foment the continued reproduction of consumption goods. The Cold War, as we are well aware, was not only an age of fear and foreboding; it was also an age of joyous consumption. It was the age in which much of the white middle class began to purchase suburban homes in the United States and cars began to increasingly dot the American landscape. More importantly and more alarmingly, beyond the dissemination and triumph of a culture of consumption, this was the historical moment wherein men and women came to see themselves as commodities and to treat themselves in accordance with such a transient and dehumanizing vision.

With the American evangelical movement that arose during the Cold War, what we undeniably and repeatedly encounter is evangelicalism in the commodity form, religion commodified. Thus, it is important to note, we encounter in the evangelical movement after the Second World War more than a lasting affinity between evangelicalism and capitalism.

²⁵ Martin, William. "The Power and the Glory of Billy Graham," *Texas Monthly*, March 1978, <http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/power-and-glory-billy-graham/page/0/2>.

²⁶ Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York: H. Holt, 1990), 118.

In this movement, we encounter an alteration of religion itself, a powerful realignment. Before we explore the development of this evangelical form, we must consider the commodity itself. For this, we turn to Karl Marx.

Marx, in *Capital*, published in 1867, began his analysis by establishing the initial incomprehensibility of the object in question: “A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood...it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.”²⁷ To this, Marx added, that the commodity appears to be mystical, enigmatical, and surrounded by necromancy.²⁸ In essence, according to Marx, a commodity is “an object outside us” that has undergone a transformation as a result of man’s labor.²⁹ Bound to the commodity is value, in the form of its use and in the form of exchange. The commodity is always reproduced, sold, and consumed for profit.³⁰ The capitalist cycle of production and consumption unfolds, therefore, not on the basis of human need but within the expansionary framework of an undying search for profits. Marx’s understanding of the consumer good was rooted in the idea of the fetishism of commodities. For Marx, the fetishistic quality of commodities stems from the attribution of an abstract and subjective value that has “absolutely no connection with their [commodities’] physical properties.”³¹ The transmogrification of commodities that is fetishism serves to mask the origin of the commodity and the social relations that were harnessed and congealed in its creation. “There...is a definite social relation between men,” said Marx, “that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.”³² Marx goes on to say:

In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realms of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.³³

²⁷ Karl Marx, “Capital, Volume One” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 319.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 320, 324.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 303.

³⁰ Theodor W. Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, ed. J. M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge Classics, 2001), 5.

³¹ Karl Marx, “Capital, Volume One,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 321.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

Another aspect of the commodity with which we would do well to familiarize ourselves is its impermanence. Arendt, in *The Human Condition*, brings out this fascinating element of the commodity:

In our need for more and more rapid replacement of the worldly things around us, we can no longer afford to use them, to respect and preserve their inherent durability; we must consume, devour, as it were, our houses and furniture and cars as though they were ‘good things’ of nature which spoil uselessly if they are not drawn swiftly into the never-ending cycle of man’s metabolism with nature.³⁴

Lurking like a shadow just out of sight, there always remains, Arendt portended, “the grave danger that no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption.”³⁵ With this last observation, any initial resistance one may exhibit to the union of religion and commodity reproduction, falls to pieces. For Arendt, all things stood in danger of being swept into this endless cycle. Religion, too, was subject to the spread of the commodity.

Having considered the essence of the commodity, we are now in a position to approach evangelicalism *qua* commodity, to see evangelicalism for what it was becoming. Much of the groundwork has already been laid for us by what we have already seen in this dissertation. The commodification of evangelicalism, does not strike us as so improbable when one considers the proximity between ideological evangelicalism and contemporary capitalism and the vocal *apologiae* that evangelicals delivered on behalf of the free enterprise system before, during, and after the Cold War. As well, we saw that American evangelicals developed a powerful language for describing and interacting with their world, a lexicon that was tinged with the ethos of capital. The inclusion of these economic concepts, between 1945 and 1981, became a prominent and permanent fixture in evangelical writing, speaking, and even praying. Whether commenting on the mysteries of their God, the goodness of the Lord’s creation, the promises of eternal life, or the political events of their times, evangelicals viewed and perceived the often chaotic world in which they lived through the lens of a capitalistic organization of life. More generally, we have seen on numerous occasions the valiant and ceaseless defenses, emanating from the evangelical faithful, of the “American way of life,” and of the system of free enterprise in which this way of life was rooted. Beneath all of this, there was the typically American fawning

³⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 125-126.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 133.

deification of the market, the unyielding and undying trust in the wisdom, fundamental goodness, and benevolent omniscience of market forces. There was the secret and unspoken faith in the just destiny of capitalism's ultimate progress. We have seen, too, the materialism of evangelicalism, the overriding emphasis on that which was quantifiable, expandable, makeable, and reproducible. Faith was a dividend that was bound to materialize in economic prosperity. God was a sort of banker, doling out, like some generous uncle, wealth and abundance; faith in God was as touchable as cash in hand. The underlying trajectory of evangelicals' conceptualization of faith was the assumption that only what can be reproduced was real, only that which can be initiated into materialization can be an aspect of reality.

Evangelicalism's incorporation of the commodity form, however, goes beyond lip service to capitalism's greatness and a marked conceptual change. In American evangelicalism after the Second World War, the evidence for commodification, the preponderance of this form in this sector of the Christian church, can be found in different ways. Marx spoke, as we saw previously, of the commodity as a product of labor. Thus, one of the clearest ways to become aware of the commodification of religion and the emergence of contemporary evangelicalism is to consider all of this as a function of labor. Neither *Christianity Today* nor Graham's sermons and radio addresses provide any real insight into the question of evangelical Christianity as a source of employment. Nor does there seem to be any reliable labor statistics dealing with evangelical churches or institutions in the secondary literature. Despite this clear gap, this period, as is well known, was the period of a prodigious expansion of evangelistic organizations, evangelical television and radio stations, the birth of new magazines, the founding of new universities. Behind the countless new television stations and their many shows, the endless hours of radio programs, the crusades, the books, the videos, stood an ever larger pool of employed men and women. Evangelicalism, in a very clear way, was no longer the private domain of the clergy and laymen. Now, it had become a source of employment, a means of earning one's daily bread, a question of labor. The growing mass of men and women employed in evangelical enterprises speaks to the encroachment of the commodity form in the evangelical religion, that faith was to be found more and more in the nexus of labor. For this we have one clear example. The evangelical church IHOP, as we saw previously, employed 1,000 full-time staff, which is by no means an anomaly in evangelicalism. The evangelical church became a focal point of employment; it was a source of wages as well as salvation. But this way of

verifying the commodification of evangelicalism, given that we lack sufficient and concrete evidence, is something we can only hint at.

Perhaps the most telling proof of evangelicalism's transformation was the approach many evangelicals adopted towards their religion, their faith, and their God. The commodification of the evangelical faith becomes most tangible in their words. We have already seen this to a striking degree with Graham, where he envisioned Christ's plan of salvation, faith itself, as a thing to be sold, that is, as a commodity. A more contemporary example, which faithfully replicated Graham's approach, can be found with the megachurch Mars Hill, mentioned previously. One of the pastors of the evangelical church in Seattle unabashedly confided to Sandler, the author of *Righteous*, "'We're selling a product... We're selling Jesus and the Bible. And what do you get for a life in Christ as a member at Mars Hill? You get community. You get authenticity. You get belonging.'" ³⁶ Another pastor from Mars Hill confided to Sandler the selfsame sentiment, affirming triumphantly, "Jesus has probably become the most marketable brand in the country." ³⁷ For these evangelicals, authenticity, belonging, and community were to be achieved through the activity of consumption. Authenticity and belonging were the magical qualities transfixed to the commodity, the blessings acquired through consumption. Jesus was a brand, salvation was something purchased. More than any actual consumer products that evangelicals might reproduce, it was this stance towards the Gospel as a meager thing to be sold that was indicative of the commodification of religion in American evangelicalism following the Second World War.

Let us pause for a moment to consider in greater depth the ideas of these two pastors. In these evangelical leaders' estimation, the ultimate aim of the transaction, the act of consumption, was neither Jesus nor his once-coveted eternal salvation. On the contrary, what was gained through consumption was something entirely temporal, immediately connected to human existence. According to the pastor, he sold authenticity, belonging, community. What the authors proposed was collective identity itself: participation in a community, the assurance and direction of belonging to the collective religious group, the confirmation of likeness. It is abundantly clear that the cultivation of a collective evangelical identity, ³⁸ to the mind of these evangelicals in the first decade of the twenty-first century,

³⁶ Sandler, *Righteous: Dispatches from the Evangelical Youth Movement*, 61.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 50.

³⁸ For the notion of the "cultivation" or invention of collective identities, especially in relation to national identities, see Álvarez Junco, [Inaugural lecture] *Historia y mito*, 3, 5, 8, 10, 45; Álvarez Junco, "La nación

was a question of participating in the activity of consumption, of buying the product they sold. The question is not whether evangelicals saw collective identity as something to be purchased; it is unmistakably apparent that this was the mindset of evangelical Christians in the United States and such a mindset conforms perfectly to so many other characteristics of the American evangelical movement. Not only was it the express position of some of the movement's most important leaders, it was tacitly accepted and unchallenged by others. But the primary question is, in fact, whether the transitoriness of the commodity, the devouring dominance of consumption, can, in any substantial way, provide the rootedness, the historical ground, and permanence needed to invent, to cultivate, collective identity. Can the act of consumption provide anything beyond consumption? Can, through the commodity, the endless cycle of production and consumption, a collective evangelical identity be forged? Was it a collective evangelical identity that was being promoted or was it, in the end, something else?

To be quite clear, these two pastors had not stumbled upon the notion of selling faith themselves, they had not developed such an understanding *in vacuo*. On the contrary, they were working within an evangelical tradition that was decades in the making. It was the work of Graham and his evangelical contemporaries that would make possible conceiving of faith as a commodity for the next generation of evangelical believers in the United States.

In *Christianity Today*, too, explicit connections between the Gospel and selling were not absent. An article from 1969 entitled "Salesmen Wanted" explicitly stated what was becoming the cornerstone of evangelicalism. "How'd you like to have a product everybody needed, with a world market and no competition?" Dr. Richard C. Halverson (1916-1995), a Presbyterian pastor, began his article.³⁹ With Halverson, as with other evangelicals, the person of the seller and the evangelist were blurred. "That," Halverson promised, "is precisely true of the Church of Christ! She has had committed to her the gospel. It is indispensable to the eternal welfare of all men. Its worldwide propagation is the mandate given to the Church by her Lord. No other institution has this message, this mandate, or this market."⁴⁰ Halverson, beside himself with joy, concluded, "Think what a businessman would do in equivalent circumstances. He'd make a killing!"⁴¹

posimperial," 447, 448, 449, 446; Álvarez Junco, "The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptation to the Age of Nations," 21, 24-25.

³⁹ Dr. Richard C. Halverson, "Salesmen Wanted," *Christianity Today*, November 7, 1969, 4 [108].

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Additional evidence that evangelicals saw their religion through the lens of consumption can also be gathered from the jargon used in American Christianity, especially in evangelical Christianity. One fairly common term is the notion of “church shopping.” The phrase is so common in religious circles in the United States and especially in evangelicalism that Ammerman, in her work *Bible Believers*, made note of its frequent use.⁴² “Church shopping” is utilized to describe the activity of finding another church. The church itself and what it offers become the object of consumption. What is perhaps most salient about such a notion is not only that the church and its message were things to be purchased but that what was sought by the shopper was a message that conformed with one’s “needs,” a product that fit one’s predilections. In such a conceptual view, churches and denominations are set off from one another in their mere attractiveness, in their ability to provide the shopper with what he or she wants.

To establish more firmly the emergence of this form as an essential aspect of contemporary evangelicalism, we may turn to the idea of the fetishism of commodities of which Marx spoke. Just as the wandering Israelites, having been led out of Egypt, ascribed to the golden calf their salvation from bondage, investing it with foreign and erroneous qualities, so too did the evangelical attach to his religion alien values, powers, histories, and promises. Rolf Tiedemann, a German philosopher associated with the Frankfurt School, described commodity fetishism, which we are here working to uncover, in a lucid way. In an essay on Walter Benjamin’s *The Arcades Project* entitled “Dialectics at a Standstill,” Tiedemann remarks, “Marx showed that capitalist production’s abstraction of value begets an ideological consciousness, in which labor’s social character is reflected as objective, thing-like characteristics of the products of that labor.”⁴³ The new, changing, and fantastic attributes, these thing-like characteristics, fixed upon the evangelical Gospel, have already beckoned us, with them we already move in the most intimate of terms. The culmination of the evangelical ideology, which we saw in chapter, rested on the synthesis of the Gospel as a universal salve, as the remedy of remedies, as a sacred escape from decline. We have seen how evangelicals told men and women that, through faith, one would receive wealth and prosperity, how evangelicalism was a cure for the cancerous scourge of communism, how a revival would restore the lifeblood of the United States, sparing it from worldly desolation and heavenly destruction. Evangelicalism was presented as the solution to all problems.

⁴² Ammerman, *Bible Believers*, 32.

Now, viewed from the standpoint of the commodity, might not all of these utterances appear as fetishisms of evangelicalism, where extraneous values are attached to the product? Does that which Christianity traditionally was, that is, the path to salvation, and in the case of evangelicalism, a product of labor remain veiled by these fetishisms, receding into the distance behind the newer more alluring attributes, which evangelicals attached to their religion, behind the stirring appeals to temporal triumph, success, and power. The supposed intrinsic characteristics of evangelicalism served to mask the social origins of this religion as a product of labor. Evangelicalism appeared, like a god in the desert, with its own mystifying and enigmatic facets and presented itself with powers that were said to be innate.

Finally, in the evangelical movement of the Cold War era, undeniable and, indeed, the clearest evidence for the dominance of the commodity comes from the actual reproduction and consumption of evangelical products. Here, as we shall see momentarily, the secondary literature has had the most to say. In *Christianity Today*, the vocation of consumption was inculcated in the believer's heart with greater subtlety. Apart from the frequent, grandiose, and idealistic lionizations of American capitalism, there were no overt appeals to consumption as a way of life or as a primary way of being religious. Instead, the reader of this evangelical publication was greeted, in every single issue, page after page, month after month, with numerous advertisements pandering a wide variety of Christian products. The consumption of "evangelical" products was more a question of showing than an imperative. Vacation Bible school packages, Sunday school programs, books, financial products, videos, training, and Bibles were just some of the numerous products on display and available for consumption for the evangelical faithful. Evangelicals, through the medium of *Christianity Today*, beyond sanctifying consumption as contemporary capitalism's mode of organization, created a constant and multifaceted inducement to consumption.

It is here, in the ever-expanding universe of commodities, where scholars have been most watchful with regards to the commodity form. As we are now aware, many scholars have called attention to the warm relationship between evangelicalism and American capitalism.⁴⁴ Other scholars have gone beyond this observation, and begun to examine the

⁴³ Rolf Tiedemann, "Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the *Passagen-Werk*," in Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin; prepared on the basis of the German volume ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 938.

⁴⁴ See Kruse, *One Nation Under God*, 7-8, 10, 37, 86, 293. Brower, *Exporting the American Gospel*, 10. Other works, whose intriguing titles might lead one to believe that the commodification of evangelicalism will be dealt with, confront one, in terms of this question, with sorry disappointment. See Gerard Thomas Straub, *Salvation for Sale: An Insider's View of Pat Robertson* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988); Turner, "Selling Jesus to

role of commodities, actual products, in evangelical Christianity. Dombek, in her aforementioned dissertation, makes not of the apogee of commodities in contemporary evangelicalism, saying:

There is Christian radio and television, of course, but now there is also Christian contemporary music in a range of genres, including punk, ska, rage rock, rap and swing. There are Christian fantasy and science fiction novels selling at levels to beat Grisham and Clancy, and Christian films such as *The Omega Code* making millions in sectarian and secular box offices and on video.⁴⁵

Evangelicalism, according to Dombek, offers followers a “utopic vision [which] is predicated on an apocalyptic script that divides the planet up into God’s spaces and Satan’s. In such a geography,” Dombek argues, “shopping helps Christians fulfill their roles in the apocalypse, assisting them in conducting spiritual warfare.”⁴⁶ Therefore, Dombek understands the evangelical view of consumption—she does not consider if evangelicalism itself is a commodity—as an effort to acquire space, to extend the physical area of God’s Kingdom. In Dombek’s view, evangelicalism can be understood as a producer of commodities, a marketplace where “Christian” products are reproduced and purchased. The commodity, in this understanding, takes on a certain functionality.

We find similar observations in a 1996 study by the anthropologist Simon Coleman. Despite the fact that the study deals with an evangelical community in Sweden, Coleman confirms the dominating importance of the commodity in evangelical thinking. This particular group of evangelicals, according to Coleman, often sees their faith through the lens of consumption. Simon wrote, “...these Christians transform religious experience and language into commodities that thereby become available to be marketed for circulation. An evangelical economy is constructed wherein the cultivation of faith involves the mass consumption of goods in the form of books, cassettes, and videos.”⁴⁷ “Perhaps the most striking example of how the Word is invested with physical qualities,” Coleman observed, “is evident in the way many Faith adherents, a group of evangelicals in Sweden, describe the process of reading the Bible as a form of ingestion akin to eating. One can ‘hunger’ for or

Modern America.” Other scholars have remarked on the various products and commodities by which one engages in evangelical spiritual life, see Heather Hendershot, *Shaking the World for Jesus: Media and Conservative Evangelical Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 6, 11, 20, 22; Carol Flake, *Redemptorama: Culture, Politics, and the New Evangelicalism* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1984), 22.

⁴⁵ Dombek, “Shopping for the End of the World,” 4-5.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁴⁷ Simon Coleman, “All-Consuming Faith: Language, Material Culture and World-Transformation among Protestant Evangelicals,” *Etnofoor* 9, no. 1 (1996): 29, accessed April, 24, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25757879>.

‘get filled’ with the word.’⁴⁸ Coleman continued by saying, “Eating is an especially powerful image because it evokes the notion of internalizing truth, bypassing the distorting effects of both social context and intellect...”⁴⁹

Dombek and Coleman shed light on an important aspect of contemporary evangelical Christianity: the ubiquitous and arresting attention which is paid to actual things, actual goods, in short, the expanding and profitable commerce and economy of the evangelical movement. The studies of these two scholars point to a historical moment in which the evangelical’s attention and devotion to the Word, to faith, to God, dealt less with these things in and of themselves and more with the numerous and varied objects that one might consume. The consumption objects became in evangelicalism, in a sense, an intermediary step between the believer and the consummation of the faith experience.

While there can be no doubt that evangelical products dominant the evangelical movement after the Second World War, a problem arises when we turn our attention to them. First, the problem becomes explaining the role of these goods, the purpose the commodity plays, the power they have. We must search for and invent explanations of the commodity in evangelicalism. We must attribute certain meanings. Second, all the while, the deeper penetration of the commodity into the evangelical religion is left obscured. It is not only the case that evangelicals simply used and perceived commodities as a means of expressing or cultivating faith; faith as such became, in this religious movement of the Cold War, an object to be consumed, the very intangibility of belief became a good to be hawked. The evangelical’s conceptualization of their religion and their belief went beyond actual products; it was, to be sure, more radical.

Before we consider the implications that such a form might have for identity, there is another essay that deals with evangelicalism and the commodity in a surprising and unanticipated way. One of the few other studies that has attempted to unveil the proximity between evangelicalism and the commodity is an article by Gerardo Marti a professor of sociology whose academic work focuses on race, religion, and identity. Marti, in his 2010 article entitled “Ego-Affirming Evangelicalism: How a Hollywood Church Appropriates Religion for Workers in the Creative Class,” approaches the question from an entirely different perspective. Studying an evangelical church in Los Angeles, Marti established the context in which this particular church, to his mind, flourished: “Self-branding is a

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

phenomenon of modern work life, and individuals increasingly become entrepreneurs regarding their own public self.”⁵⁰ It was, according to Marti, in the age of self-branding as an undeniable facet of modern work life, that evangelicalism finds fertile ground for its own cultivation. Because of this, reasoned Marti, “We need to look at how religion operates among believers in an age where identity is a commodity and workers must successfully promote themselves for multiple occupational opportunities to economically thrive.”⁵¹ The following quotation describes how this particular church aids followers in the selling of the self:

And there is a ready affinity between spreading fame for their [the creative class'] personal skills and spreading the fame for religiously based communal values and beliefs. In other words, the occupational circumstances of workers at Oasis [the Hollywood church] force them into a constant stream of self-promotion, and once they have the vision of using the influence to spread ideas and beliefs that they hold dear, they use the same set of skills to promote the fame of Jesus Christ and his Church.⁵²

What Marti brought to light in this particular study, though it is outside our particular chronological framework, was the role evangelicalism exercised in guiding the practitioner through the endless process of selling one's personal identity. Evangelization, the selling of the Gospel, serves as a testing ground for the eventual task of marketing one's own image and as a reinforcement of the self-promoting experience of the modern workplace. Or, vice versa, the continuously repeated act of selling one's identity is given daily confirmation as one participates in the activity of selling faith commodified. Seen in this way, evangelicalism appears, in addition to being conceived of as a commodity and a source of commodity production, as a forum or marketplace where one can be steered through the arcades of capital, a place where the commodification of oneself is given tacit and sacred sanction. The experience of evangelicalism, the experience of faith itself, was a mimesis of the world of labor. Selling religion becomes an exercise in selling one's identity.⁵³

We have established the gradual commodification of American evangelical Christianity between 1945 and 1981 in various ways. We have considered evangelicalism as

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Gerardo Marti, “Ego-affirming Evangelicalism: How a Hollywood Church Appropriates Religion for Workers in the Creative Class,” *Sociology of Religion* 70, no. 1 (2010): 52.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 54.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

a form of labor; though for this, in *Christianity Today* and with Graham, we can glean little concrete evidence. We have observed with Graham, *Christianity Today*, as well as other evangelical churches, the reconceptualization of faith as a good that one can sell and consume. We considered evangelicalism and the plethora of worldly promises associated with it as form of commodity fetishism. We have also briefly considered the proliferation of actual evangelical consumer goods. Finally, we have seen how, though it is outside of our period of focus, evangelicalism became a way in which the activity of selling oneself was mirrored in the selling of religion. The question we must now consider is, To what is owed this turn of events? What brought about the transformation whereby religion and commodification became intermixed? What was to be achieved with seeing one's God as the equivalent of soap? Was this occurrence an inevitability? Why did evangelicals make the active decision to approach evangelicalism in this way, fixing the commodity as one of the principal ways in which faith was to be understood, expressed, and accessed? What relation can the development of the commodity form in evangelicalism have with the cultivation of personal identity?

We must keep in mind that the contemporary evangelical movement, after World War II, began to spread and crystalize in a period of time when the dominance of the commodity began to approach its apex. We have already spoken of the increasing importance of consumption, in American society during the post World War II era, in the conceptualization of the so-called American dream. Beyond this, we might remember that this was a period when men and women began to see themselves as commodities, as things to be sold, as goods to be marketed, as products to be advertised. The division between who one was and what one purchased, the age-old question between being and having, was a barrier that grew every thinner. Marti, in his study, called ours the "age of identity commodification."⁵⁴ In *The Culture of Consumption*, Fox and Lears touch upon the advent of a world where people see themselves as objects to be sold: "Individuals have been invited to seek commodities as keys to personal welfare, an even conceive of their own selves as commodities. One sells not only one's labor and skills, but one's image and personality."⁵⁵ The *Weltlage* in which men and women see themselves as a commodity, was also described by Theodor Adorno, who saw this occurrence as an innate quality of the commodity form. Adorno, a German philosopher, sociologist, and important figure in the Frankfurt School,

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 61.

asserted in *The Culture Industry*, a collection of essays first published in 1991, “The fetish character of the commodity lays claim to actual people; they themselves become fetishes.”⁵⁶ All of these citations point to an emerging historical moment when the human mind began to enter into a radically different conceptualization of the human being.

When one considers the powerful and intoxicating experience of consumption—viewing and acquiring, displaying and discarding—seen falsely as a means by which to build one’s personal identity, the evangel’s turn to the commodity form begins to fall into proper perspective, as a natural participation in the reality of modern life, an incorporation of one of modernity’s most visible symbols and rituals. Evangelicals, then, came to the realization that the welcoming and alluring murmur of the commodity is what speaks to modern men and women. In the contemporary period, it is the material upon which, ostensibly, the elaboration of identity is carried out. It is to its voice, and not to God’s, that we are attuned. Bauman, in *Society Under Siege* validates the connection between the commodity and personal identity:

The most common, intense, and absorbing experience, the experience most likely to supply the raw material for world-imaging, is that of the consumer: an experience of life as a series of consumer choices made in response to the attractions put on display by competing shopping malls, television channels, and websites; but also in public spaces and inside private abode’s increasingly shaped, but above all perceived and made sense of, after their pattern...the power of the consumer experience over the imagination is so overwhelming because of the corroboration it receives from all other aspects of individualized life...⁵⁷

Identity and the increasingly dominant function that consumption played in personal identity’s pseudo-formation, in the contemporary age, emerged as essential aspects in the commodification of evangelicalism. But, we might ask, does what is purchased in the marketplace even contain the makings of identity? Does the commodity become a mode of expression or a mask, the semblance of personal identity? Can it even supply substance to the cultivation of a collective identity, which, we saw, evangelicals explicitly pretended to offer? It seems to be that, in the adoption of modernity’s most powerful and commanding form, we are provided with a vivid confirmation that evangelicalism emerged on the plane

⁵⁵ Richard Wightman Fox, T. J. Jackson Lears, introduction to *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980*, ed. Richard Wightman Fox and T.J. Jackson Lears (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), xii.

⁵⁶ Theodor W. Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, ed. J. M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge Classics, 2001), 191.

⁵⁷ Bauman, *Society Under Siege*, 45-46.

of collective and personal identity, that it began to erect its structure on identity's surface, in the very cleavage and burden of identity's formation. More than simply an answer to and affirmation of a certain type of economic organization of life, the commodification of evangelicalism stood as an apparent solution, as an attempt to create, a collective identity. In so doing, the commodification of evangelicalism appeared as a resolution to a crisis of personal identity that one might experience, a solution to the uncertainty and difficulty faced by one forced to navigate the ever-changing world of consumption.

In the utilization of the commodity to further evangelicalism, consumption took its place next to godliness. In American evangelicalism during the Cold War, the global apparatus of capital found new vigor, new sources of confirmation, new gestures of sanctification. The commodity and evangelicalism as a commodity related indelibly to expansion, another of evangelicalism's predominant, cohesive forms. Commodity reproduction was and is a never-ending cycle, a circle pushing outwards. Here, we have given fundament to an important distinction. We have moved away from a fixation on evangelical products themselves and come to the realization that evangelicalism, with every prayer and every conversion, every religious ceremony, every experience of faith, insofar as there hangs over this an *a priori* understanding of religion as an object to be sold, a good to be pandered, and insofar as it was a product of labor, was and is an act of consumption.

The Evangelical and Technique

*...technological production, at the very beginning, was in the grip of dreams...technology is,
at certain stages, evidence of a collective dream...*
—Walter Benjamin⁵⁸

Technology, for the evangelical movement between 1945 and 1981, was a collective dream. Technology, far beyond the incorporation of television as a major component of evangelicalism, served, like the commodity, as a point around which to gather, as a collective cause to champion. We arrive now at the most difficult stretch of our journey. We turn to evangelicalism's technological form, the complex interrelation between the American evangelical movement, its leaders, its followers, its churches, on the one hand,

⁵⁸ Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin; prepared on the basis of the German volume ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 152.

and technology, on the other. In our contemporary age, the question of technology is at once the most pressing and the most perplexing. It is a question of urgency for us who are, to use a phrase of Arendt's, enmeshed in the "technological fabric."⁵⁹ *Nolens volens*, we are in technology's clutches, in its embrace, and in its ubiquitous presence.

In our own times, thinking about technology stands before us as an imperative for the simple reason that it has come to dominate quotidian life and has spread its dominion across the globe.⁶⁰ Here, it appears before us full of promise and as our salvation, there as our damning destruction. Technology has set itself up in the midst of relations between human beings, becoming the medium, the road, through which all relations pass. Through technology, the world has witnessed a dramatic reorganization of human life, commerce, travel, leisure, as well as the arrangement of the domestic space. Technology has also facilitated an intensified the exploitation of the earth and its resources. Apart from the overwhelming and vexing importance that technology has for our contemporary age, it became, increasingly, an evermore visible aspect of the evangelical movement during this period of crystallization. The end of the Second World War and the Cold War that followed, for instance, witnessed the development of new technological feats of destruction, new possibilities of annihilation. As such, the technological form, in the context of collective and personal identity in American evangelicalism, warrants closer attention.

The emergence of the evangelical movement coincided with the appearance of television. Though first developed in the 1930s, it wasn't until after the Second World War that television was available to the American public. At the beginning of the 1960s, there was already a television in nine out of ten households in the United States.⁶¹ On the heels of television's rapid diffusion in American society, the evangelical swiftly followed, making religious programs a staple of the American television landscape and religious life in the United States. For example, what would later become one of the largest and most important evangelical organizations was founded by the televangelist Pat Robertson (1930-) in 1959.⁶² By 1976, Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) had become a million-dollar enterprise and received \$20 million in viewer contributions in a single year.⁶³ In 1963, Robertson began his well-known evangelical television program *The 700 Club*. The 700

⁵⁹ Hannah Arendt, *Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, 1949-1975*, ed. Carol Brightman (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 226.

⁶⁰ Faragher, *Out of Many*, 804.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Taylor West, "La derecha cristiana y la construcción de una comunidad estadounidense. The 700 Club," in *Másteres de la UAM. Año académico 2011-2012* (Madrid, Ediciones UAM, 2015).

⁶³ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 12-13.

Club became Robertson's principal platform for social, political, and religious discourse, his most efficient tool for collecting funds, and his primary mode of disseminating American evangelicalism's political ideology.⁶⁴ The program is one of the longest running television programs in history and is still on air today. CBN serves as a prototypical evangelical business model. With the millions of dollars in revenue generated through his network, Robertson was able to finance his other evangelical endeavors. In 1977, Robertson had amassed the necessary capital to found his Regent University in Virginia. In 1985, the televangelist became a significant private donor to the contras, the American-supported rebel group fighting against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.⁶⁵ That same year, the televangelist even hosted a "telethon" for the contras. In the American presidential election of 1988, Robertson saw fit to run for the Republican candidacy.⁶⁶ He used The 700 Club and its wide audience to garner support and solicit political contributions for a presidential campaign that ultimately ended in failure. Though his direct foray into politics was short-lived, it marked an important and historic approximation between contemporary evangelicalism and American politics. A major figure in American evangelicalism was now seeking to wield institutionalized political power.

The 1988 run for public office was not the only instance of Robertson's political dabbling. In 1981, he established the Freedom Council, which, due to alleged tax violations, ran afoul with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and was eventually shut down.⁶⁷ After Robertson's attempt to grab executive power in 1988, he founded the Christian Council, which, like the Freedom Council, was designed to further evangelical political initiatives and organize the evangelical collective into a cohesive and influential political force. Robertson's Christian Council played an important role in the political successes of evangelicals in the 1990s.⁶⁸

Television, this collective point around which evangelicals began to gather, through the long and public career of Robertson, became more than a personal pathway to political power and a way of fomenting the evangelical political agenda. Television became a space for evangelical performance, a space in which Robertson could make outlandish claims and give voice to overt calls for violence. Once such instance occurred in 1985 when the evangelical television host claimed he, through the power of his prayer, redirected Hurricane

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 14-21.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 72-73.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁶⁸ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 255.

Gloria.⁶⁹ In another hurricane-related incident, in 2012, Roberson, argued that Hurricane Sandy was divine punishment for what the pastor believed to be rampant homosexuality in the United States.⁷⁰ Natural disasters were not the only area of concern for the aging evangelical television host. In 2006, according to Laurie Goodstein, writing in *The New York Times*, Robertson pleaded for the American government to assassinate Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.⁷¹

Performance in evangelical television reached its climax with the televangelism scandals of the 1980s. The well-known and highly public indiscretions and antics of Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker, Jimmy Swagger, and Oral Roberts have become a point of considerable focus for scholars who study American evangelicalism.⁷² With these television and religious celebrities, we find the drama of evangelical belief set into a flow of images across the screen. The fallenness of man, the scandal of existence, the depravity of the human, the straying from the right path, was all visibly portrayed, for the consumer audience. Evangelicals also offered up for the collective and voyeuristic consumption of the evangelical viewing public the act of contrition, the moments and displays of confession, the splendor of rebirth. Interesting though they may be, for the history of evangelicalism's origins, the subject of this dissertation, the scandals or of little import.

We have paused here and considered more fully the question of televangelism for the reason that it was by far the most visible way technology permeated evangelical churches. Because of the overwhelming importance and presence of televangelism, scholars have made this specific aspect of evangelicalism one of the principal areas of focus.⁷³ But the question of the evangelical and technology moves decidedly beyond the now global phenomenon of televangelism. *Christianity Today* and Graham point to an evangelical

⁶⁹ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 12.

⁷⁰ Mary Elizabeth Williams, "Pastor: Blame Gays for Hurricane Sandy," *Salon.com*, October 29, 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/10/29/pastor_blame_gays_for_hurricane_sandy/.

⁷¹ Laurie Goodstein, "Pat Robertson - Week in Review," *The New York Times*, January 8, 2006, accessed June 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/weekinreview/08goodstein.html>.

⁷² For commentary on the scandals of televangelism see Quentin J. Schultze, *Televangelism and American Culture: The Business of Popular Religion* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991), 24, 32, 69-95; Steve Bruce, *Pray TV: Televangelism in America* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 204, 206-208; Bobby C. Alexander, *Televangelism Reconsidered: Ritual in the Search for Human Community* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994), 1, 19-21; Jeffrey K. Hadden, and Anson Shupe, *Televangelism: Power and Politics on God's Frontier* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1988), 4-19; Razelle Frankl, *Televangelism: The Marketing of Popular Religion* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 163-165.

⁷³ For discussions of evangelical media and television see Sara Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 1-43; Sara Diamond, *Not by Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998) 30; Turner, "Selling Jesus to Modern America," v, 25, 39, 299; Dombek, "Shopping for the End of the World: *Left Behind*, Evangelical Culture, and Apocalyptic Consumerism" (doctoral dissertation, New York University, 2005), 299. Hadden, *Televangelism: Power and Politics on God's Frontier*; George M. Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 81; Ruether, *America, Amerikkka*, 198; Bruce, *Pray TV*.

attitude towards technology that entails more than the single device of television. Through our primary sources, we see an entire worldview concerning technology unfolding. We see a struggle to anticipate and make sense of the coming changes. We see the effort to articulate an evangelical response to these technological changes. Part of this evangelical response was a stinging critique and a wariness of the developing technological world. This critique soon gave way to an almost universal praise of technology from the evangelical movement.

The Second World War saw the advent of new and efficient ways of killing—death had become something one produced—and was ended with the release of two atomic attacks upon urban centers in Japan. The decade of the 1950s saw the rise of television, which quickly spread, becoming a staple in the American home. For some in the evangelical community, the flurry of gadgets, new modes of communication, new ways of orienting life around and through technology, were indeed startling. It is to be remembered that evangelicals did not merely speak about technology, offer commentary on the meaning of technological developments, and attempt to guide their followers in what they felt to be the proper understanding and proper use of technique. Evangelicals, more than any other Christian communities in the United States at the time, embraced technology with zealotry, and become forerunners in the adoption of modern technology as a religious form. This was true with radio, but even more so regarding television, which became one of American evangelicalism's most recognizable forms.

What emerges is a picture of the nexus between evangelicalism and technology that moves beyond the single and preponderant consideration of televangelism, which has become such a recognizable aspect of this religious movement. The evangelical understanding of modern technology was, as we have mentioned, by no means homogenous. What is altogether surprising is that, concerning technology, here and there, exceptions arose, words of caution, of terror at what may come, were issued. It is with these exceptions that we begin the unraveling of the tapestry of technology and evangelicalism. From time to time, evangelicals casted towards the expansion and integration of technology, in American society, a critical eye. An editorial from 1974, "Coping with Technology," was one instance in which technology was viewed in a less than favorable light. "The multiplicity of hazards," observed the editorial, "inherent in our modern gadgetry is only too obvious."⁷⁴ The dangers that sprang from technology led the author of the editorial to propose that "A greater sense

⁷⁴ "Coping with Technology," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 29, 1974, 27 [743].

of responsibility is needed on the part of those who design and manufacture the stuff in the first place.”⁷⁵

In 1968, Harold B. Kuhn, whom we have encountered, employed a more ominous tone when describing the possible consequences of the ubiquitous spread of technology: “The power and the demonic possibility of multi-medium methodologies need to be considered in more depth than has been to date.”⁷⁶ Kuhn went on to add that technology contains within it the “possibilities for manipulation of the public mind through the deliberate selection of cultural input.”⁷⁷ Kuhn was one of the few to bring before his fellow evangelicals the reality that the spread of technology was often accepted uncritically, without consideration of its implications, and that it harbored unforeseen consequences.

Another writer, a certain Robert L. Cleath, in 1974, communicated his fear that the gradual dominance of technology, as well as the spread of bureaucracy, might usher in a stultification of human passion, emotion, and creativity. The growth of these two phenomena was paid for, in the eyes of this evangelical, with something vital in the human experience.⁷⁸ An editorial from 1968, described a similar situation brought about by modern technology. Pointing to the progressive dominance of technology in American society, the editorial saw in this continuous rise the introduction of a new sense of meaninglessness into contemporary society.⁷⁹ To cite yet another example from 1965, Malcolm Nygren painted a gloomy picture of a freshly dawning world:

Great changes are taking place in the Western world as technology comes to full fruit. Machines are replacing men and doing their job better and faster...‘Cybernation’ is the term used to describe the next generation in machine-development—devices that replace men’s brains as well as their hands. Whole categories of jobs are being wiped out. Before all this is finished, man’s life will have undergone one of the most radical alterations the world has seen.⁸⁰

Another illustrative critique of technology that came from the evangelical community was T. Eugene Coffin’s (1914-1999) satirical article “Genesis 1969” in which he composed a litany

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Harold B. Kuhn, “The Multi-Medium Man,” *Current Religious Thought, Christianity Today*, May 24, 1968, 48 [864].

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Robert L. Cleath, “Needed: Christian Professors Who Profess,” *Christianity Today*, May 24, 1974, 8 [978].

⁷⁹ “The Underside of Thanksgiving,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 22, 1968, 25 [175].

⁸⁰ Malcolm Nygren, “Automation and the Biblical View of Man,” *Christianity Today*, August 27, 1965, 16 [1164].

of some of the negative consequences of the technological transformations taking place at the end of the 1960s. Coffin said, with irony:

Thus was all the modern world completed with its host of ingenious devices created by man. In the seventh era man said, Now I will rest and enjoy the fruits of all my labors. But the screaming jets would not let him sleep; the gadgets and expanded vision gave him stomach ulcers; his unlimited power kept him nervously suspicious of his neighbors; and the creation in his own image [the computer] gave him answers to his questions he did not like.⁸¹

Coffin, in the title of his article, suggested what he felt to be the ultimate outcome of the technological world: human beings had come to see themselves as the Creator, as gods with inexhaustible and miraculous powers. The genesis of humans and their history did not lie in the remoteness of the past; origin, creation, and life were now here, newly emerging in the middle of the twentieth century. Coffin captured and attempted to draw out the pretension and hubris that often accompanies the world of technique. In this particular evangelical's estimation, there was a certain incompatibility between the modern technological vision and the Christian conceptualization of the world. In the technicized vision of the contemporary era, men and women saw themselves as creators, as the master of all; God, in short, had been supplanted.

For some in the evangelical community, the flurry of gadgets, new modes of communication, new ways of orienting life around and through technology, were indeed startling. Atomic technology, because it had become a political question involving the conflict between the United States and the USSR, was not subject to the same harsh evangelical critique. Instead, amongst evangelicals, we find that there was a frequent and vibrant survey of the power and destruction of atomic energy, a parading of nuclear Armageddon before the reader. In *Christianity Today*, the unavoidable consciousness of atomic power's destructive capability did not translate into opposition to this sort of technology, a questioning of the use and proliferation of atomic weaponry. "We only await," said one editorial in 1958, "impending atomic, hydrogenic, or satellite doom."⁸² Concerning nuclear power, Samuel M. Shoemaker, writing in *Christianity Today* in 1958, argued in favor of using atomic energy. For Shoemaker, in his article which was meant to ponder the Incarnation (God made man) of Christ, the question of nuclear power and its proliferation

⁸¹ T. Eugene Coffin, "Genesis 1969," *Christianity Today*, January 17, 1969, 7 [335].

⁸² "Law and Reformation," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, October 27, 1958, 20.

was one of use: “No material thing is evil in itself, but by its wrong use. Atomic energy can turn the world into a graveyard, but it can also help turn it into a garden, if the men who control it use it for the right ends.”⁸³

Also from 1958, was H. H. Lippincott, who mentioned the horrors of the nuclear age while simultaneously deriding attempts to bring nuclear proliferation to an end. “The survival of humanity is at stake... The harbingers of the future are ominous,” said Lippincott, pandering to the reader the world’s destruction, “‘The ashes of death’ already poison many waters and beaches of the world.”⁸⁴ In the face of the nuclear threat from Russia, in the face of a poisoned world, Lippincott advocated the expansion of nuclear weapons, the very source of the destruction he decried. To his mind, the non-proliferation movement lacked a scientific attitude, credentials, and substantial proof.⁸⁵ The whole atmosphere from which the non-proliferation movement sprang, was to Lippincott, permeated with a debasing “sentimentalism.”⁸⁶

Elsewhere in this dissertation, we have seen Hoover and Graham’s flirtatious invocations of atomic obliteration. Others, such as Phyllis Schlafly (1924-2016), the well-known conservative activist, furthered the notion, when contemplating nuclear armaments, that it, like other technological devices, was a gift from God. Though Schlafly was Catholic, her ideology was in many ways aligned with evangelicalism and she worked closely with conservative Protestants on her various political projects. “‘The atomic bomb is a marvelous gift that was given to our country by a wise God,’” said Schlafly.⁸⁷

These occasional protestations and attempts at restraining the unbridled extension of technology, the efforts to regard technology more critically, which we have up until this point observed in *Christianity Today*, emerged amidst an entirely different and eventually triumphant understanding in the evangelical community. What we have seen thus far were the voices of a few individuals, which were eventually overwhelmed by the predominant evangelical view and the gradual incorporation of technology as a religious form. The advent and cementation of the technological apparatus was greeted by most evangelicals with a joy that was seldom exhibited towards other areas of contemporary life. In vivid contrast to other areas of life where evangelicals during the Cold War perceived a ubiquitous state of dissolution and degeneracy, members of the evangelical movement, as the United

⁸³ Samuel M. Shoemaker, “The Word was made Flesh,” *Christianity Today*, December 8, 1958, 3.

⁸⁴ H. H. Lippincott, “Nuclear Threat and Soviet Russia,” *Christianity Today*, October 27, 1958, 13.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁸⁷ Schlafly quoted in Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 193.

States developed new technologies of destruction and production, saw in the implacable march of technique, in the “sheer dynamics of modern scientific and technological developments,”⁸⁸ endless cause for praise and celebration. This attitude towards technique has already come shining through for us in evangelical ideas about the American space program, perhaps one of the most complex technological undertakings of the time. We saw in the third chapter that evangelical Christians fomented the mystical notion that the United States’ penetration of space was both an act of God and a heavenly blessing. This line of thinking was not limited to the American exploration of space. In the article “Space-Age Teaching Tools,” from 1959, the author introduced the reader to God’s many earthly creations: “For the early Christian Church, God provided a common world language. He used the Roman Empire to develop a highway and sea route system which was greatly advanced for that day. At the end of the dark and sleepy Middle Ages,” the author continued, “God provided the printing press so that it was ready when the Reformation came. Today the car, the train, and the airplane are being used to speed the Word of God to all around the world.”⁸⁹ To the understanding of this particular evangelical, God’s intricate and repeated interventions into history did not end there; the piece continued, “...God has also provided special teaching tools for an age that is complicated, confused, and complacent. Radio and television are being used to tell the good news of salvation across land and sea.”⁹⁰ What emerged here was an effort to guide one’s thinking about technology itself, to bring one into conformity with the new age of space and technique, to gather the evangelical faithful into the locus of this new center: technique. Therefore, the logic of the article exhorted, one need neither fear nor question the advent of a new world, nor the altered human relations that emerging technologies might engender. To embrace television was nothing more than to delight and make use of God’s benevolent and timely creation.

If the origin of technology was not divine, it was surely the result of Christianity, argued Henry. Henry’s idealized view of technique, which he promoted in a panel discussion in 1968, went as follows: “I would say that Christianity alone makes technology possible, in the long run, in terms of this view of an ordered universe and all that is implied in this, and that only Christianity can protect technology from arbitrary exploitation of man and the universe.”⁹¹ Thus, Henry, with astounding powers of alchemy, transforms Christianity, by which he means evangelicalism, into both the progenitor of technique and

⁸⁸ Heschel, “The Moral Dilemma of the Space Age,” 216.

⁸⁹ “Space Age Teaching Tools,” *Christianity Today*, August 31, 1959, 7.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

its guardian. Here, with the advance of technique, evangelicalism acquires a prestigious collective role. It was through Christianity that technology emerged and through it that technology would be preserved, its proper “use” safeguarded. In the American evangelical movement of the post-World War II period, the inclination to see technology as associated, in some way with God, was common. So popular was this view among evangelicals that Razelle Frankl, in her 1986 book *Televangelism: The Marketing of Popular Religion*, observed, “Television, according to televangelists, is a God-given gift.”⁹² By making technology an intervention of God or the product of Christianity, the evangelical handed down judgment at the outset, before any questions can even arise. In connecting this phenomenon with the sacred, in making the church the site of the use and development of new manifestations in the technological cornucopia, the entire global apparatus of technique appeared, in the evangelical *Weltanschauung*, as something supremely good.

Whether the origin of technology was to be found in God or the Church, evangelicals almost always conceived of technology as a tool, an object over which the user exerts control and direction.⁹³ In 1966, for example, *Christianity Today* spoke in lofty tones of the use of new technological developments. “Space-age Christian pioneers,” informed the magazine, “who look through a planet-wide lens are pondering how evangelicalism can be computerized—how the latest techniques of scientific management can best serve the Christian task force.”⁹⁴ The marriage of technique and evangelicalism could only be consummated, the piece deduced by placing total and uncompromising trust in the promising possibilities that technology afforded men and women: “To succeed, evangelicals must strip away any vestige of suspicion about technology or intelligence employed in God’s service. And they must break out of the century-long rut of isolationism to overcome their present dearth of cooperative planning.”⁹⁵ At first glance, the article’s call to embrace technology and intelligence might appear as an indictment of the anti-intellectualism that some have said plagues Christian fundamentalism in the United States.⁹⁶ This is perhaps the

⁹¹ “Technology, Modern Man, And the Gospel,” [Panel Discussion] *Christianity Today*, July 5, 1968, 5 [965].

⁹² Razelle Frankl, *Televangelism: The Marketing of Popular Religion* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 151.

⁹³ For more on the instrumental view of technology see Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977), 5; Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Bluff*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1990) 10, 35.

⁹⁴ “New Era for Christian Communication,” *Christianity Today*, October 14, 1966, 3 [3].

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Marsden discusses the question of anti-intellectualism in Christian fundamentalism and evangelicalism (though for him it is doubtful if this term can be applied), see Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 114-118.

case. But in the midst of the global unfurling of a technicized world, the invitation appeared more as a goad to uncritical and reflexive acceptance of the world that was then taking shape. Almost a year later, in much the same tone, a news piece in *Christianity Today* bemoaned the lack of enthusiasm in evangelical circles regarding television, saying, “From the religious perspective, the most lamentable thing is that the churches have hardly begun to use television.”⁹⁷

In 1974, to the mind of Henry, the technological reconfigurations of the United States should be accepted by citizens as a cause for celebration, a source of joy:

A nation should be publicly credited for whatever virtues it distinctively pursues. Americans have no moral duty to suppress gratitude for significant national achievements—noteworthy social improvements made without the savagery of the French and Russian revolutions, use of American military might to destroy Hitler, technological competence to split the atom and put a man on the moon, and the world’s highest per-capita availability of foods, bathtubs, automobiles, and for good or ill, television sets.⁹⁸

In Henry’s formula, the pursuit of technology was the pursuit of virtue.

In our period of study, as evangelicals attempted to come to grips with the meaning and consequences of the proliferation of new technological apparatuses, an article from Clarence W. Jones (1900-1986) offers more insight into the ways in which evangelicals understood the technological form. In September of 1968, Jones began his article thus: “Television can be a beaming Buddha or a one-eyed ogre. It has become the most dominating and controversial servant of society in modern life, the most gluttonous consumer of attention ever to sit at civilization’s table...the handy family counsel giving gratuitous guidance on moral values and social standards.”⁹⁹ Jones, who stylized himself as an evangelical “strategist,” proceeded to praise the utilization of technology for evangelism: “The use of television for gospel witness to an entire nation is thrilling. The influence upon individuals and communities [as with Graham’s televised crusade in Great Britain] was immediate and immense.”¹⁰⁰ “Some Christian leaders commend television,” said Jones in standard evangelical fare, “not only as one of the most outstanding achievements of modern science but also as God’s communications gift to his Church of the twentieth century, a gift

⁹⁷ “TV: The Churches’ Lament,” CT News, *Christianity Today*, September 29, 1967, 22 [1246].

⁹⁸ Carl F. H. Henry, “Footnotes: Has Patriotism Had Its Day?” *Christianity Today*, June 7, 1974, 26 [1054].

⁹⁹ Clarence W. Jones, “Television Airwaves—Evangelism’s Frontier,” *Christianity Today*, September 13, 1968, 3 [1171].

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

making it possible to fulfill the goal of world-wide evangelization in this generation.”¹⁰¹ We can gather from Jones’ words that he believed technology was a tool, but, of greater importance, it was a tool through which one can exercise upon others immediate and immense control. We also see that the narcotizing stroll into passivity, what Jones classified as the most gluttonous consumer of attention, was acceptable so long as what was reflected was evangelicalism or that which was congenial to the movement. The value of television, as Jones saw it, was merely a question of input. Having established his understanding that television was a tool to be used, Jones ended his commentary in a peculiar way. Jones prophetically announced, “The really great frontiers for Christianity today lie in the air,” which is to say precisely where men and women cannot go.¹⁰² Jones’ conclusion contained the celebration of the ostensible powers of technology, the fascination and devotion to those things that technology can achieve that human beings, strictly speaking, cannot. In figuratively placing the future of Christianity outside of human reach, outside of the human domain on earth, Jones disclosed the unspoken conviction that evangelization, the great task of the evangel, was no longer a human endeavor, it was something to be automated, it was the task of technique itself.

Graham also addressed the question of television in an interview with *Christianity Today* in 1958. Graham began by deriding television's influence, its role in perpetuating what was seen as immorality: “I think that television, for example, is having a detrimental effect on Christians. I think that they are no longer sensitive to sin. I think that television has brought the night club into the home, along with violence and sex-things that Christians looked upon 10 years ago with abhorrence.”¹⁰³ Moments later, when Graham was asked about one of his rallies in San Antonio in which 3,000 people were reported to have converted and the role that television played in this event, he said, “That signaled to me that television has given us a penetration that radio has never accomplished.”¹⁰⁴ For Graham, just as was the case with Jones, the influence of television was detrimental to society in so far as it did not exude evangelical values and was not an appendage of evangelicalism’s message. In the hands of the faithful, evangelicals promised, television became a tool with which to further penetrate the surrounding world, a mode by which to extend the influence of the evangelical movement.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 5 [1173].

¹⁰³ Carl F. H. Henry, Robert J. Lamont, Billy Graham, and Dr. Harold John Ockenga, “Billy Graham Speaks: The Evangelical World prospect.” [Interview] *Christianity Today*, October 13, 1958, 3.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

In the emerging evangelical movement of the Cold War, as new techniques appeared and as the question of technology was becoming more critical to the conduct of everyday life, some evangelicals transmitted, on occasion, their awareness of the dangers that technique and technology posed, specifically for their religious activities. "One great danger," read a 1967 article in *Christianity Today*, which conveyed this sentiment, "is that mass evangelism may be reduced to a technique to be refined," that is, an autonomous, technical, and technologically dominated process bereft of human touch, involvement, and qualities.¹⁰⁵ With Jones and Graham, we see this stark and feared possibility begin to come to fruition. With these two examples, we see the evangelical message receding into the background, overshadowed by evangelicalism's flight into the ether, blurred by the promises and penetrating powers of television. In this almost imperceptible change of scene, evangelicals began to contemplate less the authenticity and veracity of their sacred mission and message and more actual technological objects themselves, in this particular case, television. Here, Jones and Graham found cause for celebration in the capabilities of television. In the evangelism of the "space age," evangelicals placed the future of Christianity, the very activity of evangelization, *the* great collective task of the evangelical Christian, beyond the grasp of the human. In this new reality, the evangelical dream of evangelizing the entire world in one generation could be achieved. However, now this achievement would not necessarily be the fruit of human endeavor but the byproduct of bringing technology into the evangelical movement. In a very real way, the evangelical's new collective task was furthering technology, which, it was thought, would inevitably occasion evangelicalism's glorious spread across the globe.

Key figures in the American evangelical movement, as it was solidifying during the Cold War, exhibited towards the dissemination of technology a varied attitude. At certain moments, we have seen, there persisted a definite incredulity vis-à-vis the promises of technology, the trust in its progress, and an awareness of the possible negative and destructive consequences that could result from the creation and spread of certain technologies. The atomic cloud of Armageddon had left its image on the human mind, and evangelicals would never fully escape it. But the skepticism evangelicals voiced was, during this period, only occasional and fleeting and was eventually overwhelmed by the triumphant view: the evangelical's lasting embrace and trust in a world dominated by technology. Whenever geopolitical concerns were involved, wherever the United States' power was in

¹⁰⁵ "Sighting the Final Third of the Twentieth Century," *Christianity Today*, January 20, 1967, 3 [379].

question, as was the case with nuclear weapons, the evangelical wholly capitulated in favor of technology.

In the often-unsettling presence of rapid and overwhelming technological change, American evangelicals struggled to fully comprehend the content and meaning of the age of space, the age of the atom, an age of nuclear holocausts. In this, of course, American evangelicals were not alone. It is difficult to conjure the depth of fear, to articulate the uncertainty, which the spread of new technologies might have engendered. Navigating the fog of the unknown and the unforeseen, evangelicals developed many new landmarks by which to orient themselves. The existence, use, and incorporation into evangelicalism of these new instances of the global apparatus of technology were all areas evangelicals sought to understand, justify, and defend. The typical apologies for technique emanating from evangelicals circles vacillated between technology as a gift from on high or product of Christianity to a tool made by and controlled by men and women. With new technological innovations, evangelicals moved to celebrate the virtues and splendor they might reflect on their country. In evangelicalism, the cause of patriotism tinged so many other considerations. At other times, evangelicals became indignant that the masses, the entire fellowship of evangelical Christianity, had not joined in on the litany of praise, adoration, and thanksgiving for the dissemination of technologies. They lamented the slow pace in which new devices had been incorporated into the life of the nation and the life of the Church. Through the collective evangelical understandings of technology as a product of an all-powerful God, an issuance of Christianity, or a manifestation of American virtue, what evangelicals moved to assert was the promise and benevolence of the age to come. In the evangelical mind, it was the guarantee of an evangelized humanity, where the irksome past of plurality would be overcome, giving way to the homogeneity of a reborn and regenerate world.

This repeated collective evangelical response to technology, and the incorporation of technology in the evangelical churches of the American Republic, stood, at once, as a clear acknowledgment of and a reply to a problem of personal identity. The technology of the modern world does not only affect and menace collectives. The question of technology reveals itself, also, to the individual man and woman. We, as individuals, are left alone to decide how to live in and make sense of the world as technology encroaches, as the growing and multifaceted reach and power of *technē* ensnares us. The evangelical's new technological form stands as an answer, as an invitation for the individual believer to acquiesce, abandon oneself, and make way for the coming world. But the highly pertinent

question of how technology affects personal identity is more difficult to answer. Many thinkers have already addressed the question of technology and what it holds in store for men and women and their history. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger, for example, in his now famous essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” takes as self-evident the notion that technology has profoundly affected men and women in modernity. Not only this, he sees the lasting and greater danger of technology as being directed towards the essence of the human being and who he is and not as stemming from any possible physical destruction a machine might unleash. “The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology,” Heidegger wrote, “The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call to a more primal truth.”¹⁰⁶ As evangelicals perfected their technological form, the consequences for personal identity that accompanied the incorporation of modern technology into their religion as well as the evangelization for technology during the United States’ Cold War remain unclear.

In viewing technology as a new dawn, evangelical’s placed their understanding in perfect harmony with the predominate American view of technology in the period after World War II. Thus, once again, it is important to point out, we encounter in the evangelical technological form not the movement’s separation from the surrounding American culture but, instead, radical and multilayered alignment. So implacable and easily ascertainable is the American adoration of technique that Wuthnow, in his previously mentioned book, noted, “American faith in technology...is virtually immune to criticism or to doubts.”¹⁰⁷ In certain sectors of American society, to question technology or its progress is the modern equivalent of heresy. “Technology is,” Wuthnow also observed, with the United States in mind, “in its way, millennialism...”¹⁰⁸ This millennialism was apparent in the evangelical movement’s newly emerging form. Quentin J. Schultze, a professor of communications made similar observations concerning evangelicalism and technology. In his work *Televangelism and American Culture* from 1991, he remarked, “Evangelicalism’s faith in technology surfaces in all denominations.”¹⁰⁹ Schultze’s use of the word faith to describe the evangelical position regarding technology is revealing of the new pattern of

¹⁰⁶ Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 28.

¹⁰⁷ Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion*, 287.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 286.

¹⁰⁹ Schultze, *Televangelism and American Culture*, 55; see also 49.

evangelicalism's collective organization and orientation. Evangelicalism's trust in technology was ubiquitous.

Though scholars occasionally give attention to evangelicalism's general attitude towards technology, this is often eclipsed by the overwhelming attention that has been placed on televangelism. At times, in the secondary literature, evangelicalism's embrace of technology might appear to be reducible to the single instance of television. Instead, it emerged on different fronts and in relation to diverse occurrences, developing into a form that went far beyond television. As we have seen here, the emergence of evangelicalism occurred admits the spread of a global technological apparatus of which television was only a single part. In the wake of the worldwide diffusion and expansion of technology, we find that American evangelicals played a crucial part. In the United States, these Christians were champions of the new technological age. Alongside sharing the Christian message, evangelicals shared the promises of the changing world of technique. As the conflicts and struggles of the Cold War played themselves out, the American evangelical Christian was responsible for the sanctification of what is perhaps *the* quintessential phenomenon of the contemporary age.

The Idolatry of Might

Il potere è sempre seducente.

—Oriana Fallaci¹¹⁰

All of the different forms that evangelicals used to express their religion, which are under examination in this dissertation, gave concrete manifestation to Bauman's assertion that identity, in our contemporary age, had become a perpetual turning over, an endless revolution, a "palimpsest" identity. Expansion, the commodification of American evangelical Christianity, the incorporation and the endless praise of technology, and, as we shall see, the idolatry of might provided evangelicals with a way to seemingly express their collective identity. Of greater significance, these forms continuously gave the collective identity of the evangelical the quality of phantasmagorical change that is so familiar to the modern person, registers so powerfully in the contemporary mind, and receives constant and vivid corroboration in American society.

¹¹⁰ Oriana Fallaci, "Henry Kissenger," in *Intervista con la storia* (Milano: Rizzoli, 1974), 26.

In *The Anointed: Evangelical Truth in a Secular Age*, written in 2011, historian Randall J. Stephens and Karl W. Giberson, a Canadian physicist whose work focuses on the often tumultuous confluence of religion and science, argued that a new frame of reference was needed to understand American evangelicalism. Individuals, in the evangelical community after World War II, inform Stephens and Giberson, rise to a position of prominence because the faithful perceive them as “anointed” by God; they are believed to be prophets. “High-profile leaders,” the authors wrote, “who attract great followings, and who are, in the vocabulary of their constituents (and themselves), ‘anointed’ by God to speak for him to Christians, resemble the biblical prophets of old who spoke as God’s official messengers.”¹¹¹ Billy Graham, Oral Roberts, and Jerry Falwell were, according to the authors, exemplars of the prophet paradigm.¹¹² The two scholars go on to explain the idea of the prophet as understood by the evangel: “The figurative meaning of anointing refers to the process by which God sends his spirit in a special way to a person empowering that person to speak and lead other Christians.”¹¹³

The idea of the evangelical leader of the Cold War as prophet, rising from the smoldering embers of the New Israel (the United States), which evangelicals constantly argued was in a process of destruction, is indeed a compelling image. In the moment of undoing, the authors argue, the evangelical emerged poised to effect the nation’s salvation, to return it to the path of righteousness. This idea is of significance for us only in that it points to the figure of the prophet himself. One of the most important and illuminating works on these towering figures of the Hebrew Bible comes to us from one of twentieth-century Judaism’s most important thinkers, Abraham Joshua Heschel. We turn to Heschel for one precise reason, namely, that he holds in his mind both the prophet and power and touches their fundamental discord, permanently separating the two. In Heschel’s doctoral dissertation *The Prophets*, published in English in 1962, which was undertaken to understand the role, importance, and unique way of being of such men, Heschel said something altogether unexpected concerning the prophet and power, revealing an aspect of the ancient prophet of Israel, which bears inextricably on the life and dreams of the contemporary evangel. In the section “The Idolatry of Might,” Heschel asked:

¹¹¹ Karl W. Giberson, and Randall J. Stephens, *Anointed: Evangelical Truth in a Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 7.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 8.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

Why were so few voices raised in the ancient world in protest against the ruthlessness of man? Why are human beings so obsequious, ready to kill and ready to die at the call of kings and chieftains? Perhaps it is because they worship might, venerate those who command might, and are convinced that it is by force that man prevails.¹¹⁴

The prophets, claimed Heschel, rose up at different times and in different places to lay waste to “established patterns of indifference.”¹¹⁵ For Heschel, “The prophets repudiated the work as well as the power of man as an object of supreme adoration.”¹¹⁶ Heschel goes so far as to extend this prophetic repudiation of power to the entire realm of politics, though politics is, of course, not synonymous with power. “Isaiah,” informs Heschel, “could not accept politics as a solution, since politics itself, with its arrogance and disregard of justice, was a problem.”¹¹⁷ To the prophet, as Heschel sees him, whose overriding and all-encompassing concern was God, and God in relation to men and women, the wielding of power, the will to grasp at it, power’s adoration, and the participation in its form were wholly incompatibly with the theistic vision.

With the evangelical movement, with the so-called and self-proclaimed prophet of the twentieth century, we encounter something strikingly different. The renunciation of power and all its works, and all its pomps, was decidedly not what occurred in contemporary evangelicalism in the United States between 1945 and 1981. One may view the evangelical, through his or her relationship with power, as barred from the heights of the prophet or as a prophet of a new age whose attachment to power is astounding in its completeness.¹¹⁸ We, in the final section of this chapter, are not interested in the evangelical *qua* prophet of old; for us, such concerns are inconsequential. Rather, we are interested in the evangelical’s relation to power in this historical period, its development as yet another of evangelicalism’s predominant forms, and the undulations such an occurrence brings to personal and collective identity. Here, we are attentive, in this Christian movement, to the rumors of power’s promised acquisition, the dutiful and constant genuflection in its ostensible presence, and the

¹¹⁴ Abraham Joshua Heschel, *The Prophets* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 159.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 159.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹¹⁸ There is another problem with Giberson and Stephens’ use of the term prophet. Ruether observes, “Prophetic religion is a religion of self-criticism,” that is, it was a criticism of the Jewish community, a critique of the Jews, for the Jews, Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide*, 230. Heschel also underscores this idea, saying, “Instead of cursing the enemy, the prophets condemn their own nation,” that is, their own religious community. Abraham Joshua Heschel, *The Prophets*, 12. The rhetoric of decay and critique that is to be found in evangelicalism was, almost always, directed towards the American Republic, which is not synonymous with the evangelical church, and towards many outside of the evangelical movement. See also Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk*, 28-29.

will, celebrated and encouraged, to expand and achieve power. The evangel's energies and the evangel's mind, focused towards the idolatry of might, constituted a new evangelical form.

Heschel's notion of the idolatry of might is of particular significance in our uncovering of this aspect of evangelicalism for the dual aspect of the relation to power, which he, in his study of the prophets, elucidates. For Heschel, this form of idolatry does not consist in a simple will to power, a concerted effort to exert and gather in power, like the miser gathers in his money. In the first place, as he perceptively observed, there is a celebration of power itself, an adoration of the doings and works of men and women, which might reflect power's light. At times, said Heschel, "deep in our hearts is the temptation to worship the imposing, the illustrious, the ostentatious."¹¹⁹ Concomitant with this worship of might, was the will to achieve it, to organize and to be so as to expand and acquire power. Arendt was aware, as she wrote in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, that people could behave towards power as they might towards expansion, i.e., arrange power so as to achieve power: "power organized for its own sake would get more power."¹²⁰

The first and perhaps the most visibly identifiable facet of the idolatry of might in American evangelicalism, in the period following the Second World War, was, as Heschel has shown us, the adoration of power itself, the celebration of those occurrences or physical things that are believed to bestow or to be emblems of power. Of the evangelical movement's propensity to worship all that may bear a resemblance to power, we have already been given a glimpse. For the evangelical of the twentieth century, the amulet of the hour was technology. As we saw in the pervious section, Henry extolled the national achievements of the United States: the destruction of the atom and the unharnessing of its energy, putting a man on the moon, and the "heaven of wealth,"¹²¹ as Marx called it, of sumptuous consumer goods. The technological prowess of the United States, the exponentially expanding quantity of commodities, spoke to Henry as indubitable emanations from the font of American might. As such, Henry's words in 1974, not only served as a voice in service of technology, a drumming up of support, an attempt to discursively delineate the boundaries of a collective identity, but as a flirtation with might itself, as a goad to its adulation. Henry's observations were not only meant for internal contemplation of what it was to be an American, they were also directed, in a way, towards a wider

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁰ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 148.

audience. American power was not, of course, reaching its zenith in a vacuum; the context in which such celebrations of power emerged was the struggle with the forces of Soviet-style communism and the international competition of states. Henry's praise was a triumphant nod to his country's place of honor, its topmost position in the avant-garde of progress. Henry did not only name the sources and instances of American power, we will remember that he demanded gratitude and reverence in contemplation of the exploits of the American Republic.

In *Christianity Today*, rapture with American might was always eventually countered and juxtaposed with the horrifying prospect of its lost, the weakening of the nation's grip on world dominance, the creeping shadow of decadence, which we have already explored. Another example, from 1959, comes to us from Rene de Visme Williamson (1908-1998). Williamson was part of the reformed Calvinist tradition and graduated with a Ph.D. from Harvard. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s he was a professor of political science, primarily in the South.¹²² Williamson began his article in 1959 with the distressing toll of alarm: "America is in the doldrums politically, morally, and spiritually...many sources all point to this same low condition..."¹²³ "Threatened by lack of vitality inside and aggression outside, American democracy is in a critical condition."¹²⁴ Williamson followed this observation with glowing worship of the same virtues, which had so enraptured Henry. The Calvinist professor stood in awe of the United States' "vast natural resources, immense technological know-how, its stupendous economic power, its military competence..."¹²⁵ Despite these visible elements of power, the United States, argued the author, was in decline. "...The answer," for the current precariousness of the American future, the author posited:

lies with the progressive secularization of our national life which has eroded away much of the Christian foundation was laid, upon which American democracy depends for its vitality and proper functioning, and without which we cannot successfully compete with Communists for the minds, hearts, and souls of the people who live behind the Iron Curtain and in the uncommitted [non-Christian] parts of the world.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 100.

¹²² Cecil Eubanks, "Williamson, Rene de Visme," *First Principles*, October 9, 2016, accessed December 10, 2016, <http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=208&>.

¹²³ Rene de Visme Williamson, "The Future of American Democracy" *Christianity Today*, June 22, 1959, 8.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

Williamson concluded his article, offering up evangelicalism as the only viable solution to the problem of the salvation of American democracy and the defeat of communism: “Is there any way out of this dilemma?” he asked, “There is, and it can be summarized in one word: conversion. We must carry out the Great Commission.”¹²⁷ That is, to the mind of Williamson, American power could be maintained and safeguarded. The pathway to this end was, as was often the case in American evangelicalism, faith itself.

Apart from the very clear praising of American technology, military dominance, commodity production—those elements which appeared to confer power or to be tools through which power was wielded—the evangelical succumbed to this adoration in a way that almost passes us by imperceptibly. The belief that the foundation of the United States rested upon or in Christianity makes religion a sort of talisman, a source of power. To the mind of Williamson, this vital center was not only the ground from which all these virtues sprang, but could be used for the vanquishment of communism, a natural spring of otherworldly power whose application can be realized in this world. For Williamson, attachment to Christianity was not to be found in its central creed, its saving grace, but in its usability in overcoming communism, in perpetuating his country’s place of dominance.

The Vietnam War, spanning part of the 1960s and 1970s, once again drew the United States into the center of world affairs. It also provided evangelicals struggling to articulate and further their movement with additional and convenient opportunities to celebrate the United States’ unequalled status of dominance on the stage of the world. The American military, with its undeniable technological sophistication and supremacy, as well as its ever-increasing budget, was, now and again, another demonstration of this country’s rightful predominance amongst the nations. In an editorial from 1965, “Halting Red Aggression in Viet Nam,” which sought to justify the American incursion in Indochina, casting it in the most favorable of lights, is an example of the idolatry of might, which we are attempting to uncover. “The United States,” argued the editorial, “has no ulterior motives, wants no territory, and is willing to help in the development and growth of Southeast Asia.”¹²⁸ For those who held doubts as to the feasibility of a decisive victory over the United States’ communist foes in Southeast Asia, which evangelicals argued was born out of the best of American intentions, the editorial addressed directly, hinting at the ferocity and violence that the American government was capable and willing to perpetrate. “No possibility exists of

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ “Halting Red Aggression in Viet Nam,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, April 23, 1965, 32 [788].

military successes for aggressors,” the editorial jubilantly announced.¹²⁹ “Only the thinnest edge of American power has been unleashed,” the editorial warned presaging candidly and indifferently the destruction to come.¹³⁰ In 1965, as the American invasion expanded, and after threatening the full use of American military power, the “unleashing” of destruction, the editorial reminded readers that the United States was to be loved and respected: “America is still the greatest bastion for freedom, and it holds the greatest military power in history.”¹³¹ For the evangelical, freedom and military dominance and its destructive use could be uttered in the same breath. During the Cold War, the celebration of American power, the delightful contemplation of its use against foreign adversaries, in one of the evangelical movement’s most important publications, was a commonplace. The celebration and adoration of Christ, on the one hand, and war and power, on the other, occurred side by side in the same magazine. Just as God could be presented to the believer as one markets soap, so too could freedom be dealt out from the tip of the sword.

Closely connected with the idea of the United States as the joyous climax of world power, the historical pinnacle of military might, was the harrowing notion that such power had been lost, that the country found itself in the anguish of reversal. With such notions we are already familiar: the idea that what propelled the American Republic—Christianity, the American religious heritage, biblical foundations—into the role of potentate was slowing dispersing. Looked at from the perspective of power, a persuasive duality emerged, a paradox in which the evangel can, in one breath, glorify the dominance of the United States and, in another, become the rhetorician of its decline, utter the murmur of dissolution. Henry R. Van Til (1906-1961), writing in 1959, provides us with another example. Van Til, born in Indiana and raised a Calvinist, was a professor at Moody Bible Institute until 1958.¹³² Van Til began by reminding readers of the predominant evangelical maxim: that Christ should rule over all realms of life. “Religion is not of life a thing a part, it is man’s whole existence,” he wrote.¹³³ For Van Til, “The radical, totalitarian character of religion is such, then that it determines both man’s cultus and his culture.”¹³⁴ Previously, the motor of the United States was Christianity, religion was the secret source of its success, development, and unrivaled superiority, that is to say, its power. According to Van Til, the idol was in

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² “Memorial: Henry R. Van Til, 1906-1961,” *The Evangelical Theological Society*, 1961, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/5/5-1BETS_5-1_9-10_Memorials.pdf.

¹³³ Henry R. Van Til, “The Relation of Religion and Culture,” *Christianity Today*, September 14, 1959, 3.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

danger of being lost. "...Humanism," he said, "has introduced a new paganism, so that Christianity no longer controls the media of culture, and it is no longer the motivating power in the cultural urge of the West."¹³⁵ To Van Til's mind, Christianity had lost its pride of place in American culture; it no longer was in a position to dominate, to impose its influence. From the evangelical Christian's perspective the danger was twofold. First, there was the regrettable situation in which Christianity was no longer practiced. Second, and perhaps more alarming, with such a turn of events, the wellspring of American power was running dry.

In *Christianity Today*, this same sentiment was voiced by one of the evangelical movement's most important figures, Francis A. Schaeffer (1912-1984). Schaeffer, who was born into a Lutheran family but later converted to Presbyterianism (specifically to the Bible Presbyterian Church denomination), studied under the famed fundamentalist and controversial Protestant theologian J. Gresham Machen in the 1930s.¹³⁶ Eventually, after Machen's tutelage, Schaeffer moved to Switzerland founding the evangelical organization L'Abri where he would carry out his lifelong work of evangelization and combating the spread of theological liberalism, socially liberal attitudes.¹³⁷ Schaeffer was a prolific writer and his work has played a pivotal role in the Cold War articulation and promotion of contemporary evangelicalism. Schaeffer's 1981 *A Christian Manifesto* sold 290,000 copies in the first year of its publication.¹³⁸ Central to Schaeffer's evangelical outlook on life and the world was his steadfast belief in the rapid and alarming disintegration of the West, the abandonment of its essence.¹³⁹ Schaeffer's Christian manifesto was meant to mobilize evangelicals, especially in the United States, against what they generally perceived or characterized as the onslaught of secularization, which Schaeffer characterized under the umbrella term of "secular humanism."¹⁴⁰ In keeping with evangelical tradition, Schaeffer utilized a war-drenched vocabulary and, in the manifesto, painted the world with the

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³⁶ "Francis Schaeffer," *Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals*, accessed December 12, 2016, <http://www.wheaton.edu/isae/hall-of-biography/francis-schaeffer>.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* See also FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 350.

¹³⁸ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 246.

¹³⁹ See Francis A. Schaeffer, *How Should We Then Live? The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and Culture* (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1983). See also Francis A. Schaeffer, "The Modern Drift: Is Nobody Home in this World?" *Christianity Today*, June 20, 1960, 3-4. At times, the loose concept of the West was dramatically reduced in Schaeffer's thinking and equated almost exclusively to a racial entity. Schaeffer, warning of the West's abandonment and rejection of Christian belief and values thus: "Our country is under the wrath of God! Northern European Culture is under the wrath of God." Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, 15.

¹⁴⁰ See Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, 80. For more on Schaeffer's crusade against "secular humanism," see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 8, 356-357.

pigment of darkness, destruction, and foreboding, describing the *Weltlage* of the beginning of the 1980s as a veritable Manichaean struggle.

In our investigation of the evangelical movement's idolatry of might, this Cold War turn to and praise of power, Schaeffer interests us for another reason. We find with Schaeffer, one of twentieth-century evangelicalism's most important figures, writing in *Christianity Today* in 1969, additional evidence for evangelicalism's developing form. "The Bible," wrote Schaeffer, "makes it plain that our joy and spiritual power depend on a continuing relation to God. If we do not love the Lord as we should, the plug gets pulled out and the spiritual power and the spiritual joy stop."¹⁴¹ Quite clearly for Schaeffer, God was a source of power, faith provided decidedly more than the promise of eternal life. Yet, in this particular instance, the author of the article carefully qualifies power as something spiritual, as a tool or aim of an otherworldly realm. Despite this apparent effort to spiritualize power, we often find in Schaeffer's work an oscillation between a focus on the Kingdom of God, the spiritual, on the one hand, and the earthly cultural, social, and political entity of the West, on the other.¹⁴² Indeed, the West and what Schaeffer believed to be its rapid and horrid dissolution were a persistent element of his thinking and role as an evangelical "philosopher."¹⁴³

We need not only rely on Schaeffer for evidence of this vicissitude, this to and fro between the spiritual and the political or the mundane. Between 1945 and 1981, as we have seen throughout this dissertation, there was wide evidence for the shallow depths of the spiritual in the evangelical movement. We have seen how in American evangelicalism the "spiritual" inevitably takes on a material form, a mundane significance—riches as the reward for faith, the triumph of the United States as the outcome of spiritual renewal, the destruction of communism as the end of religion. Thus, Schaeffer's presentation of a relation to God, faith, as an avenue to spiritual power should be read against the larger narrative in evangelicalism of worldly desires and ambitions, the fears of Christianity losing cultural position in the Cold War period,¹⁴⁴ and the enduring hope to achieve power here and now.

Turning to our other primary source in this dissertation, the figure of Graham, we find a powerful echo of the idolatry of might that was promoted in *Christianity Today*, the same cravings and promises of power. With Graham, in a clearer way, we move more fully

¹⁴¹ Francis A. Schaeffer, "The Universe and Two Chairs," *Christianity Today*, April 25, 1969, 11 [683].

¹⁴² Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, 11, 14, 15, 20-21.

¹⁴³ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 246.

into the second aspect of idolatry of might, which Heschel elucidated: power as an object, an end in itself, a center around which to organize. With the evangelistic work of Graham, evangelicalism becomes an avenue through which to acquire power. In one sermon, for example, from the late 1940s, the American evangelist offered his assurances that power was a part of the experience of rebirth: “Thus, when you have entirely yielded to him, He fills you with His Spirit, and his powerful dynamo called the Holy Spirit will enable you to stand against every onslaught of Satan.”¹⁴⁵ Another example, before 1950, was Graham’s effort to appeal to American youth by the attachment of an aristocratic status to the process of Christian salvation. In the sermon, Graham stressed the haughty distinction of nobility that might come from participation in the mysteries of evangelicalism. “Think of it,” he said, conjuring up the image for the audience, “royal blood flowing through your veins, an aristocrat born from on high! What a thrill surges through your heart as you contemplate such a privilege.”¹⁴⁶ What was far more attractive for Graham, and what served better as a means of gathering in new disciples, was not Christianity as the path to salvation, but the distinction of a nebulous social superiority, which one might access through rebirth and which might propel one to the guarded and coveted corridors of earthly puissance.

A slightly more bizarre and perhaps more chilling instance can be found in Graham’s sermon from the autumn of 1958. At one of his crusades in Charlotte, North Carolina, Graham delivered a sermon whose subject was, as its title indicates, the problems facing American youth. According to the Billy Graham Center at Wheaton College, there were 14,500 people in attendance that night. Graham preached thus:

I believe that one of the problems among teenagers is that they need something to believe in. They want a master, they want someone to control them, just as Hitler was able to get the youth of Germany and Mussolini was able to get the youth of Italy and the communists were able to get the youth of Eastern Europe.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Marsden, *Fundamentalism in American Culture*, 238.

¹⁴⁵ Billy Graham, “Retreat! Stand! Advance!” [Sermon] in *The Early Billy Graham: Sermons and Revival Accounts*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland Pub., 1988), 41.

¹⁴⁶ Billy Graham, “Youth’s Hero” [Sermon] in *The Early Billy Graham: Sermons and Revival Accounts*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland Pub., 1988), 62.

¹⁴⁷ Billy Graham, “The Problems of Youth” [Sermon], *Billy Graham Center Archives* - Wheaton College, September 23, 1958, accessed June 2, 2013, <http://www2.wheaton.edu/bgc/archives/docs/bg-charlotte/0923.html>.

McLoughlin, in his aforementioned biography of the American evangelist, mentioned Graham's sermon, dismissing it out of hand.¹⁴⁸ More telling of Graham's designs than his perhaps inordinate praise of Hitler and Mussolini's ability to "get" the youth of their respective countries was his understanding of ruling itself, of power, of mastery. The evangelical, Graham firmly believed, was to assume, was destined to don, the mantle of master, to exert control over others. Moments later, in the same sermon, Graham observed in admiration of the Soviet Union, "They have an ideology, they have a control, they have a security in their state in Communism." This ideology, this control, was for Graham what evangelicalism was to provide. As adherents to the national creed, evangelicals themselves would emerge as the masters and dominators that the populace secretly longed for, assuming the role of wielders of power and control. With Graham, as with so many other evangelicals, the kingdom of his dreams was still a kingdom, to use the words of Ruether, "based on domination and subjugation."¹⁴⁹

More frequent than the direct pretensions to mastery and control were the allusions, enveloped in mist and apocalypse, to the arrival of the Kingdom of God, wherein evangelicals would assume their place, come into their right of rebirth: rulership. In the Charlotte sermon of 1958 mentioned above, Graham preached, "I believe that Christ alone shall conquer. His kingdom shall be built."¹⁵⁰ While Graham awaited with hope the arrival of the millennial kingdom of Christ, he said, in the same breath, bringing one back to the true center of focus, that is, to evangelicals themselves: "We are on the winning side and someday He is coming back to claim His own."¹⁵¹ Beneath the rhetoric of piety and boundless idealism associated with a heavenly kingdom where God would rule, where the blameless Lamb of God was doing the conquering, was the implied understanding that evangelicals would be the ones exerting power. In American evangelicalism of the Cold War, the calls and trumpets of the Kingdom were cryptic exhibitions and celebrations of the evangelical's eventual glorious assumption to the heights of power. Evangelicals, as Graham said, were on the winning side.

Turning our attention once again to *Christianity Today* we find a mirroring of Graham's understanding of the violent coming of the Kingdom, as well as the Kingdom as the moment in which evangelicals would come to rule. "First and best of all," read one editorial in 1960, "he [the believer] knows that everything is going to come out right.

¹⁴⁸ McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 90.

¹⁴⁹ Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk*, 9.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Gloomy though the immediate outlook may appear, the Christian has the serene inner assurance that history's ultimate issues are safe in God's hands. His Kingdom will prevail, and all will be well."¹⁵² Citing Scripture, the editorial continues with its prophetic vision, in the offing, of the evangelical's rise to power: "'Be of good cheer, for I have overcome the world' We are on the winning side," the editorial concluded lest the reader forget the evangelical's future place of rule, "and who would not be glad?"¹⁵³

The utterances of *Christianity Today* and the sermons of Graham fall in line with the prophecy and promise of rule that one finds in evangelicalism's extreme though influential fringes. In Christian reconstructionism¹⁵⁴ (also known as dominion theology), which emerged most prominently in the United States around the Calvinist theologian Rousas Rushdoony (1916-2001)¹⁵⁵ in the 1960s and 1970s, the theologically sanctioned desire to acquire power, to dominate the public sphere, reaches a fervent, intricate, and forthright expression. As the theological ism suggests, reconstructionists were and are looking to rebuild, reconstruct, the United States according to Christian principles, especially Mosaic Law from the Hebrew Bible. Reconstructionism is a form of theonomy, a belief, in short, that God is the lawgiver. Richard John Neuhaus (1936-2009), a prominent figure in American Roman Catholicism and confidant of President George W. Bush, took up the question of the belief in theonomy in American evangelicalism in 1990.¹⁵⁶ In an article in *First Things*, a journal on religion that promotes a religious outlook for understanding public life in the United States, Neuhaus writes that theonomy is more than a belief that God is the giver of law. Instead, reconstructionists profess "that the Mosaic law given at Sinai was not just for Israel but is God's design for all nations of all times."¹⁵⁷ Thus the Law of Moses, in the mind of a reconstructionist, acquires a universal and compulsory character for the believer and the non-believer alike.

The influence of reconstructionism both in terms of its number of adherents and its ideas in the wider American evangelical movement is difficult to measure both over time

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² "It Is Time for Rejoicing," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, May 23, 1960, 20.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ For more on Christian reconstructionism see Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 246-248; Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 138, 238; Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 80-81, 96-101; FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 8.

¹⁵⁵ For more on Rushdoony see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 8, 337-45.

¹⁵⁶ Richard Mouw, "Richard John Neuhaus, Warts and All," *Christianity Today*, May 15, 2015, accessed August 8, 2016,

<http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2015/may-web-only/richard-john-neuhaus-warts-and-all.html>.

¹⁵⁷ Richard John Neuhaus, "Why Wait for the Kingdom? The Theonomist Temptation," *First Things*, May 1990, accessed September 5, 2015, <https://www.firstthings.com/article/1990/05/002-why-wait-for-the-kingdom-the-theonomist-temptation>.

and across the multifarious groups, churches, publications, and organizations, which make up the evangelical constellation. However, it is believed by many scholars that the tenets and ideas of reconstructionism have bled over and enjoy a considerable influence in other areas of American evangelicalism. Neuhaus, in his 1990 article, remarks of dominion theology's influence, saying that "'prolific' is hardly adequate to suggest the veritable flood of publications from these writers."¹⁵⁸

Neuhaus' piece is interesting for us for one particular reason. In it, Neuhaus quotes theonomist George Grant (1954-). Writing in a publication from Dominion Press in 1987, Grant encapsulated and made public, in the frankest possible manner, the evangelical's true relation to power, the secret object of their coveting. With Grant, the seemingly qualification of "spiritual" was cast aside. What was left was naked worldly ambition, an unmasked will to power. Grant wrote, "'It is dominion that we are after. Not just a voice. It is dominion we are after. Not just influence. It is dominion we are after. Not just equal time. It is dominion we are after. World conquest."¹⁵⁹ In the same vein, David Chilton, an influential promotor of this brand of theology, wrote, "The Christian goal for this world is the universal development of Biblical theocratic republics, in which every area of life is redeemed and placed under the Lordship of Jesus Christ and the rule of God's law."¹⁶⁰

Other scholars have, here and there, mentioned the evangelical obsession with might, the overt connection between God and power, rebirth and triumph, faith and dominance. In the 1972 study about the conversion of participants in the counterculture during the 1960s and 1970s to evangelicalism, entitled *The Jesus People: Old-Time Religion in the Age of Aquarius*, we find one such example. In *The Jesus People*, professor of sociology and evangelical Ronald M. Enroth, professor emeritus of English at Calvin College and Solzhenitsyn scholar Edward E. Ericson, Jr., and author C. Breckenridge Peters, took notice of the curious promises of power, which flourished in this segment of the evangelical movement in the second half of the twentieth century. According to the authors, a popular slogan of these groups, which were primarily located in California, was "All power through

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* In a 2008 article, American historian Molly Worthen confirmed Neuhaus' observation in terms of reconstructionism's intellectual influence on American evangelicalism. Molly, then a doctoral candidate, however, diminishes the impact of reconstructionism, in terms of numbers, arguing that this wing of evangelicalism never had "more than a handful of adherents," Molly Worthen, "The Chalcedon Problem: Rousas John Rushdoony and the Origins of Christian Reconstructionism," *Church History* 77, no. 2 (2008), accessed March 16, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20618492>. Marsden, too, attempted to diminish the historical significance of reconstructionism in the evangelical movement, see Marsden, *Fundamentalism in American Culture*, 248.

¹⁵⁹ George Grant quoted in Neuhaus, "Why Wait for the Kingdom? The Theonomist Temptation," *First Things*.

¹⁶⁰ David Chilton quoted in Neuhaus, "Why Wait for the Kingdom? The Theonomist Temptation," *First Things*.

Jesus.”¹⁶¹ About this slogan, the authors had little else to say. Why evangelicals sought this power, why it was laid before the adherent as a golden apple, and what this power was to be used for were left intentionally open-ended. Yet the slogan itself stands as an additional testament to the fact that evangelicalism, as a movement, began to understand that power, or at least its mirage, was a highly coveted end, it was a central point around which to rally, towards which to fix the collective gaze.

Similarly, the authors of *Exporting the American Gospel* pointed out the devotion to power in evangelicalism outside of the United States. For example, a popular song amongst the converts of American missionaries in Liberia, went, “Satan power is powerless power, but Jesus power is super-super power.”¹⁶² Here, we encounter, though geographically far removed from the American evangelical, the same pattern, the same manner in which religion was expressed and framed. Through Jesus, it was said, one would achieve, gain access to, some mysterious force. In such a framework, faith in Jesus becomes a repository from which to draw power for one’s personal use.

These two examples further reveal the pervasion of the search for and promise of power in evangelical Christianity. In our examination of the idolatry of might as an evangelical form, we have also seen evidence for the continuance of this form beyond the specific period of time dealt with in this dissertation and the specific context of evangelicalism in the United States. The earthly quest for power could be found from the converts of California to the new evangelical disciples of the African continent; wherever evangelicalism spread, the never-satiated thirst for power followed. Or, conversely, wherever there was a thirst for power, a personal desire to rule, evangelicalism found the ample ground for its origins. The second way in which the idolatry of might manifested itself, in contemporary evangelicalism, what we might call the desire to “possess” and acquire power, which we are now observing, reaches its most explicit and unflinching form in the desire to rule, to have control over others, to annex the organs and institutions of power. Thus, what emerged in contemporary evangelicalism was not only the promise, shrouded in mystique, that through the movement, through rebirth in Christ, one would be granted eternal life but also the more beguiling notion that the evangel will rule, will wield the scepter. Alongside the evangelical’s coveting, we encounter the notion that the evangelical *qua* lord of the earth was something fated, it was the glorious destiny of the

¹⁶¹ Enroth, *The Jesus People*, 105, 126.

¹⁶² Brouwer, *Exporting the American Gospel*, 149.

elect. The cyphers of their triumph had been written deep in the past by the very hand of God and nothing nor nobody could emerge to thwart this divine plan.

To conclude our discussion of one of evangelicalism's most visible forms, we gather, in yet another way, how this religious movement distanced itself from that which it historically was, from the nucleus of faith that, in the past, bound the Christian community. With evangelicalism as a medium through which to access power, a means of achieving dominance, what of Christian belief was left? Can the God of the Christians be both Savior and a source of earthly power, an avenue to mastery and control? Or, in such an amalgam, does that which we understand as Christian begin to melt away? We are asked by evangelicals to accept their faith, to acknowledge their piety, to trust in their belief in God and their adherence to Christian precepts. Time and again, we will hear their songs, feel the weight of their prayers, behold the repeated calls for public displays of piety and reverence. The calls for revival reverberate in our minds as did the awakenings, which captured American souls centuries before. Yet, very often, when peering behind the veil, when looking beyond, we glimpse not God, but the idolatry of might; we see atop the pedestal a new idol. The celebration of and desire to acquire power, as Heschel has shown us, was not something altogether new; be that as it may, its development into a pillar of evangelicalism, its ascent to one of this movement's central forms, reached a new intensity, acquired special importance.

In bringing our discussion of these evangelical forms to an end, it is asked of us to hold in our minds a strange thought, principally, the idea that, through these forms, what emerged could not be counted purely as evangelicalism. We are asked to not accept so uncritically that which we have placed before us. With expansion, with faith as a commodity, with technology, and with power as a form around which religion revolved we might ask what of evangelicalism was left. In the forms in which evangelicals sought to give expression to their sentiments, voice to the yearnings of their heart, what comes to the fore was expansion for the sake of expansion, the rapacious desire to grow. With evangelicalism as a commodity, for example, was it religion that was presented to the world or merely another instance of capitalist reproduction, yet another installment of consumption? Was the evangelical's embrace of technique merely a furtherance of technique?

With these forms, what was involved was not only the question of the commodity, not only technology, not only an unquenchable desire to expand. Hovering around these issues, to be abundantly clear, was the question of identity. The evangelical forms we have seen here relate to identity in two ways. Most clearly, in the first place, was that these evangelical *Gestalten* became a central point of organization, a pattern by which to seemingly cultivate collective identity. Through them, it was believed, evangelical faith could be given concrete and lasting expression. Participation in the collective provided the evangelical initiate with much desired ends: expanding influence, a world of commodities, the consumption and use of technology, power. All of these forms were simultaneously ends of evangelicalism and ways in which the delineation of a collective identity could be carried out. Whether or not these forces, these forms, can be harnessed in the creation of collective identity, whether an authentic collective identity can emerge from such sources, are questions beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Second, the development of these four evangelical forms we have examined in this chapter were not only related to collective identity and its formation. Always and everywhere, they involved personal identity and the burden of its elaboration. In some instances, the development of the evangelical collective identity was meant to resolve issues and problems, which, necessarily, confronted one on the individual level. The commodity and the spread of technology along with a world oriented towards technique were dramatic alterations in the organization, understanding, and conduct of human life that one experienced, perforce, on a personal level. Though men and women may seek answers in all sorts of places, the question of what to consume, how to consume, the meaning and threat of technology, are questions that appear, necessarily, on our individual horizon. The wholesale incorporation of these forms into Cold War evangelicalism was a way of resolving, at least on the surface, the questions plaguing the American mind, a way of both narcotizing the adherent to the advent of a new world dominated by consumption and technology as well as guiding the believer through the intricacies and complexities of consumption and technique. The answers to these questions, which one had to decide oneself, were now given.

The case of evangelicalism's idolatry of might was a direct address of the powerlessness one might feel, the precariousness of individuality, the fear facing the atomized person, awash in a sea of constant and rapid change. The inability to act, the powerlessness one felt in creating one's personal identity, could, the evangelical said explicitly and in diverse ways, be overcome. Power could be had, might could be achieved, dominance was in grasp, the evangelical promised, if one only believe. The donning of the

collective mask of evangelical identity was an avowed solution to the burden and problem of personal identity and its cultivation.¹⁶³

With these evangelical forms, these ways of supposedly cultivating collective identity, the most important point to remember in terms of personal identity, is that the question was conveniently sidestepped. What evangelicalism offered instead was a powerful redirection of energies and focus. Now one, instead of being preoccupied and burdened with the development of one's personal identity, can thrust all energy, all thought, into expansion of some external end, into the endless cycle of evangelicalism's growth. Through evangelicalism, one could answer the question of personal identity via consumption of certain Christian goods and products, which is to say one could ignore the question altogether. The question of technology and its inherent implications for personal identity were, through evangelicalism's approbation and benediction, not resolved but summarily dismissed. The question of what cultivation of personal identity can emerge in the midst of these forms we leave unanswered.

Our examination of the ways in which the evangelical movement was organized, in the context of personal and collective identity, has answered a broader question concerning evangelical Christianity in the United States. Hitherto, American evangelicalism's relation to the surrounding culture has been expressed and understood through the lens of separatism. This we have hinted at previously. "All," in the evangelical movement said Marsden in his study of fundamentalism and evangelicalism, "share to some degree the common experience of becoming outsiders to the most sophisticated modern culture."¹⁶⁴ This separatism from what evangelicals believed to be a fallen, corrupt, and worldly culture, spilled over into politics, a sphere that evangelicals maintained they had fully abandoned. Yet, in our examination of these forms, these undeniably dominant features of contemporary evangelicalism, we see the wall of separation dissolve before us. In the thinking of Arendt, expansion for the sake of expansion stood as one of the consummate expressions of modernity, one of its principal discoveries, one of its clearest modes of organization. With the entrance of the commodity and technology into the evangelical church, we behold the strongest links and clearest complicity with the world. Contemporary ways of being American, contemporary aspects of life during the Cold War, were made a permanent feature of the American evangelical movement. With the idolatry of might in American evangelicalism, the constant yearning for power, we behold not the saint with eyes lifted to

¹⁶³ Marsden, *Fundamentalism in American Culture*, 252.

the heavens but the human being whose mind was consumed with the struggles of this world, with the desire to acquire power and to maintain a place of prominence.

With these forms, we are, once again, confronted with new questions concerning the outlook of evangelicalism in the United States. Are we still dealing with a religious movement whose gaze was fixed on the promises of eternal life? Did the salvation of the human soul continue to play a primary role? Or did new objects of focus come into view? Did new mundane centers emerge around which the collective evangelical identity was forged?

¹⁶⁴ Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*, 6.

V

New Evangelical Relations

The question of identity is a question involving the most profound panic—a terror as primary as the nightmare of the mortal fall...An identity is questioned only when it is menaced, as when the mighty begin to fall, or when the wretched begin to rise, or when the stranger enters the gates, never, thereafter, to be a stranger...

—James Baldwin¹

Our eventual reckoning with the question of human relations was already written in our uncovering of the various evangelical forms discussed before. All of them, each in their own way and according to their own laws, involve a relationship of one human to another. This is perhaps most clear with the commodity where Marx demonstrated unequivocally that it was forged in the social nexus of labor, where man employs man, where one is utilized by another. The subtext of the evangelical's idolatry of might, as well, was a relation, albeit of dominance, of achieving power over others, to what ends one may only wonder. Technology and expansion, too, presuppose a certain relation to others.

Other reasons indicate to us, in our search for evangelicalism's genesis as a problem of collective and personal identity, the supreme importance of human relations. With Arendt, we saw that the bewildering question of the "who" and its flourishing, its coming into view, emerges, not in isolation, in the sterility of a vacuum, in the simplified remoteness of space, but in a web, a web of preexisting and intricately moving human relations. To speak of identity, both collective and personal, is also to speak of the other who is the recipient of identity's perception.² To utter the *who* is, at the same time, to utter the *whom*, the one to whom identity is related. To not consider this, to leave this obfuscated, is, at a fundamental level, to not even bring identity, in its essence, into question.

James Baldwin, one of the most important authors from the United States, a man who, with moving eloquence, was able to capture the experience of black men and women

¹ Baldwin, "The Devil Finds Work," 537.

in the United States, also pointed to another manner in which relations come into play in our discussion of the evangelical and identity. In the first place, it is of note that his words reinforce Arendt's position that identity is something that is made manifest only in the presence of others. Second, Baldwin brings into relief the role that the other may represent. At different times, this other stands not merely as a background upon which to project identity, as a strand in the web upon which identity is suspended, but as a fundamental and harrowing challenge, one that calls into question who one is. The situation where one's identity is called into question, where one is hurled back upon oneself, in forced examination, Baldwin understood was of the most primary kind, the most terrifying of experiences. As a pariah, as the one who stood outside of American society as a black homosexual, Baldwin understood the challenging role that he embodied.

In the case of American evangelicalism, as it unfolded in the years following World War II, Baldwin's words seem almost prophetic, as the precise description of what was occurring amongst the evangelical faithful, the terrible image of what the evangel was experiencing. In the period between 1945 and 1981, three groups in particular emerged and confronted the evangelical collective identity in distinct ways. Not only was the evangelical forced to revisit relations towards these three groups, the very appearance of these men and women fundamentally and unyieldingly challenged who the evangelical believed himself to be. Thus, in the very midst of these relations, we find the evangelical's conceptualization of what it was to be an American, to be a Christian, and to be a man or a woman, being called starkly into question. In addition to the shattering of the evangelical's self-image, we find that the evangelical, towards these uncompromising voices of dissent, reacted in particular ways, attempting to spin new threads of interaction. And in the elaboration of these new relations, we find yet another facet of evangelicalism's crystallization. Coalescing around identity, we behold the ever-growing fields that evangelicals desired to annex.

The three groups we have chosen as means of inquiry into the evangelical's relations—as one of identity's many faces—make their way before us for the reason that they embody this challenge, they were the living forms of rebellion from which the evangelical reeled in horror and with averted gaze. The African-American, the homosexual, and women (some of them) all began, in the years after World War II, to assert themselves, to claim for themselves new rights, new privileges, and freedom from ancient and stifling

² Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 183-184; Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Politics of Identity," 9, 28.

burdens. They began to develop collective and personal identities of their own. To these different groups, the evangelical had much to say, many poisoned darts to hurl.

Before delving into the web in which the evangelical found himself, it is important to note that, historically speaking, religion has always attempted to govern human relations. Prescriptions and prohibitions on who to touch, when to touch them, who is outside of the elect and how they are to be treated has always been a component of the religious world. It is often the case that, simultaneous with the creation of the chosen, of the saved, comes the codification and crafting of the damned. Another clarification we would do well to make is that, with our three groups, we do not pretend to be comprehensive in our examination, as if this were all of the possible human relationships that evangelicals established.

Relations with African Americans

*Are you so afraid lest peering from this high Pisgah, between Philistine and
Amalekite, we sight the Promised Land?*

—W. E. B. Du Bois³

In November of 1966, almost a year and a half after the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and after a sentiment of protest and resistance, around issues of race, had become a staple of American life, *Christianity Today*, as one of the guiding lights of evangelical Christians, did something altogether peculiar and uncharacteristic: it apologized. Through an editorial, evangelicals stated with complete sincerity and heartfelt repentance, “We recognize the failure of many of us in the recent past to speak with sufficient clarity and force upon the biblical unity of the human race. All men are one in the humanity created by God himself.”⁴ The editorial continued:

We reject the notion that men are unequal because of distinction of race or color. In the name of Scripture and of Jesus Christ we condemn racialism wherever it appears. We ask forgiveness for our past sins in refusing to recognize the clear command of God to love our fellow men with a love that transcends every human barrier and prejudice.⁵

³ W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited, 1973), 109.

⁴ “One Race, One Gospel, One Task,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 25, 1966, 24 [216].

⁵ *Ibid.* A similar manifesto of racial solidarity was issued by the Southern Baptist Convention, some two years later in 1968. This particular theological declaration, a latecomer to the scene of racial unity and harmony, was spurred on by the assassination of Martin Luther King or the riots taking place in over 110 cities across the

But why, exactly, were these evangelicals seeking the forgiveness of the African American community? What had they done and what had they left undone? In what way had, during all these years, evangelicals defied the clear command of God? What barriers had they tossed into the path of equality for black men and women in the United States? As the social and political movement for civil rights continued, what role did the evangelical play? How did the evangelical relate to the African American community in the United States?

The stance taken by evangelicals towards the movement for civil rights and the betterment of the societal and economic conditions of African Americans is generally accepted by scholars as one of concentrated opposition; indeed, the evangelical's confession of guilt dispels any assertion to the contrary. Julia Kirk Blackwelder, now a professor of history at a Texas A&M University, concluded in a 1979 article in *Phylon*, a journal of African American studies founded by W. E. B. Dubois, that "While external factors help to explain differences in the salience of racial issues from one Southern white church to another, they do not explain why fundamentalists church members were antagonists of the civil rights movement."⁶ Though perhaps unclear, Christian fundamentalism, according to this historian, opposed and undermined efforts to create equality in the United States, and to remove the formal equipage of exclusion. Blackwelder cites, in her article, our very own L. Nelson Bell, with whom we are well acquainted, as saying of racism in the United States:

'There are others - and they are as Christian in their thinking and practice as any in this world - who believe that it is un-Christian, unrealistic and utterly foolish to force those barriers of race which have been established by God and which when destroyed by man are destroyed to his own loss.'⁷

Others have pointed out the reality of this antagonism. Balmer, too, in *Thy Kingdom Come*, highlighted the absence of white evangelicals in the movement for civil rights, which, for the author, seems to demonstrate their general disinterest towards African Americans at the time.⁸ Another example of evangelicalism's initial hostility to the Civil Rights Movements and the retroactive efforts of some to erase from memory this racist stance is

United States. The motion passed at the Baptist convention that year by a vote of 5,687 to 2,119; 15,000 attendees abstained, which indicates the shallowness of the Baptist resolve when faced with the question of racial equality, Dupont, *Mississippi Praying*, 205-208.

⁶ Julia Kirk Blackwelder, "Southern White Fundamentalists and the Civil Rights Movement." *Phylon* 40, no. 4 (1979): 341, accessed April, 15, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/274530>.

⁷ L. Nelson Bell quoted in Blackwelder, "Southern White Fundamentalists and the Civil Rights Movement." *Phylon*.

⁸ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 17.

recounted by Hedges. In the 1970s, Hedges claims, Jerry Falwell, a prominent Baptist preacher and televangelist from Virginia, attempted to “recall all copies of his earlier sermons warning against integration and the evils of the black race. The only sermon left in print from the 1960s is called “Ministers and Marchers.””⁹ The sermon that remained, explains Hedges, was one that simply denounced the political involvement of Christian religious leaders.

We might consider, for a moment, what exactly the evangelical was attempting to uphold, what type of society they worked to save. Was ideological racism a benign system of separation, a mild organization of segregation, a society built merely upon lines of distance? Such a conceptualization offers us only a truncated and obscurantist understanding, for racism, in the United States, was and is a creeping vine, working into cracks and grooves, patiently waiting to spread its foliage and cover the entire surface of American society. Above all else, in addition to being a system of segregation, American racism was a system of terror. Of the violent aspects of ideological racism, in the American Republic, many have written. Baldwin, to cite just one example, was keenly aware of the destructiveness of a society infused with the social construct of racism. In one essay, published in *The Progressive Magazine* in 1962, he wrote of racism’s representatives, “...they have destroyed and are destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and do not know it and do not want to know it.”¹⁰ Baldwin saw the violence, which was intimately entangled in such a system, so too did he see the ease with which such occurrences may be unceremoniously dismissed from the mind, abandoned like an unseemly bastard child.

Of this other side of racism in the United States we have a unique example, an illustrative institution, which forces into unconcealment the barbarous consequences and macabre reality of this ideological system. This institution illustrates the world that many were struggling to maintain, the foundations these Christians worked with fervor to repair. The American practice of lynching offers one way in which the manifest violence of racism played its part in American society.

Naturally, what is most striking about the practice of lynching is the brutality and senselessness of the acts themselves. The body of the victim becomes the living focus of hatred and the desire to express it. This performance of violence was a commonplace in God’s chosen land. An anti-lynching poster from 1922, for example, places the number of

⁹ Hedges, *American Fascists*, 28.

¹⁰ James Baldwin, “My Dungeon Shook: Letter to My Nephew,” in *James Baldwin: Collected Essays*, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: Library of America; distributed the U.S. by Penguin Putnam, 1998), 292.

lynchings in the United States, after 1889, at 3,434.¹¹ After the Civil War, as the legal and recognized ownership of other human beings had been removed, lynching emerged as a tool to keep African Americans in their place and to discourage others who worked to improve their lot. The formal institutions of slavery were exchanged for the omnipresent threat of sudden and unpredictable outbursts of terrible violence. Between 1882 and 1930, calculated Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, in their 1995 book *A Festival of Violence*, there were 2,500 lynchings in just ten states in the South.¹² “The scale of this carnage,” said Tolnay and Beck, “means that, on the average, a black man, woman, or child was murdered nearly once a week, every week, between 1882 and 1930 by a hate-driven white mob.”¹³ Still, a mere parading of numbers does not sufficiently bring to light the sadism with which these acts were perpetrated. The mode in which these acts were carried out sheds more light on the character of lynchings in the United States: hangings, gun-fire, beatings, torture and mutilation.¹⁴

Not all mob violence ended in death. In the South, when it came to blacks, violence could be meted out with appalling ease. For instance, “To prevent blacks from voting in Edgecombe County [North Carolina],” wrote Newkirk of the Reconstruction era, in *Lynching in North Carolina*, published in 2009, “conservatives castrated eleven freedmen who supported the Republican Party.”¹⁵ Another example, explains Newkirk, can be found in the county of Roxboro, North Carolina, where, after the Civil War, the Ku Klux Klan “routinely beat blacks for even the slightest offenses.”¹⁶

African Americans accused of a crime lacked, in a great many cases, even a semblance of a fair trial, and, in other cases, a total lack of incriminating evidence. Mortal guilt often rested on accusation, rumor, blackness, a vile mix of fear and hostility. Thus, another level of senselessness was added to these violent affairs. Nor was violent crime such as murder, rape or arson even necessary to mark the black person for death at the hands of a mob.¹⁷ As Newkirk points out, “Though fear of sexual assaults by black men on white women formed the basis for many of North Carolina’s lynchings, merely writing a letter or

¹¹ Vann R. Newkirk, *Lynching in North Carolina: A History, 1865-1941* (Jefferson, NC: Mcfarland & Company, Inc., 2009), 18.

¹² E. M. Beck and Stewart E. Tolnay, *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), ix.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Newkirk, *Lynching in North Carolina*, 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁷ See Beck, *A Festival of Violence*, 19.

making contact with a white woman could also be harmful to Africa American men.”¹⁸ In Newkirk’s study, one finds, among more serious allegations of rape and murder, some of the most trivial offenses for which lynchings were carried out. Trespassing, robbery, making threats, acting as a “peeping tom,” being in a white woman’s room, strike activity, arguing with a white man, and simple race prejudice, could all be found in the catalogue of misdeeds that could bring death to a black person living in North Carolina.¹⁹ Of the 170 documented lynchings in North Carolina, between the years of 1865 and 1941, for eighteen, the motives that led to murder at the hands of a mob were unknown.²⁰ The authors of *A Festival of Violence* present numerous incidents similar to the one mentioned here:

In September of 1923, a black youth from Pickens, Holmes County, Mississippi, borrowed 50 cents from a white man. When he repaid the loan, the white man demanded 10 cents interest, which the boy did not have. He and his father fled, thinking that nothing would be done to the boy’s mother and sister, who remained behind. Later a mob of nine white men attacked the boy’s home and riddled his sister with bullets, killing her as she tried to run.²¹

Nor was lynching confined to a narrow time or place. Though the practice of lynching emerged as a common practice in the South after the Civil War and experienced its most intense period of implementation between 1880 and 1930 the practice was maintained well after the close of the Second World War. “Records compiled by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,” wrote Beck and Tolnay, “show that mob violence continued throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Indeed, some of the most well-documented lynching incidents,” they continue, “occurred during these decades.”²² The 1955 lynching of Emmet Till, a fourteen-year-old black boy from Chicago, for the pseudo-transgression of whistling at a white women, confirms the willingness, amongst many, to turn to violence for even the slightest provocations.²³ Just as lynchings eluded narrow spans of time, erupting here and there as violent reminders of the power of racial ideology late into the twentieth century, so too was the institution beyond a specific geographic area. Though, in the South, the amount of lynching victims varied from county to county, it was prevalent

¹⁸ Newkirk, *Lynching in North Carolina*, 18.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 167-170. For a more detailed list of possible criminal and noncriminal transgressions that, in the South, could lead to lynching, see Beck, *A Festival of Violence*, 47.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Beck, *A Festival of Violence*, 21.

²² *Ibid.*, 239.

²³ *Ibid.*

throughout the region. Texas and Oklahoma, which were not included in Beck and Tolnay's study, were also the scenes of what these writers called the "festival of violence."

As one delves deeper into the complexities of this American institution of violence, it becomes undeniable and regrettably clear that one of the factors that facilitated and even promoted the carrying out of mob justice was the complaisant attitude and complicit involvement of local and state governments, as well as, other organs of the state: law enforcement and the judiciary. Newkirk wrote that "the position generally taken by governors until the early 1920s as one of indifference."²⁴ The powers that be throughout the South were loath to persecute members of lynching parties and even investigate mob incidents. Law enforcement officials often participated in these acts of violence or aided, through neglect or overt participation, in the delivery of the accused into the hands of a waiting mob. Because of this, lynching cannot be politely shunted aside as an insignificant instance of mob violence, outbursts of anger latent in the masses. The state, in its various forms, was an integral and oft-appearing actor in this common American drama.

In our discussion of this particular façade of the enduring history of American racism, we should also bring to light the peculiar and alarming role of the bystander. A lynching is understood to be a murder by three or more persons, thereby excluding all other assassinations that were carried out by fewer individuals. At times the mob swelled to numbers in the thousands.²⁵ Despite the fact that the mob itself could reach, depending on the incident in question, extraordinary size, lynchings were often carried out as spectacles, with large crowds of men, women, and children, looking passively on at the day's brutal entertainment.²⁶ "At times," Beck and Tolnay informed, "lynchings acquired a macabre carnival-like aspect, with the victim being tortured and mutilated for the amusement of onlookers."²⁷ The authors cite an excerpt from the New York *Tribune*, which reported a lynching in 1899, and conveys with terrible vividness the reality of an aspect of American culture and history:

'Sam Hose [Holt]...was burned at the stake in a public road, one and a half miles from here [Newman, Georgia]. Before the torch was applied to the pyre, the Negro was deprived of his ears, fingers and other portions of his body with surprising fortitude. Before the body was cool, it was cut into pieces, the bones were crushed into small bits and even the tree upon which the wretch met his fate was torn up and disposed of as souvenirs. The Negro's heart was cut into

²⁴ Newkirk, *Lynching in North Carolina*, 18.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 137.

²⁷ Beck, *A Festival of Violence*, 23.

several pieces, as was also his liver. Those unable to obtain ghastly relics directly, paid more fortunate possessors extravagant sums for them. Small pieces of bone went for 25 cents and a bit of liver, crisply cooked, for 10 cents.²⁸

As a final point in our attempt to remember, in a fuller sense, the reality of racism in the United States, by beholding one of racism's many faces, Beck and Tolnay confirm and lend support to a claim, which we made earlier concerning speech and evangelicalism, in particular, language and ideas that dehumanize, making of the subject in question a scornful and subhuman object. "It is important to understand," communicate the authors, "that years of racist propaganda had, in the minds of whites, lessened blacks to simplistic and often animalistic, stereotypes. These debasing images," they continue, "further depersonalized and dehumanized the victim, reducing him or her to a hated object devoid of worth."²⁹ In the minds of these two scholars, the connection between language and violence is clear: the dehumanizing words leveled at blacks had worked as a preparatory step, a necessary element, in the eventual and sustained destruction and subjection of a people. What happened in the speech and concepts of many whites foretold, like an oracle of destruction, the violent fate of many blacks. Conceived of as one depraved, as a sexually insatiable predator, as one akin to the beast, the black man, the black women, and the black child were dressed in the robes of sacrifice.

The history of lynching is one of systemic and undying racism's most visible and extreme manifestations. It is important to observe that, during the Jim Crow era, the control and observation of the black person, especially in the South, went well beyond these frequent outbursts of violence, these ritual and public tortures and executions. The very speech of blacks was controlled—they were made to address whites with "courtesy titles." The ground upon which African Americans walked on was something regulated—they were made to "yield" the sidewalk to approaching whites.³⁰

Lynching stands as a bloody and integral part of the world evangelicals struggled to maintain, part of the wall they fought to keep up. In Mississippi during the 1930s, a group of Methodist women did unite in an anti-lynching crusade.³¹ Apart from this one initiative, there was no major effort to condemn or thwart the rampant violence of racism. Evangelicalism as a whole, but particularly in the South where questions of race were most

²⁸ Quoted in Beck, *A Festival of Violence*, 21.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁰ Dupont, *Mississippi Praying*, 27.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

salient, confronted the complex apparatus of segregation, dominance, and violence that was ideological racism with silence. Dupont clearly confirms this in *Mississippi Praying*.³²

Graham, too, was a perpetuator of silence.³³ For all his crusades, for his hundreds of sermons preached throughout the United States, and his repeated calls for renewal, Graham, until the 1960s, did not fundamentally question the racial order of American society. McLoughlin, in his biography of the evangelist, mentioned Graham's neglect of the subject of segregation and racial strife. "In the first fifteen years of his ministry," wrote McLoughlin, "Graham not only did not express sympathy for equal rights for Negroes, he did not even attempt to apply Christianity to their problems."³⁴ Graham, like so many other evangelical leaders, was the bearer of the Gospel of the white man, revealed for white salvation. Later, in his 1967 essay, McLoughlin assuaged his assessment of Graham, acknowledging the fact that the evangelist had desegregated his crusades in 1954.³⁵ This small gesture in working towards racial equality and harmony in the United States was, for McLoughlin, "offset" by Graham's constant insistence that any form of social or political protest was un-Christian and undemocratic.³⁶ Thus, despite allowing African Americans to attend his religious rallies, Graham preached far and wide against any political policy or activity that would bring about a substantial change to the social and political arrangements that made the subjugation of other races an American reality.

But it was with more than silence that the evangelical worked to preserve the American racial order of subjugation. The sharp lines of segregation cut right into the heart of the Christian Church. Dupont demonstrates that the evangelicals were intertwined with and supported the entire apparatus of segregation. For example, in the South, even within the Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist denominations, there was a mandatory racial separation, which resulted in exclusively white and black churches.³⁷ Thus, segregation was

³² Dupont states unequivocally, in the specific context of evangelicalism in Mississippi up until 1962, "Mississippi's white Baptists did not speak collectively against the violence that enabled white supremacy to thrive," *Ibid.*, 33-34, see also 26-32.

³³ On the evangelical movement's general indifference to the Civil Rights Movement see FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 203. On Graham's chaotic back and forth on issues of race, segregation, and Christianity see *Ibid.*, 203-205.

³⁴ McLoughlin, *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age*, 91.

³⁵ McLoughlin, "Is There a Third Force in Christendom?" 67.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ For interdenominational segregation, specifically with southern Methodists, who included segregation in their administrative structure in the 1930s, see Dupont, *Mississippi Praying*, 28-29. Of the evangelical religion's overall role in sustaining racial denigration and structural racial inequality, Dupont writes, "Religion erected walls between white and black life that remained as strong and impenetrable as political, economic, or educational barriers, and it thus helped bear the weight of white supremacy," *Ibid.*, 34.

not only a social reality, not only a political form of alienation, it was also, perhaps most importantly for us, a religious practice, an aspect of being Christian.

What brought the evangelical's silence to an abrupt end was the sustained challenge of the Civil Rights Movement. The feared, distant, and segregated enemy had arrived at the gate; the evangelical's collective identity as Americans was now under question. For evangelicals who believed fervently in the unquestionable greatness of the United States and the inferiority of African Americans, the most terrifying thing had occurred: "The Negro," to use the words of Martin Luther King Jr., "came to feel that he was somebody."³⁸ Unprepared for the coming changes, so distant from the problems of others, the movement for civil rights shook the very foundations of their collective notion of self. The Civil Rights Movement with its boycotts, marches, sit-ins, lofty discourse, and its moving prayers to end segregation proved to be a direct and powerful challenge. When the evangel spoke of Americans wallowing in material prosperity, black men and women showed them economic destitution. When evangelicals sang of freedom, African Americans showed them chains of oppression, segregation, and hatred. When evangelicals gathered in jubilation as a man walked on the moon, black men and women showed the United States that, here on earth, in their very midst, some could only make the walk of poverty and uncertainty. When evangelicals praised and worked to build up the Christian foundations of the United States, restore its religious heritage, the black man and the black woman asked the world Why they still remained on the outside looking in? And for all the evangelical's lofty notes of the United States as a land of justice, as the eternal bastion of freedom, as the world's deliverer, the black person knew, in their hearts, the violent conditions of their existence. Thus, from the evangelical perspective, the movement for civil rights emerged not as a simple reorganization of society, but as a fundamental confrontation of *who* evangelicals were. The identity that evangelicals had fabricated, when brought into proximity with the reality of their fellow citizens, was swiftly falling to pieces.

At times, King's words brought the contrast between the evangelical's imagined and idyllic world and the reality of African American existence in the United States into dramatic relief. For instance, while confined to a Birmingham jail in 1963, King wrote a response to a letter from eight Southern clergymen, who had denounced the civil rights leader's activities. "I am here in Birmingham," King informed his detractors, "because

³⁸ Martin Luther King Jr., "Facing the Challenge of a New Age," in *I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World*, ed. James Melvin Washington (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 18.

injustice is here.”³⁹ The injustice taking place in Alabama was a manifestation of the inequality and maltreatment of black men and women, which had for so long been occurring, in varying degrees, all across the United States. Having established the reason for his mission, King turned his focus to the role of the Christian Church in the United States and its complicity with this manifest injustice. “I have been so greatly disappointed with the white church and its leadership,” King admonished.⁴⁰ For the believing Christian who stood indifferent to the stultifying power of segregation and to the violence that erupted as the system of institutionalized racism came undone, King decried that his fellow believers were “more cautious than courageous and have remained silent behind the anesthetizing security of the stained-glass windows.”⁴¹ The imprisoned King concluded by calling into question the viability and value of those Christian churches that either actively or passively aided in the support of segregation. “Is organized religion,” he asked, as if it were addressed directly to evangelicals, “too inextricably bound to the status quo to save our nation and the world?”⁴² Thus, the evangelical, many of whom tacitly or vocally supported segregation, had to contend, not only with the transformation of society involving the gradual inclusion, at least politically, of blacks, but the harrowing, questioning voice of justice. They were being forced to take account of themselves.

King’s assertion that churches, which forcibly held up the edifice of racism, were making themselves irrelevant was not the only way that the movement decisively countered the conventional evangelical understanding of life in the United States and what it was to be American. Pray-ins, like sit-ins, brought the realities of segregation awkwardly, and at times, violently, into view. Civil rights activists used pray-ins as a means of bringing to light the hypocrisy of churches that refused entrance to blacks. No longer could one hide behind the walls of the church, immune to the truth of segregation.

The Civil Rights Movement did not simply confront American evangelicals with the unseemly reality of the status quo, and thereby call into question the righteousness of the Christian church; the struggle for political and social equality also struck at and undermined other convictions some evangelicals held about Americans and the country in which they lived. During the Cold War, the great and often propagandized belief of the evangelical was that the United States was the land of the free, a just and merciful nation. Americans, they

³⁹ Martin Luther King Jr, “Letter From a Birmingham Jail,” in *I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World*, ed. James Melvin Washington (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 84.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 97-98.

urged, were freedom-loving, truth-livers, and truth-lovers. One of the evangelical movement's most consistent objects of praise and applause was the United States's material prosperity. The Civil Rights Movement brought to light what before had been lurking as a macabre shadow—what was always known but rarely discussed. King, along with other activists, shattered this scheme and in his most well known speech he confronted the nation with a reality that ran counter to the evangelical's dream of his country:

But one hundred years later, the Negro still is not free; one hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination; one hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity; one hundred years later, the Negro is still languished in the corners of American society and finds himself in exile in his own land.⁴³

The wholesome image, the collective sense of self, that evangelicals had fondly maintained was now, through King's poetic words, fractured. The angelic dreams of the United States as free, prosperous, and just were, the evangelical came to know, no longer universally applicable. The evangel's songs of capitalism's power, its triumph, its bountiful riches, now began to ring hallow.

The evangelical's basic and cherished notion of themselves and the essence of their country, was challenged in another decisive and astounding way. For them, the United States was a civilized country, it was a glorious participant in Western Civilization. Evangelicals often brought the West and its achievements into contradistinction with what they believed were other, more savage parts of the world. Working under the pretext of civilization, an underlying assumption emerged that the more primordial and baser instincts of humankind had been sloughed off, left in the depositories of history. As lover's of justice, of freedom, how could Americans be violent? Writing in 1949, Reinhold Niebuhr, a prominent Protestant theologian, spoke in his book *Faith and History* of this popular misconception in society: "...the belief that human brutality is a vestigial remnant of man's animal or primitive past represents one of the dearest illusions of modern culture, to which men cling tenaciously even when every contemporary experience refutes it."⁴⁴ With the violent and frenetic attempts to suppress the movement for civil rights, Americans experienced first hand the brutality of which men and women were still capable, the

⁴³ Martin Luther King Jr., "I Have a Dream," in *I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World*, ed. James Melvin Washington (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 102.

⁴⁴ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History: A comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1949), 10.

savagery that was latent in what was believed to be the land of freedom. Decorum and decency were jettisoned by many, mobs viciously heckled black students entering desegregated schools and encircled and taunted those who participated in sit-ins, law enforcement and police dogs attacked protestors, and the threat of arbitrary killings still hung, with the constancy of the stars in the night sky, over the African American's head. The stark and undeniable facts of the African American experience, in the United States of the 1950s and 1960s, were no longer distant rumors the burden of which might be lessened by the remoteness of time and space. Now brutal footage flashed across the television screen, violent images graced the covers of American newspapers. In short, one could no longer escape the violent reality that was unfolding. As Heschel, who participated in the Civil Rights Movement, expressed so well in his 1965 *Who is Man* "What he [man] has long disregarded suddenly erupts in painful awareness."⁴⁵ Evangelicals had forgotten the suffering of others, the violence of segregation, the effects of ideological racism. Now, the Second World War in the past, the consequences of this history asserted themselves. The assassination of King in 1968, led one editorial from *Christianity Today* to the realization that the United States had not, as one might hope, forsaken all participation in violence. "King's murder reinforced Ho Chi Minh's claim that the United States is a nation of violence and special privilege," the editorial wrote, concluding, "America, like other nations, fall embarrassingly short of full devotion to justice and freedom."⁴⁶

The Civil Rights Movement had been a long time coming. The abolition of slavery, enacted by the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, was replaced with the systematic legal regimentation of black lives. Where laws of separation ended, social prejudice, hatred, fear, and unthinking prevailed, working tirelessly to grind African Americans into the dust of inferiority, to consign them to the ghetto of exclusion. In the United States, the vaunted land of freedom, God's chosen nation, the country whose glorious foundations rested on the sacredness of the Holy Book, through law or social more, the space one occupied, one's work, one's movement, one's studies, what, where, and when one consumed were all brought under strict control. Many of the men and women who would dare to transgress these lines met their end at the hands of the lyncher and the mob, a fact we have already explored. The imperialism of American racism even invaded the most intimate of spaces: who one spoke to, whom one married, were all facets of external, invasive surveillance and coercive domination. In the years that followed emancipation, with the creation of an

⁴⁵ Abraham Joshua Heschel, *Who is Man?* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965), 3.

intellectual leadership, with the founding of educational institutions, with the establishment of organizations to protect and advocate for African Americans—such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) founded in 1909—slowly, inroads into the bulwark of racism were made. In *Brown vs. Board of Education*, the United States Supreme Court, in 1954, superseded discriminatory state legislation, declaring the notion of separate but equal educational institutions unconstitutional. In 1955, in Montgomery, Alabama, Rosa Parks, with her simple act of defiance, sparked the bus boycott that lasted for little more than a year and which became one of the most visible signs of the emerging struggle for equality.

Towards the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, in the fleeting moments when *Christianity Today* did begin to address the events surrounding the Civil Rights Movement, it did so, initially, only in the spirit of reaction and detraction. Forced to engage with African Americans, to acknowledge the accusations of injustice streaming forth from the black community, evangelicals intended to establish themselves as mediators of human relations and to develop a collective response. We find in our source *Christianity Today* that the evangelical's voice of reaction was less a mere sharing of opinions and more as a concerted effort to bring human relations, this unique and creative aspect of being human, under the tutelage of the evangelical Church. Evangelicals desired to bring about a situation whereby relations were no longer a fundamental aspect of who personal identity, a realm where the individual person is free to *create* relations, bringing about a purposeful relationship. Instead, the evangelical telos was to make of human relations a conditioned, mediated, and controlled experience. Relations, in this way, lost their unique and free quality. The evangelical, no longer a simple bearer of a message, awarded themselves with the position of the expert who wielded a commanding authority and divine knowledge of how the black man and the black woman were to be treated, where their place in society was to be found, what the proper understanding of the events of the 1950s and 1960s was. The evangelical offered the proper way of seeing others.

Evangelicals writing in *Christianity Today* worked diligently to undermine the attempt to rid American society of segregation. One of the most effective ways to achieve this was through various forms of disparagement. An editorial in 1959 exemplified this with perfection. Comparing the struggle for civil rights to the abolition of slavery, the editorial informed readers, "Today's ministerial attitudes toward segregation, desegregation, and

⁴⁶ "Johnson, King, and Ho Chi Minh," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, April 26, 1968, 24 [744].

integration are strikingly similar to those expressed almost a century ago toward slavery. In that earlier day, extremists soon inflated the alternative of ‘slavery or abolition’ into the *ultimate* social issue.”⁴⁷ Clergymen, who supported the struggle for social and political equality, the editorial clearly stated, were labeled extremists and guilty of exaggerating the social conditions of blacks. Those who worked for civil rights were not only marked as extremists, the editorial went on to say: “Intentional elevation of the abolition cause above the unity and peace of the nation and above the mission and message of the churches,” the editorial informed, “attested to the radicals primary interest in social change (if not in social revolution) rather than in personal regeneration.”⁴⁸ Using the evangelical interpretation of abolition as a form of exaggerated extremism, which was unduly furthered to the detriment of the peace and unity of the nation, the editorial implies that the movement for civil rights was also a threat to the Republic itself—unity and peace were its first victims. In the effort to delegitimize the movement to end ideological and institutional racism, evangelicals utilized another familiar tool, protesting that the path of the Christian Church was to preach salvation and not the reformation of the social order nor the righting of historical wrongs. Evangelicals themselves constantly undermined their own convenient formulation that the Christian Church should maintain the primacy of the Christian message of salvation untainted by involvement in the political or the social. The vigorous support of capitalism, for example, the perpetual campaign against communism, the elevation of the United States into the status of a chosen nation, the support of the American invasion of Vietnam, the frequent moral invectives hurled at various groups—homosexuals, non-conforming women, pornographers, student protestors, to name a few—all undeniably attest to the fact that the evangelical did not politely excuse him or herself from the realm of politics or the sphere of society. On the contrary, what becomes increasingly clear is that the evangelical was the foremost champion of such intervention, always ready to state their position, provide their expertise, use their influence to occasion the desired outcome. It wasn’t until the Civil Rights Movement was well underway that evangelicals added, reluctantly, the equality of the races into their already ambition political program.

With the protective armor of an otherworldly *Weltanschauung*, which presented evangelicals as pious and neutral observers, the editorial, in its effort to counter the Civil Rights Movement, changed tactics. Moving away from the label of extremist and the notion that the political was beyond the concern of an evangelical Christian, the editorial attempted

⁴⁷ “Race Tensions and Social Change,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 20.

to alter the terms of the political debate. The editorial warned that “swift integration” might not be ideal for both races and, more revealing, that “...the issue at stake becomes Big Government more than the Exiled Negro.”⁴⁹ The problem was not, the editorial argued, the present or historical situation of blacks in the United States, nor was it a question of freedom. The Movement for Civil Rights, the editorial argued, was detrimental to American society because it brought with it the danger of Big Government.

In a single editorial, all manner of damning accusations were put forward. Desegregationists were extremists and radicals. In their promotion of a social reform and not exclusively the message of salvation they were blasphemous, if not heretical. The revolutionaries of the Civil Rights Movement were also, warned the evangelical Christian, devious promoters of an expanded government. We see in such a groping and haphazard denouncement of the Civil Rights Movement the lengths that evangelicals would go to in order to shore up the decrepit edifice of segregation.

Evangelicals, at other times, attempted to crush or stall the movement for civil rights by attempting to convince the faithful of the pointlessness of such efforts, to point out its ineffectuality. One cannot act, we are reminded, one cannot bring about change. The power of political change pales in comparison to the power of Christ, the evangelical faithful were informed time and again. “Lobbying, log-rolling, filibustering, sit-down strikes, all put together,” proclaimed an editorial in 1960, “will not do the good that one individual, completely consecrated to Christ, could accomplish in removing cultural blights and establishing genuine community.”⁵⁰ The editorial in question was attempting to navigate the complexities of the white conscience and the “negro” vote. “The solution seems ultimately to lie not in a civil rights act (although we pray that a workable civil rights act will be forthcoming),” read the editorial, “It lies not in more expositions of the doctrine of the dignity of man (profoundly true as it is). The solution lies in infusing both cultures with the mind and spirit of Jesus Christ.”⁵¹ Thus, to bring about a change that the evangelical was often openly against or only, at other times, half-heartedly supported, they begged Americans, both white and black, to do nothing, to pass no law, stage no sit-in, but rather to abide in festering silence submerged in the mire of suffering, exclusion, and violence. Once again, the evangel was not content in merely stifling action but presented the evangelical faith as the only viable means of change, the true and noble path of equality. Once again the

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁵⁰ “White Conscience and the Negro Vote,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 28, 1960, 23 [543].

telos of Christianity becomes something other than eternal life. Evangelicalism was both salvation and a sociopolitical solution. But in order to promote the mundane and transformative power of evangelicalism, these Christians were forced to ignore the fact that the chosen nation, the one whose foundations were Christian, had proven wildly ineffective at eliminating the possibility of a segregated society in the first place.

Graham was also a purveyor of evangelicalism as a social program for change, as the only possible path of human action. Well into his lengthy career as a leader of the evangelical movement, the evangelist in 1958 offered his remedy to America's racial tensions. "Down here in the South," Graham said in North Carolina, "there are thousands of people that are suffering anguish at this particular time. It's not just a Southern problem, it's the world problem."⁵² "Would to God," Graham beseeched the world, heart full of anguish, "that all of us could come to the Cross. And see in Christ a solution of all the problems that bewilder us and confuse us."⁵³ For, he added, "The country needs Christ."⁵⁴ In this particular context, the evangelical's calls to salvation and the fanfare surrounding it served a concrete political and social purpose. Here conversion, Graham's Christ as solution, works to stymie political change, withdraw action from the space of politics. What was achieved with such a withdrawal was the maintenance of a social order in which black men and women were barred from a fuller participation in American society. Here, in the evangelical scheme, salvation stood as a viable means of maintaining segregation and ideological racism.

Bell, writing in *Christianity Today* in 1968, tried to foil the advancement of the Civil Rights Movement with an appeal to law and order. The subject of Bell's column was not specifically the riots and explosive anger that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. on April 4, 1968, which had occurred a few days earlier. Instead, it was civil disobedience itself that was the subject of Bell's ire. What Bell argued against was the essence of the Civil Rights Movement itself. "Calculated civil disobedience, seemingly so innocent, has brought in an era of lawlessness and bloodshed that can plunge our nation into unbelievable chaos. The tragic death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and subsequent events bear mute testimony to the uncontrolled forces now unloosed across the land," he wrote in his column.⁵⁵ "Civil disobedience," he wrote, "can lead to the dissolution of law and order,

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Billy Graham, "The World's Darkest Hour" [Sermon], Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Charlotte, NC. October, 18, 1958, <http://billygraham.org/video/the-worlds-darkest-hour/>. See also Billy Graham, *What's Wrong with the World?* [Sermon], video, Charlotte, NC, 1958, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXcslIP3bdg>.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ L. Nelson Bell, "Civil Disobedience," A Layman and his Faith, *Christianity Today*, April 26, 1968, 20 [740].

with anarchy the result. Further, it can lead to revolution. And revolution can open the way to dictatorship, with the resulting loss of freedom and ultimate bondage.”⁵⁶ According to Bell, the method of the civil rights movement of disobeying certain laws so as to reveal their discriminatory nature and move to overcome them, “To engage in or condone civil disobedience is to loose a tiger of destruction.”⁵⁷ Still in 1968, even in the wake of King’s violent death, evangelicals besmirched the struggle for civil rights, labeling it as a stepping stone to anarchy, revolution, destruction.

In addition to being ineffectual, a way of fomenting revolution, the effort to eliminate elements of racism and segregation in the United States, according to the evangelical, smacked of communism. A scathing letter to the editor in 1959 by a certain Carey Daniel, a member of the Dallas, Texas chapter of the White Citizen’s Council, demonstrated the wide spectrum of evangelical thinking regarding race and postulated that racial tensions, which were beginning to boil to the surface, had their origin not in the sins of the American past but in the nefarious cabals of Moscow. Daniel began his letter by citing the Bible in a ploy to suffuse his racial hierarchy—whites at the apex—with Scriptural authority. The Biblical story Christians and evangelicals most often used for justification of slavery and the subjugation of blacks was the story of Noah, the curse of his son Ham, and his son’s banishment. Many, needing to add legitimacy to the practice of slavery and what later became segregation, see in Ham’s curse a Biblical sanction for ideological racism. In essence, the existing social order in the United States, Daniel argued, had been ordained by God himself. “But we do believe what God’s word teaches, that the Lord himself assigned the Canaanites, the servile division of the Hamitic, or Negro race, a place of servitude, not slavery (cf. Gen. 9 and Josh. 9),” wrote the Texan.⁵⁸ “And woe be to any white man who tries to take the Negroes out of the place where God put them...” he threatened with an invocation of God’s wrath.⁵⁹ “Race-mixing,” Daniel’s epistle went on to say, uncovering the foreign elements of racial tensions was “itself godless communism and...our present racial trouble in this country is largely the result of a plot that was hatched in Moscow 31 years ago.”⁶⁰ While not all evangelicals combed through the Bible in search of a God’s condemnation of certain races—these Biblical appeals did not feature prominently in *Christianity Today*—we see that it was perfectly within the spectrum of evangelical belief

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Carey Daniel, “Race Tensions.” Eutychus and his kin, [Letter to the Editor] *Christianity Today*, March 2, 1959, 24.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

and practice not only to see blacks in a holy place of servitude as acceptable but also the very doing of God himself.⁶¹ African Americans' attempts to leave their place of subjugation, for Daniel, was not only a transgression against Biblical decorum and Christian more but also a form of communism.

Almost a year later, in 1960, evangelicals were still promoting rumors of communist involvement in the Civil Rights Movement. A news report in the magazine left a subtle hint, like a seed waiting for the right conditions to germinate, of Soviet machinations in the domestic affairs of the American Republic. The news piece reported on the arrest of a young Rev. James M. Lawson, a black divinity student at the Divinity School of Vanderbilt University, who had staged various sit-ins to protest segregated restaurants in the early part of 1960.⁶² "The possibility," the news piece concluded, "that Communist sympathizers might be behind some demonstrations was raised by Dr. B. C. Goodpasture, editor of the weekly *Gospel Advocate*, leading Church of Christ periodical."⁶³ While *Christianity Today* did not explicitly advocate the idea, this was carried out by another evangelical publication, the idea was presented as a possibility. In May of 1961, Ockenga reanimated the rumor that communist powers were at work in the current racial tensions besetting the United States. "The strategy of communism," Ockenga cautioned, "is conquest through conflict, chaos, and confusion. The Communist seeks to divide his enemy through promoting race conflict, class conflict, and religious conflict. One wonders just how much of the nationwide conflict being stimulated over race questions is perpetrated by Communist money and influences today."⁶⁴ "To counteract communism," and the racial tensions it supposedly had spawned in the heart of the American Republic, said Ockenga, "we need a *consistent theism*. We need to understand the implications of the belief in God for every realm of human life."⁶⁵

With Ockenga, we have clear evidence that the charge of communism was a contrivance that served a particular purpose. Here, its purpose was to shift focus. Suddenly, through Ockenga's sophism, the subject under discussion was no longer racial strife and the historical sources of such tension. Instead, now, our one's gaze was purposefully shifted towards the vile intrigues of a foreign power.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Dupont supports this assertion. While evangelicals sometimes used this method of biblical apology, resorting to biblical exegesis as justification for racial segregation and denigration, it was not, according to Dupont in her study of evangelicals and the Civil Rights Movement in Mississippi, common, Dupont, *Mississippi Praying*, 31.

⁶² "Reaction to 'Sit-ins' Divides Southern Clergy," CT News, *Christianity Today*, April 11, 1960, 25 [585].

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Harold John Ockenga, "The Communist Issue Today," *Christianity Today*, May 22, 1961, 11.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

In yet another example of the calculated attempt to attribute, to the movement for civil rights, communist characteristics was shown by an editorial from the winter of 1959. In keeping with the evangelical sentiment of the time, it was drafted not as response to the plight of African Americans but as a reaction to the changes taking place, a rejection of the possibility that a new collective and personal identity for black men and women might come into being. “Earnest moderates,” evangelicals stylized themselves, “who denounce segregation and consider it doomed, sense danger in the present context of Supreme Court decree and Federal implementation. They realize that immediate integration may offer a strategic vehicle for a quasi-socialistic political philosophy that shows little sympathy for limited government and States’ rights.”⁶⁶ In a familiar dance, the evangel, along the narrow line of moderation, denounced segregation simultaneously upholding the obstacles to its removal.

The evangelicals use of the powerful and negative connotations of the term “communist” to defame the civil rights movements and its leaders, the sanctimonious appeal to states’ rights, that is the right of individual states to discriminate against and treat its citizens unequally, marked much of the evangelicals view of the African American. Eventually, though, they began to cede ground. This gradual acquiescence only came about after considerable gains had been made, only after the consciousness of the nation had been awakened, after desegregation asserted itself as an inevitability. In December of 1965, R. N. Usher-Wilson informed that it was now the “right and duty” of the state to enforce black Americans’ right to vote, though he saw in this occurrence “that the state is thus compelled to intrude into what should be areas of free and private choice.”⁶⁷ Usher-Wilson’s delayed and lethargic rally to the protection of the rights of black citizens—the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had already been passed—was infused with the standard rhetoric that only evangelicalism could bring about the true change that so many desired. “A social revolution,” cautioned the graduate of St. Augustine’s College in Canterbury, England, “that does not accept the full spectrum of Christian morality will only lead from one confusion to another.”⁶⁸ But for black Americans, who fully believed that they had been created in the likeness of God, there was no confusion nor were there perplexing questions. They knew, in the suffering of their hearts, in the blood and tears that painted their lives, that they were human and that they were equal.

⁶⁶ “Race Tensions and Social Change,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, January 19, 1959, 21.

⁶⁷ R. N. Usher-Wilson, “Fragmented Morality and The Social Drift,” *Christianity Today*, December 17, 1965, 11 [1299].

The assassination of King in 1968 left evangelicals with no other option than to take sober account of the state of their country and society. With King, the movement's most visible and moving figure, now gone, a considerable thorn had been removed from the evangelical side. A man who had questioned and called evangelicals to task was now, conveniently, out of the picture. "King lived daily with the knowledge that he was marked for death," reported *Christianity Today*, "When it came, its violence set in bold relief the tragic predicament of the nation. Race relations has moved into another, more savage, era."⁶⁹ Another editorial wrote:

The rash of riots, violence, and disorders that erupted in more than 130 American cities after the despicable murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., is a black page in American history. Such terror and destruction are the fruit of 'permissive anarchy,' as someone has labeled the current laxity in confronting lawlessness.⁷⁰

From this editorial it is difficult to deduce if, for evangelicals, the murder of King was more lamentable than the outburst of anger it caused. This editorial, entitled "The Ugly Spirit of Mobbism," which moved to shift focus from King's slaying and its enormous repercussions to the riots taking place in American cities, used the occasion to once again sing to the American citizen of the country's inevitable end. The evangelical, the twentieth century's great poet of decay and decadence, thus composed his lament:

Every intelligent American should be disturbed by the immense problems facing the nation today: the grueling costly war in Viet Nam, the twilight global struggle against international communism, our crumbling inner cities, the need for racial equality in society, our ever-lengthening welfare rolls, the declining U. S. economic position, the erosion, of moral standards, the dissipation of resolute national purpose.⁷¹

What becomes abundantly clear for us in this period is that the evangel attempted to transform the unique, human experience of establishing relations into a conditioned affair, to make it a function of evangelicalism. Evangelical leaders, through the various fora of their religion, sought to establish themselves as mediators with the black American. They offered mostly white, conservative Protestants the proper way of seeing, understanding, and of relating to this oppressed minority in the United States. The universal ordeal, characterized at times by love and joy, at other times, by anger and fear, of establishing human

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ "The Life and Death of Martin Luther King," CT News *Christianity Today*, April 26, 1968, 37 [757].

⁷⁰ "The Ugly Spirit of Mobbism," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, May 24, 1968, 26 [842].

relationships disappears as a facet of an individual who might be free to see another, speak to another, feel another, outside preconceived prejudices and pre-established dictates. The human faculty of relating, one's capacity to forms ties with others, as an aspect of identity, was slowly taken over by evangelicalism and individuals looked to this new religious ideology for the regulation and direction of human relations. The evangelical did not say to its church members "As a Christian, you are free to act towards black men and women as you will. You are free to establish relations, to create bonds." On the contrary, evangelicals informed that the Church of Christ had no prerogative in social or political affairs, stressing the importance and centrality of salvation, only to intervene, time and again, against the Civil Rights Movement, bringing to the table the most creative techniques and damaging accusations to discredit it. Having done so, they offered the evangelical faith as the only means of creating lasting and meaningful change in the political and social problem of race in the United States. Not only was evangelicalism, as was the case for every other problem, billed as the solution, it was advertised as the only plausible sphere in which proper relations could be established. Only through the collective sieve of evangelicalism could true community be built. Thus, evangelicals presented the American citizen with the paradox of accepting and entering a religious community, which fundamentally and repeatedly opposed civil rights and racial equality, as a means of ameliorating race relations.

In a word, the evangelical attempted to govern relations with the black community. In the Cold War period, the lines of the evangelical's collective identity ran in direct opposition to those of the African American community. The point where the hopes and desires of the black community ended, the self-understanding of the American evangelical began. How African Americans were to be treated, where they were allowed to be, whom they were allowed to marry, what they were allowed to do, how the movement for civil rights was to be perceived were all things that evangelicalism attempted to gather unto itself. The evangel's frenetic search for the most damaging and most damning critique of the movement for civil rights all testify to their desire to keep people of color in their place. Such ambitions, such efforts to bring human relations under the auspices of the church, were not something new to religion. History is littered with examples of religious communities controlling and limiting relations with the nefarious other in religious, social, and political

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

contexts.⁷² What is perhaps unique in this particular case, as the evangelical worked to uphold African Americans' position of inferiority, was that it occurred in the midst of an emerging alternative. Slowly the social barriers to the African American's inferior status were passing away, people questioned the very foundations and criteria of racial segregation and denigration. Suddenly, one was in a position to decide for oneself how to treat others, what relations one would establish. The constricting binds of traditional hatred and racial prejudice began to loosen. As the possibility of a greater equality dawned, thereby shedding light on one's freedom to forge new bonds, to engage black people as people, the evangelical attempted to reinforce its governing grip on human relations. The movement for civil rights was, for numerous reasons, a pivotal moment in American history; its value and consequences cannot be reduced to a single point. But, for our discussion, the significance of the toil and suffering of the Civil Rights Movement lies in the fact that it was a moment in which new possibilities of collective and personal identity opened up for African Americans. Across new horizons of being light began to appear. Evangelicals, for the longest time, worked to snuff out this light, to eliminate the other's identity.

With the development of evangelicalism's collective identity, the burden of personal identity the uncertainty and difficulty of its formation can be, at least for the briefest of moments, resolved. How, on a personal level, one interacts with others, how one treats others, was not answered by oneself. Instead, evangelicalism provided the solution. What to think of the political chaos of the civil rights era? Here, too, evangelicalism had the answer. Was the black man equal? Evangelicalism had the power to tell you.

Despite the evangelical's role as opponent of the Civil Rights Movement and their intention to use the vehicle of their ideology to take on the labor of relating to others, in 1966, something of tremendous magnitude occurred. The apology issued in an editorial, whether it was tapping into a widespread sentiment, which was reverberating in the evangelical community or the thoughtful reflection of a few, demonstrated a decisive, conclusive, and incontrovertible departure from almost all the evangelical had said and done before. "We recognize the failure of many of us in the recent past to speak with sufficient clarity and force upon the biblical unity of the human race," ran the evangelicals' words,

⁷² One may take as an example the Church's centuries-long persecutory regulation, which was carried out along with the state, of European Jews. A Jew's professions were controlled, his movements were monitored, he was expelled, forced to convert, and obliged to wear identifying clothing, amongst a host of other things. Jane S. Gerber, *The Jews of Spain: A History of the Sephardic Experience* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), *passim*. See also Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide*, 183, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 195-196, 200-201, 209.

“All men are one in the humanity created by God himself.”⁷³ In a new spirit of fraternity, evangelicals rejected race as a criterion for discrimination. They categorically condemned racism. And they asked for forgiveness for their shortcomings. This was the Cold War evangelical’s finest hour, not because their apology had any lasting effect, representing great progress in race relations, nor for the reason that their words could undo the barbarism of slavery and the enduring trauma of systematic racism nor even because they admitted they were wrong, which of course they were. Nor did this momentary spirit of contrition mark a new and glorious era in the attitude of evangelicals towards African Americans. It is the evangelical’s finest moment in that, during a hurried instant, they admitted that they were human and therefore fallible. They disrobed and stood naked before the world no longer bedecked in the regalia of righteousness. In the spirit of humility, they moved to right their many wrongs. And in this *mea culpa*, in their walk to Canossa, the evangelical cast off the role of mediator of relations, of showing others how blacks were to be treated and seen, and sought to create a new beginning and bring change to a nation so that, in the future, its citizens may no longer suffer the agony of living in a republic whose foundations were built with the reassuring letter of freedom and dignity but filled with the spirit of structured barbarism, hatred, and separation.

It may be lamentable that the suffering of blacks was needed to remind evangelicals of their humanity, that they too could make mistakes, that there were fundamental contradictions with the creed they preached and sold and the reality of the society that they so cherished. Despite this, the response of evangelicals was significant. Though it may not have created any lasting impact in the United States regarding the problem of racism, though it may have been forgotten as quickly as it was uttered, for a moment, like a cloud that offers shady respite in the blaring heat of the sun, the evangelical’s apology conveyed a moment of lucidity, humanity, and humility to a volatile situation, to circumstances that should never have come into existence. For a religious movement purporting to have all the answers, solutions to all of life’s problems, the sobering realization that one was not in possession of all the answers, that one did not have a universal formula for life, represents a fleeting escape from the unbreakable gravity of their ideology. The moment stands as a promise that, even in the path of ideology’s implacable sweep, something nobly human may prevail.

⁷³ “One Race, One Gospel, One Task,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 25, 1966, 24 [216].

The Children of the Cities of the Plain

*How long yet must my feet, at Fate's behest,
The path of exile tread, and find no rest?*

—Moses ibn Ezra⁷⁴

In the 1960s, evangelicals, in terror and disbelief, were forced to turn their startled gaze back to Sodom. In such a turning, they were plucked from their dreams of solace, dreams sustained and soothed by the knowledge that that city and its denizens had been, for all time, squelched in the heat of the Lord's holy wrath. But all who turn to the Cities of the Plain and play in its fields, the evangelical was beginning to discover during the Cold War, no longer turned into pillars of salt nor were charred by celestial fire. The homosexual appeared, as if from nowhere, daring to speak in the 1950s and more prominently in the 1960s and this period, with all of its tremendous social change, also became the scene of their public appearance, the end of voicelessness. A consciousness, a history, an identity of suffering that had for so long appeared in secret, in darkness, in the milieu of anonymity—presence only with the stamp of absence—was beginning to come to light, like a flower struggling towards the sun. The pariah was coming to the gates; many would not welcome this wanderer. This decision to speak, which in the society of the time constituted a form of rebellion, brought the homosexual into decisive and unremitting conflict both with the evangelical and society, a cleavage, which for the former, would persist up until the present. Indeed, the person of the homosexual, as well as other sexual minorities, would become one of the central, obsessive preoccupations of evangelicalism as the twentieth century came to its close.

The issue of homosexuality and the evangelical's visceral reaction to it⁷⁵ has often been documented in historical studies dealing with this religious movement in the United States. Balmer, in *Thy Kingdom Come*, for example, makes note of the evangelical movement's enduring animus towards homosexuality, observing, "Although evangelicals

⁷⁴ Moses ibn Ezra, "Songs of Wandering," in *The Selected Poems of Moses ibn Ezra*, ed. Heinrich Brody (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1934), 2.

⁷⁵ Muesse, though what he says is in specific reference to Christian fundamentalism in the United States can just as easily be applied to evangelicalism, calls this religious community's relation to homosexuality an "obsession," Mark W. Muesse, "Religious Machismo: Masculinity and Fundamentalism," in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 1996), 92, 98. See also John C. Fout, "Policing Gender: Moral Purity Movements in Pre-Nazi Germany and Contemporary America," in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Westminster John Know Press: Louisville, 1996), 112-113.

have always been uneasy about homosexuality, gay and lesbians suddenly represented all manner of threats. They were corrupting our children and infecting our military.”⁷⁶ For Balmer, it was only in the last decade of the twentieth century that homosexuality became a galvanizing issue for evangelicals. The evangelicals writing in *Christianity Today* between 1956 and 1981, however, make evident that the harvest of hatred towards the homosexual was gathered in much earlier.⁷⁷ What features most prominently in some of these scholarly studies is the evangelical movement’s attempt to foment and fortify political opposition to the expansion of rights for sexual minorities. In the 1990s, as Balmer shows, the evangelical stance would sometimes take the form of opposition to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, support of state amendments that would prohibit legislation providing legal protection to gay men and women, denunciations of legislative efforts to prevent discrimination of homosexuals in public schools, and, eventually, uncompromising resistance to same-sex marriage.⁷⁸ Clarkson, throughout *Eternal Hostility*, also brings into stark relief the evangelical church’s hostility towards homosexuality. He recounts various occasions in which evangelicals, in a political context, opposed legal and civil rights protection for homosexuals in the 1990s.⁷⁹ For Diamond, the trajectory and content of the evangelical’s relation towards homosexual is much more dire. As she explains in *Spiritual Warfare*, “The enmity of the Christian Right toward gay people is potentially the most dangerous element of its ideology and political game plan. It is safe to say that the leadership of the Christian Right will no be satisfied until homosexuality is banned in the United States.”⁸⁰

The homosexual, like African Americans, arose in this period in a way that fundamentally challenged the evangelical concept of the world, their interpretations of life, and what, in the end, it was to be a man. While the response and way of relating to homosexuals often resembled their treatment of black Americans, evangelicals prepared an equally, yet subtly different and noxious feast for the homosexual. The point upon which such discourses and efforts converged was the very identity of the homosexual.

Closely linked to the issue of homosexuality was what evangelicals called and promoted as the crisis of masculinity. As the Cold War progressed, we would do well to

⁷⁶ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 25.

⁷⁷ “But ever since the Religious Right formulated its position against abortion in the late 1970s and its condemnation of homosexuality in the 1990s,” writes Balmer, demonstrating his conviction that evangelical opposition to homosexuality emerged decades later *Ibid.*, 5; see also 25.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 25, 91.

⁷⁹ Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 60, 115-116,

⁸⁰ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 101.

recall, the evangelical movement increasingly partook in the rhetoric of masculine decline. Assailed on all sides, the center of a nefarious conspiracy, the male and masculinity had entered, as the waters settled after the Second World War, into the evangelical's lore of decay. The two-sided schema of masculine decline appeared, on the one hand, in the form of a generalized anxiety towards the masculine sex's supposed emasculation. On the other hand, there was the heroic, but perhaps tragicomic, effort to transform God made Man into the erotic image of their hyper-masculine ideal, to make of American evangelicalism the avenue of a renaissance of masculinity. Evangelical Christians advertised that through their ancient faith the once great figure of the American male would enter its golden age. The evangelical's visceral rejection of the homosexual cannot be separated from the fretting disquiet in which the American male was believed to persist.

For the most part, up until the 1960s, the homosexual's life and experience were encased in the chilling ice of silence. In E. M. Forester's novel *Maurice*, written towards the beginning of the First World War, which remained unpublished until the author's death, he says perspicaciously of the secret conditions of the homosexual's existence, "...but on this, which touched him daily, civilization was silent."⁸¹ Society's tacit and long-respected agreement to not speak about homosexuality was one in which the evangelical participated fully. Thus, as evangelicals began to speak about homosexuality it was carried out neither to uncover the suffering of this social group nor to understand their afflictions nor even to sympathize with their status as pariah; the evangelical began to speak with the fierce intensity of reaction. Just as blacks had been made to fester in the inhumanity of segregation through the forgottenness of silence, so too was the homosexual quietly kept in his place by not naming him, not speaking.⁸²

In the 1950s and the 1960s,⁸³ what led evangelicals to break their silence, in *Christianity Today*, was the gradual and steady struggle for change on the part of homosexual activists. Here and there, voices began to appear, men made public their identities; masks slowly came off revealing to many that strangers had been living in their midst. In short, the homosexual began to speak. The decade of the 1950s brought to the American Republic men and women working together for change, men and women who founded and organized

⁸¹ E. M. Forester, *Maurice* (New York: New American Library, 1975), 156.

⁸² On the silence in which homosexuals were often forced to live prior to the changes brought by the gay liberation movement in the United States, see Marcus, *Making Gay History*, 21, 83.

⁸³ Here we diverge decidedly from Balmer's assertion that homosexuality suddenly, in the 1990s, become an issue of paramount importance for the evangelical community, Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 25.

various groups, the purpose of which was to combat discrimination.⁸⁴ It is clear from the report in *Christianity Today* that one organization in particular, which was established in 1964, was deeply troublesome to evangelicals. That year in San Francisco, liberal Protestant clergymen founded the Council on Religion and the Homosexual with the express intent of “establishing a dialogue.” The earliest intentions of gay activists like those at the Council on Religion and the Homosexual was not to upend society but to achieve equality.⁸⁵ While other organizations had worked to better the social conditions of gays and lesbians, the liberal Christian ministers created an organization whose ministry vis-à-vis the evangelical, hit closer to home: they had combined religion and homosexuality, an effort that evangelicals derided as preposterous.⁸⁶ Therefore, in the beginning, evangelicals did not only reanimate the long tradition of animosity towards same-sex relationships, they moved decisively to remove the possibility of speaking itself, to eliminate the other’s faculty of speech. With this attempt, in the strengthening of the bondage of silence, the evangelical hoped that the homosexual would languish in his anonymity.

Apart from this particular project, carried out by members of the Protestant community in the United States, there was not, at least in the beginning of the 1960s, a widespread rapprochement between the dominant social or religious powers and the homosexual. What we see amongst evangelicals was a feeling that the homosexual was appearing, was on the increase, was suddenly and ominously stepping onto the American scene, immigrating from some far-flung, unknown, and undesirable place. *Ipso facto*, we can gather a glimpse of the conditions of Sodom’s child, the eternal orphan of the world, namely, in the form of his exclusion from American society. The passage from obscurity to appearance speaks to the homosexual’s status of pariah as the Second World War grew evermore distant. Evangelicals perceived the increased visibility of homosexuals, their gradual appearance, through the lens of their theological biologism. The homosexual, in the eyes of evangelicals, acquired the unsightly and odious appearance of biological growth, ominous symptom of contagion, the sign of a virus.

A news piece in 1966 captures the feeling, amongst evangelicals, that there was a general change in perception with regard to the homosexual in some parts of society, that there was a growing presence of these individuals. “Homosexuality,” read the article, “is no longer an unmentioned, neglected curiosity. A shift in attitude is especially perceptible in

⁸⁴ See Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 923; Marcus, *Making Gay History*, 21, 23.

⁸⁵ Marcus, *Making Gay History*, 83.

⁸⁶ “Sexual Dialogue,” CT News, *Christianity Today*, April 23, 1965, 50 [806].

Britain, where last month the House of Commons approved in principle a liberalization of laws against homosexuality.”⁸⁷ Needless to say, the occurrence was an unwelcome one for evangelicals. An editorial in 1969, conveyed the same understanding in which homosexuality was some growing organism: “Homosexuality is growing rapidly in the United States even as the laws prohibiting it are being whittled away.”⁸⁸ Little less than a year later, a news piece by Cleath reported, with tangible consternation, “Never before has homosexuality been so visible in this country, especially in entertainment and news reporting, and never before have homosexual groups been so militant.”⁸⁹ Whether it was a sudden increase in homosexuality or a rising visibility, another editorial further developed the underlying evangelical attitude towards this new and unanticipated foe. The editorial “Confusion over Criteria a Sign that Morality is Declining,” expressed the idea that homosexuality was spreading as would a contagious disease. “One legitimate manner [to assess moral decline] is to consider the things of which a nation is ashamed,” instructed the editorial in 1962, “Of some things decent men and decent societies have always been ashamed. Homosexuality is one of them. The shame about homosexuality is not that the practice today is being faced and dealt with...The shame is rather that its practice is being increasingly and openly admitted and discussed without shame.”⁹⁰ In the early 1960s, the editorial made clear, it was the mere fact that homosexuals were speaking at all that was worrisome. Evangelicals interpreted the fact that homosexuals no longer wore the distinctive badge of shame, no longer signaled to the world their lowly status and their wretched origins, as a clear sign of civilization’s slip into the abyss. To admit and discuss that reality of one’s existence was, to the evangelical, a supreme affront, an audacious form of rebellion. In addition to being scandalized by such talk, evangelicals were intent upon maintaining the environment of silence wherein the homosexual and those like him were deprived of the human faculty of speech. And in this, that the homosexual’s words were a form of rebellion, the evangelical was, perhaps, right. It was as if the homosexual, having felt his exclusion, having seen the confined space of his movement, having had visions of his future exile from paradise, surveyed the sorry state of his world and rejected it. Hannah Arendt, in her 1944 article “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition” draws out, in magnificent fashion, the conditions of pariahdom—in this case for Jews—and the powers of discernment that it, at times, can bequeath. “The bare fact that the sun shines on all alike

⁸⁷ “Church Channel To Homosexuals,” CT News, *Christianity Today*, March 4, 1966, 53 [597].

⁸⁸ “The Laws Against Homosexuals,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 7, 1969, 32 [134].

⁸⁹ Robert Cleath, “The Homosexual Church,” CT News, *Christianity Today*, September 11, 1970, 48 [1100].

⁹⁰ “Confusion over Criteria a Sign that Morality is Declining,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, September 14, 1962, 25 [1173].

affords him daily proof that all men are essentially equal.”⁹¹ Those at society’s margins cannot help but see things more clearly, cannot help being aware that they are people of flesh and blood. Not only do they see what others did not, all of the machinations of oppression, the artifice of society, the walls of exclusion, are to them “but sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal.”⁹²

In another way, the evangelical’s assessment of the situation was entirely correct. Homosexuality was not spreading, like some infectious disease, as evangelicals attempted to entice their followers into believing, but was indeed becoming more visible. Gay culture was moving out of the shadow of secrecy and into public view.⁹³ A measurement of this growing presence can be gathered from literature. In Marcel Proust’s monumental *In Search of Lost Time*,⁹⁴ published in six volumes between 1913 and 1927, which appeared in the United States in the 1920s, one finds the subject of homosexuality interwoven in a vast array of competing themes and a myriad of characters. In a way, the massive scale and complexity of Proust’s masterpiece allows the provenance of the citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah to appear, yet remain hidden. Only with great effort and considerable time does one come into contact with this theme. Gore Vidal’s *The City and the Pillar*,⁹⁵ published in 1948, confronts the subject of homosexuality more candidly and was one of the first novels to do so. Vidal, in addition to daring to make homosexuality the leitmotif of this work, had the audacity to portray the protagonist not as some bringer of decay, as a menace to society, the traditional *pharmakos* who would be struck down for the indecency of his transgressions, but as one who had come to terms with the circumstances of his life. Baldwin’s 1956 novel *Giovanni’s Room*⁹⁶ is yet another example of the increasing boldness with which the person of the homosexual was dealt. Patricia Highsmith published her *Strangers on a Train*⁹⁷ and *The Price of Salt*⁹⁸, later renamed *Carol*, in 1950 and 1952 respectively, both of which dealt with the theme of this shadowy figure on the margins of human sexuality. And Forester’s *Maurice*, as we have said, was published in 1971, though penned long before. Other works of literature of course abound, but these few examples speak to the fact that, in the United States,

⁹¹ Hannah Arendt, “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition,” *Jewish Social Studies* 6, no. 2 (1944): 103, accessed January 30, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4464588>.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 104.

⁹³ Marcus, *Making Gay History*, 24.

⁹⁴ Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*, ed. Christopher Prendergast (London: Allen Lane, 2002).

⁹⁵ Gore Vidal, *The City and the Pillar* (London: J. Lehmann, 1949).

⁹⁶ James Baldwin, *Giovanni’s Room* (New York: Delta Trade Paperbacks, 2000).

⁹⁷ Patricia Highsmith, *Strangers on a Train* (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).

⁹⁸ Patricia Highsmith, *Carol* (London: Bloomsbury, 2003).

homosexuality was being acknowledged, in some quarters, as a fact of life as well as a legitimate subject of art.

Though, on some fronts, homosexuals enjoyed greater space in society, in other areas their situation continued to be precarious. For the homosexual, the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s were not only decades of greater social constraints but of active repression. With the Eisenhower administration and McCarthy's purges, the state hounded and aggressively pushed homosexuals out of government.⁹⁹ The American Psychiatric Association did its part in stigmatizing homosexuals as mentally ill, in maintaining same-sex relations as an instance of mental degeneracy, which, in turn, further undermined and delayed their legitimate participation in American society.¹⁰⁰ Another gauge by which to measure the position of the homosexual in American society, after the Second World War, is to look at this outcast's legal status. While the "legal involvement with homosexuality" stretched back into the first millennium BCE, the criminalization and legal marginalization of homosexuals, was alive and well for the greater part of the twentieth century.¹⁰¹ Jorge L. Carro, a professor of law at the University of Cincinnati, in an essay from 1992, paints a grim picture of the legal rights of homosexuals in the twentieth century. In this picture, we see the long reach of the arm of the state, under the sanctimonious cover of morality, into the private and intimate realm of human sexuality, into the very nucleus of desire. Carro recounts that the criminalization of sodomy began in the colonial era of the United States. In North Carolina, for example, during the nineteenth century, it was a felony punishable by death.¹⁰² The legal proscription against homosexuality remained intact and unscathed in all fifty states and in the District of Columbia well into the 1960s.¹⁰³ At the time of the writing of Carro's article, twenty-five states still maintained legislation criminalizing homosexual activity; in sixteen of those states, it was a felony offense. Carro shares a standard anti-sodomy statute from 1988: "Sodomy and Buggery: Whoever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with a beast shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for no more than twenty years."¹⁰⁴ As Carro demonstrates throughout the rest of his article, the

⁹⁹ For more on this period of oppression see: Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 923.

¹⁰⁰ Marcus, *Making Gay History*, 5, 21, 73, 96, 122, 145-147, 179-183; Faragher, *Out of Many*, 672.

¹⁰¹ Wayne R. Dynes and Stephen Donaldson, introduction to *Homosexuality: Discrimination, Criminology, and the Law*. Vol. 4. *Homosexuality: Discrimination, Criminology, and the Law*, ed. Wayne R. Dynes and Stephen Donaldson (New York: Garland Pub., 1992), vii.

¹⁰² Jorge L. Carro, "From Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority to AIDS: What is in the Future for Homosexual Aliens," in *Homosexuality: Discrimination, Criminology, and the Law*, ed. Wayne R. Dynes and Stephen Donaldson (New York: Garland Pub., 1992), 52.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

“crime” of homosexuality was, during the course of the twentieth century, a pretext for preventing the entrance of “psychopathic” personalities, i.e., homosexuals, into the United States. This began with the Immigration Act of 1917, which barred entrance to diseased individuals (homosexuality being considered a disease of the psyche). The legal prohibition against diseased homosexuals was also used to stage the removal of immigrants already in the United States.¹⁰⁵

Such was the state of affairs for the homosexual in the years after 1945: increased visibility coupled with sustained legal marginalization and criminalization. In the context of the homosexual’s increasing visibility, the alternative between silence and speaking cannot be overstated nor can we diminish the meaning of the evangelical’s initial attempts to choke this newfound voice, to push the homosexual man back into the desert regions of speechlessness. Speaking, of course, touches, universally, upon something human, it holds significance for all men and women. We have established previously that, for some, it is at the very nexus of personal as well as collective identity. Yet for the homosexual, whose identity very often lies hidden behind a mask, something only to be brought out in word, speaking takes on an added weight. Of this situation, of the dilemma facing the homosexual, Henning Bech, a Danish sociologist, author, professor, was well aware. “Everywhere artificiality, uncertainty, covering up,” wrote Bech in his 1997 book *When Men Meet*, a study of the homosexual’s navigation of modernity.¹⁰⁶ “One lament recurs over and again in the hundred-year history of the homosexual: that he cannot be himself,” observed Hennig, bringing into sharp focus the dilemma of the homosexual.¹⁰⁷ To not speak, to wear this public mask, to play this public role, to be forced into silence, these were a denial of the reality of one’s existence. Thus, the evangelical’s righteous attempts to wrest from these men their speech, to deprive him of their words, was more than an insignificant opposition to homosexuality; rather it was a reaching into the very depths of one’s being, it was an attempt to strike at that which was most essential, to prevent the emergence of personal identity itself.

In the decade of the 1960s, when the confrontation between homosexuals and the evangelical church intensified, the evangel would not only avail himself of silence and the

¹⁰⁵ Carro cites various court cases as examples of what he calls the “exclusion of homosexual aliens:” *United States v. Flores-Rodriguez*, *Quiroz v. Neely*, and *Fleuti v. Rosenberg*, a case involving the deportation of a lawfully admitted Swiss national. The court eventually found in favor of the Fluetti. In response, Congress attempted to reassert the immigration prohibition of homosexuals in an amendment to the Nationality Act of 1965. *Ibid.*, 58-61.

¹⁰⁶ Henning Bech, *When Men Meet: Homosexuality and Modernity*, trans. Teresa Mesquit and Tim Davies (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997), 95.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

attempt to reimpose silence's toxic reign, as tools with which to remove the homosexual from the American scene. These Christians would also attempt to cast the homosexual in a new mold, to clothe him in the hideous and worn garb of detractor, destroyer, desecrator, and demiurge of destruction. Of this, we have already been given an example. The gravity of the predominant way in which evangelicals caricatured and demonized the homosexual lies primarily in the fact that, now, the homosexual was not only beheld as a sinner bound for hell's consuming fires, the eternal recipient of damning justice, which, coming from evangelicals, was altogether unsurprising. The evangelical invective went beyond the mark of the sinner. The homosexual, like so many other figures during the Cold War, was a deliverer of decay. In this addition, with the application of such labels, such formulas, something of incredible theological importance occurred. We can observe the evangelical leaving a place of opposition to homosexuality on exclusively religious grounds. Instead, in the Cold War, they crafted their critique by drawing, not only from the Christian canon of animosity towards same sex relations and desire, but from the now long-established tradition and rhetoric of degeneracy, of pathology, which we have already explored and in various places encountered. And in a movement and society that saw so many occurrences through the lens of war, where God was a conquerer and his adherents commandos, where culture was a field of battle and cultural objects were spoils of war, the evangelical's framing of the homosexual as some sort of mortal enemy, a clandestine force, a nefarious mafia, is altogether predictable.¹⁰⁸ For the burgeoning religious movement that ostensibly manifested its opposition to modernity, it had artfully adopted some of the modern era's most conceptual forms.

Christianity Today, side by side the traditional, Christian opposition, offered these new ways of understanding the sexual deviant. The editorial "The Debilitating Revolt" discussed homosexuality and its increased acceptance and presence in some parts of American society in terms of a revolt. "If man in the twentieth century," said the editorial in 1967, "continues his revolt against God's law in the realm of sex and other areas of life, he not only will create his own hell on earth but also will face the terrible judgment of a righteous God."¹⁰⁹ Here, though God, his law, and his judgement were brought into the mix, the discussion was permeated with the possibility of earthly, temporal destruction and revolt. Hanging over the homosexual's indiscretions was the heavenly promise of American

¹⁰⁸ Clarkson provides additional examples of evangelicals framing culture in terms of war see Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 90.

¹⁰⁹ "The Debilitating Revolt," [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, July 21, 1967, 25 [1041].

destruction. The priority of maintaining the social order and upholding long-established social norms shines, undeniably, through. This warning of destruction, in the context of the 1960s and 1970s with all of its palpable change, acquired a glaringly political hue. The homosexual was framed as yet another manifestation of social dissolution and destruction.

The child of Sodom, as the one barred from the Kingdom, the one who would inevitably face God's terrible judgement, was also reiterated by Harold Lindsell. In 1973, he observed, with finality, "Paul declares that homosexuals shall not inherit the kingdom of God."¹¹⁰ "If he does not repent he is doomed..." Lindsell remarked moments later.¹¹¹ "The church cannot admit," the author spells out his argument, "those whom God excludes."¹¹² For Lindsell, the separation of the homosexual, which would be dealt out unceasingly throughout eternity, was to begin her and now: "It is discrimination on the part of the church to exclude homosexuals, but it is not oppression. Discrimination lies at the heart of Christianity."¹¹³ This particular evangelical's desire to see the homosexual outside of his church, beyond the redeeming touch of the Savior, is altogether unsurprising and insignificant. The division of the world into light and darkness, saved and unsaved, the man of grace and the apostate, those who abide in God and those who were his enemies, has long been an aspect of Christianity.¹¹⁴ What is of far greater importance to us is Lindsell's effort to make evangelicalism *the* authoritative and uncontested voice concerning homosexuality in American society. "The final and the conclusive argument against homosexuality does not come from the psychologists, the sociologists, the secularists, or the humanists," wrote Lindsell, in an attempt to dismiss the arguments of his opponents, "It comes from God, who has spoken his word against it and has never stuttered in his speech."¹¹⁵ The evangelical of the twentieth century did not merely look with disfavor on the homosexual, opting to dispel him from the ranks of the elect, purge his church of the degenerate, and wait, with anxious verve, his inevitable and infinite damnation. Here, we see him move, as a larger debate was emerging in the United States, to provide the answers as to how the homosexual was to be treated, to be the guide for the perplexed, to offer American society *the* conclusive argument against the homosexual, to dominate and snuff out any possible dialogue. Here, we see that

¹¹⁰ Harold Lindsell, "Homosexuals and the Church," *Christianity Today*, September 28, 1973, 10 [1290].

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 11 [1291].

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ The development of this idea—the inauthentic, fallen world versus the spiritually redeemed Kingdom of God—as a theological tool against and with which to negate the Jews, in early Christianity, can be found in Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide*, *passim*.

¹¹⁵ Harold Lindsell, "Homosexuals and the Church," *Christianity Today*, September 28, 1973, 11 [1291].

the evangelical was not content to merely carry out his beliefs, to practice the precepts of his religion. The evangelical's belief about homosexuality was not merely for themselves alone but was to be imposed on all peoples for all times. Here, in the evangelical's attempt to become the infallible expert concerning the homosexual, the very mouthpiece of God, we see the latent ambitions of the evangelical movement, that is, the desire to rule over, to have power over, others, to control the sex, desires, and pleasures of others.

As the American rhetorician and logician of decline, evangelicals developed other, more extreme, and equally disparaging titles for their homosexual opponents. In an article from 1960 by Pitirim A. Sorokin, the author remarked that the "Increase of the homosexuals and other 'sex-deviants,' attested by decreasing prosecution and increasing legalization of such relationships when it is done with the consent of both parties," was an undeniable example of a deep crisis in American morality.¹¹⁶ The rise of the homosexual, the degenerate, was another instance of what Sorokin called "sex anarchy."¹¹⁷ Just as with the movement for civil rights, the homosexual was labeled as a catalyst of anarchy, a spreader of demonic ideologies. For these Christians, it was not so much the soul of the deviate that hung in the balance, but rather the imagined fate of the nation.

In the editorial "Has America Passed Her Peak?" from 1968, the evangelical magazine explicitly linked the idea of the United States' fading power and the rise of the homosexual. In the context of American decline, the editorial observed, "Homosexuality is boosted as a socially acceptable way of life—not only by deviates but by leading clergymen and social engineers."¹¹⁸ Then, the author carefully placed, for the reader, homosexuality in its proper role: "If Americans...do not soon repent of their sins of hatred, greed, violence, crime, divorce, and illicit sex—as well as other personal and social sins—turn to God, and live in accordance with his commandments, our decline will inevitably lead to the fall of the American nation."¹¹⁹ In such a conceptualization, the invert, the one who deviates, was made into an instigator of the fall of the nation, into the one gently and joyously pushing the Republic into the abyss.

In the Cold War, evangelicals were generous with their terms of disdain. Just as was the case with civil rights activists, these Christians attached to their fellow human beings any term that might illicit fear or denigrate. One surprising example of this comes from a

¹¹⁶ Pitirim A. Sorokin, "The Depth of the Crisis: American Sex Morality Today," *Christianity Today*, July 4, 1960, 3.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ "Has America Passed Her Peak?" [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, March 1, 1968, 29 [553].

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

homosexual himself. In an anonymous letter from March of 1968, we see a new criminal motif with which to decorate the figure of the homosexual. The nameless individual warned his fellow evangelicals, as Forester said in *Maurice*, that “only the most depraved could glance at Sodom.”¹²⁰ With the appearance of the homosexual, according to the epistoler, new dangers confronted the world. “To legalize homosexual activity—or give it church approval,” he informed his fellow believers, “would result in more aggressiveness of adults among youth.”¹²¹ Unmistakably, this man affirmed that the homosexual was a predator and would bring about a perhaps total and irreversible corruption of the youth. In this formulation, the homosexual was not only himself depraved, the embodiment of decay and sin. As an agent of corruption, he spread his sin and his depravity to the innocent.

Time after time, and much in keeping with the evangelical thinking during the Cold War, we see the most important category for dealing with and understanding homosexuality was the biological category of decline, decadence, decay. The existence of the homosexual, whether in secret or in public, said the evangel, was to permit a biological terror to roam free, pathology to reign supreme. The homosexual, these Christians attempted to impart to their followers, carried within him, like a black stain upon his soul, the power to destroy the United States as a nation, reduce it to ashes, ashes that would mingle with the dust of forgotten history. The homosexual was the porter of oblivion. As such, evangelicals viewed homosexuals not with righteous disapproval and holy distance but as a threat that needed to be extinguished, a pathogen which needed to be eradicated. Even the oft-repeated notion that homosexuality was increasing, as opposed to merely more visible, betray their biological underpinnings of the evangelical understanding of the homosexual. In addition to an organic threat, evangelicals, at times, accused the homosexual as being the planter of the seeds of destructive, revolution and anarchy. The homosexual was also a predator, an aggressor in relation with American youth. Here too, the homosexual had extraordinary powers of corruption. As we can see, alongside the clouds of decay and rebellion, evangelicals espied around these men the aura of crime.

In the evangelicals branding of the homosexual as criminal or harbinger of decay we uncover the underlying quality of the evangelical relation to another person in one of its purest forms. The evangelical's relation to the homosexual was one of unadulterated and unabashed instrumentality and dehumanization. Deprived of human qualities, and injected with insidious traits, the homosexual no longer resembled a human being. Thus denatured,

¹²⁰ Forester, *Maurice*, 160.

the homosexual could be handled accordingly. Recast into the harbinger of evil, into the delightful bringer of the United States' destructions, the homosexual's hopes and dreams, love and affection, fear and suffering, were poured into a mold that was not of his making. In this instrumental relationship, where the homosexual was made to play the villain, evangelical Christians were not alone. Evangelicals were simply acting in accordance with the vision and prejudices of the period immediately following the end of the Second World War. Beyond evangelicalism's conformity to aspects of American society, this instrumentality conforms, in a more general way, to the tenor of our contemporary society. Heschel, in his 1966 work *The Insecurity of Freedom*, asked, "What is the spirit of the age?" to which he answered, "It is, I believe, the instrumentalization of the world, the instrumentalization of man, the instrumentalization of all values."¹²² Though Heschel would not have argued that instrumentality is entirely new in human history, he saw it as the predominant way of interaction of the contemporary world, he believed that it had been set up as one of its supreme values, one of its governing principles. Seen through Heschel's eyes, the handling of men and women as instruments, as means, becomes not a unique and singular aspect of evangelicalism, but a way of participating in the project of the age, a reification of existing patterns of relation.

Beside the new masks of destruction, which the homosexual was made to wear, the evangelical did maintain what we might call the traditional Christian animus towards the descendants of Sodom. Only now, the evangelical understanding became a bewildering amalgam of Christian theology and political theory, crime and destruction, and a function of the biological cycle: a struggle for life and death. Among all these, evangelicals urged that, in the typical Christian lexicon, the homosexual suffered from "the lust of the flesh."¹²³ *Christianity Today* began the issue of April 27, 1967 by observing, "The alcoholic and the homosexual are the unfree persons caught in the web of uncontrollable physical or psychological forces..."¹²⁴ In their eyes, homosexuality was a form of addiction, a weakness of the psyche, echoing the reigning understanding of psychologists at the time. Though here evangelicals diagnosed homosexuality as a disease, it still remained a moral question, a sin for which the homosexual would be offered eternal damnation.

¹²¹ "Letter from a Homosexual" [Anonymous letter] *Christianity Today*, March 1, 1968, 23 [547].

¹²² Abraham Joshua Heschel, *The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human Existence* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1966), 40.

¹²³ "Letter from a Homosexual" [Anonymous letter] *Christianity Today*, March 1, 1968, 23 [547].

¹²⁴ "A Free God for Free Men," *Christianity Today*, April 27, 1962, 3.

In 1969, B. L. Smith, in his article “Homosexuality in the Bible and the Law,” attempted to provide readers with the evangelical understanding of this now public phenomenon, ranking it under a wider umbrella of criminal activity and transgression. “In Leviticus 18,” Smith observed, “the sin of homosexuality (or sodomy) is listed along with bestiality, child sacrifice, adultery, coitus with family relations and with a wife during menstruation. In Leviticus 20 it appears as a capital offense, together with child sacrifice, wizard-consultation, cursing of parents, adultery, incest, bestiality, and other improper unions.”¹²⁵ In the evangel’s twentieth-century campaign for righteousness, homosexuality has taken clear and unmistakable precedence over other mortal sins such as sexual relations with a wife in menstruation and wizard-consultation, becoming one of the principal points of fixation of American evangelicalism. As a sin, and, for the evangelical, one of a particularly grotesque nature, the homosexual brings upon himself, as we have seen, exclusion from the kingdom of heaven.¹²⁶ Smith tried to remind the reader that the sinning homosexual was at home in a world of fallen man.¹²⁷ “All homosexuality needs the forgiveness of God,” wrote Smith.¹²⁸ But with Smith, something subtly new was introduced. Smith, an evangelical who believed in the divine inspiration and literal interpretation of Scripture, presented the Bible and the Mosaic Law, as a means of deciphering the proper relation to homosexuals, as the ultimate answer to the problem of homosexuality. For Smith, Leviticus 20 was not an interesting tidbit, a historical curiosity of a different and remote age. On the contrary, it was a living symbol of the homosexual’s ultimate condemnation and corruption. In this particular passage’s prescription of death for the homosexual, the solution was clearly presented.

Flirtation with the death penalty as the proper and holy response to homosexuality in the United States was not uncommon in evangelicalism during this period. It was especially pronounced and advertised in evangelicalism’s extreme but influential theological wing: reconstructionism. American reconstructionists have been advocating the death penalty for a number of crimes listed in the Bible.¹²⁹

An editorial very much in line with Smith’s commentary declared in 1969, “Scripture pronounces its own judgment on homosexuality and states clearly that those who

¹²⁵ B. L. Smith, “Homosexuality in the Bible and the Law,” *Christianity Today*, July 18, 1969, 7 [935].

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 8 [936].

¹²⁹ See Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 81-83, 100-101. See also Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 103; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 248.

practice it shall not inherit the kingdom of God.”¹³⁰ “Wherever Christianity was strong,” the editorial reminisced, “laws against the homosexual abounded. In our day Christianity is rapidly becoming a minority faith, and with its decline has come a loosening of laws against sexual immorality.” Evangelicalism experienced prodigious growth in the years after the Second World War; despite this growth, evangelicals claimed that Christianity had been demoted to minority status in the United States. Despite evangelical’s clear successes, it was still the victim. As Christianity faded into the background, the homosexual moved to the foreground. The acceptance of homosexuality was tied, in the estimation of the evangelical, with the progressive weakening of their religion in the United States. “We are quick to point out,” concluded the editorial, “that the Gospel is for the homosexual too. The Church had better make it plain that Christianity and homosexuality are incompatible even as it proclaims deliverance for the homosexual from his sinful habit through faith in Jesus Christ.”¹³¹

In all of *Christianity Today*’s dealings with the homosexual, it seems that there was only one moment when the deviant was seen as a person, when the evangelical attempted to understand the experience of these men and not make them a mere subject of evangelical theological explanation and analysis. In an anonymous article from 1967, an evangelical recounted the insights he had gained from his years as Christian counselor. He wrote that prior to meeting homosexual he did not “understand the sense of otherness that haunts the homosexual that he feels he has no place in church or in society.”¹³²

The previously mentioned anonymous letter from a homosexual, which appeared in *Christianity Today* in 1968, revealed with greatest clarity the evangelical’s relation to this sexual sinner, the underlying meaning of said relation, and what the evangelical was attempting to achieve. “The homosexual’s problem is very similar to the alcoholic’s,” began the anonymous homosexual, maintaining the idea that his sexuality was a form of addiction.¹³³ “Two people,” the author instructed, “might become emotionally attached to one another because of their similar problem, but this cannot be classified as love.”¹³⁴ Incapable of love, the author then painted the grim picture of the homosexual’s existence: “Society looks with great disfavor on the practicing homosexual, and he moves from place to place, job to job. He is running not only from society, but also from the lust within him. Finally he is

¹³⁰ “The Laws Against Homosexuals,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, November 7, 1969, 32 [134].

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² “What I’ve Learned in Counseling...” [Anonymous letter] *Christianity Today*, June 9, 1967, 5 [893].

¹³³ “Letter from a Homosexual.” [Anonymous letter] *CT*, Vol. XII, No. 11– March 1, 1968, p. 23 [547].

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

discovered and condemned.”¹³⁵ But there was a solution, said the author, a chance to stop running. “What is the solution?” he asked, “Only the forgiveness of sin through Jesus Christ and constant deliverance through the Holy Spirit.”¹³⁶ Finally, the author declared, “I am a homosexual—but I am also a servant of the living Christ who experiences God’s forgiveness and deliverance. By the grace of God this temptation does not express itself, and I am victorious through Christ.”¹³⁷ On the surface, the author’s conclusion was perfectly in keeping with Christian thinking. A benevolent Christ redeems the undeserving sinner. Yet, beneath the traditional message of salvation, there lurked something more. For this furtive sexual deviant who, under the cover of anonymity, attempted to navigate the difficult situation that life had presented him, the only pertinent question was, What, to be exact, was not given expression? Was it some unnecessary fragment that was allowed to be forgotten? Was it some minuscule piece of one’s identity that could be discarded so effortlessly? Or, on the contrary, was it something more essential, precisely who one was that was forced to be cast into oblivion? In evangelicalism’s relation towards homosexuals we encounter, once more, evangelicalism not merely as the path to eternal salvation but as a means of achieving some worldly end, a vehicle by which to overcome some obstacle, to overcome some aspect of being. In the theological organicism of the Cold War evangelical movement, which was directed to the homosexual subject, the Christian God became an instrument in the discontented and alienated homosexual’s search to escape himself, to undo what nature had done, what he, in the end, had been given. This involves a subtle yet crucial reversal. The Christian God, in this particular instance, cannot be seen as an end, but only as a means. In the evangelical worldview, where homosexuality was a stumbling block to paradise, refashioning the Christian Savior into the solution for homosexuality might seem, to the reader, a logical conclusion. In such thinking, the exorcism of homosexuality was a prerequisite for admittance into the kingdom. The fact still remains that evangelicalism, in such a conceptualization, was flaunted, not as the way to God, but as the solution to a worldly problem. Here, through evangelicalism, the homosexual was shown the secret route by which to elude his ravenous pursuers, the elixir with which to make disappear society’s disfavor, condemnation, and, ultimately, to avoid the painful confrontation with who he was. Here, evangelicalism becomes the most powerful of elixirs: the means of escaping oneself, of overcoming the disquiet of contemporary life, of triumphing over others. With chilling

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

irony, the homosexual, who had been barred from heaven's heights, was asked by the evangelical to embrace the God whose hand had cast him out of paradise's gates, to return to the Church that would not have him, and which, with righteous airs, contemplated his death and rejoiced in the holy distance of his separation. Evangelicalism asked the homosexual to lay himself on the altar of sacrifice. This was precisely evangelicalism's most seductive appeal: the subtle suggestion that one cannot manage on one's own, that one can avoid who one is, that personal identity was not something created, but something one attains upon consuming evangelicalism.

But in this new possibility of self-destruction, which the homosexual was invited to invest upon himself, other mechanisms of power were subtly at work. All of this involved, also, new procedures and tactics of observance and control. The evangelical's evolving relation towards this new and terrifying figure was more than political opposition or religious condemnation; it entailed the elaboration of pleasurable processes of ratting out the homosexual, discursively describing his essence and future, hunting down his depraved proclivities, uncovering the angles of his deviance, tracking the motions and gestures of his remove from the masculine ideal.¹³⁸

Another example of evangelicals presenting their faith as an elixir with which to dissolve homosexuality can be found in *The Jesus People*. In the *Hollywood Free Paper*, the main publication of this subset of evangelicalism, one man was quoted as saying, "I was a homosexual and Jesus set me free."¹³⁹ The wording this man used, as with the letter from the homosexual in *Christianity Today*, is telling. We see in the homosexual's idea that he was set free from his bondage of sin, a pervasive dissatisfaction with life, one's given circumstances, even with one's limitations. In the vast literature about evangelicalism, the reality of this bitter and destructive alternative, where one is asked to eliminate facets of who one is, only appears to have been coherently and cogently captured in this particular work. Of evangelicals, and especially those associated with the Jesus People, the authors of *The Jesus People* wrote, "Every effort is made to destroy one's former identity."¹⁴⁰ This quote offers additional confirmation of our idea that evangelicalism worked to undermine the collective and personal identities of homosexuals. In the case of the citizens of Sodom, long persecuted and maligned, evangelicals worked to eradicate every vestige of one's former self.

¹³⁸ For these insights, I am indebted to Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), *passim*.

¹³⁹ Enroth, *The Jesus People*, 177.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 77.

In Arendt's biographical work *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess*, published in the United States in 1958, she traces the life of one of Judaism's most important cultural figures. There is in Rahel's struggle with her Jewish identity and her efforts to integrate fully into Berlinese society, at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, an overture to the experience of the homosexual more than a century later. Arendt writes, capturing perfectly the dilemma, "Rahel's struggle against the facts, above all against the fact of having been born a Jew, very rapidly became a struggle against herself."¹⁴¹ The evangelical's promises of salvation were nothing more than an invitation to a bitter, cruel, and fruitless struggle against oneself.

The homosexual was and is confronted with an odious predicament: being a homosexual or nonbeing, speaking or not speaking, acceptance of who one is or denial, coming to terms with oneself or flight. It is clear that what evangelicals offered the emerging inhabitants of the accursed cities was not a mere escape from some external circumstance, a trivial altering of one's life. The evangelical proposed that the homosexual eliminate one of the most basic aspects of his identity, suppress that which, for whatever reason, nature or Providence or God had given him.

Our inquiry into the evangelical's way of relating to homosexuals has been fruitful for many reasons. The evangelical's treatment of the homosexual is important in that, through it, we are able to see the underlying purpose of this sort of human relation, which moved to deprive others of a basic aspect of being human: speaking and of collective and personal identity. One of the nodal points of evangelicalism's emergence during the Cold War was the very suppression of the homosexual's identity, the possibility of its coming to flourish. This denial forms one of the foundational stones of modern American evangelicalism. To speak of the evangelical's emergence, all the while forgetting these continuous and ubiquitous acts of suppression of one's identity, these relations of power, is to obscure from whence evangelicalism came and what was its purpose in contemporary American society. Through the instrumental handling of the waif of Sodom, the willingness to attribute to these men the role of the destructive agent, the corrupter of morals, the furthering of the notion that the appearance of the degenerate was the coup de grâce for a nation struggling for life, we see the ease with which one can be stripped of all his or her human qualities, and thus prepared for his undoing. This, in turn, breathes freshness into many observations that we have made

¹⁴¹ Hannah Arendt, *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (London:

along the way of this dissertation. The homosexual was dropped down into the process of decay and decadence to which evangelicals so often alluded, biological metaphors once again reared their head, and evangelicalism once more becomes, not a means of salvation, but a tool in achieving one's earthly ends, a process of self-aggrandizement or a tool by which to vanquish others. Of course, amidst all of this, the antique prohibitions against the homosexual were maintained almost as vestiges, props, by which to create an effect for the spectator. Wrapped in the words of Scripture, in the power of the Spirit, the evangelical would lend ancient authority and gravitas to his more contemporary aims and designs.

In this way, evangelicals separated themselves even more from their religious predecessors, who had appeared at various points in American history. This occurred, on the one hand, through a turn in discourse whereby the strictly religious content of their thinking was emptied. But it was also occasioned in the use of new instruments. American evangelicals during the Cold War made assiduous and adroit use of concepts, discourses, and modes of uncovering that, centuries prior, were in a state of development. The tradition of organic thought, as Arendt called it, as well as other mechanisms of power were ready, when the evangelical movement arrived, as perfected tools.

The immediate purpose and import of this relation lies also in the fact that we see the desperate lengths that evangelicals went to in order to dominate the discussion of homosexuality in the United States and to frame political and social discourse. These Christians were not content with simply reviling homosexuality, issuing their anathema, and harboring their personal animosity and desire for the homosexual to remain outside the church. Instead, evangelicals, as with so many things in the evangelical movement of the Cold War, had the definitive answer, *the* solution. From the very lips of God they had received their edicts of expulsion and they worked to weave them into the political fabric of the United States, to remove the damned from the sweeping hills of the righteous nation. Yet the very basis of the evangelical relation to the homosexual was one in which the homosexual should not exist at all, should be eradicated from the face of the earth, the light of his desire expunged forever like a burnt out sun. In this way, this type of relation moved beyond politics, spilling over into all aspects of life.

At the juncture of the homosexual's appearance, when the homosexual stood before them, evangelicalism presented itself, both to its adherents and to the larger society, once again, as a repository of answers, as a guide for men and women who no longer wanted to

decide, who wanted to be told how to relate, how to treat others. But in the answer itself, in evangelicalism as a cure to homosexuality, in faith as a means to escape oneself, we encounter evangelicalism unmasked. What was offered to the homosexual was a sacrifice, an urging that he make of himself a burnt offering, that the fumes of his burning flesh might please a just God. Beneath this call, lies the fundamental position that the homosexual should not exist at all. This cannot be conveniently confined to an isolated theological understanding, but should be seen as a general worldview, which contained the pious notion that the homosexual should not *be*. In this way, the evangelical relation towards the homosexual was, besides being an attempt to influence the social and political discourse of the time, pre-political, a movement at the most fundamental level, a maneuver on the most primary plane: it was the elaboration of a metaphysics of annihilation.

But many would not heed the call to self-sacrifice, nor embrace so willingly their death. It was as if many had renounced what George Santayana, in his novel *The Last Puritan*, called “this obscure modern martyrdom,” this macabre invitation to not be oneself.¹⁴² Many men had come to realize, as the strength of the evangelical movement grew, what Santayana said with such poignancy, that with such a sacrifice “...would not save any world. It would not even save any soul.”¹⁴³

Evangelicalism and Women

The evangelical’s antagonism and efforts to suppress the collective and personal identities of homosexuals were closely linked to their stance towards women. The evangelical opposition to homosexuality during the Cold War was, of course, multifaceted. But closely connected to the anxiety about homosexuality and its “spread” was the question of gender and the crisis both in American society and the evangelical church surrounding notions of masculinity. The homosexual, in his being, transgressed gender and societal norms that many deemed sacred, natural, and inviolable. There was a pronounced effort during the Cold War, as we explored in chapter two, to construct and strengthen certain notions of masculinity. The so-called “crisis of masculinity” made the appearance of the homosexual to the evangelical mind all the more startling and it added to their efforts of suppression and removal of homosexuality a caustic and pungent quality that otherwise might not have existed. The homosexual, then, was not just a violator of decency, he was, in

¹⁴² George Santayana, *The Last Puritan: A Memoir in the Form of a Novel* (New York: Scribner, 1936), 224.

fact, a living manifestation of one's deepest fears, the dreaded image of separation from the masculine norm, which one was invited at every hour to stymie, suppress, identify, and struggle against.

But the post-World War II "crisis" of American masculinity also coincided with significant historical changes in the role, status, and conceptualization of American women. The conjuncture of these events—the crux in the understanding of what it meant to be a man and alterations in the social place and roles of women—colored the evangelical's response to women and intensified their opposition to change. At its heart, in the defense and elaboration of a concept of masculinity, Scott informs us, one finds a strict division between the masculine and the feminine.¹⁴⁴ She wrote in her now famous 1986 essay on gender, "The idea of masculinity rests on the necessary repression of feminine aspects...and introduces conflict into the opposition of masculine and feminine."¹⁴⁵ The anxiety surrounding masculinity in the evangelical church between 1945 and 1981 and the effort to reify the masculine ideal were partially exacerbated by the transformation of the place of women in American society, but they also presaged an eventual increase in conflict, a hardening of positions, an attempt to cement for all time woman's place of inferiority, subjugation, silence, limited power, and forgottenness.

Religion's relationship to women has very often been a history of subjugation.¹⁴⁶ This is particularly true for Christianity. Thus, when the growing evangelical movement of the Cold War entered the scene, offering women a lauded place of inferiority and subservience, such actions appear before us as a seamless continuance of biblical thinking, a mere dusting off and showcasing anew of an ancient creed in contemporary American life. One even might be lulled into thinking that, towards women, nothing had changed. What casts the contemporary evangelical's relation towards women in a different light was that this attitude emerged in a new context, admits bellowing winds of change, over against new possibilities of seeing and understanding women, their place in the world, and the worth of

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," 1063-1064.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 1063.

¹⁴⁶ See Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk*, 95-99. See also Brown, *The Body and Society*, 83-102, 112-113. Brown writes of Christianity in the third and fourth centuries, "In Christian circles, the vocal advocacy, for well over a century, of extreme views on continence had brought about a situation unheard of in Judaism. Married men trembled on the brink of being demoted to the position of women; their physiological involvement in sex made them ineligible for roles of leadership in the community." Brown, *The Body and Society*, 146. Among other important factors, it was out of these fears that the ideology of subjugation, within the confines of the marital relationship, sprang.

their collective and personal identities. It was in strident opposition to viewing women with fresh eyes that the evangelical's relation was hammered out.

In *Christianity Today* between the end of the 1950s and the middle part of the 1970s, there was a glaring absence of women. The notable dearth of contributions from female authors in the magazine, in this historical period, combined with *Christianity Today's* tangible lack of interest in the conditions and experience of women in the United States, leaves us with a void. This is not to say that the evangelical movement did not direct itself to the "feminine sphere." Numerous publications crafted solely for a female readership did emerge. "Church women," Ammerman noted in *Bible Believers*, "can even cook from Christian cookbooks."¹⁴⁷ But in *Christianity Today*, evangelicalism's premier organ of thought, we are generally confronted with the voicelessness of women. This voicelessness, this conspicuous absence, though a unique obstacle, is exceedingly revealing. The void speaks to us; the absence points the way. In this void, the essence of the evangelical position was put on full display. The general absence of women, in *Christianity Today*, was a concrete manifestation of the belief that women should be out of view or, if seen, not heard. In a word, it mimicked women's general position in American society. It gave textual reality to social relations. It was written confirmation of the social order. In every single issue, *Christianity Today* dealt with the most pressing political, social, and theological events of the times. Yet, the vast majority of these discussions were undertaken with the exclusion of women, which indicates quite clearly that the world and its affairs was, for the evangelical, beyond the purview of the female mind.

After the Second World War, the *Sitz im Leben* of women in the United States was marked by numerous and in many ways unprecedented forms of change. Indeed, it was change itself that breathed new vigor into the evangelical's call for subservience and exclusion. One of the most visible changes, in our historical period of focus, was the legalization of abortion, in 1973, as a result of the United States Supreme Court decision on *Roe v. Wade*.¹⁴⁸ Given the fact that the subject of legalized abortion and evangelicalism has been generously treated by scholars, we will not devote considerable time to it here.¹⁴⁹ In addition, Balmer, as was discussed in the introduction, discounts the legalization of abortion as occasioning the genesis of American evangelicalism and the Christian Right.

¹⁴⁷ Ammerman, *Bible Believers*, 116.

¹⁴⁸ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 1011.

¹⁴⁹ See Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 5-7, 9-11, 19, 24, 26; Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 55-58, 64-65, 84, 90-100; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 135-136, 166, 170-172. Despite the fact that this work focuses on

Nevertheless, the legalization of abortion represented a sweeping change for women, a change that carried with it vast implications for many areas of life: the use of one's body and the family being just a few.

Prior to the legalization of abortion in 1973, a larger economic shift had been occurring in American society, which fundamentally altered the position of many women in the United States. The steady increase of women entering the labor force, after the Second World War, slowly transformed the American family, extended greater economic independence to women, subjugated women to the constraints and burdens of life in the modern workplace, and set up the American woman as a competitor of men in the search for employment. To these transformations the evangelical was staunchly opposed. In evangelicalism, the place of women was in the home. Her realm and dominion was the domestic. The domestic space was, in its way, the private. In her fiefdom, women, according to evangelicalism, were subordinate to men. The breakdown of the walls of domestic confinement had, in truth, begun much earlier. The figure of the workingwoman appeared well before the social convulsions of the Cold War era. The American historian William Henry Chaffe, in his 1972 book *The American Woman*, pointed out that it was already at the beginning of the twentieth century when women were pushed, by the circumstances of life, into economic activity. The period between 1880 and 1920, according to Chaffe, witnessed "the most important upsurge of female employment...At that time," he wrote, "increased urbanization, a large influx of cheap foreign labor, and the development of new mass production industries combined to cause a dramatic increase in the female labor force."¹⁵⁰ At least towards the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, to the mind of Chaffe, "Married women worked, not because they sought liberation from the burdens of domesticity or enjoyed a new equality with men in the job market but so that their families could survive economically."¹⁵¹ Thus, much earlier, the march of capital had forced many at the margins of society to fill the toiling ranks of laborers, and thereby eroding what Chaffe designates as the sexual division of labor.¹⁵² The evangelical's definition of the woman's place as a role to be played out in the privacy of the home corresponded to a reality and an ideal that, for many, had long ceased to exist. Ironically enough, it was capitalism, held up as sacred by evangelicals, which had pushed many women to seek out employment, thereby

evangelicalism after 1981, evidence of the movement's continued opposition to legalized abortion can be found in Hedges, *American Fascists*, 21, 23, 82, 135,-136, 152.

¹⁵⁰ William Henry Chaffe, *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 54.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

tearing asunder their superimposed scheme of the world. After the Second World War, the sequestering of women to the home as one of the highest, feminine ideals corresponded to a certain economic class, which had at its disposal certain privileges: principally wealth and time. It was a privileged class that had not yet felt the burden and marginalization of capitalism's process of accumulation. Regardless of whether some women had entered the realm of work up until the 1920s, prejudices were carried over into the workplace and female members of the working class received inadequate compensation for their toil, which was manifested in all types of jobs.¹⁵³

By 1920, over eight million women were employed in some capacity throughout the United States. "The poorest states—South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama," informs Chaffe, confirming his assertion that economic destitution, as a byproduct of capitalism, forced women to seek employment, "had the highest proportion of married women working."¹⁵⁴ But women as laborers were not viewed simply as violators of sacred norms; women, in this new capacity, emerge as competitors in the selling of their labor. This fact, undeniably strikes the awareness of both employer and employee. "Instead of serving men at home, she competed against them at work," Chaffe attentively observed.¹⁵⁵ One clear example of the woman worker *qua* competitor, in relation to her male counterpart, can be observed with streetcar workers after the First World War. Women, while most men had been sent to the front, had taken over this economic role only to be pushed out as men returned. "Male workers," Chaffe said, "went on strike in Cleveland in order to force women streetcar conductors out of work."¹⁵⁶

The economic factor—women in the workplace—a trend which began in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, continued apace in the period in which evangelicals slowly rose to a place of visibility in American society. And this occurred, to be clear, well prior to the 1970s, the supposed decade of evangelicalism's politicization. The separation of labor, based on gender, was vanishing with unprecedented rapidity, and the cleavage this created became more acute. "In 1960," Chaffe remarked, "twice as many women were at work as in 1940, and 40 per cent of all women over sixteen held a job. Female employment was increasing at a rate four times faster than that of men."¹⁵⁷ The number of working

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 8, 46.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 60-61.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 218.

mothers in 1960, according to Chaffe's study, increased by 400 percent.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, the increase in working women in the United States, after the Second World War, registered a change in reasons for seeking employment. Whereas, between 1880 and 1920, the prime motive was economic necessity, in the post-war era, women sought work as a means to increase disposable income, to pursue other avenues of non-essential consumption, and, says Chaffe, many desired to work "for its own sake and for the personal rewards conferred."¹⁵⁹ Chaffe wrote that, from 1940 to 1970, "there could be little question that the sexual division of labor in the home had broken down, or that women's work had played an important contributing part."¹⁶⁰ It was against the backdrop of such changes that evangelicals crafted and asserted their relation towards women, women who were, increasingly, more independent.

Inextricable from the economic position and status of women was the role of work in the life of the American, the value attached to it in a capitalist society during the twentieth century. To work was not simply to earn one's daily bread, a burden and curse of existence, a punishment for the Fall of humankind. It involved, in fact, much more. Work was a way in which Americans embodied certain values. We need not search far and wide for evidence that the value of work, specifically work that is productive and remunerated, has been established as the cardinal virtue and end of contemporary life—corroboration can be found wherever one looks. Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of this value in American society of the twentieth century and up to the present day, we find, in Fromm's *The Fear of Freedom*, an idea of what we mean. Fromm, though speaking of capitalism in its nascent form, as it struggled to assert itself against the Catholic Church and the inefficient system of feudalism, wrote that, in this period, "Work became increasingly a supreme value. A new attitude towards work developed and was so strong that the middle class grew indignant against the economic unproductivity of the institutions of the Church. Begging orders were resented as unproductive, and hence immoral."¹⁶¹ Fromm's statement still holds today. In like manner, Luxemburg, in her speech "Women's Suffrage and Class Struggle," given in 1912, made a similar observation, noting that in a capitalist economic system the only type of labor that has value, that is "productive" in the eyes of society, is that form of labor which contributes to the

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 219.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 222.

¹⁶¹ Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*, 50. Similarly, according to Weber, in a capitalist society, "...labor came to be considered in itself the end of life, ordained as such by God." Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), 83.

reproduction and accumulation of surplus value (profit).¹⁶² The social praise heaped upon productive work in capitalist societies, has its counterpart in the acrimonious disdain directed towards those who are “unproductive,” who do not or cannot work or are not paid for their labor, which we have no intention of fleshing out here. Therefore, in the United States, productive work was and is a “moral” value. It has also been perceived as an exclusively masculine value, the domain and virtue of men, one of the principal signs of masculinity.¹⁶³ The economic exclusion of women that has characterized American society for much of its history, was not exclusively an economic issue, it was a prohibition against woman participating in the “moral” life of the nation, of striving towards one of society’s highest goals, practicing one of this country’s most esteemed virtues, and performing the rituals of status. Just as the Jew, the Muslim, and the Christian keep the sabbath, observe their fasts, maintain their religious feasts, as a way of participating in their community, of embodying the virtues of their people, of being towards God, so too, does work become, in the context of the United States, a means of admittance to and acceptance by society.

The dilemma facing women: exclusion from productive work itself, which is held in highest regard in American society, making them economic sinners and entering into the labor force only to be branded as competitors—is a part and parcel of modern woman’s existence. The hostility towards female unproductivity, in terms of capital, and women as economic competitors, need not play out openly and violently; it has become the underlying basis of society and was an inherent element of the contemporary American value system. These two bitter alternatives are to be kept in mind when undertaking any discussion of the evangelical’s relation to women, for this paradox, despite protestations and assurances of the

¹⁶² Luxemburg, “Women’s Suffrage and Class Struggle,” 220. Of the “bourgeois mentality,” which places work at the apex of its moral hierarchy, Ellul writes, “The bourgeois morality was and is primarily a morality of work and of métier. Work purifies, ennobles; it is a virtue and a remedy. Work is the only thing that makes life worthwhile; it replaces God and the life of the spirit. More precisely, it identifies God with work: success becomes a blessing. God expresses his satisfaction by distributing money to those who have worked well. Before this first of all virtues, the others fade into obscurity. If laziness was the mother of all the vices, work was the father of all the virtues. This attitude was carried so far that bourgeois civilisation neglected every virtue but work,” *The Technological Society*, 220.

¹⁶³ Concerning the gendered conceptualization of work, where breadwinning and economic activity outside the home were and continue to be conceived of as exclusively male values and activities, see: W. Merle Longwood, “Changing Views of Fatherhood: A Christian Ethical Perspective,” in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 1996), 240, 244; Linda Nicholson, *Identity Before Identity Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 29-30. While productivity and economic prowess are celebrated in contemporary society as signifiers of manliness, the opposite is also true: economic failure and existence outside the economic life of a particular place is seen as inadequacy, a poignant, identifiable, and perennial lack of manhood: Timothy Noon, “‘I Took it Like a Man:’ Survival and Hope Among Poor Men,” in *Redeeming Men: Religion and Masculinities*, ed. Stephen B. Boyd, W. Merle Longwood, Mark W. Muesse (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 1996), 157-161.

sanctity of the home and the laudable role of woman as wife and mother, gives pigment to all of the evangelical's speculations concerning women's submissive role and animus to female independence.

An additional fundamental challenge to the evangelical identity, was the stirring up of new intellectual currents. On numerous points, the emergence of second-wave feminism, or women's liberation, in the 1960s persisting into the 1970s, ran counter to the predominant evangelical worldview. This cresting second-wave of feminism emerged on many fronts. A series of important works entered the feminist intellectual canon during this period. For example, Betty Friedan published *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963.¹⁶⁴ A precursor to Friedan was French intellectual Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1949), which was placed on the Catholic Church's List of Prohibited Books.¹⁶⁵ The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which we will soon address, as well as the passing of a series of other legislative measures were a central focus for those involved in feminism. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, though principally crafted in order to bring racial discrimination to an end, also included a provision eliminating gender discrimination. Prior to this, Congress passed, with the support of President Kennedy, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which sought to eliminate disparities, based on gender, in remuneration for work.¹⁶⁶ Consequently, the feminist movement not only sought to rethink the position of women in society, in the family, in the realm of sexuality, but to advocate for structural changes, which they believed created an environment of inequality.

The economic, political, and intellectual changes coming together around the question of women in American society as the icy sun of the Cold War dawned were all signs of the coming confrontation with the evangelical *Weltanschauung*. Perhaps, no one better understood the significance of the gradually changing place and role of women better than Arendt. Writing in the mid-1950s, "Introduction into Politics," which was published in *The Promise of Politics*, touches upon what is at stake. "The simple fact of the emancipation of women and of the working class—that is, of segments of humanity never before allowed to show themselves in public life—puts a radically new face on all political questions."¹⁶⁷ Ultimately, to Arendt's mind, this was an alteration in the fabric of relations as, for her,

¹⁶⁴ Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: Norton, 2001).

¹⁶⁵ Gray, Francine du Plessix. "Dispatches From the Other," *The New York Times*, May 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/books/review/Gray-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

¹⁶⁶ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 968.

¹⁶⁷ Hannah Arendt, *The Promise of Politics*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books Inc., 2007), 144.

politics was a space between men and women, arising between human beings, “established as relationships.”¹⁶⁸

In *Christianity Today*, opposition to the new visage of political questions can be gleaned. In an article from 1959 concerning the ordination of women, written by a certain Elton M. Eenigenburg (1915-1987), we find a summary of the evangelical’s view of feminism, which was then just emerging. Eenigenburg’s mentions disparagingly “feminism, or the modern theory of ‘women’s rights’...”¹⁶⁹ Eenigenburg viewed feminism simply as a farce. Eenigenburg made it clear that the idea that women were on an equal plane with men was laughable. “The permanent element, of course,” in this debate about women’s rights, “is the natural subordination of woman to man...in the divine order of creation.”¹⁷⁰ Eenigenburg then washes his hands of the matter pointing to the Lord as the responsible party: “This is not our arrangement but God’s.”¹⁷¹ Eenigenburg’s self-excusals from responsibility in the social place of women in the United States is highly important. It was more than a maintaining of the existing order. Eenigenburg added a holy veneer to the American social relations. Modern relations between men and women were not the result of a long historical development and social mores. They were, instead, the very doing of God.

Kathryn Kuhlman (1907-1976), an itinerate evangelist and healer, who travelled throughout the United States. In a 1973 interview with *Christianity Today*, she offered a folksier yet similar answer when asked about women’s liberation. “I still think,” answered Kuhlman, “the husband should be the head of the family. I know how it was at our house: If Papa said it, it was just as though God had said it. We never had any women’s lib [liberation], but we had a mighty happy family. Papa did the work, and Mama ran Papa without Papa knowing it, and it was a beautiful situation.”¹⁷²

Historians, sociologists, and other observers have devoted considerable efforts in the documentation of evangelicalism’s political opposition to women. In our period of study, this most often takes the form of evangelicals’ political maneuvering against legalized abortion and its eventual and careful development into one of the most divisive and galvanizing of political issues by evangelicalism’s devotees. Scholars and journalists have also paid a great deal of attention to the emergence of some groups, beneath the umbrella of evangelical Christianity in the United States, that have resorted to violence and terrorism as

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁶⁹ Elton M. Eenigenburg, “The Ordination of Women” *Christianity Today*, April 27, 1959, 15.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Kathryn Kuhlman, “Healing in the Spirit,” [Interview] *Christianity Today*, July 20, 1973, 7 [1081].

a means of fulfilling their political aims concerning legalized abortion. During the 1980s, the assassination of doctors and the staff of abortion clinics, the bombing of said clinics, as well as other tactics form, understandably, a prominent part of many works on evangelicalism.¹⁷³

The evangelical's political activity, which directly concerned women and their status, also coalesced around the ERA.¹⁷⁴ The Amendment, which was initially proposed in the 1920s and was first voted on by the Senate in 1946,¹⁷⁵ languished in the inertia of post-war American politics until the 1970s. The purpose of the ERA was to establish, through an amendment to the Constitution, a permanent and binding equality between the sexes. The text of the ERA was remarkably simple and comprised of three brief sections; the first stated plainly, "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." The second section awarded the Federal legislature the necessary power to enforce the provisions of the Amendment; the third provision was merely a stipulation of time, establishing that the ERA would take effect two years after ratification. In 1972, the ERA passed in both congressional houses and was, therefore, to be submitted to the States for ratification. By 1973, thirty states had approved the amendment, falling short of the thirty-eight states required for ratification.¹⁷⁶ The possibility that the constitutional amendment could become law led evangelicals, for various reasons, to rally together and move the masses they had gathered in their churches to oppose and ultimately defeat the proposed constitutional change, which would foster, perhaps only in a legal sense, the flourishing of equality.

One of the most visible opponents to the ERA was Phyllis Schlafly, a Catholic, and with whom we are already acquainted. Her organization Stop ERA, which eventually became the Eagle Forum, worked tirelessly to stop the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.¹⁷⁷ Schlafly's favored tactic in bringing about this eventual defeat was painting the ERA as a communist plot, which would expand government, undermine the traditional family, and remove the "special" privileges, such as a woman's claims on her husband's income and the right to refuse dangerous forms of unemployment.¹⁷⁸ The activities of Schlafly also served as a rapprochement between conservative Catholics and evangelical

¹⁷³ See, for instance, Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 139-161, 167-168; Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 93-97; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 229, 231, 250-252.

¹⁷⁴ See Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 109; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 131; John M. Murrin, et al., *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, 968.

¹⁷⁵ Chaffe, *The American Woman*, 188.

¹⁷⁶ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 167.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 169.

Protestants. Protestants, throughout the history of the United States, had viewed their Catholic counterparts with supreme suspicion, often seeing the Roman Church as the embodiment of evil, the famed and haunting Whore of Babylon. Whereas before, common ground between these two groups flowered around opposition to communism, now a broader alliance was emerging, at whose vital center were social and political issues.

Diamond, in *Roads to Dominion*, places the ERA under the rubric of a perceived menace to the traditional family, which galvanized evangelicals into concentrated opposition.¹⁷⁹ As does James Davison Hunter, a professor of religious studies at the University of Virginia, who, in his 1983 book *American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity*, argues that evangelicals viewed the ERA as a decisive threat. Writing in 1983, Hunter commented, “Another threat is posed by the feminist movement in America and its most important legislative proposal, the Equal rights Amendment to the Constitution.”¹⁸⁰ Hunter explains the evangelical stance on the matter, saying that, to the evangelical mind, “Legally sanctioning and encouraging the role of women in the working world undermine the integrity of the family, as well as the rest of American society.”¹⁸¹ As a counterpoise to Hunter’s mild presentation of the evangelical position, regarding the ERA, we may take the words of some evangelicals themselves. Clarkson, in *Eternal Hostility*, mentions that in Iowa an Equal Rights Amendment was proposed as an amendment to the state constitution in 1992, and the measure attracted equally visceral opposition, as did the ERA in the decade of the 1970s. Though the Iowa amendment came later than the ERA, the sentiments were the same, the rhetoric of opposition already a highly developed evangelical tool, the tactics of mobilization already well honed. The televangelist Pat Robertson made a concerted effort to see the proposal defeated. For Robertson, the establishment of equality for women was part of a more sinister and diabolic net into which the United States was becoming entangled. The supporters of the amendment, deduced the televangelist, were hell-bent on the destruction of the American family. ““The feminist agenda,”” Clarkson quoted a fundraising letter from the prominent evangelical, ““is not about equal rights for women. It is about a socialist, anti-family political movement that encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism, and become lesbians.””¹⁸² Lesbians, and the dangers they pose, throughout Robertson’s long

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 166-170.

¹⁸⁰ James Davison Hunter, *American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 104.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Clarkson, *Eternal Hostility*, 133.

career as a leader in the evangelical community, have proven to be one of his most cultivated obsessions.

The scribes of *Christianity Today* also saw, in the ERA, ominous clouds of storm and destruction. One editorial, written in April of 1973, provides a *coup d'oeil* of the evangelical attitude towards such a political change. The piece, entitled “Sex Rights and Wrongs,” began:

One major challenge now facing our society is that of giving each sex its due rights while at the same time affirming that men and women are not altogether interchangeable. The problem for women is not so much unequal laws as unequal treatment. Whether a constitutional amendment is the right kind of corrective is open to debate.¹⁸³

While, in this instance, the evangelical appears to cede ground, admitting that woman were hindered, in American society, by unequal treatment, the issue at play, for evangelicals, was not a desire to maintain the uniqueness of men and women. It was born out of evangelicalism’s theological conviction that women were subordinate to men. In the end, the issue of a constitutional amendment was not open to debate as the editorial makes clear moments later. “Given the current sex revolution,” observed the editorial, “many aspects of which run contrary to Christian ethics, the proposed amendment deserves special scrutiny. Technically, its wording is so sweeping that it could be used to support homosexual marriage, for example, or to eliminate sexual differentiation of public lavatories, dressing rooms, and dormitories. This would,” the piece concluded, “infringe upon Christian moral rights.”¹⁸⁴ In the eyes of evangelicals, the amendment, apart from altering the functioning of public lavatories, had implications for the Christian church. As some denominations in the United States began to ordain women, the evangelical warned, “But if the ERA passes, the churches’ decisions will be made for them. Women might have the right to claim any position, biblical principles and church policies notwithstanding.”¹⁸⁵ The editorial concluded, in a jovial spirit, “Men are now subject to certain restrictions because they are men, and women because they are women. In the best interests of both, let’s keep it that way.”¹⁸⁶ As was the case with so many other happenings in the Cold War era, American evangelicals infused their political, social, economic, and religious discourse with the effluvia of decay, decadence, and destruction.

¹⁸³ “Sex Rights and Wrongs,” [Editorial] *Christianity Today*, April 13, 1973, 31 [731].

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 32 [732].

Scholars have also pointed out this theological polemic against women—their inferiority and subjugation—which evangelical’s have developed and perfected. This polemic informs the various political campaigns that evangelicals have waged regarding woman’s reproductive rights, the ERA, and woman’s economic role, but, in its way, it goes beyond them, transcends the political. The underlying motif of this theological doctrine is that women were, are, and forever will be subordinate to men. The evangelical of the Cold War era made appeals to a divine hierarchy at the apex of which was God, followed by men, and, at the bottom, were women.¹⁸⁷

Christianity Today was also a platform for the elaboration and propagandizing of the doctrine of women’s inferiority and divinely sanctioned place of submission. As the desert of secularism grew in American society in the post-World War II era, making inroads in various institutions and social practices, this magazine remained and prospered as an oasis upon which certain structures and logics of inequality could flourish. We have already encountered this with Eeningburg and Kuhlman. A panel discussion in 1967 on the subject of work provided another occasion for the promotion of femiale subjugation, this indispensable article of faith. A woman on the panel, Dr. Austin, concerning the role of women, interjected, “Women are subordinate in authority and should be; and I find women find happiness only in this relationship. I want my husband to be the head of my home. I definitely want him to be the leader and the children to look to him.”¹⁸⁸ In this context, where working life was under discussion, one gathers that not only were women subordinate but that this very subordination was the pretext for their removal from the economic sphere.

The attachment to women’s subordination can also be seen in Graham. The home of which the woman was an integral part was, Graham reminds us, “in trouble.”¹⁸⁹ In 1972, the home was not merely in a disconcerting state, as Graham informed the crowd gathered all around him in Birmingham, Alabama, “the home which is the basic unit of society,” he said in the standard dialectic of despair, “is going to be destroyed and society will be destroyed with it.”¹⁹⁰ Vital to Graham’s algebra of apocalypse was the generalized notion that relations between men and women were changing, and such a change, in this American evangel’s eyes, carried with it the germs of ruin. In the face of ruin, Graham provided the anxious crowd with a regimen, a plan by which to combat this temporal undoing. In this sermon,

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ Hedges, *American Fascists*, 4, 12.

¹⁸⁸ “What’s the Sense of Work?” [Panel discussion] *Christianity Today*, September 1, 1967, 8 [1128].

¹⁸⁹ Billy Graham, “The Home” [Sermon], video, 1958, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cwg6ieMg-B0>.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Graham instructed that “from the very beginning, God was underscoring the fact that a man and a woman are different.”¹⁹¹ Moments later, the evangelist added, “And we must accept whether we are female or male and that is God’s plan.”¹⁹² What Graham was inching towards was the idea that men and women had, before all time, certain spheres which had been prepared for them, areas in which they had, through divine designation, been assigned. “And we must accept,” the evangelist declared, “whether we are female or male and that is God’s plan...But the point I’m trying to make is: We’re different and God made us different and we’re to stay different. Men and women, we are each to fill our function in the way God created us.”¹⁹³ The attempt to change women’s role in American society, the entrance of women into the workplace, new patterns and attitudes of relations, were not insignificant slights to decency, they were part and parcel of the home’s destruction, which, in turn, spelled death for the American Republic. Just as with the homosexual, woman, the perpetual temptress, was leading man into prohibited and destructive things, beguiling him into consuming luscious and forbidden fruits. Human relations, to the evangelical, were not a domain in which freedom can happen. Instead, here, relation itself was the subject of evangelical analysis and control. In this evangelical’s ideological schema, a woman was not a unique creature created by God nor was she a person endowed with the ability to act and think independently. Quite the contrary, she was there, she had been born, for no other purpose than to fulfill a function. If she moved beyond her circumscribed realm, a woman was not an independent individual making decisions for herself, she was, instead, to be seen as an enemy, as one who invites destruction.

Yet again we are confronted with the evangelical’s general disbelief and disinterest in salvation as such. What comes repeatedly to the fore is more that a woman should, in this world, submit to man than experience the joys of rebirth. In evangelicalism, theoretically, what was required to be born again was the acceptance of Christ as one’s savior. Yet, the social subjugation of women becomes one of evangelicalism’s most prominent features, some alien element added onto the process and imperative of salvation.

According to evangelicals, the perpetual and divinely approved subjugation of women had its roots in Scripture. One can say that it was one of the many fruits of the evangelical’s biblical hermeneutics. Evangelicals, with their biblical literalism, believed

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

themselves to be merely abiding by the revealed word of God. In the introduction, we pointed out the importance evangelicals themselves, as an explanation of their actions and thought, attribute to this literal interpretation. It is seen as a font from which all things flow. Some scholars have followed in the evangelical's footsteps, pointing to a literal exegesis as the source of many of evangelicalism's social teachings.¹⁹⁴ Hunter, in his aforementioned work, lists this as one of the four cardinal tenets of this religious movement, saying, "At the doctrinal core, contemporary Evangelicals can be identified by their adherence to...the belief that the Bible is the inerrant Word of God..."¹⁹⁵

The two Genesis accounts of creation offer a useful example for unravelling the mystery of literal interpretation. The first, from chapter one, recounts the simultaneous creation of man and women, setting the two sexes on an equal plane: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him: male and female image, created he them (Genesis I:27)."¹⁹⁶ Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a pivotal figure in the American struggle for equal rights for women during the nineteenth century, in *The Woman's Bible*, a commentary on the Bible that attempted to abolish the theological subjugation of women in the Christian world said of this passage that, undeniably, "the masculine and feminine elements were equally represented."¹⁹⁷ For Stanton, writing in 1895, they were equally represented in human form and in the Godhead, that is, the divine Father was also a Divine Mother; for our purposes we will focus on the former understanding. Following the creation both of man and women, God offers the living and breathing manifestations of his image dominion, care over the entire world. Stanton draws the following conclusion from this quick succession of events: "As to woman's subjection, on which both the canon and the civil law delight to dwell, it is important to note that equal dominion is given to woman over every living thing, but not one word is said giving man dominion over woman."¹⁹⁸ The second story of creation, told in the following chapter of Genesis, provides a different account of the events dealing with creation. The better-known story, perhaps for its imagery, tells of Adam being brought into a profound sleep and a rib was removed from which woman sprang. This second, and contradictory, version of the creation of humankind, led

¹⁹⁴ See Hedges, *American Fascists*, 4, 18, 19, 20, 122; Sandler, *Righteous*, 69, 72, 73, 74.

¹⁹⁵ Hunter, *American Evangelicalism*, 7.

¹⁹⁶ This biblical passage is taken from Elizabeth Cady Stanton, *The Woman's Bible*, (Seattle: Pacific Publishing Studio, 2010), 1.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Stanton to remark, “The second makes her a mere afterthought. The world [is] in good running order without her. The only reason for her advent being the solitude of man.”¹⁹⁹

We see from Stanton’s criticism, that to hold up woman’s subjection, to use the second story of creation as justification for submission, necessarily involves the suppression of the other biblical passage where woman was co-created, and sort of co-dominatrix. Thus, we encounter the fundamental contradiction and impossibility of all literal interpretation: one passage is brought to the fore while the other recedes into oblivion. The activity of evangelical hermeneutics was always one of suppression and emphasis, laughter and gravitas, forgottenness and remembrance. One story is elevated to dogma, another quietly dismissed. The arrival at such a juncture is perhaps inevitable when a book imbued with meaning and significance, ripped from its historical context, is used as an ideological tool, a blueprint, a holy sanction for one’s temporal aims.

One of the few authors to call into question the validity of evangelicalism’s biblical literalism as an explanation for anything and to point out such a theological framework’s fundamental contradictions was Balmer. He refers correctly to evangelical literal exegesis as “selective literalism.”²⁰⁰ Balmer argues, “Most evangelicals worry very little about biblical proscriptions against usury or about Paul’s warning that ‘every woman who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered dishonors her head.’”²⁰¹ Despite their lack of concern for these issues, evangelicals rush to the Word of God, Balmer shows, to prevent the ordination of women, which is expressly forbidden in the First Epistle to Timothy. Around the evangelical’s biblical interpretations, there always hovered the question, Were these interpretations of Scripture true evangelical understandings of the Word of God or were they *a posteriori* biblical justifications in line with one’s current ideological project?

Having rejected biblical literalism’s explanatory power in the treatment of women, for the very contradictions such interpretations engender, we are brought to the question of what was the basis of the evangelical’s relation towards women? With the veneer of adherence to Holy Writ, the evangelical developed a spurious naturalism with which, at every turn, they directed towards women and through which these Christians sought to bind them. In a word, evangelicals pretended to know the secret nature of woman, the

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰⁰ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 8-11. Hedges also denounces as a misnomer evangelicalism’s title of biblical literalism: Hedges, *American Fascists*, 6.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 9. Dupont also passingly mentions the impossibility of a “literalist hermeneutic,” Dupont, *Mississippi Praying*, 25.

metaphysical intricacies of her life and being.²⁰² It was as if evangelicals said to women, “We know who you are, who you have been, we know how you are to be seen, how you shall be treated.” Evangelicals forged one single identity to which all women must rise and conform.

This naturalism can, in a way, be contrasted to the evangelical’s treatment of black Americans and homosexuals. Blacks, as evangelicals saw it, persisting in their belief for decades, could be allowed to putrefy in the noxious brew of racism, stew in a socially and historically fabricated ideology with its myriad manifestations of violence, degradation, intimidation, and exclusion. The tradition of a just and free nation, a nation whose foundations were biblical, had for centuries given precedent to the dehumanization and depersonalization of blacks. Out of the Words of God, grew flowers of evil. The African American community was, for a vast period of time, powerless to combat these conditions. The homosexual, too, under the burden of his precarious position, was not of great concern. When the representatives of Sodom began to speak, becoming a growing “malaise” in the United States, they had no Abraham to come to their defense. Instead, our so-called modern prophet, unlike the patriarch of the Hebrew Bible, did not challenge God, but sought obsequiously to implement his Law and quickly branded the homosexual, by the benediction of their holy hand, with the mark of annihilator: destroyer of morality, perverter of youth, underminer of the American Republic. In a word, the African American and the homosexual could be forgotten. When they rose up, they could be removed, cut down with divine swiftness. But the situation of women was dramatically different. Their ubiquitous presence in society, their role as mothers, as wives, and their part in the very continuance of society meant that they could not be dismissed so easily. Instead, the evangelical understood, women must be always included; an eye must always be given to her importance, to her “place,” her “sphere,” here ordered compartment. Yet, her movements and aspirations must be always controlled, always observed, always discussed, her identity forged and perfected in the evangelical mold.

We must balance evangelicals advocating for the subjugation and reduced public role of women with the fact that, at times in *Christianity Today*, women appeared and, in other instances, for example with Kathryn Kuhlman, women emerge as evangelical leaders, as

²⁰² Calhoun, in the aforementioned study, explores this modern tendency towards naturalism in approaches to identity: “This appeal to nature was reinforced and transformed with the rise of both modern arguments about

visible representatives of this growing movement. We must weigh the naturalism, which was thought to govern women, with the fact that the contrary often seemed to come into view. Women, though everywhere asked to return to the harem, were occasionally traipsed out and allowed to show their faces, even to assume influential roles. This fact seems, on the surface, to run counter to the evangelical's overriding theological position concerning women. What is the character of this appearance? What was being allowed to come out of the shadows and into the light? Very often, the appearance of women in evangelicalism took the form of the woman as her own jailer. That is, women were permitted on stage only so as to deliver the lines of their own removal. This we saw with Kuhlman, who, despite being a well-known representative of evangelicalism, one who had the power to heal, used her prominence to reassert women's status of subjugation. So, too, did we see this with Dr. Austin. Notwithstanding Austin's inclusion on a panel discussion on work and her own situation as a workingwoman, she uses her voice to promote the evangelical's theology of submission, her status and authority to shoo women back under the umbra of the private realm. Austin's call for feminine subordination, in the context of labor, not only appears as a dictate for the home, but as an articulation of the belief that a woman would do best to not leave the home in the first place, to not work at all.

At times, the general absence of women from *Christianity Today*, a publication that overwhelming featured men, was reinforced by a more calculated exclusion. On certain subjects, where women would naturally play a vital part in the discussion, where the occasion almost demands the presence of a woman, they were nowhere to be found. The most illustrative example of this was a panel discussion on sex, from 1960, entitled "Sex in Christian Perspective" in which not a single woman was present. In evangelicalism, the only conceivable scenario where sex might take place was between a man and a woman, within the confines of marriage. In evangelicalism, all other forms of desire and pleasure were cataloged and proscribed. Thus, woman, as a variable in the evangelical's sexual equation, her body intimately involved in the act itself, had a vital stake in the elaboration of any Christian "perspective" concerning sex. Yet, she remained absent, leading one to wonder if these specific men cared at all what women thought about this subject or if they viewed women as voiceless, passive, recipients of male desire, mere objects upon which sex was imposed. The panel itself was very much in keeping with what have seen already, i.e., the evangelical's preoccupation with and promotion of the tantalizing notion of moral and

the biological roots of human identities and Romantic demands for individuals to express and be true to their

sexual decay. For all of the evangelical's angst at the ubiquitous presence of sex in the American Republic, it was constantly the subject of their discussions and musings. One participant, Dr. L. Nelson Bell observed, "One trouble" in the question of contemporary sexuality, "is that modern man refuses to recognize that God has set certain standards, certain absolutes for sex, as he has for behavior generally."²⁰³ To which a certain Dr. Wirt responded, "I would not limit the revolt to modern *man*. The emancipation of woman in my opinion is also an important factor. She has thrown off restraints," he continued, "under which women have chafed for centuries and inevitably, thereby, has asserted her sexuality. Back of all [behind] the present liberty and license of sex you will find the assumption of the new freedom of woman [*italics original*]."²⁰⁴ For Wirt, the assertion of female sexuality was a pseudo-freedom. Not only this, the liberation of woman in general was an integral source of the nation's decay. Woman, ever the harlot, though not allowed a place at the table, could be berated for her erring ways. The discussion reaches its climax with Bell, who, moments later, reminds us: "I believe that unless the trend is reversed, sex obsession is destined to destroy our nation. I believe God will judge us in some manner and that we deserve that judgment."²⁰⁵ Thus, women, too, along with homosexuals, communists and other deviates, were made to be mere waves in the rising tide of destruction.

On the rare occasion when a woman's name graced the pages of *Christianity Today*, amidst the overwhelming majority of male contributions, it often occurred in conjunction with topics that were, perhaps to some, more appropriate for females. Though not always, articles from women generally oscillated around topics pertaining to culture and literature. Virginia Ramey Mollenkott's article "Approach to Modern Literature," from the winter of 1959, provided an understanding of modern literature, which seems, in its gentleness and open-mindedness, to depart from the general tenor of contemporary evangelicalism. For many evangelicals, the arts and education were nothing more than another battleground in the fight to plant Christianity atop all realms of life. "Convinced of the reality of Christ's redemption for and in life, evangelical forces must challenge and storm the high places of culture and learning," wrote Henry in 1958.²⁰⁶ "The Christian challenge to bring culture under the superintendence of God," continues Henry in total satisfaction with his educational plan, "holds promise of staggering benefits to all mankind among the nations of

inner natures," Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Politics of Identity," 15.

²⁰³ "Sex in Christian Perspective," [Roundtable discussion] *Christianity Today*, July 4, 1960, 6.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ Carl F. H. Henry, "Christian Education and Culture," *Christianity Today*, November 10, 1958, 5.

our world.”²⁰⁷ “The higher seats of our learning must be won for Christ,” wrote one author in 1961, “and the church must see it as our major battlefield.”²⁰⁸ Another piece from 1966 reads, “So the Christian stake in education and the arts centers in the unity of truth. In education this means a philosophy that relates all fields of knowledge to God and that reflects a totally Christian world view.”²⁰⁹ That is, education was to be nothing more than a paltry reflection of evangelicalism. Mollenkott, in striking contrast to these men, wrote of the positive and edifying consequences of exposure to literature, saying, “...modern literature can bring awareness of worldviews that oppose our own. This is valuable for obvious reasons; we need to break out of our insularity, to understand the concepts which large minds are thinking beyond the boundaries of own ideological environment, however excellent that environment may be.”²¹⁰ Some ten years later, Mollenkott contributed an article on the question of aesthetics and Christianity.²¹¹ A similar article dealing with aspects of culture came from E. Beatrice Batson in 1965 in her article about the enriching world of Dante.²¹² We find still another from Jane W. Lauber’s, who, in 1966, fretted that Christians were somehow losing their artistic heritage.²¹³ One of the few instances when a woman was permitted to submit an article not directly related to art, literature or culture came from Dorothea Krook in 1960, where she attempted to bring out the meaning of the resurrection of Christ and thereby evince the shallowness of humanist philosophies.²¹⁴ Two other articles from 1960 reinforce the idea that women were only prepared to deal with certain spheres of life. “Guiding the Preschool Child,” from Mary E. Lebar and “Fine Arts and Christian Education,” written by Cynthia Pearl Maus demonstrate that the woman, in the evangelical worldview, was to be confined to the feminine arts or literature.²¹⁵

While few would decry the inclusion of more women in the publication, the fields that women were confined to—the arts, literature, the humanities—in the context of the United States, take on a special meaning. The juxtaposition of the vigorous and brawny tension of an active life, a life in business and in the world’s affairs, with its movement, its challenges, its intense and narrow focus, with the more “feminine” and contemplative,

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁰⁸ F. Cawley, “Christ’s Finality: A Lost Vision?” *Christianity Today*, April 24, 1961, 17.

²⁰⁹ “The Christian Stake In Education and the Arts,” *Christianity Today*, September 2, 1966, 3 [1171].

²¹⁰ Virginia Ramey Mollenkott, “Approach to Modern Literature,” *Christianity Today*, February 16, 1959, 17.

²¹¹ Virginia Ramey Mollenkott, “Christianity and Aesthetics Conflict or Correlation?” *Christianity Today*, May 9, 1969, 6 [718].

²¹² E. Beatrice Batson, “Dante: A Poet to Discover,” *Christianity Today*, September 24, 1965, 6-8 [1258-1260].

²¹³ Jane W. Lauber, “Are We Losing Our Artistic Heritage?” *Christianity Today*, September 2, 1966, 34 [1192].

²¹⁴ Dorothea Krook, “The Meaning of the Resurrection,” *Christianity Today*, April 11, 1960, 4.

perhaps even passive, life of the mind and arts has been, for one thinker, an identifiable aspect of American society. Santayana spoke, in 1920, of what he felt to be an important leitmotif of intellectualism in the society of his adopted home. Santayana mentioned “that separation which is so characteristic of America between things intellectual, which remain wrapped in a feminine veil and, as it were, under glass, and the rough business and passions of life.”²¹⁶ It was not that American men were not involved in intellectual affairs, but rather that for one segment of the American population thinking, literature, and the arts represented abstractions from life, superfluities, and distractions, which, far from edifying, were left to amuse and entertain those confined to the domestic sphere. Thus, in a way, to whatever extent Santayana’s observation proves accurate, women, though allowed to offer a word here and there in the pages of *Christianity Today*, were only allowed to participate in subjects that reflected the feminine mystique. Hofstadter, writing some four decades later, echoes Santayana observations about American intellectual life. Hofstadter also saw the lines that many had drawn between the active life and the life of the mind, contemplation. Hofstadter remarks that many in the United States regarded culture in general as impractical and ineffectual, “that culture is feminine and cultivated men tend to be effeminate.”²¹⁷

In closing our discussion on the relation of evangelicals to women, we must first point out the political implications of said relation. The political consequences of this relation negate the prevailing understanding that evangelicalism was, up until 1976—the so-called Year of the Evangelical—with the mobilization around the presidential election of Jimmy Carter, which is recounted time and again in the historiography concerning evangelicalism. There was according to Hedges, “A decades-long refusal by most American fundamentalists to engage in politics at all following the 1925 Scopes trial...”²¹⁸ This position can also be found in Diamond: “In the first half of the twentieth century, evangelicalism was a *prepolitical* movement...”²¹⁹ Elsewhere, Diamond furthers the idea of evangelicalism’s supposed apoliticism, “Historically,” she observes, “evangelicals shied away from political participation partly because of their theological priorities and partly

²¹⁵ Mary E. Lebar, “Guiding the Preschool Child,” *Christianity Today*, August 29, 1960, 11 [939]. Cynthia Pearl Maus, “Fine Arts and Christian Education,” *Christianity Today*, August 29, 1960, 9 [937].

²¹⁶ George Santayana, “Character and Opinion in the United States,” in *Selected Critical Writings of George Santayana*. Vol. 2., ed. Norman Henfrey (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 48.

²¹⁷ Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 186.

²¹⁸ Hedges, *American Fascists*, 11.

²¹⁹ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 92. See also Erling Jorstad, *Evangelicals in the White House*, 4.

because of the ridicule heaped on them by secular society,” after the Scope trials.²²⁰ Balmer also promotes the idea of evangelicalism’s withdrawal from the public realm after the Scope Trials in Tennessee, saying, “They [evangelicals] remained not so much somnolent as invisible to the larger society until the mid-1970s.”²²¹ It was Carter, Balmer argues, who “began to lure evangelicals (Southerners especially) out of their apolitical torpor.”²²² One of the only scholars to offer an opposing view to this myth of apoliticism was McLoughlin who, in his previously mentioned essay from 1967, already sees the evangelical’s political leanings and announces their entrance into the public square, observing, “...Billy Graham’s books, sermons, and political comments, are lock, stock, and barrel with Senator Barry Goldwater.”²²³ Goldwater, a conservative senator from Arizona, ran for president in 1964 against Lyndon B. Johnson. To McLoughlin’s mind, the winds of evangelicalism’s politicization could already be felt. “The new evangelicals” observed the historian, “are the spiritual hard-core of the radical right.”²²⁴

Notwithstanding this perceived political withdrawal, this alleged and enduring political comatosis, everywhere we encounter, prior to this prodigious date, the evangelical in political movement. The most visible aspects of the evangelical’s position towards women, appeared around political issues such as the legalization of abortion and the ERA in the 1970s. Despite this, already in the 1950s and 1960s, evangelicals were attempting to thwart a changing social and political climate. When one considers the evangelical’s relation to black Americans and to homosexuals, in the 1950s and 1960s, the dichotomy of evangelicalism’s political separation falls to pieces with even greater speed. Evangelicalism’s strident anti-communism, in a way, also emerged as a political program, a participation in the political life of the nation. More than anything else, the evangelical continuously announced to the world his political ambitions. The evangelical’s theological doctrine of bringing all realms of life under the lordship of Christ stands as a promise of things to come. In sum, we would do well to break away from seeing the evangelical, in the 1970s, as entering the sphere of politics, and recognizing that they had been there all along.

²²⁰ Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare*, 2. See also Ruether, *America, Amerikkka*, 198.

²²¹ Randall Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, xvi.

²²² *Ibid.* See also Balmer, *Blessed Assurance*, 52, 59, 102.

²²³ McLoughlin, “Is There a Third Force in Christendom?” 61.

²²⁴ *Ibid.* FitzGerald, in contrast to McLoughlin, offers a different picture of evangelical support for Goldwater. She cites a pole from *Christianity Today*, which shows that 62 percent of evangelical publishers—not evangelical churchgoers—voted for Johnson in the 1964 presidential election, FitzGerald, *The Evangelicals*, 243-244.

For evangelicals, there were not women, but woman, a fixed and singular ideal. In any discussion of the evangelical and women during this period, always and everywhere, this relation, the naturalism that evangelicals sought to award women, was not for evangelicals alone, that is, it was not a program for their own community or prescriptions for their own holy nation. If this were the case, we would have little to say. Instead, the evangelical truths regarding woman, were for all women for all time. Though Christianity's understanding of God, through the screen of evangelicalism, began to dissolve, despite the fact that evangelical's leading voice could reduce God to a trifling bar of soap, the vestiges of this religion's universalism remained intact. The body of Christ, though it now cared little for the things of eternity, still maintained the universality of their precepts. The church was still the *only* way, the *only* path to salvation and the only receptacle of true being, which now, of course, had new meanings. Who woman was, how she was to be treated, was still, to the evangelical mind, the prerogative of the church.

To an extent, the positions that evangelicals took towards women and towards homosexuals was a tension created by the simultaneous breakdown and crisis of the predominant male gender identity in the United States during the Cold War. What occurred was not simply a breakdown of accepted gender identities, evangelicals sought to inject with new vigor the accepted and created gender identity of the American male, to secure his place of dominance, to safeguard his claims to righteousness. It might seem that, as was communicated earlier, the evangelical's position was an unsurprising continuation of things past, a reassertion of already latent modes of antagonism. But beneath the weight of these tired maxims, the world was changing. Women were entering the workforce with continuing speed, pushed both by circumstance and a desire to work. New ways of thinking began to tread fresh pathways in the human mind. New legislation sought to ameliorate the precarious position of women in the United States and codify their equality. Most importantly, there was an inkling, a growing feeling, a joyous sentiment, that a woman was also a being, also one who could direct her existence, one who, awash in the sea of life, could swim on her own. Many had come to realize that women were also in the world and therefore had a stake in its life, a right to behold the flickers of its spectacular beauty. It was against the newly emerging possibility of a woman defining who she was and who she was to become, against the confines, horizons, and formation of new and developing independent collective and personal identities, that evangelicals wove their ties of relation and attempted to universally apply their naturalism, like so much maquillage, to the female person. The subordination of

women, together with all of its vast implications, was, of course, the same old and tired river, a place often visited in human history, though its waters were fresh and new.

Thus, the evangelical's response was an answer to a larger and looming question always asserting itself silently from a distance. It was identity posed as a question. The question was "Who is woman?" and it was in response to this question that evangelicalism offered itself as a collective answer. Evangelicals, in the Cold War era, entered into the fray, not with a precept, which they desired to live by, but an iron maxim to which all people should be chained. Just as with African Americans and homosexuals, evangelicals boasted that they had the definitive answer. They knew woman's secret nature, where she was to be found, the space that would define her life, the time that would mark her existence. The constant appeals to the female nature, to her natural and divinely decreed subjugation, served to mask evangelicals' efforts to bring the lives of women under the looming shadow of the Cross, a benediction of oblivion. The evangelical's relation to women, a naturalistic metaphysical principle, was an effort to make, as was the case with other groups, the aspect of relation, this integral and undeniable dimension of identity, an accretion of the evangelical ideology, taking unto itself the burden of painting and repainting the picture of one's life. In this form of relation, in the evangelical's appeal, one finds a concreteness and stability, which was undoubtedly appealing. The promise of a set pattern can be set off against the burden of decision, of making of identity one's own creation.

As a final word, we would do well to give space to the duality of the evangelical's promises. In Karen McCarthy Brown's 1994 essay "Fundamentalism and the Control of Women," she notes that fundamentalism is characterized "by the presence of high degrees of control of women."²²⁵ Of fundamentalism, she observes, "This is a group centrally concerned with social order and social control."²²⁶ In this, Brown is of course correct. Yet we have seen, on various occasions, that women were seeking out this control, seeking out these answers, seeking out a system that had the ostensible power to direct, on every possible plane, their lives. We might come to a fuller understanding if we see the evangel's relation to women not only as an imposition, as an external pattern of control, but as something desired, a welcoming, into the woman's heart, of the transformative power of ideology. The evangelical's relation to women was as much a response as it was a supplication.

²²⁵ Karen McCarthy Brown, "Fundamentalism and the Control of Women," in *Fundamentalism and Gender*, ed. John Stratton Hawley (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 5.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 177.

In our examination of evangelicalism's relation to other groups as aspects of collective and personal identities, we have descended deeper into the origins of evangelicalism. We undertook this endeavor with the assumption that collective and personal identities can only emerge and only have meaning in society, that is, amongst others, in the warm or fiery presence of other people. Identity is no longer held as the sign of atomized individuals. The appearance of these three groups, in confident independence, challenged fundamentally who evangelicals felt themselves to be. More than a challenge, what occurred, during the decades that followed the Second World War, was an appeal from various quarters and mixed with the sound of distinct voices. On the character of this appeal and its meaning for human relations, Arendt was uniquely attuned and made a perceptive observation, which has immediate bearing on our discussion. In her 1958 book about Rahel Varnhagen, Arendt wrote with striking eloquence:

For what blasts human relationships is never alienness or baseness or vanity but only the ignoring of this appeal, in which we want to have it recognized that we are human beings. If the appeal fails, if the other refuses to listen to reason, there remains nothing human, only the eternal differences and incomprehensible otherness of physical substances.²²⁷

The cry of the African American, the speaking of the homosexual, and the growing self-assertion of women were, on the most fundamental plane, a desperate appeal, at times a pleading, at times a demand, to make others know that these men and these women were human beings. Not only did the evangelical scoffingly reject this appeal, they worked actively to maintain barriers of separation, shore up walls over which no human voice could pass, voices which might disturb the garden of their righteousness. More than the political and social efforts of evangelicals, more than the campaigns against the ERA for example, on the most basic level, in the space of one human vis-à-vis another, the evangelical toiled to prevent the emergence of the other's personal identity and collective identity, to deprive the other of speaking, of taking upon oneself the task. These acts of suppression were carried out according to two patterns. The first was the zealous effort to thwart any possible change, to undermine movements of emancipation, to snuff out dialogue, to libel and disparage, and

to paint, with brushstrokes of horror and decay, the collective image of their foes. The second was to offer evangelicalism, faith, Christ, as the only avenue of betterment, the only space in which identity could truly emerge. For the African American, said the evangelical, it was only with the conversion of the world, the universal triumph of the Cross, that change would come about. It was only through this transcendental moment that the black man and the black women could come into the joy of personhood and equality. While rejecting and shooing away the “Negro” with their left hand, they offered entrance into the body of the elect with the right. For the homosexual, evangelicalism was advertised as an escape from oneself. Through this sacrifice, the evangelical achieves his end, the elimination and destruction of the homosexual *qua* homosexual. For women, evangelicalism offers the path to woman’s true nature. Those who rebuffed evangelicalism’s advances were defamed not only as sinners but were given a whole host of disparaging titles, all of which had negative political and social implications.

To speak of these as human relations is to concede too much. For what of human was left? We will call them evangelical relations. In our excursus into these bonds, we have unwittingly stumbled upon an aspect of evangelicalism’s emergence, between 1945 and 1981, that has, heretofore, remained concealed. We have posed the origins of the evangelical movement as a problem of identity for its adherents and its converts. We have said that evangelicalism’s enduring attraction was that it offered the illusion that one need not decide for oneself, need not take on the burden of identity’s becoming. The collective evangelical identity became a seemingly adequate surrogate for personal identity. This was what many were in search of. Yet, here, we have come into a greater understanding. It was upon, against, and in attempt to extinguish the identities of others that evangelicalism found also the ground of its flowering. It was in tandem with the identity of these others, those outside evangelicalism’s saving grace, and in an attempt to suppress or annex that which was essential to identity, that the genesis of evangelicalism can begin to be felt. So, too, do we begin to grasp the extended multiplicity of what was at play. This decision to not decide or, in respect to the other, prevent the appearance of identity, was not an event that was accomplished on a single front or in a single moment. It was carried out day after day, week after week, and in relation to many different people. The rejection of decision was, if we may, carried out perpetual

²²⁷ Arendt, *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess*, 153.

Conclusion

Bauman's thesis saw the conditions of postmodernity converging upon the individual and producing a situation in which the elaboration of one's personal identity was evermore difficult, increasingly a mirage vanishing from one's grasp. Religious fundamentalism, Bauman posited, emerged in this delirium, confronted the seeming impossibility of decision, which the elaboration of identity requires, and removed the daunting and prolonged task of creating a personal identity. This doctoral dissertation in history was an application of Bauman's theory to American evangelicalism between 1945 and 1981; it was also an exploration as to how Bauman's thesis might appear, might historically materialize. For Bauman, ours is an age of increasing problems concerning the elaboration of identity, a period of crisis. In this vacuum, thought Bauman, religious fundamentalism finds its footing and its *raison d'être*. Religious fundamentalism, then, emerges as an apparent remedy to the problems and questions surrounding personal identity.

To carry out our exploration of Bauman's theory of religious fundamentalisms in this dissertation, we expanded upon Bauman's understanding of identity as a sort of construction, aided by the insights of other historians, sociologists, and thinkers who have intervened on the subject of identity. Through our primary sources *Christianity Today* and the sermons of Billy Graham, we have explored new facets of American evangelicalism during the Cold War. And, furthermore, through these sources, we have arrived at a new conceptualization of the project of identity. We have conceived of identity and its elaboration as something created and revealed through language;¹ as emerging in the nexus and as a product of intellectual systems;² as something given expression through specific forms, symbols, and traditions; and as a question of interactions, challenges, and relations in the social and political realms.³

Guided by our understanding of identity, we first turned, lead by Arendt's indications, to language, to the evangelical's speech. Through the methodology of conceptual history, our examination of the evangelical lexicon centered on certain leitmotifs of the period—clichés, communism, biologism, the market, militarism—and specific basic concepts [*Grundbegriffe*] “God,” “Christ,” “decay.” With the use of the concepts “America,” “communist,” “Romist,” “freedom,” for instance, we saw not only the evangelical's occupation of political space but the attempt to bring the various debates of the era under control. The trumpeting of

¹ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 179.

² Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 458.

"America" as the site of unending freedom and untold prosperity, in the midst of the social, economic, and political inequality of many groups, served to mask reality, to protect the evangelical adherent or even the speaker himself from it, just as Arendt so piercingly suggested was the function of the cliché. The liberal labeling of the foe as communist, the sounding of the alarm of Rome's rise to power in the United States, had similar effects. But, one may ask, with *Christianity Today* and Billy Graham, have we witnessed nothing more than the private observations of concerned citizens? Or, have we seen in the evangelical church's appropriation of political discourse, an effort to relieve the citizen of the burden of political thinking? In the unfolding uncertainty of the Cold War, in the face of new and unforeseen technological terrors, in the midst of sweeping upheaval around the world and in the United States, in the acute discomfort of new and penetrating questions regarding social life, the evangelical church supplied the adherent with both the path to salvation and proper understanding of political, social, and economic questions. This, to be quite clear, the power to supply ready-made or easily discernible answers to life's problems, was part of evangelicalism longstanding allure.

Though, with respect to Christianity, not new, the incorporation of military concepts in the evangelical church and in its speech dominated the Cold War period, reaching up to the heavens and transforming their very conceptualization of God. This was not some inevitable and natural occurrence, some insignificant result of Cold War existence, an unavoidable crossing over. It was a *decision*. The militarized jargon emanating from evangelical leaders and the faithful can be read in many ways. Most importantly, it answered a socio-political question, a human question: What roles do violence, war, and destruction have in our society? Who are we as Americans? Who am I and what is my relation to violence and, subsequently, to others? The incorporation of these concepts into evangelical speech, we maintain, was a way to legitimize war and violence at a crucial moment in American history, a moment when the role of the United States and the reach of its armies, the expanding and darkening shadow of its puissance, was not only being tested but being questioned.

Similarly, market and economic concepts invaded and permeated the evangelical community in the period between 1945 and 1981. While Protestantism and capitalism had long been intertwined, the use of these concepts in contemporary evangelicalism marked a new and unabashed moment of intensity and intersection. Now the talk was less of God and his glory, less of salvation, and more of efficiency, gains, numbers. Evangelicalism became

³ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 183-184; Baldwin, "The Devil Finds Work," 537. Calhoun, "Social Theory and

and is still becoming *economized*. The forces that dominated in the market began to dominate also in the Church of God. The mingling of the Lord and capital also worked, amid the global confrontation between communism and capitalist countries, to answer, on behalf of the believer, questions regarding the proper economic organization of the world. Who, now, would dare to question capitalism and its organization of life when God himself was one of its chief exponents and when his ministers used so freely its terminology?

As was the case with these other transformations in the evangelical lexicon, the elaboration of theological biologism, the adoption of organic metaphors, demonstrated the evangelical's increasing proximity to a world from which, it was continuously advertised, they were separate. It was very much a *modern* linguistic turn. It too involved violence and the objectification of the other. It marked a moving away from purely religious concepts. In the new evangelical configuration, the communist was not derided as an unbeliever but was seen by evangelicals through the conceptual lens of cancer. Those who violated the sexual norms of the United States at mid-century were not simply sinners but tumors, biological terrors. Their sin had become political; their bodies and the pleasures they could make happen were of public concern. Beneath all of this, it was a subtle recognition that the fear of hell and damnation no longer, over the minds of many, held sway. In the climate of the Cold War, the branding of the sinner needed to occur with terminology that was no longer specifically linked to and historically associated with the beyond, that is, the eternal, but was, instead, firmly rooted in the world of the living. This organicism, this burgeoning theological world of organic concepts, was by far more politically expedient; it was also more damning, more dangerous for the one branded, and had a greater excluding power. The sinner of old was bound for hell. The human being as a social cancer needed to be observed, apprehended, quarantined, and erased.

In the second chapter, we considered evangelicalism's ideological turn, the transformation from religion to an ideological performance. As Arendt suggested, the movement of ideology was not upon or against the world itself but instead directed towards the individual's inner life, and, therefore, related to identity and the question or the quandary of its formation. The development of this ideology had a socio-political purpose and attempted to order and explain coherently the temporal fabric of contemporary life, to color one's conceptualization of the world, one's very thinking. In this ideological worldview, the American past was glorious and one of chosenness. The present was an age of decay and

decadence. The future, once taken hold of by evangelicals, was one of redemption and restoration. Decay, decline, crisis, quite clearly became not only something evangelicals experienced but something that was created, something propagandized, and object of promotion. But with this ideological train of thought, we see evangelicalism transformed into something other than the path to salvation; we see it attempt to become the solution to very earthly problems. In evangelicalism *qua* ideology, paradise and eternal life recede into nothingness, becoming a thing of the past. Modernity's break from the past was, through evangelicalism, strengthened.

In the following chapter of this dissertation, we approached the question of action in our historical sources and we considered action as a necessary nodal point of identity's formation, expression, and continuance. There, we encountered something altogether surprising: the concerted and virtually ubiquitous effort to remove the faculty of action as a human possibility, to wrench from the human mind the notion that one can act at all. The great slogan of Cold War evangelicalism was, "We can do nothing." We cannot change the world; we cannot transform it. At the level of the individual, likewise, one was powerless and ineffectual. Having said this, having repeatedly interwoven this into the thoughts of the evangelical faithful, evangelicals presented their movement as the only viable path of action, the only possible thoroughfare whereby the world, society, and human beings can be transformed. Intimately connected with these developments, in this branch of the Christian Church, was precisely what Bauman had observed: the apparent charting of a "complete map of life," an ever-expanding and all-encompassing catalogue of questions and answers. Evangelicals issued their dictums on numerous and increasing aspects the post-war world. The question of space, technology, patriotism, war, and consumption were just a few realms which came under the evangelical's surveying eye and which experienced this church's intervention. What one thought about men and women's entrance into space was not a question posed to oneself but was an answer one might receive, a predigested response.

The fourth chapter was an excursus into and examination of evangelical forms, ways in which religion itself, in the post World War II period, had become organized and in which it was promulgated to the farthest reaches of the globe. We supposed that this new, multifarious organization *eo ipso* involved the question of personal and collective identity, that in these forms' very ascendancy new problems and new obstacles were presented to identity formation. We have, with what has hitherto been described merely as proselytization, reformulated it into a process of endless expansion. In all instances, they were forms that were not unique to evangelicalism; they were adopted from the world beyond the church. To

what extent the incorporation of these forms in evangelicalism represents a secularization of the church is difficult to say. The delight in and zeal for expansion is easily identifiable in the complex web of persons, entities, and churches that made up evangelicalism in this period. What we find is a fascination with expansion itself. Organizations and groups arose whose *sole* purpose was to engender further expansion. In this endless rush of activity, tendencies of the modern world were given reflection and the energies required for identity's creation were, conveniently, redirected. With the endless process of expansion, the problem of identity could be sidestepped. The question hanging above the prodigious extension of evangelicalism during the Cold War remains, Was it evangelicalism that was extended or was it expansion. And did expansion as a technique, become a process that simply laid claim to more individuals, accumulated more usable bodies? Does each new convert, each soul born anew, become a mere stepping stone, a trifling instrument of expansion?

In a moment such as the 1950s when consumerism became a means of both restarting the world economy after the Second World War and the very foundation of the so-called American dream, the commodification of religion, the transformation of evangelicalism into nothing more than another object of consumption, evangelical leaders made one of the wisest and most perceptive of decisions. The marriage of consumption and evangelicalism stands as an important development in evangelical Christianity's history and, through it, one of the strongest links between evangelicalism's genesis and identity was woven. We have registered this historical trend on four levels. We did so first on the level of labor. For this, with our particular sources, we have no data. With IHOP, the focus of *God Loves Uganda*, we saw that they had 1,000 full-time employees. For the production of movies and books, television and radio programs, magazines and Christian music, one can suppose that behind this stands masses of employed men and women. Here, lacking substantial information, we can only hint at this occurrence, the situation in which religion is no longer the product of the clergy but of the laborer. Second, the commodification of religion is also identifiable in terms of the products that this group produced, which were consumed as a means of religious expression, and around which, very often, religious life congregated. Scholars, to some extent, have explored this. Third, in this dissertation, the most important discovery was to take seriously the utterances of evangelicals themselves: that their religion was a *thing* consumed, that faith itself was reproduced and purchased, that the "plan of salvation" was a commodity one sold. This was a frank attestation of their beliefs, designs, as well as a clear evidence of the extent to which capitalism had set itself up upon the alter of God. Lastly, another way that commodification and evangelical religion had become intertwined was demonstrated through

Marti's study, though it was elaborated outside of our specific period of focus. Here, we see that the activity of selling the Gospel become a testing ground for selling oneself. The commodification of faith facilitates and mirrors, and in so doing, legitimizes, the commodification of one's person, one's "identity."

The rapid inclusion of this multifaceted form in American evangelicalism acts out and ostensibly resolves the dilemma of consumption facing, on a daily basis, the individual. What to consume? How to consume? *If*, in fact, one should consume this or that thing? As Bauman understood, consumption represents "the most common, intense, and absorbing experience, the experience most likely to supply the raw material for world-imaging," in the modern, or for him postmodern, world.⁴ In a society in which consumption, as many have argued, is taken as a sign of identity, as a representation of the self, evangelicalism as a product consumed corresponded with perfection to this new and evolving state of the world.

The entrance of technology into American evangelicalism is quite clear. Despite moments of apprehension and fierce critiques, evangelicals, almost universally, incorporated all technological developments of the period into their movement and lauded, at the level of theory, the technological achievement of their nation. It is important to note that, almost always, the discussion of technology, whether by the evangelist or the scholar, is reduced to a singular technological device as opposed to a dominating and global system of organization and exploitation. In evangelicalism, the attitude towards a specific technological device goes beyond its mere use. At times, the pendulum swung between undying faith in technique and its deification, either as a gift from God, a form of heavenly intervention or as a form of celebration of the Christian deity. Technology, as well as the global apparatus of technique of which it is apart, quite clearly had become sacred.⁵ God, enjoined the evangelical, watched over with benevolence the glorious history of our technological developments. The implications that technique's triumph in the evangelical heart and mind has on identity remain unresolved and elusive. Here, we present technique's lording over identity as a possibility. The historical problem that was then in a state of development, continues to be very much a question for us in the present. Lastly, with respect to this form, we see what we have seen elsewhere, namely, the evangelical church's efforts to meet and provide answers to new societal, political, economic, and human questions. The evangelical was not only the master of the things of the spirit but the expert of the technological world, its high priest.

⁴ Bauman, *Society Under Siege*, 45.

In this thesis about the crystallization of American evangelicalism during the Cold War, the final form we examined was the idolatry of might, an undeniable aspect of contemporary, twentieth-century evangelicalism. Religion had become organized so as to achieve power. Here, evangelicalism is unmasked. That is, very often, we see that what simmered beneath the promises of salvation, the worship of God, the entire process of evangelization, the pious appeals to religiosity, was the praise for and desire to acquire power. In the wake of this discovery, the evangelical's penchant for conservative politics is reduced to secondary importance. Their burning desire was to rule, to wield power, not to preserve some sacred traditional social structure. In the years following the Second World War, evangelicalism was a vehicle to many things; most strikingly, it was a step towards the accumulation and exercising of might, an exercise in its idolatry. For many watchful observers, this is not a grand revelation; it is the subtext of the evangelical's political activities and ambitions. Beyond the clear political implications of a specific group clamoring for God yet willing power, we take this candid admission as clear and additional historical evidence that evangelicalism was no longer projected towards the eternal, that, for this religious community, the eternal no longer weighs on the present. The gravity and power of evangelical Christianity's message rested with its promises for triumph in *this* world. In a way, the prayers, hymns, denunciations of moral decline, and calls to repent were all colored by an evangelicalism that increasingly did all things with a patient view to the acquisition of future power.

In the final chapter of this dissertation, we considered identity, both personal and collective, as a question of human relations. Human relations themselves were the only milieu in which identity can emerge and have meaning. With new and growing force, the arrival of African Americans, homosexuals, and women onto the scene of American political and social discourse represented a fundamental challenge to their collective identity both as Americans and as evangelical Christians. Both of these collective identities had been formed, in their minds, without a thought to these other groups, the minorities at the periphery; indeed, these identities were conceived with the exclusion of these groups in mind. The marginalized conditions and often-endangered existences of these communities evinced, as nobody else could, the bitter contradictions of the America of evangelical dreams, the purported land of freedom, truth, chosenness, election. It was not that evangelicals simply *opposed* many

⁵ Ellul writes of men and women in the contemporary world and their deification of technique: "He therefore transfers his sense of the sacred to the very thing which has destroyed its former object: to technique itself." *The Technological Society*, 143.

political alterations and the transformation of social norms, which swirled around these different social groups from the 1950s throughout the 1970s. In this, they demonstrated that they were very much at home in mainstream American society. Of far greater significance, was the fact that evangelicalism took upon itself the task of relating, this aspect of identity's formation. How all of these men and women were to be seen and understood was a dictate of the evangelical church. How the black man was to be treated was the prerogative of the evangelical. Speech and voice were privileges evangelical Christians would not extend to the degenerate. The evangelical had divined the secret nature of "woman" and they would constantly survey the female species and ensure that she measured up to this ideal, that she remained within the confines of the home, that her economic resources were nonexistent, and that she subjugated herself to the vaunted superiority of men. In those days this was called the "divine order" of the world. Many, in this period, given that they had no place in this holy order, began to reject it.

Aside from the evangelical prescriptions concerning where the other can go, can work, can love, can be, what is more intriguing was that the very ground of evangelicalism's emergence, in this specific moment in history, was an attempt to snuff out the flourishing of the other, to ensure that the identity of the other, even as a future historical possibility, didn't emerge. Part of the very structure of contemporary evangelicalism's genesis, the very threads of its tapestry, was a negativity vis-à-vis the other. This is also part of the history of evangelicalism, part of the origins of the Christian Right.

Ultimately, these were relations of power, a question whose full exploration is precluded by the limitations of this dissertation. It was a relation of power within the beating heart of the individual and against others. The individual evangelical was invited to contemplate, with horror, if he himself was a homosexual. If not, to constantly survey others for signs of a man's decay, degeneracy, and participation in the corrosion of society.

Before we assess the validity of Bauman's theory, there are issues outside the immediate question of identity that have, from time to time, been touched upon in this dissertation, issues which deserve to be brought to the reader's attention once again. One of these is the accepted idea that evangelicalism was an insular force in American society, that, between the evangelical and the non-evangelical, there was a chasm of difference. Cold War evangelicals, who saw themselves as a redeemed body, a holy nation, in the midst of a fallen world, ardently advertised their separatism; scholars have also promulgated this notion. The political expression of this was the oft-voiced concern, on the part of academics and

journalists, that evangelicals had invaded the space of politics and represented a threat to democracy. The notion is often given concrete form in the dichotomy of modernity and its detractors, progress and the antiquated, the exacting truth of scientific knowledge and the archaic world of myth. The question is not so much if evangelicalism was undemocratic—of course it was—but, rather, What type of culture and society would produce such undemocratic forms of religious fundamentalism? What latent or visible aspects of the contemporary age conspire to allow this body of religious belief and practice to flourish and extend itself across the face of the earth? Rather than say, with regards to the evangelical movement of the Cold War, “What an aberration.” We might say, “What a beautiful and precise expression of our modern ethos.” Evangelicalism is viewed of as an antagonistic force out of step and working against modernity.⁶ Time and again, we are confronted with the opposite. In terms of the evangelical’s lexicon, the concepts they employed, with respect to technology, the adoption of the commodity as a religious mode, to nationalism, to issues regarding race, women, and sexuality the evangelical was very much in keeping with American society of the time. Regardless of the content, the evangelical was watching TV and listening to the radio just as were so many other Americans. Many of the concerns and questions troubling American life had their corresponding elements in the evangelical church. As we saw in Chapter II, the anxiety regarding masculinity during the 1950s and 1960s—issues that have not been resolved today—especially pronounced in the federal government and surrounding the antics of Senator McCarthy, were a visible and abiding aspect of the evangelicalism of the Cold War era. What is most arresting is not the evangelical’s supposed alienness but their conformity with so many features of American society during the second half of the twentieth century. The evangelical movement emerged in exquisite cohesion and in perfect harmony with the society that surrounded it. The forces, ideas, and ambitions of the Cold War evangelical movement were taken *from* modernity and were not harnessed *against* it.

The second and perhaps most glaring of these issues is the narrative, almost universally accepted, of the evangelicals alleged political coma throughout the post-war decades and their sudden, unannounced awakening in 1976. The notion of separation was extended to our understanding of the relation between the evangelical and the political. Apart from Sutton’s previously mentioned 2012 article and Dupont’s 2013 *Mississippi Praying*, no

⁶ Carol Flake, *Redemptorama: Culture, Politics, and the New Evangelicalism* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1984) 10, 16. Alternatively, it is described as an opposition to “modernism,” see Balmer, *Blessed Assurance*, 28, 97.

other major works have presented an alternative picture. Their findings concerning the political character of this religious community do not constitute a part of the larger discussion of Cold War evangelicalism. Balmer, in 2014, still insisted on the evangelical's political withdrawal for much of the Cold War period.⁷ In this dissertation, we have seen throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and the beginning of the 1970s, that is, well before 1976, that the evangelical was politically active. This has been demonstrated in numerous and varied ways. Despite the fact that evangelicals claimed to eschew politics, we see a constant and intense interest in all political issues and a copious amount of commentary on the political concerns of the moment. With the issues of homosexuality, women and the ERA, and the full social and political inclusion of African Americans, evangelicals issued their pronouncements, organized, and acted so as to counter the coming changes. To the political problems of communism, war, prayer in public schools, Catholics in politics, nuclear weapons, the inclusion of China in the UN, and the exploration of space, these Christians were highly attuned. The evangelical's discourse during the Cold War was almost everywhere a political discourse. In addition, evangelical leaders cavorted with the most powerful figures in American politics and carried out their crusades at the very feet of American institutional power.⁸ And, though it has not been explored at length here, evangelicals established and cultivated numerous political associations. 1976, the purported "Year of the Evangelical," was not a climax, it was not the evangelical's entrance into politics, nor was it the sudden and astounding birth of the Christian Right; it was, instead, entirely anti-climactic, it was a continuation of decades of work, thousands of sermons, a near half century of prayer and desire. What is now known as the Christian Right in the United States cannot be separated from the evangelicalism from which it stems nor from the decades of preparatory work from which this conservative political cohort benefits. Scholars, journalists, and the public often see the sudden emergence of the Christian Right and their influential and multifaceted involvement in American politics towards the end of the 1970s and well after, as a spontaneous and reactionary force. The arrival of the Christian Right was neither a sudden nor a visceral reaction. Instead, it was a reinvigoration and making public of what had long existed and flourished in many social and political circles in the United States, though the beliefs, trends, aspirations, and phenomenon of evangelicalism were unknown to many outside the movement.

⁷ Balmer, "The Real Origins of the Religious Right" *Politico Magazine*.

⁸ Kruse, *One Nation Under God*, 52-54, 57-64, 242-244, 246-247, 252, 260-263.

The third undercurrent of this dissertation is one to which the scholarship on this subject is not particularly attuned. It is the issue of the draining of the theological content of evangelicalism, what we have called here the eclipse of the eternal.⁹ Certainly, it is a slippery question to raise. To what extent one believes in a certain tenet is indeed difficult to measure. The end of the Second World War ushered in a new moment of secularization both in society and in politics. Compulsory prayer was removed from public schools. Once unquestioned social mores, very much influenced by religion, were openly challenged. *Brown* judiciously ended segregation in schools. In the midst of this drift away from religion, in *some* segments of American society, and the abandonment of "traditional" morality, evangelicals were some of the most visible, devoted, and enduring champions of religion and faith. New evangelical universities opened, new preachers spread the word. Crusades and revivals flourished across the land, reaching even the men and women of power in the nation's capital. Yet, despite their clear, accepted, and advertised role in the United States as messengers of God, one can, from a certain perspective, see a redirection, observe religion projected towards new ends. This was evidenced, to an extent, through transformations in terminology, through a conceptual change. Whereas before, the Christian deity might be conceived of as the Lord, the Savior, the redeemer of the world, the unblemished lamb, he was now the equivalent of soap—a mere trifle to be sold. As a general or a commander, the Christian God became a mundane administer of violence. And, at times, God was made to be a dispenser of goods, an aid in the race to accumulate capital. There was speculation as to the physicality of God, but only so as to drive home the importance and dominance of a certain masculine ideal. These changes with respect to the central figure in the Christian religion mark what is called ideologization [*Ideologiesierbarkeit*], the incorporation of concepts into ideologies.¹⁰ The conceptualization of God was altered so as to make it fit in the evangelical ideology, which was an amalgam of capitalism, chauvinism, expansion, and a cultivated and express desire for power. Here, with the evangelical, God was brought—made an instrument—into the discourses concerning gender, capitalism, war, and was appropriated as a tool in ideological conflicts. The sinner, too, as we are now aware, was taken hold of in new ways, transmogrified into new and terrifying beasts and demons. Most revealing was the

⁹ In order for such an idea to have any basis, a certain understanding of Christianity must be accepted, namely that the nucleus of Christian belief, the vital center of the religion, is a question of redemption, salvation, eternal life. According to Ruether: "The most fundamental affirmation of Christian faith is the belief that Jesus is the Christ...On this affirmation, everything else in Christian theology is built," Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide*, 246. In this sense, with Jesus as the Christ, the purpose of Christianity is salvation.

¹⁰ For the use of this intellectual tool in conceptual history see, Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 38.

reconfiguration of religion for new earthly ends. The explicit and principal purpose of faith had been, perhaps irrevocably, altered. Now faith, conversion, the intent of rebirth were no longer univocally linked to eternal life, this one, single end; instead, these aspects of religion were a tool in an entirely new and complex web of aims and ambitions. Evangelical Christianity in the United States was promoted as a means to economic self-aggrandizement,¹¹ the salvation of the nation, a conduit of future power, a means of overcoming life's problems, a weapon with which to vanquish communism. These are only a *few* examples. The personal God of evangelicalism wanted to help you, wanted to transform your life, deliver your desires. It seems the only person who anticipated this occurrence in religion, and not in specific relation to evangelicalism, was Arendt.¹² The question moving forward becomes, What to make of a religion over which the eternal no longer works its ancient power?

Now at the end of this dissertation, we are in a position to assess the merits, applicability, and validity of Bauman's theory. The theory's most attractive quality is that it brings, concerning the origin of the contemporary evangelical movement, more into play than other theories, which dominate the study of this religious group in the United States. Bauman's theory and our exploration of it move us decidedly away from singular events, which are used to explain evangelicalism in all of its manifestations or explain the emergence of the Christian Right as a distinct and separate phenomenon. Evangelicalism was and is a multifaceted socio-religious institution, its politicization was complex and long, and it holds over the lives of its adherents an enduring influence. We cannot neatly and conveniently separate evangelicalism from its later, visibly politicized form. The theories of the legalization of abortion¹³ and Bob Jones University¹⁴ are powerless as a way of offering a more nuanced understanding of the movement. Moreover, they are chronologically untenable. By looking away from the legalization of abortion as *the* moment of galvanization, we begin

¹¹ This, admittedly, is no mystery; many scholars have remarked on the prominent rise of the gospel of prosperity.

¹² Arendt identified the tendency among social scientists during the Cold War to conflate religion and communism and the functionalist temptation to view religion as a weapon against communism, see Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 101-102. That the *use* of religion in the ideological struggle with communism might distort the essence and end of religion Arendt anticipated in a 1950 article; she wrote, "Confronted with a full-fledged ideology, our greatest danger is to counter it with an ideology of our own. If we try to inspire public-political life once more with 'religious passion' or to use religion as a means of political distinctions, the result may very well be the transformation and perversion of religion into an ideology..."

"Religion and Politics," in *Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1994), 384. There is no reason to suggest that, in this remark, she had in mind American evangelicalism.

¹³ Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 161.

to see that evangelicalism's was, in many ways, already politically active, already in "movement." It is important, as we have already said, to consider evangelicalism not only as a conservative political phenomenon. The conservative politics of evangelicalism is only one aspect of this religious community. Evangelicalism, as they themselves attest to, means to operate over the entirety of the individual's life, to rule over all spheres of the world.

In many ways, we have problematized and questioned the concept of identity itself. The use of this concept for understanding the origin of evangelicalism has unfolded different and hitherto unconsidered aspects of evangelical Christianity in the United States. The questions of evangelical speech and action are, generally speaking, not raised in studies of American evangelicalism. Everyone knows that evangelicals believed in God. But how did they conceive of him? How did they speak *of* him? And how did they speak *to* him? Into what roles was the God of the evangelical cast? Was this the God of a country, a specific historical entity, an American God? These are far more exacting and insightful questions. Our examination of the evangelical lexicon led us to their use of biological terminology, organic metaphors, and a whole, developing theology of biologism. Along these same lines, the advent of the commodity form in the evangelical church is quite evident. Approaching it as a question of identity, considering the advent of this form as a response to questions and problems of personal identity in the midst of consumption as an increasingly dominant aspect of the world, provides an intriguing reason for the zeal with which evangelicals have mixed their religion and the art of selling.

When considering evangelical relations and these relations as the web from which identity springs into relief, we experience, all these decades later, the evangelical's opposition to these groups. We behold the fervor with which evangelicals would keep these groups apart—apart from society, apart from God. Far more revealing, we see that the very spirit and materiality of evangelicalism, the very font of its genesis—the articles, sermons, groups, magazines, words, radio programs—were directly related to extinguishing the identity of the other, to bringing the other into docile silence, into obliterating separation.

Through the exploration of Bauman's theory, we have been led to another important realization. We have seen the overwhelming importance that the semantic field of crisis, decadence, decay, enjoyed in contemporary evangelicalism. Decay, in the evangelical *Weltanschauung*, which was beginning to be articulated after the Second World War, began to touch all things, wilt all flowers, make itself known in all areas of life. It fit perfectly into

¹⁴ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 14.

an ideological dialectic. Crisis, the evangelical had discovered, both in the life of the individual and the historical existence of the nation, was the precursor to conversion. The life beset by obstacles, the nation in the midst of undoing, spurned one and was a catalyst to rebirth. The evangelical of the twentieth century was the identifier of decay, the one who announced the coming crisis, warned of the travail of decadence. But the advent of this conceptual turn was not, at least primarily, theological. That is, it was not some outgrowth of the pessimism that surrounds their premillennialism, with its expectation of apocalypse and imminent worldly destruction. We have also considered decay not in isolation but as an element in an ideological system, which, necessarily, focuses its power on the individual, on the inner life, on identity. With the discovery of the power of these concepts, seeing the emotions they invoked, the fear they induced, the horrific prospects of doom they engendered, the evangelical employed them with prolific zealously. The resultant state of affairs has three important historical consequences. First, as we have mentioned, decay and its related concepts become more rhetorical devices, political tools, and ways of inducing conversion than the expression of an actual belief about the world. Second, the very mention of decay, the very whisper of decadence, the signaling of crisis, had the desired effect of planting the frightful seed of decline. Here, what is meant is that evangelicals themselves were creators and propagandists of crisis and decadence. In a sense, crisis could not exist without them. Third, given that these concepts were brought into relation with so many aspects of life, over the span of decades, deployed “universally and indiscriminately,” we may begin to speak of what is called in conceptual history the whiting out of meaning or “semantic bleaching.”¹⁵ The rhetoric of decline and their devotion to it was one of the American evangelical’s lasting contributions to American politics. This facet of the evangelical lexicon normalized, for millions of people, a perpetual and haunting state of expectation and supposed decline, permanent crisis.

It must be recognized that this theory is not without its problems. The first, and the one that looms over this approach to evangelicalism with darkest clouds, pertains to the concept of identity itself. We have carried out the realization of this dissertation having established certain presuppositions concerning this central concept. Are language and action truly related to identity? And if so, how and to what extent? How may we describe this interconnectedness? Is identity always fashioned, in some way, with relation to the other?

¹⁵ Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 56.

What is the meaning of this other for personal identity and its formation? In short, how do we quantify and qualify identity's constituent parts and the geography of its constant becoming? To what extent, is identity, understood as a continuous project, as Bauman suggested, even applicable, verifiable or a true aspect of the world? More to the point, what significance does the concept identity have? Could it be nothing more than a meaningless construct? Might it not be a secularized equivalent of “soul” in which case the concept of identity is problematic indeed?

Another problem relates to the essence of evangelicalism, in short, it is a question of what is religion and what role has it played throughout history. There is no doubt among many scholars that American evangelical Christianity constitutes a new turning point in the history of religion. It has even been called a new age. If we reframe our thesis with the terms utilized in historical discourse—collective and personal identity—we may describe evangelicalism's birth, as a moment when collective identity overpowered, made obsolete, and, to an extent, replaced personal identity. It was not merely an exercise in imposition and imperialism but a solution desperately sought, a nostrum after which many hunted. The Lordship of Christ over all things, which was and continues to be the ideological slogan of the evangelical church in the United States, was this community's effort to remove decision from the equation. While with evangelicalism, between 1945 and 1981, this can certainly be verified, the question becomes to what extent should this be regarded as something altogether unheard of in human history? For, religion, even though it is usually focused on some realm beyond this world, has always provided the adherent with a code, a guide, directions for acting, for living.

Insofar as collective identity becomes an attractive and feasible alternative to the burden of personal identity and its formation, a certain imperialism is involved, a certain reach towards hegemony. Of course, some might counter, this is how religion always acts. In the eyes of many, religion always reaches beyond the purely spiritual. It is *always* political. Religion, in the eyes of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci to cite one single example, is always a hegemonic force, always a political actor, always a form of “total social praxis.”¹⁶ Thus, nothing new has emerged; we may only speak of a marked and easily identifiable continuance.

Beyond religion's role in society, in culture, and in our personal lives, there are elements of evangelicalism that have emerged here, which have roots in the past. As such,

here, we may also speak not of something new but of continuance. Religion has long proved to be an essential underpinning of certain societal, economic, and political arrangements of the *Lebenswelt*. It is no surprise, some might argue, that this has continued in contemporary evangelicalism. As Weber and Tawney demonstrated in their respective studies, Protestantism provided a certain sanctified impetus to capitalist development. With organic metaphors and the general biologism, which becomes so pronounced in twentieth-century evangelicalism, it is abundantly evident that this originated in the nineteenth century and well outside of evangelical circles. Evangelicals, Balmer observed, have always embraced technology.¹⁷ Thus, in some ways, evangelicalism did not appear in the world as something entirely new. In a sense, there was the continuation of many existing trends and the adoption of others.

Another limitation of this dissertation deserving of mention relates to concepts and their treatment as it has been carried out here. The first chapter, which explored evangelical parlance and those concepts that enjoyed the most favor with this group of Christians during the Cold War, was not a seamless or dogmatic implementation of conceptual history or its methodology. Nor was it carried out with a constant eye to the guidelines of this branch of historical inquiry. Instead, conceptual history, some of its claims and some of its ideas, served as legitimation of our undertaking and as a point of departure for carrying out a neglected aspect of analysis of American evangelicalism in the secondary literature. Richter argued in his 1995 introduction to conceptual history that *Begriffsgeschichte* was, everywhere, a useful path of historical questioning.¹⁸ This can be seen as a beginning of its application to American evangelicalism. In addition, gender studies and its important examination of power and masculinity serves as a useful conceptual framework for the further exploration of identity, gender, and masculinity in evangelicalism during the Cold War as well as after this period of American history.

This particular limitation brings us to other possibilities for new historical studies of American evangelicalism, both in our period of focus as well as after 1981. The possible paths of future historical inquiry suggested here could not only compensate for some of the

¹⁶ John Fulton, "Religion and Politics in Gramsci: An Introduction," *Sociological Analysis* 48, no. 3 (1987): 198-199, 202, accessed December 1, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3711518>.

¹⁷ See Balmer, *Blessed Assurance*, 10. Balmer's observation is problematic. Balmer doesn't take into account the possible transformation of technology in the face of new technological developments, unprecedented destructive powers, and almost unlimited powers of expansion, all of which are characteristics of technology in the twentieth century.

¹⁸ Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 6.

limitations of this dissertation but offer fresh insight to this area of American history, as well as a deeper understanding of certain aspect of American culture, society, economics, and politics, from the vantage point of the evangelical church.

The most promising area of future research is, without a doubt, in conceptual history. One reason for this lies in the fact that such research, in the United States, is sparse.¹⁹ While this laguna is true for American historiography in general, it is true to an acute degree regarding religion and evangelical Christianity in the United States. Indeed, we might go so far as to say, given the evangelicals intimate and abiding involvement in politics, that a full understanding of American political history and the conceptual history of the political and social realms would be impossible without bringing into consideration evangelicalism. A diachronic approach, prior to our period of discussion, and following the rise of Reagan, is also needed. To what extent are the concepts that dominated Cold War evangelicalism unique to the era, products of some of the most intense ideological struggles of modern times, to what extent are they a continuance of a prior age? What changes occurred with the eventual fall of communism? What new foes were sought out? What new ideologies did evangelicalism come to incorporate, embody, and serve?

More evidence, beyond the sources examined here and outside the specific time frame treated in this dissertation, should be sought to demonstrate the new secularized ends of evangelical Christianity. What other ends, besides the vanquishment of communism, economic prosperity, and national salvation, does evangelicalism come to serve? What new promises does it have in store? What tempting and fantastic treasures does it claim to provide the adherent or the freshly reborn, the one now just emerging from the regenerative waters? Did the theological denuding of evangelicalism in favor of mundane goals continue?

The question of evangelical relations should be expanded to include more groups. Of particular importance, is the evangelical relation and attitude towards Jews, Judaism, and the modern state of Israel.

Likewise, more research can be carried out concerning evangelicalism and its technological form. Central to this question is the essence of technology or, if one is to think deeper, technique. What does it do, how does it effect us? This is a question we cannot resolve here. As decade followed decade, the bond between evangelicalism and technology was strengthened. Evangelicals became evangelists for technique just as much as they were messengers of God. In an age when faith and religion are increasingly given expression

through technology, via this medium, the relationship between technology and religion becomes an important and unavoidable question. More accurately and of central importance in this dissertation, we may begin to think about not a holy union between evangelicalism and this or that technological device but instead about a technicized religion, a religion refashioned according to the dictates of technique, remade so as to expand across the surface of the globe, reorganized to perpetuate the spread of certain economic, political, and scientific techniques. There is already in place a formidable philosophical tradition, much more convincing, which has abandoned this erroneous vision.²⁰ It should be included in our understanding of evangelicalism and this particular form. How did the evangelical prepare and condition the adherent for the advent of this unfolding world? How can we begin to see the evangelical as a necessary element in the global spread of a world of technique?

A similar line of inquiry could be carried out with respect to the commodity form. As a technological product,²¹ as a good consumed, as a television program watched, a Christian album sold, what are the intricacies of labor and evangelical Christianity? When we speak of evangelicalism, are we speaking of legions of workers or legions of believers or both? More can be said on the transformation from faith to commodity. Beyond the actual products produced, to what extent can we consider evangelicalism *qua* commodity? To what extent was it still an expression of faith? Are the two compatible? That is, can faith survive the fiery process of commodification?

The 2016 presidential election briefly introduced the subject of evangelicalism back into public debate and before the public eye in the United States. Only briefly, for other matters dominated the discourse, the debate, and the political propaganda. What role does evangelicalism still have in American society? How will born-again Christians vote? What remains of the movement's power? All of these are questions that have recently emerged. Rumors, too, of the collapse of the evangelical collective, the disappearance of the

¹⁹ Burke, "Conceptual History in the United States: A Missing 'National Project,'" 127–44; Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 5, 143–160; Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 5.

²⁰ See Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society*, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964). Donna Haraway advocates a reinvigoration of our examination and critique of technique, the social relations they engender, and their spread to other, previously untechnicized, realms of life, stressing the need for "theory and practice addressed to the social relations of science and technology, including crucially the systems of myth and meanings structuring our imaginations," "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-feminism in the late Twentieth Century," *The Cybercultures Reader*, ed. David Bell and Barbara M. Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2000), 302.

²¹ Haraway writes of the vanishing boundaries in our contemporary age, an occurrence that facilitates the blending of religion and technique: "The dichotomies between mind and body, animal and human, organicism

evangelical movement, the liquidation of their power, have circulated.²² All of these commentaries fail to comprehend that this movement is not a mere synonym for conservative politics. This is only one aspect of the evangelical church's broad appeal. Evangelicals, as they plainly tell us, seek to reign over all areas of life, to bring all aspects of existence beneath the Lordship of Christ.

Donald Trump's astonishing election in 2016 definitively dispelled the rumors of the evangelical collective's demise or that there was an irreparable fracture in their collective identity. In November 2016, American evangelicals voted overwhelming for the new president, a man who, throughout his life, had never given any overt displays of religion nor spoken much of God and salvation. Some estimates place the figure of evangelical support as high as 80 percent.²³ Trump, as he began his election campaign, was not an evangelical. While at a campaign rally at the evangelical Liberty University in April 2016, he misquoted his "favorite" Bible verse, thereby betraying, for him, the foreignness of Scriptural texts.²⁴ Trump's decades of public antics, his often crude choice of words, his life's almost singular devotion to the accumulation of capital, his ignorance of Scripture and Christian belief, were no matter for the vast majority of white evangelicals. They saw in Trump, and Trump saw in them, the makings of a symbiotic relationship, a relation of mutual use and exploitation. Trump, for the evangelical, was and is a vehicle to power, just as were Goldwater, Carter, Reagan, and Bush.

And after some seven decades of striving, zealous prayer, countless conversions, endless evangelistic work, the founding of newspapers, universities, think tanks, and churches, the contemporary evangelical movement moves towards its logical conclusion and achieves its most coveted and long-standing objective. The 2016 presidential campaign allowed many elements of the American rightwing to move out of the shadows, while at the same time it also emboldened others facets of the American right. Though many of these

and machine, public and private, nature and culture, men and women, primitive and civilized are all in question ideologically," *Ibid*.

²² Lindsey Cook, "The Declining Influence of White Christian America, in Charts," *US News & World Report*, July 19, 2016, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-19/the-declining-influence-of-white-christian-america-in-charts>.

²³ Sarah Pulliam Bailey, "White Evangelicals Voted Overwhelmingly for Donald Trump, Exit Polls Show," *The Washington Post*, November 9, 2016, accessed January 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/11/09/exit-polls-show-white-evangelicals-voted-overwhelmingly-for-donald-trump/?utm_term=.aab2340b1b93; Kate Shellnutt, "Trump Elected President, Thanks to 4 in 5 White Evangelicals," *Christianity Today*, November 9, 2016, accessed January 15, 2016, <http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2016/november/trump-elected-president-thanks-to-4-in-5-white-evangelicals.html>.

²⁴ Jonathan Merritt, "Trump's Bible Fail," *The Atlantic*, April 15, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/trumps-bible-fail/478425/>.

groups benefited from the election results, Trump's victory was, for many reasons, the evangelical's victory. There are many obvious reasons for such an assertion, which we cannot explore here. The most important reason that Trump's election represents a fundamental victory for American evangelicalism is that it marks the triumph of their entire *Weltanschauung*. The Gospel of Despair has spread beyond the walls of the evangelical church. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, it has framed the parameters of American political, social, and economic debate. Trump's campaign slogan "Make America Great Again" is a distillation of the evangelical message, one that, all at once, harkens back to America's mystical greatness, conjures up the present's putrid atmosphere of decay and decadence, and promises a glorious return to America's essence, presages a sweeping victory and a new age. Trump's message, which was very much the evangelical's message, appealed to many outside of traditional evangelicalism.

In his inauguration speech on January 20, 2017, hand atop not one but two Bibles, Trump adopted important themes and concepts in American evangelicalism. He spoke, among other things, of "America first," of the military, of the wonders of American industry and technology, of God, and of power.²⁵ "When America is united, America is totally unstoppable," he said in contemplation of American might.²⁶ Trump did not stop to consider what "America first" means for the world, what destruction an unstoppable America might rain down, whose lives and whose histories might be beaten by such a storm. These notions, invocations, and ideas, of course, are not exclusive to American evangelicalism, but they have in evangelicalism, roles of unparalleled importance. Beneath the concepts so familiar to evangelicals, Trump gave a more direct and public nod to the evangelicals who had played such a crucial part in his election. By far of greatest importance in our discussion of American evangelicalism in its period of crystallization during the Cold War, is the fact that Trump himself inaugurated a "new millennium," brought forth a new and wondrous age: "We stand at the birth of a new millennium, ready to unlock the mysteries of space, to free the earth from the miseries of disease, to harvest the energies, industries and technologies of tomorrow."²⁷ The words of the new American president could not have been better spoken by an evangelical himself. Trump's new millennium is an escape from yesterday, a flight from perceived and imagined undoing. It is part and parcel of the dialectic of crisis and decadence,

²⁵ Donald Trump, "Donald Trump Inauguration Speech Full Transcript." *Belfast Telegraph*, accessed February 5, 2017, <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/donald-trump-inauguration-speech-full-transcript-35386639.html>.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

which the evangelical had spent most of the twentieth century perfecting. We must of course concede that contemporary evangelicals were neither the only ones in the United States warning of decline in the twentieth century nor were they the inventors of such concepts. But who else in context of the American Republic of the Cold War and after had preached decadence and decay with as much zeal, to as many people, and for so long, as the evangelical? Who but the evangelical had warned and primed millions of American men and women of the coming winds of ruin? The corrupting spread of decay, the rhetoric of decadence, has been one of the evangelical's great contributions to American politics in the twentieth century. Evangelicals have made it a constant feature of American social and political discourse. Near the beginning of the twenty-first century, Trump used the groundwork that evangelicals had prepared and he co-opted their message of decline to grand and mesmerizing effect.

Whatever is in store for American evangelicalism, which has firmly attached itself to one political party and to the new President, whether it withers or flourishes under Trump, the future of this religious movement must now be contemplated from a global vantage point. As we now awaken and stagger to understand Trump's so-called new millennium, as we prepare ourselves for the new sufferings the reign of the elect will undoubtedly produce, we see that evangelicalism and Christian fundamentalism, along with other fundamentalisms, have spread across the entire globe, enveloping millions of people. Now, any considerations of evangelicalism, any prognosis as to its fate, must take this into account. What began in the United States is now a universal phenomenon.

Finally, it is important to point out, the question of personal identity and its slow elaboration was not a problem that only afflicted the evangel; it is a dilemma that faces us all. We are all beckoned to abandon this task; everywhere encouraged to flee ourselves. Likewise, evangelicalism as a system, as a technique, as a collective identity, that seeks to resolve this problem, to unburden the individual, to remove the onus of decision, was neither an anomaly nor an aberration. Instead, it was one of many modes on sale for the American public during the Cold War, one of many possible enchanting products that promises total and seamless solutions for a world beset by problems.

Conclusión

La tesis de Bauman propone que la posmodernidad produce una situación en la que la creación de una identidad es cada vez más difícil. El fundamentalismo religioso, según Bauman, emergió en este delirio, enfrentó la aparente imposibilidad de decidir y deshizo el deber prolongado de elaborar una identidad. Esta tesis, centrada en la importancia del movimiento evangélico en la historia reciente de Estados Unidos, fue un intento de aplicar la teoría de Bauman al evangelismo estadounidense entre 1945 y 1981. Fue una exploración de la tesis de Bauman, una exploración de como el problema de identidad se manifestaría. Según Bauman, la edad contemporánea crea un vacío en el que la posibilidad de elaborar una identidad personal se aleja cada vez más. En este ambiente de incertidumbre constante y cambio veloz, observa Bauman, el fundamentalismo religioso encuentra tierra firme para desarrollarse y su razón de ser. El fundamentalismo religioso emerge como un supuesto remedio para los problemas y las cuestiones que rodean la identidad personal.

Para llevar a cabo esta exploración de la teoría de Bauman hemos, a través de los logros de historiadores, sociólogos y otros pensadores que han tratado el asunto de la identidad, expandido el concepto de identidad que Bauman nos ha ofrecido. A través de nuestras fuentes primarias *Christianity Today* y los sermones de Billy Graham hemos podido explorar nuevas facetas del evangelismo estadounidense durante la Guerra Fría. Y además, con estas fuentes, hemos creado otra conceptualización del proyecto de la elaboración de la identidad. Hemos entendido el proyecto identitario como algo construido y revelado a través del lenguaje;¹ como una creación que emerge del nexo de sistemas intelectuales;² como algo que se expresa por medio de formas específicas, símbolos y tradiciones; y como una cuestión de interacciones, desafíos y relaciones entre las esferas de la sociedad y de la política.³

Con esta conceptualización de identidad empezamos la investigación, empujado por Arendt, con la forma que los evangélicos tuvieron de hablar. El estudio de ese lenguaje del evangélico, examinado a través de la metodología de la Historia de los conceptos, se ha centrado en temas específicos del periodo—clichés, el comunismo, el biologismo, conceptos de guerra, y otros conceptos centrales [*Grundbegriffe*]: “Dios,” “Cristo,” “la decadencia.” Con la utilización de “América,” “libertad,” “*Romist*” [partidarios de la Iglesia Católica

¹ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 179.

² Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 458.

Romana] no solo vemos la ocupación del espacio político por parte de los evangélicos sino también el intento de controlar los debates del momento. Al ofrecer Estados Unidos como una fuente inagotable de libertad y de incalculable prosperidad a pesar de la desigualdad social, económica y política de varios grupos sociales, vemos que de alguna manera, los evangélicos estaban enmascarando la realidad, estaban protegiendo al adherente evangélico del lado más oscuro del proyecto estadounidense. En la incertidumbre creciente de la Guerra Fría, cara a cara con nuevos terrores tecnológicos, en medio de la agitación social en el mundo y en Estados Unidos, la iglesia evangélica proveyó al adepto de un camino de la salvación y de la cosmovisión correcta, una ideología política cristiana, y de respuestas a las cuestiones económicas más preocupantes. Esto, francamente, la capacidad de producir y difundir respuestas a todo, fue y es uno de los aspectos más atractivos y seductores del evangelismo, como hemos demostrado en esta tesis doctoral.

Aunque no sea nueva en la historia del cristianismo, la incorporación de conceptos relacionados con los ejércitos y sus operaciones en la iglesia evangélica dominó el periodo de la Guerra Fría, incluso alcanzando al cielo y arrasando al Dios cristiano con conceptualizaciones nuevas. Existió una resignificación potente de los términos. Esto no fue un acontecimiento inevitable o natural, un resultado insignificante de existencia en la Guerra Fría. Fue una *decisión*. Se puede entender la jerga militarizada del evangélico de diferentes maneras. Lo fundamental es que responde a una cuestión socio-política, a una cuestión humana: ¿Qué rol tienen la violencia y la guerra en nuestra sociedad? ¿Qué clase de país somos? El uso prolífico de estos conceptos en el lenguaje evangélico, la conexión explícita entre lo sagrado y el militarismo, fue, creemos, como ya explicamos en esta tesis, una manera de legitimar la guerra y la violencia en un momento crucial de la historia estadounidense, el momento de la expansión y del uso del siempre más grande ejército estadounidense.

Asimismo, los conceptos de la esfera económica y del mercado libre impregnaron el movimiento evangélico entre 1945 y 1981. El protestantismo y el capitalismo siempre han tenido, como sabemos, una estrecha relación; dicho esto, el uso de estos conceptos en el evangelismo contemporáneo logró un nuevo momento de intensidad. El discurso fue menos el de la gloria de Dios, de Cristo y de la salvación y el más de la eficacia, los beneficios y las ganancias económicas, el de los números. El evangelismo fue economizado. Las fuerzas dominantes y aclamadas del mercado, empezaron a dominar en la iglesia de Dios. La mezcla

³ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 183-184; Baldwin, "The Devil Finds Work," 537. Calhoun, "Social Theory and

del Señor y el capital sirvió también, en medio de la confrontación global entre el comunismo y los países capitalistas, como respuesta a las preguntas más importantes del momento.

El desarrollo de una teología del biologismo, la adopción de conceptos orgánicos, muestra claramente la proximidad creciente del evangelismo que ellos tacharon como degenerado. Y como sabemos no era la primera vez que ocurrió. Ya habían pasado esos acercamientos a finales del siglo XIX pero ahora era propio de esta religión renacida. Fue todo un giro conceptual moderno. También, de manera más oculta, estaban involucradas la violencia y la objetivación del otro. Aquí vemos un claro alejamiento de conceptos estrictamente religiosos. En la nueva configuración evangélica surgida durante la Guerra Fría, el comunista no fue rechazado por no ser creyente sino fue tachado de ser un cáncer, como una enfermedad. Los que violaron las normas sexuales dominantes en Estados Unidos no fueron simplemente pecadores sino también tumores, terrores biológicos. El pecado ya era de nuevo algo político. A este conjunto de representaciones extremas, el miedo al infierno y a la condenación ya no ejercen su poder sobre la mente moderna. En el clima de la Guerra Fría, para efectuar la flagelación del pecador fue necesario una terminología desvinculada de la vida eterna y directamente relacionado con el mundo de los vivos. El organicismo, las callejuelas oscuras y florecientes de metáforas orgánicas, fue, políticamente hablando, más expeditivo; también fue más peligroso, tuvo mayor potencia de exclusión, herró al condenado con un simbolismo terrible y mortal. El pecador de ayer estaba destinado a la desgracia del infierno cristiano. El ser humano de hoy, como cáncer social, tenía que ser observado, arrestado, puesto en cuarentena, borrado.

En el segundo capítulo de esta tesis doctoral hemos explorado la transformación ideológica del evangelismo estadounidense siempre utilizando nuestras fuentes primarias. Siguiendo a la autora Hannah Arendt, hemos considerado que la ideología no opera sobre o en el mundo sino en la vida interior del adherente. Por lo tanto, y de alguna manera, la ideología está relacionada con la cuestión de la identidad, está conectada a esta faceta de la vida. El desarrollo de una ideología tenía un propósito socio-político y fue un intento de ordenar y explicar coherentemente la tela temporal de la vida contemporánea, colorear el pensamiento. En esta *Weltanschauung*, el pasado de Estados Unidos fue, para muchos, glorioso y el de un pueblo elegido. Sin embargo esos creyentes también consideraban que el presente era una edad de decadencia y de declive. El futuro, bajo el dominio de Cristo,

the Politics of Identity,” 9.

prometían los cristianos evangélicos, sería el de la restauración y redención. La noción de la descomposición, del declive, de la crisis, llegaron a ser en el léxico del movimiento evangélico, menos un reflejo de la realidad y más algo creado, algo de propaganda, un objeto para promover. Con el evangelismo *qua* ideología, vemos la transformación de la religión en un camino menos de salvación y más de solución de problemas mundanos. El paraíso y la vida eterna retroceden hacia la nada, llegan a ser artefactos del pasado.

En el siguiente capítulo, el tercero de esta tesis, hemos considerado la facultad de acción, su importancia en la formación de una identidad personal y el papel que la acción tuvo en el evangelismo durante el momento de su cristalización histórica. Ahí, hemos encontrado algo sorprendente: el intento concentrado y prácticamente ubicuo de eliminar la facultad de acción como una posibilidad humana. El gran lema del evangelismo de la Guerra Fría fue: “No podemos hacer nada.” No podemos cambiar el mundo, no podemos transformarlo. Al nivel individual, asimismo, el individuo no tiene poder de actuar, de empezar de nuevo. Después de hablar constantemente de la impotencia de los hombres y las mujeres modernos, el evangélico presentaba el movimiento evangélico como la única vía de acción, la única manera de transformar el mundo, la sociedad y a sus habitantes. Íntimamente relacionado con esto estaba justamente lo que Bauman observó: la creación del mapa completo de la vida, un intento de resolver todos los problemas, responder a todas las preguntas, trazar todos los caminos. Las cuestiones de la exploración del espacio, la tecnología, el patriotismo y el consumo fueron *algunas* de las esferas bajo la supervisión y dirección de la iglesia evangélica.

En el cuarto capítulo, hemos visto las nuevas formas evangélicas, la nueva organización de la vida religiosa, la nueva manera de expresar la fe cristiana después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Hemos dado por sentado que estas formas tenían algo que ver con la identidad personal y la labor de su formación. Hasta cierto punto, hemos dejado de ver la gran actividad del evangelismo como un mero proceso de proselitismo. En cambio, ahora lo vemos como un proceso de expansión sin fin. Lo que observamos en el movimiento evangélico de ese momento es una fascinación y una obsesión con la expansión en sí. Aparecieron grupos y organizaciones dedicados exclusivamente a la actividad de engendrar la expansión del evangelismo (en inglés, *church growth*). Al dedicarse a la hazaña perpetua de expandirse, se puede evitar la cuestión de la identidad personal. Respecto a la expansión evangélica de la Guerra Fría, podemos preguntar ¿Pero qué es exactamente lo que se está expandiendo?

La mercantilización de la religión, la transformación del evangelismo en un objeto de consumo, en un momento como fueron los años cincuenta de una explosión consumista en Estados Unidos como estrategia para la recuperación económica tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y también en un momento de incorporación de este consumo feroz en la construcción del llamado Sueño Americano, la transformación del credo evangélico en un objeto más de consumo fue todo un acierto. Representa uno de los acontecimientos más importantes de la historia evangélica en el periodo de la posguerra. Y además constituye también uno de los vínculos más fuertes entre la génesis del movimiento y la cuestión de la identidad. El fenómeno se manifestó en cuatro áreas del evangelismo. Primero lo vimos con el evangelismo visto desde la perspectiva del trabajo. Con nuestras fuentes no tenemos datos suficientes al respecto. Pero vimos que la iglesia IHOP, mencionada en el documental *God Loves Uganda*, tiene 1.000 empleados. La producción de los libros, las películas, los programas de televisión y de radio, las álbumes de música cristiana implica, *eo ipso*, masas de trabajadores. Como faltan datos, en esta tesis, solo lo podemos sugerir. Segundo, se puede identificar la mercantilización del evangelismo, como hemos visto en la presente investigación, en términos de los miles de productos que el movimiento produce y consume. Cada vez más, la expresión religiosa iba vinculándose al acto de consumo. Los académicos, de manera limitada, han explorado este aspecto del evangelismo en Estados Unidos. Tercero, en esta tesis hemos hecho hincapié en la reformulación conceptual que tuvo lugar en el evangelismo. Hemos visto la tendencia frecuente de ver la religión, la fe misma, como algo para promover, algo para vender, un mero e insignificante objeto de comercializar. Esta moda aparecía en muchos números que hemos revisado de *Christianity Today*, en la obra de Billy Graham y creemos que es algo de suma importancia histórica. Se ve esta tendencia también después de nuestro periodo de análisis, después de la llegada de Reagan. Y vimos también, en el estudio de Gerardo Marti, que el acto de vender el Evangelio, el intento de comercializar la religión, correspondía al acto de vender la personalidad, de ofrecer la “identidad,” en el mercado laboral. Así, el evangelismo es un reflejo de la sociedad que le rodea y legitima la mercantilización de la persona. Así, el movimiento evangélico intervino, por parte del adepto, en la cuestión de la progresiva mercantilización del mundo y de la vida.

La rápida inclusión de esta forma multifacética en el evangelismo estadounidense representa y resuelve, al parecer, el dilema del consumo que enfrenta a diario al individuo. ¿Qué consumir? ¿Cómo consumir? ¿Qué programa ver en la televisión? ¿Si uno debe consumir esto o el otro? El consumo, Bauman nos lo definía como “la experiencia más común, más intensa, más absorbente, la experiencia que con toda probabilidad provee la

materia prima para imaginar el mundo,” en la vida moderna.⁴ En una sociedad en la que, han aseverado muchos, el consumo es el equivalente a la identidad, el evangelismo como producto de consumo corresponde de manera nítida a este nuevo estado y a su desarrollo en el mundo.

La entrada de la tecnología en el mundo del evangelismo está bien clara. A pesar de momentos de aprehensión y duras críticas, los evangélicos, de manera casi universal, iban incorporando los nuevos avances tecnológicos del periodo. Al nivel de la nación, de los logros míticos de la República, los evangélicos elogiaron cada paso que se daba. Los elogios de los evangélicos y los comentarios de los académicos, respecto a esta forma en el movimiento evangélico, deberíamos destacar, están casi siempre reducidos al objeto tecnológico en lugar de conceptualizar la situación como un sistema global de organización y de explotación. Al concebir el objeto, en el evangelismo del periodo, la postura se acerca a un instrumento tecnológico específico que no va más allá del mero uso. La postura vacilaba entre una fe inmortal en la tecnología y la deificación, en la forma de un don de Dios, una intervención divina o una manera de celebrar a la deidad cristiana. La tecnología, como hemos visto en esta tesis doctoral, se hizo sagrada para los evangélicos.⁵ Dios, aseguraban los evangélicos, siempre bendecía el progreso tecnológico. Y de nuevo si algo caracterizó la evolución interna en Estados Unidos durante los años de la Guerra Fría, los años que examinamos en esta tesis, es la apabullante revolución tecnológica que acompañó al incremento del consumo en Estados Unidos, y de nuevo los evangélicos lo hicieron suyo como hemos demostrado a través de nuestras fuentes. La cuestión del impacto que tiene el triunfo de la forma tecnológica en el corazón evangélico para el proceso de construcción identitaria está todavía sin resolver. En esta tesis solo podemos plantear la posibilidad del dominio de la técnica sobre la identidad, que las dos, de algún modo, están relacionadas. En la época de la Guerra Fría, con el rápido progreso en el campo de la tecnología, como hemos señalado, el evangélico no fue solamente el mensajero de Dios, sino que también era el sumo sacerdote del mundo técnico que se avecinaba.

En esta tesis centrada en el estudio del movimiento evangélico durante la Guerra Fría la última forma que vimos fue la idolatría del poder, innegablemente un aspecto saliente del evangelismo del siglo XX. Los evangélicos organizaron la religión para conquistar y adquirir el poder. Aquí la máscara se cae. Es decir, vemos que por debajo de las promesas de salvación, de la fe en Dios, del proceso entero de evangelización, hubo por parte de los

⁴ Bauman, *Society Under Siege*, 45.

evangélicos un deseo de dominar, un elogio y un deseo del poder. Más allá de la política conservadora de los evangélicos estuvo el deseo de dominar, de poseer poder. En las décadas después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el evangelismo se vinculó a muchos fines; sobre todo, fue un peldaño en la acumulación y en el uso del poder. Este aspecto del evangelismo es conocido. Dadas las implicaciones políticas de una sed tan difusa de dominio, esta admisión cándida supone una evidencia de que este movimiento religioso había trascendido su proyecto hacia la vida eterna. El impacto y lo atractivo del mensaje evangélico tenían que ver con las promesas explícitas de triunfo y gloria en *este* mundo. Hasta cierto punto, las oraciones, las denuncias del declive moral y las exhortaciones a la redención estaban todas coloreadas con esa mirada paciente dirigida hacia la adquisición del poder en el futuro.

En el último capítulo de esta tesis, hemos reflexionado sobre la identidad individual y la identidad colectiva en el contexto de las relaciones sociales. Solo en este contexto, solo en un espacio común, la identidad empieza a emerger, a tener sentido. Con una fuerza en aumento, la llegada de los afroamericanos, los homosexuales y las mujeres a la arena pública estadounidense en los años sesenta del siglo XX representó un desafío a la identidad colectiva de los evangélicos. Los evangélicos habían reformulado una identidad religiosa estadounidense homogénea, sin fisuras y sin dar cabida a los grupos minoritarios. Las condiciones de estos grupos marginales pusieron en evidencia, como no podía ser de otra manera, las contradicciones amargas de la América de los sueños evangélicos. Lo importante aquí no es solo que los evangélicos se oponían a los distintos cambios sociales producidos entre los años cincuenta y la década de los setenta. En esto, demostraron que tenían un lugar en la sociedad estadounidense. De mayor importancia fue que el movimiento se hizo a través de establecerse relaciones un aspecto básico del proceso identitaria, este aspecto de formar la identidad. Cómo entender a estas personas, cómo verlas, fue una máxima de la iglesia evangélica. Como tratar al afroamericano fue la prerrogativa del evangélico. Al homosexual, el evangélico no le daría la posibilidad de hablar, de normalizar su realidad, de abrirse a la esfera pública. Respecto a la mujer, el evangélico consideraba que había adivinado la naturaleza secreta de la mujer y exigiría que esa mujer viviera siempre según el modelo evangélico. En todos los casos no fue una cuestión, una proscripción, para la comunidad evangélica, no fueron dictámenes dirigidos a los fieles, sino que fue un programa socio-político para todos, un orden al que todos tenían que felizmente someterse.

⁵ Para la santificación de la técnica en “la sociedad tecnológica” véase, Ellul, *The Technological Society*, 143.

En aquel entonces, se llamaba el “orden divino.” Muchos, en este periodo, dado que no tenían lugar en este orden sacrosanto, no se podían identificar con un mensaje que les excluía.

Aparte de las prescripciones evangélicas que servían para controlar al otro lo que intriga más es que el fundamento del movimiento, en este momento de su historia, fue el intento de destrozarse el florecimiento del otro, el intento de eliminar la identidad del otro como futura posibilidad histórica. Parte de la misma génesis del movimiento, su razón de ser, uno de los pilares de su identidad, fue esta negatividad respecto al otro. Fundamentalmente, creemos que estas son relaciones de poder, una cuestión cuya plena exploración queda fuera del marco de esta tesis. Son relaciones de poder dentro de la propia persona y de esta contra los demás.

Antes de considerar la validez de la teoría de Bauman, han surgido temas, a lo largo de esta tesis, que deberíamos tratar más a fondo. Uno de ellos es la idea ampliamente aceptada de que el evangelismo, según ellos, era algo aparte, estaba separado del mundo degenerado. La noción del separatismo cultural y espiritual viene tanto de los evangélicos como de los académicos. Muchas veces se expresa esta noción con la idea de la modernidad y el evangelismo como fuerza antagónica a ella. En muchas ocasiones, los evangélicos y numerosos académicos ven el movimiento fundamentalista del evangelismo como un opositor, un detractor, del mundo moderno.⁶ Una tras otra vez, nos confronta a lo opuesto. Sin embargo, en esta tesis creemos que hemos visto en cuanto al léxico de los evangélicos, los conceptos que utilizaron, respecto a la tecnología, la adopción de la mercantilización como forma religiosa, el chovinismo, las cuestiones de raza, la sexualidad y las mujeres, como los evangélicos formaban una parte integral de la sociedad estadounidense. Independientemente del contenido, los evangélicos veían la televisión y escuchaban la radio como tantos otros en el país. Muchas de las preocupaciones en la sociedad estadounidense tenían sus elementos correspondientes en la iglesia evangélica después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Como vimos en el capítulo dos, la ansiedad sobre los valores representados como de la masculinidad durante los cincuenta y los sesenta, especialmente pronunciada por el propio gobierno federal y alrededor de la figura del senador McCarthy, como ya señalamos, fue un aspecto visible y duradero en el evangelismo de la Guerra Fría. Lo más llamativo no

⁶ Carol Flake, *Redemptorism: Culture, Politics, and the New Evangelicalism* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1984) 10, 16; Balmer, *Blessed Assurance*, 28, 97.

es la exclusión y separación del evangélico sino su frecuente y estrecha conformidad con las tendencias del mundo a su alrededor.

El segundo tema subyacente, y quizá el más importante, es la idea de que, hasta 1976, los evangélicos habían permanecido en un, por así decirlo, coma político. Además del estudio de Sutton de 2012 y del libro *Mississippi Praying* de Dupont, publicado en 2013, que analizamos en esta tesis, hay un consenso casi unánime respecto al supuesto apoliticismo del movimiento. Balmer, por ejemplo, todavía en 2014, insistía en el abandono político de los evangélicos al principio y durante la Guerra Fría.⁷ En esta tesis creemos que hemos demostrado que, durante las décadas de los cincuenta, los sesenta y parte de los setenta del siglo XX, es decir, mucho antes de 1976, el evangélico estaba ya políticamente activo. Pese a las promesas difundidas por ellos de haber abandonado el foro político estadounidense, vemos un interés vivo y constante por casi todos los asuntos políticos del momento. Respecto a la homosexualidad, los derechos de las mujeres, la ERA (la Enmienda de Igualdad de Derechos) y la inclusión social y política de la comunidad afroamericana, los evangélicos hicieron públicas sus declaraciones, organizaron e intentaron contrarrestar los cambios que se preveían. Respecto a los problemas políticos del comunismo, la guerra, la oración en las escuelas públicas, las armas nucleares, la inclusión de China en la Organización de Naciones Unidas y la exploración del espacio, estos cristianos estaban increíble y vivazmente atentos. En el escenario nacional de la política, los evangélicos, sobre todo Billy Graham, frecuentaban los lugares de poder, hacían sus cruzadas en la capital del país, donde asistían las más conocidas figuras políticas, y mantenían relaciones íntimas y públicas con las figuras más selectas de la política nacional. Además de todo esto, aunque no lo hemos visto con detalle aquí, los evangélicos crearon en este periodo numerosas asociaciones políticas. La fecha 1976, el llamado “Año del Evangélico,” no fue un punto culminante, no fue un despertar, no fue una entrada evangélica en la política estadounidense. Al contrario, fue una mera continuación de décadas de trabajo, miles de sermones, casi medio siglo de rezo y deseo.

Por último, un tema de suma importancia que ha surgido en varias ocasiones en esta tesis doctoral constituye un vacío en las publicaciones sobre este movimiento religioso. Aquí nos referimos al acto de vaciar el contenido teológico del evangelismo, lo que hemos llamado el eclipse de lo eterno.⁸ Es una sombra del evangelismo difícilmente comprensible.

⁷ Balmer, “The Real Origins of the Religious Right” *Politico Magazine*.

⁸ Aceptamos que el núcleo de la fe cristiana ha sido, históricamente hablando, la preocupación con la salvación y la vida eterna. Según Ruether: “La más fundamental afirmación de la fe cristiana es que Jesús es el

Hasta qué punto uno realmente cree en un dogma se mide a duras penas. Sin embargo, el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial introdujo un nuevo proceso de secularización tanto en la sociedad como en la política de Estados Unidos. Se prohibió la oración obligatoria en las escuelas públicas. Se empezó a cuestionar las normas de la sexualidad influenciadas por la religión. El caso de *Brown vs. El Consejo de Educación de Topeka* (1954) judicialmente abolió la segregación en las escuelas de la República estadounidense.⁹ La educación en Estados Unidos, que una vez había sido el dominio sagrado de las iglesias y de la influencia y de su pensamiento religioso, abrió el camino hacia un sistema educativo más independiente. En este tumulto, en este alejamiento de la religión, por parte de *algunos* segmentos de la población estadounidense, los evangélicos se alzaron como uno de los más visibles, más devotos y más fervientes representantes de la fe, de la iglesia y de su influencia en todos los aspectos de la vida en Estados Unidos de la posguerra. Los evangélicos abrieron nuevas universidades e hicieron proselitismo. Las cruzadas y los avivamientos florecieron por todo el país, llegando incluso a los líderes políticos de la capital. A pesar de todo esto, del rol reconocido de los evangélicos como mensajeros de Dios, se puede ver, desde cierta perspectiva, una reorganización y reorientación, lanzando la religión evangélica a nuevos e inesperados fines, como hemos ido explorando a través de las fuentes en esta tesis doctoral. Se ve en cuanto a la terminología, a través del cambio conceptual. Ahora el Dios cristiano, el Redentor del mundo, se había transformado casi en una mercancía, en una nadería, en un objeto, para vender. Como general o comandante mundano, parecía un ser capaz de administrar la violencia. En otras ocasiones, convirtieron a Dios en un dispensador de bienes, de mercancías, un ímpetu en la carrera de la acumulación de capital. Especulaban también acerca del aspecto físico de Dios pero solo para poder imponer un ideal masculino en la sociedad estadounidense. Alteraron la conceptualización tradicional que las Iglesias cristianas tenían de Dios para hacerle caber en la ideología evangélica, esa amalgama de capitalismo, nacionalismo, expansión y un cultivado anhelo del poder. “Dios,” como concepto, se convirtió en una herramienta ideológica. A los pecadores también, como ya sabemos, lo transformaron en nuevas bestias y nuevos demonios.

Lo más revelador fue la reformulación de la religión para lograr distintos fines mundanos. El propósito explícito y principal de la fe evangélica fue, quizá irrevocablemente, alterado. El renacimiento espiritual, la conversión, la fe misma, ya no estaban

Cristo...Encima de esta afirmación, se construye toda la teología cristiana,” *Faith and Fratricide*, 246 [mi traducción].

⁹ Murrin, *Liberty, Equality, Power*, 968.

exclusivamente vinculados con la vida eterna; en cambio eran herramientas de una nueva y compleja red de objetivos y de ambiciones. Los evangélicos promovían el movimiento evangélico como un medio de enriquecimiento económico personal, la salvación de Estados Unidos, un camino hacia el poder futuro, un sistema para vencer a los problemas de la vida, un arma para destruir el comunismo. Estos son *algunos* ejemplos. El Dios personal del evangelismo quería ayudarte, quería transformar tu vida, entregarte los deseos. Parece que la única autora que anticipó este cambio en la religión, y no con respecto al evangelismo, fue Hannah Arendt.¹⁰ Partiendo de esta situación, la pregunta que inevitablemente se impone es ¿Cómo entender una religión en la que la vida eterna, las promesas de la salvación, han dejado de ejercer su poder de siempre?

El atributo más atractivo de la teoría es que nos permite introducir más consideraciones en el debate histórico. Ya hemos dejado atrás los acontecimientos singulares como el del caso de la Universidad de Bob Jones¹¹ y la legalización del aborto¹² como las causas primarias del movimiento evangélico. Hemos roto con la noción de un evangelismo alejado del foro político. Nos hemos distanciado de explicaciones singulares como la idea de un mero y ciego rechazo de la secularización. Por ello es importante estudiar este movimiento durante la Guerra Fría desde una perspectiva histórica. Es un movimiento que atraviesa toda la vida estadounidense desde el inicio de la Guerra Fría. Es importante, como hemos dicho, intentar considerar al evangelismo en su totalidad y no solamente como un fenómeno político conservador. El conservadurismo del movimiento es incuestionable, aun así es solo *un* aspecto de esta comunidad religiosa. Recordemos que los evangélicos buscan operar y dominar todas las facetas de la vida humana, imponer el llamado señorío de Cristo sobre todas las esferas de la existencia mortal.

De algún modo, hemos problematizado y cuestionado el concepto de identidad. El uso del concepto de identidad explorado por Bauman nos ha permitido sacar a la luz otros aspectos de este movimiento religioso estadounidense que anteriormente no habían sido considerados. Las cuestiones del léxico evangélico y los conceptos que utilizaban, generalmente hablando, no se abordan en la literatura académica. Todo el mundo sabe

¹⁰ Arendt, después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ve una transformación general en la manera de concebir la religión en relación con la amenaza del comunismo. En esta transformación, Arendt observa que se replantea el propósito y el fin del sistema religioso; el resultado es la ideologización de la religión. Véase *Between Past and Future*, 101-102; Arendt, "Religion and Politics," in *Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1994), 384.

¹¹ Balmer, *Thy Kingdom Come*, 14.

¹² Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 161.

perfectamente que el evangélico cree en Dios. ¿Pero cómo conciben a Dios? ¿Cómo hablan de él? ¿En qué roles se puso al Dios del evangélico? ¿Es este Dios meramente un dios nacional, un dios estadounidense? Estas son cuestiones más relevantes. Aquí también, en cuanto al léxico, hemos podido considerar el desarrollo devoto de una teología biológica, de un organicismo, un tema totalmente ignorado en relación a la cultura religiosa estadounidense y tan importante para entender la historia de Estados Unidos. En este sentido, hemos podido descubrir la prevalencia de la mercantilización de la religión. Viendo esta celebrada forma religiosa desde la perspectiva de la identidad y los problemas de la elaboración de ella en medio de un mundo dominado por la mercancía, podemos ofrecer una razón convincente respecto a este cambio brusco y profundo en la religión evangélica. Y sobre todo acercarnos a la comprensión de su inmenso crecimiento e importancia en la historia reciente.

Hemos visto también la importancia dominante del campo semántico de crisis, decadencia, descomposición, en el discurso del evangelismo de la Guerra Fría. La decadencia, al entender del evangélico después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, tocó todas las cosas. El evangélico del siglo XX identificaba la decadencia, la anunciaba. El triunfo de este giro conceptual no fue teológico. Es decir, no fue el resultado de pesimismo del premilenarismo, con sus expectativas de apocalipsis y destrucción inmanente del mundo. Los evangélicos entendían el poder emocional de estos conceptos, el miedo que inspiraban, y, al darse cuenta, los evangélicos empezaban a utilizar los conceptos con un celo aplastante. Pero no hemos considerado el concepto de la crisis en el evangelismo contemporáneo en aislamiento, donde deja de tener sentido, como si apareciera de la nada. En cambio, lo hemos visto como un elemento en un pensamiento ideológico que necesariamente operaba sobre el individuo, invadía la vida interior y, por supuesto, vulneraba la identidad.

Respecto a la cuestión de la decadencia, hemos llegado a tres conclusiones. Primero, hemos podido ver, que estos conceptos eran más herramientas políticas, maneras de influir a los demás, que una experiencia del mundo. Segundo, la simple mención de la crisis, el susurro de la decadencia, tenía el efecto de plantar una semilla, sembrar el miedo. Lo que queremos decir es que el evangélico mismo fue el que creaba la decadencia, promulgaba la noción de una crisis abrumadora. Tercero, el uso casi indiscriminado de estos conceptos, la aplicación de ellos a tantos aspectos de la vida, produjo un “blanqueo semántico,” como lo denomina la historia de los conceptos.¹³ Efectivamente, dejaban de tener significado. La

¹³ Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 56.

retórica del declive, de la decadencia, ha sido una de las contribuciones evangélicas más importantes a la política y a la historia estadounidenses en el siglo XX. Este léxico normalizó, para millones de personas, un estado perpetuo de expectación apocalíptica, tensión y supuesta crisis.

Hay que reconocer que, con respecto a esta teoría, hay problemas. El primero de ellos y, sin duda el más importante, tiene que ver con el concepto central de la teoría y de esta tesis, es decir, la identidad. Hemos elaborado esta tesis empezando con ciertas presunciones acerca del concepto de identidad. ¿Están el lenguaje y la acción relacionados con la identidad personal o la colectiva? ¿Y si están relacionados, hasta qué punto? ¿Cómo podemos describir este estado de interconexión? ¿Siempre se elabora, de algún modo, la identidad en relación con el otro? ¿Qué peso, qué significado, tiene este otro en el proceso de formación? ¿En suma, cómo calificamos y cuantificamos las partes constituyentes de la identidad y la geografía de su perpetuo devenir? ¿Hasta qué punto deberíamos entender la identidad así, como un proyecto continuo, como la concibe Bauman? ¿En el centro de nuestra tesis, qué valor tiene el concepto en sí? ¿Podría ser nada más que un constructo insignificante? ¿Quizá sea el equivalente secularizado de “alma?”

Otro aspecto lo podemos designar como el problema del rol histórico de la religión. Entre muchos académicos, no hay duda que en cuanto al fenómeno evangélico hemos entrado en una nueva fase de la religión. Utilizando los términos del campo histórico podemos reformular la tesis de Bauman diciendo que el nacimiento del fundamentalismo religioso en el siglo XX, en nuestro caso del evangelismo estadounidense, es el momento en el que la identidad colectiva subyuga, hace obsoleto y, en cierta medida, sustituye a la identidad personal. Lejos de ser una imposición, aparece como una solución, un objeto desesperadamente buscado. Pero la pregunta es, ¿Hasta qué punto deberíamos considerar esto como algo realmente nuevo en la historia? Aunque el enfoque principal de la religión ha sido a lo largo de la historia el mundo del más allá, la religión siempre ha ofrecido al adherente un código, una guía, direcciones de como actuar, de como vivir.

El abandono de la identidad personal y el intento de remplazarlo con la identidad colectiva, la decisión de no decidir, coincide además con una idea expansiva del movimiento evangélico, con un deseo de ocuparlo todo, con lo que hemos llamado un auténtico imperialismo, un intento de alcanzar una hegemonía. Pero para muchos, el intento de conseguir y efectuar una hegemonía es un aspecto perenne de la religión. Para muchos, la religión siempre va más allá de lo espiritual, es siempre una fuerza política. Para citar un

ejemplo, a los ojos del marxista italiano Antonio Gramsci, la religión es siempre una fuerza hegemónica, siempre un actor político, eternamente una forma de “praxis social total.”¹⁴ Quizá con el evangelismo debamos hablar en términos de continuación.

Otra limitación de esta tesis que deberíamos mencionar tiene que ver con los conceptos y el trato de ellos en esta obra. En el primer capítulo, tratamos varios conceptos y aspectos procedientes del léxico evangélico durante la Guerra Fría pero la investigación no fue ni una aplicación dogmática ni perfecta de la historia conceptual ni de su metodología. En cambio, la historia de los conceptos sirvió como punto de partida, como inspiración, hacia un estudio de una parte esencial pero ignorada de la historiografía sobre el evangelismo estadounidense del siglo XX. El análisis de los conceptos y el lenguaje como aspectos de la identidad, cuestiones relacionadas con ella, que hemos realizado aquí representa solo un inicio. Así como las aportaciones de los estudios de género tan importantes para examinar los discursos de poder y el deseo de llenarse de atributos que son considerados como masculinos de los discursos hegemónicos.

El evangelismo ha tenido una influencia indeleble en la sociedad, cultura y política de Estados Unidos. Hoy en día, la diversa y bien establecida comunidad evangélica ejerce una influencia igualmente importante e igualmente en extensión. Pese a la abundante bibliografía, todavía faltan muchos caminos por recorrer. Un área de investigación es la antes mencionada historia de los conceptos. No solo es un área de investigación un poco abandonada en Estados Unidos,¹⁵ sino que además nunca se ha utilizado para analizar un movimiento tan determinante en las culturas políticas estadounidenses como es el evangélico. Tampoco existe una obra académica sobre el evangelismo que enfatiza el lenguaje o los conceptos. Es un ámbito de la historiografía completamente abandonado.

Se puede expandir el tema del evangélico y su relación con el otro. De especial importancia es la relación evangélica hacia los judíos, el judaísmo y el estado moderno de Israel.

De igual manera, se puede profundizar y mejorar la investigación de la mercantilización y la forma tecnológica en el evangelismo. Respecto a la mercantilización de la religión, hace falta una investigación del evangelismo en Estados Unidos como un trabajo y como un producto de trabajo, es decir, desde la perspectiva laboral. Fácilmente se

¹⁴ John Fulton, “Religion and Politics in Gramsci: An Introduction,” *Sociological Analysis* 48, no. 3 (1987): 198-199, 202, accessed December 1, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3711518>.

puede registrar, analizar y catalogar la difusión de esta forma, esta predilección sobresaliente de concebir la fe como un objeto de consumo, fuera de nuestro marco histórico y fuera de nuestras fuentes primarias. Se puede sondear también la cuestión de qué queda de la religión, del evangelismo, después de este proceso.

En cuanto a la tecnología y su total dominio en el discurso de la iglesia evangélica, también se puede investigar qué queda precisamente del movimiento evangélico bajo esta forma tecnológica. En las miles de horas de programas de televisión emitidas por los adherentes y los líderes evangélicos década tras década, ¿Es la fe la que se transmite o se transmite la estructura tecnológica y su supremo dominio? Cualquier estudio futuro debe apartarse de la conceptualización severamente limitada de la unión entre la tecnología y el evangelismo que solo toma en cuenta un aparato tecnológico específico, e.g., la televisión. Existe ya una tradición filosófica, mucho más convincente, en contra de tal visión de la tecnología que debería ser incluida.¹⁶ ¿Cómo podemos ver el evangelismo como parte de un avance global de la técnica? ¿Cómo ayuda el evangélico en la propagación del mundo técnico? ¿Cómo preparan y condicionan al adepto para un mundo transformado por la técnica? ¿Cómo borra la técnica los últimos rastros de identidad? ¿Cómo podemos empezar a entender y delinear una religión “tecnizada?”¹⁷

La elección presidencial de 2016 ha reintroducido, brevemente, el asunto del evangelismo en el debate público de Estados Unidos. Solo brevemente porque otros asuntos dominaban el discurso, el debate y la propaganda política. ¿Qué papel tiene o sigue teniendo el evangelismo en la sociedad estadounidense? ¿Cómo votarán estos cristianos renacidos? ¿Qué queda del poder del movimiento? Estos son algunas preguntas que han surgido. Rumores del colapso del colectivo evangélico, la desaparición de la presencia y movimiento evangélicos, el desgaste de su poder, han circulado.¹⁸

La elección asombradora de Donald Trump en 2016 ha silenciado todos los rumores del declive del colectivo evangélico o de que había una fractura irreparable sobre la faz de la identidad evangélica. La inmensa mayoría de los evangélicos estadounidenses votaron por Trump, un hombre que, a lo largo de su vida, nunca se ha presentado como

¹⁵ Véase Burke, “Conceptual History in the United States: A Missing ‘National Project,’” 127; Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 5, 143-160; Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 5.

¹⁶ Véase Ellul, *The Technological Society*.

¹⁷ Donna Haraway

¹⁸ Lindsey Cook, “The Declining Influence of White Christian America, in Charts,” *US News & World Report*, July 19, 2016, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-19/the-declining-influence-of-white-christian-america-in-charts>.

especialmente devoto ni muy preocupado con Dios y la salvación. Según algunas cifras el apoyo evangélico al candidato alcanzó el ochenta por ciento.¹⁹

Al empezar su campaña electoral Trump claramente no era evangélico. En un mitin en la universidad evangélica Liberty University en abril de 2016, por ejemplo, citó mal la Biblia lo cual pone en evidencia su ignorancia de los textos sagrados del cristianismo.²⁰ Trump y su larga tradición de excentricidades públicas, sus vulgaridades, su pura devoción a la acumulación de capital, su desconocimiento de las Sagradas Escrituras, no les importaron a los evangélicos. Los evangélicos vieron en la figura de Trump, y Trump vio en ellos, la promesa de una futura relación de uso mutuo y de explotación. Trump fue y es, para el cristiano conservador, un vehículo al poder futuro.

Después de los esfuerzos de casi siete décadas, el rezo ferviente, una cantidad incalculable de conversiones, un sinfín de trabajo de evangelización, la fundación de periódicos, universidades, *think tanks* e iglesias, el movimiento evangélico contemporáneo se acerca a su conclusión lógica y logra su objetivo más deseado. Como ahora estamos empezando a entender, la campaña electoral de 2016 permitió a muchos elementos de la derecha política en Estados Unidos salir de la oscuridad. Aunque muchos de estos grupos se han beneficiado de los resultados de las elecciones, la victoria de Trump fue, por muchas razones, una victoria evangélica, un asunto que no podemos explorar con detalle aquí. Pero la razón más importante es que el fenómeno político de Trump y su llegada al poder registran el pleno triunfo de la cosmovisión evangélica. El evangelio de la desesperanza de los evangélicos, creado en la Guerra Fría, se ha extendido más allá de los muros de esta iglesia cristiana. En la segunda década del siglo XXI ha marcado las fronteras de los debates políticos, sociales y económicos en Estados Unidos. El lema de la campaña electoral “Make America Great Again” [literalmente, Hacer a Estados Unidos grande de nuevo] es una destilación del mensaje evangélico, un mensaje que a la vez recuerda a la grandeza enigmática de la república estadounidense, conjura la atmósfera podrida de decadencia en el presente y que promete una vuelta gloriosa a la esencia de Estados Unidos. En 2016, el mensaje de Trump, que coincide a la perfección con el mensaje ideológico del movimiento

¹⁹ Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “White Evangelicals Voted Overwhelmingly for Donald Trump, Exit Polls Show,” *The Washington Post*, November 9, 2016, accessed January 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/11/09/exit-polls-show-white-evangelicals-voted-overwhelmingly-for-donald-trump/?utm_term=.aab2340b1b93; Kate Shellnutt, “Trump Elected President, Thanks to 4 in 5 White Evangelicals,” *Christianity Today*, November 9, 2016, accessed January 15, 2016, <http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2016/november/trump-elected-president-thanks-to-4-in-5-white-evangelicals.html>.

²⁰ Jonathan Merritt, “Trump’s Bible Fail,” *The Atlantic*, April 15, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/trumps-bible-fail/478425/>.

evangélico de la Guerra Fría, ha sido atractivo incluso para muchos fuera de la tradición evangélica.

El 20 de enero de 2017, durante su discurso inaugural, la mano puesta sobre no una sino dos Biblias cristianas, Trump incorporó temas y conceptos importantes en el evangelismo estadounidense, ideas y términos que hemos tratado aquí. Habló, entre otras cosas, de “América primero,” del ejército, de las maravillas de la industria y la capacidad tecnológica de Estados Unidos, de Dios y del poder.²¹ “Cuando Estados Unidos está unido, es totalmente imparable,” dijo Trump contemplando el poder afamado de Estados Unidos.²² Estas nociones, estas invocaciones de Dios y estas ideas corresponden también a otros actores en la historia estadounidense. Pero durante el discurso Trump reconoció a su público evangélico, un conjunto religioso que ha tenido un papel clave en su inesperada llegada al poder. De suma importancia en esta tesis de historia sobre el evangelismo estadounidense en el periodo de la Guerra Fría es que Trump mismo inauguró un “nuevo milenio,” hizo nacer una edad nueva y bienaventurada: “Atestiguamos el nacimiento de un nuevo milenio listo para revelar los misterios del espacio, para liberar a la Tierra de las miserias de la enfermedad y aprovechar las energías, industrias y tecnologías del mañana.”²³ El nuevo milenio de Trump es una fuga del mundo de ayer, un escape del percibido y terrífico deshacer del mundo. Es una parte integrante de la dialéctica de la crisis y la decadencia que los evangélicos pasaron la mitad del siglo XX perfeccionando. Los evangélicos estadounidenses ni inventaron estos conceptos ni fueron los únicos que los utilizaban. ¿Pero en Estados Unidos de la Guerra Fría quién, aparte del evangélico, predicaba la decadencia y la descomposición con tanto celo, a tanta gente y durante tanto tiempo? ¿Quién, con la excepción del evangélico, había advertido a millones de hombres y mujeres estadounidenses de y preparado para las brisas venideras de la destrucción. El miedo de la difusión de la decadencia en Estados Unidos, la retórica de la decadencia, han sido la mayor contribución evangélica a la política estadounidense del siglo XX. Los adherentes del movimiento evangélico lo han hecho una faceta constante de los discursos sociales y políticos de Estados Unidos. Al alejarnos del principio del siglo XXI, Trump utilizó el trabajo preparatorio de los evangélicos y cooptó el mensaje evangélico de declive con un resultado impresionante y cautivador.

²¹ Donald Trump, “El Discurso Inaugural Completo de Donald Trump, Con Análisis Y Comentarios.” *The New York Times*, January 20, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/01/20/el-discurso-inaugural-completo-de-donald-trump-con-analisis-y-comentarios/>.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

Sea lo que sea el devenir del evangelismo estadounidense, ya firme e integralmente parte de un partido político y fuente de apoyo al líder de una nueva era de la política de Estados Unidos, si, bajo Trump, el evangelismo florece y reverdece o se marchita, debemos contemplar el evangelismo y el fundamentalismo cristiano desde la perspectiva global. La verdad es que ya nos despertamos a una religión que se ha expandido por el vasto mundo, a todos los países, a todos los rincones del planeta, a todas las poblaciones. El evangelismo ha sido “globalizado” y, por lo tanto, cualquier aseveración respecto al destino del evangelismo en Estados Unidos tiene que tomar en cuenta el nuevo y siempre reforzándose contexto global. Lo que empezó en Estados Unidos después de los horrores de la Segunda Guerra Mundial ya es un fenómeno universal. Y esto será otro de los temas que se deberán explorar desde una perspectiva histórica en futuras investigaciones.

Por último, no queremos caracterizar la cuestión de la identidad y su lenta elaboración como un problema exclusivamente para los evangélicos; es un dilema que afecta a todos. Estamos todos invitados a abandonar este deber, esta tarea. De la misma manera, el evangelismo no fue una anomalía, o sea el único sistema, intento, movimiento, que nace de este abismo, que propone salvarnos del desierto que nos rodea; al contrario, el evangelismo es uno de los diferentes modos a la venta, uno de un sinfín, siempre en crecimiento, de productos cautivadores que prometen soluciones totales y perfectamente aplicables para un mundo asediado por problemas.

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